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Abstract:	  This	  doctoral	  thesis	  develops	  a	  methodology	  to	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  anti	  money	  laundering	  and	  counter-­‐financing	  of	  terror	  efforts	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  by	  applying	  five	  “markers	  of	  success”	  (as	  determined	  by	  AML/CFT	  professionals)	  to	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  framework.	  The	  markers	  are	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework;	  AML	  
Legislation	  Enforcement;	  AML	  Legislation	  Awareness;	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  
Cooperation;	  and	  Transparency.	  The	  analysis	  chapters	  attempts	  to	  measure	  these	  criteria	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  sources,	  including	  UAE	  laws	  of	  2002	  and	  2004	  and	  their	  amendments	  and	  replacements	  of	  2014;	  various	  regulatory	  documents	  and	  policies	  enacted	  by	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  and	  other	  UAE	  bodies;	  expert	  opinion	  when	  available;	  and	  other	  materials	  from	  both	  official	  bodies	  and	  the	  country’s	  media.	  The	  findings	  show	  generally	  uneven	  progress	  and	  sometimes-­‐inconclusive	  results.	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  UAE,	  driven	  by	  external	  pressure	  coupled	  with	  internal	  self-­‐interest,	  established	  an	  AML/CFT	  regime.	  As	  part	  of	  its	  AML/CFT	  framework,	  the	  UAE	  also	  created	  an	  outreach	  program	  via	  official	  bodies,	  and	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  of	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  encouraging	  private	  sector	  compliance.	  However,	  measuring	  enforcement	  is	  problematic	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  hard	  and	  publicly	  available	  statistical	  data	  for	  much	  of	  this	  period.	  Efforts	  made	  to	  encourage	  a	  culture	  of	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  have	  run	  up	  against	  limited	  availability	  and	  accessibility	  of	  data.	  Accordingly,	  the	  UAE	  remains	  perceived	  as	  a	  largely	  non-­‐transparent	  jurisdiction	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  financial	  crimes.	  Recent	  (2016)	  legislative	  developments	  underscore	  the	  UAE’s	  effort	  to	  change	  this,	  as	  it	  is	  due	  for	  a	  new	  FATF	  evaluation	  in	  2019.	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Preface	  	  This	  doctoral	  thesis	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  analyze	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  (AML)	  and	  Counter-­‐Financing	  of	  Terrorism	  (CFT)	  legislation	  and	  policy-­‐implementation	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  using	  selected	  “markers	  of	  effectiveness,”	  derived	  from	  interviews	  and	  surveys	  with	  AML/CFT	  professionals.	  Herein,	  these	  markers	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  legislative	  regimen	  built	  around	  the	  following	  pieces	  of	  legislation:	  
• UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002	  (“Regarding	  Criminalization	  of	  Money	  Laundering”);	  	  
• UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (1)	  of	  2004	  (“On	  Combating	  Terrorism	  Offenses”);	  	  
• UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (7)	  of	  2014	  (On	  Combating	  Terrorism	  Crimes),	  which	  replaced	  the	  aforementioned	  Federal	  Law	  No	  1	  of	  2004;	  and	  	  
• Federal	  Law	  No.	  (9)	  of	  2014	  (“Regarding	  the	  Amendment	  of	  Some	  Provisions	  of	  the	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002	  Regarding	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering”).	  	  
They	  are	  also	  used	  to	  examine	  legislative	  awareness,	  private	  sector	  commitment	  and	  cooperation,	  and	  transparency	  about	  AML/CFT	  issues	  in	  the	  UAE.	  	  	  As	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  legislation	  discussed	  here	  ended	  in	  2014,	  that	  year	  may	  be	  broadly	  construed	  as	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  under	  study.	  However,	  some	  later	  developments	  (and	  sources)	  are	  mentioned	  in	  passing	  where	  relevant.	  	  Due	  to	  health	  conditions	  that	  affect	  mobility	  and	  create	  accessibility	  issues,	  I	  have	  had	  to	  rely	  in	  many	  cases	  on	  digital	  academic	  and	  media	  databases.	  In	  cases	  involving	  materials	  deemed	  to	  be	  not	  immediately	  or	  easily	  available	  in	  analog	  form	  (for	  example,	  in	  the	  collections	  of	  most	  good	  university	  libraries)	  the	  web	  link	  to	  a	  given	  source	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  bibliography.	  	  	  Please	  note	  that	  links	  listed	  herein	  were	  functioning	  at	  the	  time	  this	  doctoral	  thesis	  underwent	  final	  editing	  in	  January-­‐February	  2017.	  	  In	  footnotes	  and/or	  the	  bibliography,	  I	  have	  acknowledged	  my	  research	  assistants	  at	  the	  American	  University	  of	  Sharjah	  when	  they	  aided	  me	  with	  translation	  and	  transcription	  of	  Arabic	  sources	  (I	  am	  not	  an	  Arabic	  speaker/reader)	  or	  in	  processing	  some	  statistical	  
	  	  	  
11	  
data.	  Finally,	  as	  English	  is	  not	  my	  first	  language,	  my	  husband,	  a	  professor	  of	  mass	  communication	  at	  the	  American	  University	  of	  Sharjah,	  assisted	  with	  proofreading	  and	  stylistic	  suggestions	  meant	  to	  improve	  clarity	  and	  readability.	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1.	  Introduction	  	  In	  the	  new	  millennium,	  and	  especially	  after	  the	  terror	  attacks	  of	  11	  September	  2001,	  concern	  about	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  has	  evolved	  beyond	  national	  borders.	  Individual	  countries	  have	  been	  encouraged	  (sometimes	  pressured)	  to	  develop	  corresponding	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  measures,	  designed	  and	  dictated	  by	  intergovernmental	  bodies.	  Adopting	  standardized	  AML/CFT	  laws	  became	  a	  norm	  across	  the	  globe,	  to	  the	  point	  where	  (according	  to	  one	  author)	  “there	  are	  more	  developing	  countries	  with	  AML	  policies	  than	  developed	  ones.”1	  A	  few	  years	  into	  this	  trend,	  observers	  began	  to	  assess	  whether	  such	  measures	  have	  had	  any	  impact	  on	  money	  laundering	  worldwide.	  Questions	  like:	  “Are	  AML	  rules	  really	  effective?”	  have	  moved	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  academic	  research.2	  They	  are	  often	  accompanied	  by	  arguments	  that,	  while	  acknowledging	  the	  complexities	  of	  any	  assessment,	  fail	  to	  offer	  any	  definite	  answers.	  By	  2009,	  one	  study	  observed	  that	  international	  efforts	  to	  combat	  transnational	  crime	  and	  money	  laundering	  were	  merely	  entering	  the	  conceptual	  phase	  of	  “crime	  prevention,”	  a	  relatively	  new	  notion	  in	  criminology	  and	  policy-­‐making,	  while	  predominantly	  still	  based	  on	  reactive	  law	  enforcement	  models.3	  	  A	  signal	  that	  international	  bodies	  had	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  a	  newer	  approach	  came	  in	  2013.	  Then,	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (FATF)	  introduced	  its	  new	  methodology	  for	  the	  fourth	  round	  of	  member	  countries'	  mutual	  evaluations.	  It	  now	  includes	  not	  only	  technical	  compliance	  with	  the	  group’s	  Forty	  Recommendations	  on	  AML/CFT	  regimens,	  but	  also	  assessment	  of	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  corresponding	  laws	  and	  regulations	  for	  “producing	  the	  expected	  results.”4	  	  	  
UAE	  “Expected	  Results”	  This	  work	  addresses	  AML/CFT	  issues	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  which	  has	  its	  next	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Sharman,	  The	  Money	  Laundry,	  6.	  2	  Pieth,	  and	  Aiolfi,	  “Synthesis:	  Comparative	  International	  Standards	  and	  their	  Implementation,”	  415.	  3	  Walker	  and	  Unger,	  “Measuring	  Global	  Money	  Laundering:	  The	  Walker	  Gravity	  Model,”	  821.	  4	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (hereafter	  FATF),	  “Methodology	  for	  Assessing	  Technical	  Compliance	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations	  and	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  AML/CFT	  Systems,”	  5.	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FATF	  mutual	  evaluation	  scheduled	  for	  2019.5	  What	  the	  UAE	  believes	  the	  “expected	  results”	  should	  be	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  both	  past	  evaluations	  and	  current	  efforts.	  The	  latter	  are	  marked	  by,	  among	  other	  things:	  	  
• Enacting	  new	  AML	  legislation	  in	  2014;	  	  
• Working	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  suspicious	  transaction	  reports	  (STRs)	  filed	  –	  a	  criticism	  going	  back	  to	  evaluations	  as	  early	  as	  2008;	  	  
• Establishing	  in	  2016	  a	  new	  supervisory	  authority,	  the	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre	  (DESC).	  Though	  still	  in	  incipient	  form	  as	  of	  this	  writing,	  the	  DESC’s	  main	  responsibilities	  will	  reportedly	  include	  “combating	  corruption,	  fraud,	  crimes,	  bribery,	  embezzlement,	  destruction	  of	  public	  property,	  forgery,	  counterfeiting,	  money	  laundering,	  terrorism	  financing,	  illegal	  organisations	  or	  other	  crimes	  that	  may	  be	  committed	  by	  entities	  that	  are	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Centre;”6	  
• Positioning	  itself	  as	  a	  dedicated	  international	  player	  in	  combating	  economic	  crime,	  apparent	  in	  the	  country’s	  efforts	  to	  host	  multiple	  conferences,	  summits	  and	  training	  courses	  dedicated	  to	  this	  topic.	  	  	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  2013	  FATF	  evaluation	  methodology	  guidelines,	  one	  can	  reasonably	  ask	  if	  these	  remedies	  and	  initiatives	  were	  introduced	  to	  reduce	  money	  laundering	  crimes,	  or	  to	  demonstrate	  enough	  compliance	  with	  FATF	  recommendations	  to	  do	  well	  by	  its	  evaluation	  standards.	  In	  that	  light,	  this	  doctoral	  thesis	  will	  use	  certain	  “markers	  of	  effectiveness,”	  derived	  from	  interviews	  and	  surveys	  with	  AML/CFT	  professionals,	  to	  broadly	  assess	  the	  country’s	  corresponding	  regimen	  and	  approach.	  	  
Rationale	  for	  Studying	  the	  UAE	  The	  UAE,	  a	  small	  but	  wealthy	  Arab	  Gulf	  state	  formed	  in	  1971,	  is	  important	  to	  the	  study	  of	  AML/CFT	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  One	  is	  that	  it	  holds	  a	  unique	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  character	  in	  its	  region.	  As	  Hertog	  appropriately	  observes:	  “The	  UAE	  however	  is	  a	  regional	  outlier	  in	  terms	  of	  extremely	  high	  per	  capita	  rent,	  low	  levels	  of	  political	  mobilization	  and	  an	  atomized	  civil	  society.”7	  Among	  Middle	  Eastern	  states,	  it	  embraces	  indigenous	  Arab	  and	  Islamic	  traditions	  (including	  and	  recognizing	  the	  influences	  of	  Bedouin	  tribalism	  and	  Islamic	  Shariah	  law),	  while	  simultaneously	  welcoming	  and	  incorporating	  Western	  business	  and	  legal	  practices,	  and	  officially	  promoting	  modernity	  and	  tolerance.	  It	  also	  offers	  a	  rare	  regional	  example	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  stability.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  FATF,	  “Global	  Assessment	  Calendar,”	  July	  2015,	  5.	  6	  Uncredited	  in	  Khaleej	  Times,	  “New	  law	  to	  protect	  Dubai's	  economy	  from	  financial	  crime.”	  	  7	  Hertog,	  “The	  Role	  of	  MENA	  Business	  in	  Policy	  Making	  and	  Political	  Transitions,”	  11.	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The	  latter	  factor,	  economic	  stability,	  may	  speak	  to	  how	  the	  international	  business	  community	  has	  accepted	  the	  UAE	  as	  a	  cooperative	  member.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  oil	  has	  been	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  the	  country’s	  rapid	  growth.8	  The	  UAE’s	  stability	  and	  development	  can	  also	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  country’s	  leadership,	  which	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  bay’a,	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  recognition	  of	  authority,	  fostered	  by	  the	  rulers’	  benevolence	  to	  and	  respect	  for	  their	  subjects.	  Further,	  “by	  providing	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  population	  with	  a	  package	  of	  distributed	  wealth	  and	  a	  comprehensive	  welfare	  state,	  the	  rulers	  have	  been	  able	  to	  purchase	  political	  acquiescence	  and	  considerable	  popular	  support	  from	  both	  locals	  and	  expatriates.”	  9	  As	  Almezaini	  remarks:	  “Rentierism	  continues	  to	  enhance	  the	  authorities’	  legitimacy,”	  assuring	  political	  stability	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  latter	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  refusal	  of	  the	  country’s	  politically	  connected	  business	  elite	  to	  sign	  a	  petition	  put	  forward	  to	  the	  UAE	  government	  by	  over	  100	  Emirati	  intellectuals	  demanding	  more	  legislative	  power	  for	  the	  Federal	  National	  Council,	  a	  predominantly	  advisory	  body.10	  	  	  That	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  found	  itself	  in	  such	  a	  position	  also	  speaks	  to	  the	  country’s	  rapid	  economic	  growth,	  largely	  stimulated	  and	  reliant	  on	  direct	  foreign	  investments,	  making	  the	  country	  an	  especially	  important	  global	  economic	  player.11	  This,	  coupled	  with	  social	  modernization	  and	  experiments	  with	  low-­‐level	  democratization	  (such	  as	  elections	  to	  the	  Federal	  National	  Council,	  whose	  members	  had	  hitherto	  been	  appointed),	  helped	  move	  it	  away	  from	  reliance	  on	  tribal	  customs	  and	  into	  a	  role	  as	  the	  multinational	  financial	  and	  economic	  bridge	  between	  West	  and	  East.12	  	  	  But	  such	  rapid	  change,	  along	  with	  free	  trade	  laws	  and	  the	  deregulation	  of	  financial	  sectors,	  also	  enabled	  criminal	  organizations	  to	  start	  to	  exploit	  the	  system	  through	  illegal	  activities.13	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  2002	  it	  initiated	  comprehensive	  AML	  legislation	  in	  response	  to	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  concerns	  about	  the	  practice.	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  UAE	  (which	  had	  technically	  criminalized	  money	  laundering	  as	  early	  as	  1987)	  was	  responding	  to	  a	  larger	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Davidson,	  The	  United	  Arab	  Emirates:	  A	  Study	  in	  Survival,	  5;	  Muhammad,	  Islam,	  and	  Marashdeh,	  “Financial	  development	  and	  economic	  growth.”	  9	  Davidson,	  The	  United	  Arab	  Emirates:	  A	  Study	  in	  Survival,	  71-­‐72,	  104.	  10	  Almezaini,	  “Private	  Sector	  Actors	  in	  the	  UAE	  and	  Their	  Role	  in	  the	  Process	  of	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Reform,”	  45,	  64.	  11	  Muhammad,	  Islam,	  and	  Marashdeh,	  “Financial	  development	  and	  economic	  growth.”	  12	  Uncredited	  in	  Khaleej	  Times,	  “About	  the	  Federal	  National	  Council.”	  13	  Arlacchi,	  “Address	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime.”	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trend,	  as	  international	  pressures	  increasingly	  stimulated	  individual	  countries	  to	  enact	  legislation	  that	  more	  specifically	  targeted	  this	  type	  of	  economic	  crime.14	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  new	  law	  reflected	  a	  realization	  that	  the	  country’s	  geographic	  position	  and	  the	  transitional	  state	  of	  its	  financial	  system	  placed	  it	  in	  the	  high	  target	  zone	  for	  transnational	  criminal	  activities.15	  	  	  The	  UAE	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  geopolitics	  of	  the	  region.	  Flanked	  by	  regional	  powers	  Iran	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  the	  UAE’s	  foreign	  policy	  continuously	  reflects	  a	  diplomatic	  balance	  of	  regional	  influences	  and	  inevitable	  dependency	  on	  and	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  outside	  world.	  Despite	  the	  country’s	  pro-­‐Western	  drive,	  the	  UAE	  has	  remained	  openly	  critical	  of	  US	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  especially	  regarding	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  conflict.16	  It	  was	  also	  one	  of	  only	  three	  states	  to	  recognize	  the	  Taliban	  government	  in	  Afghanistan	  during	  1996–2001.17	  Its	  foreign	  policy	  is	  not,	  however,	  belligerent.	  “The	  UAE	  adopts	  a	  policy	  of	  promoting	  conciliation,	  cooperation	  and	  consensus,	  seeking,	  whenever	  possible,	  to	  defuse	  confrontation	  and	  conflict.”18	  The	  country’s	  national	  security	  largely	  depends	  on	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  weapons	  and	  the	  latter’s	  actual	  military	  presence	  in	  the	  country.19	  The	  latter	  also	  reflects	  the	  United	  States’	  interests	  in	  maintaining	  political	  stability	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	  While	  the	  UAE	  itself	  is	  of	  geopolitical	  interest	  in	  the	  study	  of	  AML/CFT,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  Islamic	  Finance.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  as	  “the	  UAE	  holds	  17.4	  percent	  of	  its	  total	  domestic	  banking	  sector	  assets	  in	  the	  Islamic	  banking	  system	  and	  accounts	  for	  nearly	  7.4%	  of	  the	  global	  Islamic	  banking	  assets.”20	  Overall	  there	  is	  a	  limited	  understanding	  of	  the	  specific	  money	  laundering/terror	  financing	  risks	  posted	  by	  Islamic	  Finance	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  comprehensive	  standards	  or	  best	  practices	  related	  to	  AML/CFT	  in	  the	  Islamic	  finance	  context.21	  Some	  in	  the	  West	  especially	  perceive	  Islamic	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  Savona	  and	  De	  Feo,	  “International	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  Laundering	  Trends	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  Policies,”	  54-­‐55.	  15	  Al-­‐Mulla,	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Money	  Laundering],	  307-­‐308,	  translated for the author by Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim.	  	  16	  Al-­‐Alkim,	  “The	  Foreign	  Policy	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates”	  19-­‐103,	  171-­‐206.	  17	  Katzman,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (UAE):	  Issues	  for	  US	  Policy,	  6.	  18	  Hellyer,	  “Evolution	  of	  UAE	  Foreign	  Policy,”	  161-­‐178.	  	  19	  Al-­‐Mashat,	  “Politics	  of	  Constructive	  Engagement:	  The	  Foreign	  Policy	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,”	  457-­‐480.	  20	  Islamic	  Financial	  Service	  Board,	  “Islamic	  Financial	  Services	  Industry	  Stability	  Report	  2015,”	  9.	  21	  Kyriakos-­‐Saad,	  Vasquez,	  El	  Khoury,	  and	  El	  Murr,	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  Finance	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  Laundering	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Finance	  products	  and	  services	  as	  vulnerable	  to	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorism	  financing.22	  	  	  Islamic	  Finance	  is	  sometimes	  confused	  with	  hawala.23	  As	  a	  contributor	  to	  the	  ACAMS	  Today	  website	  notes,	  “Security-­‐related	  concerns	  about	  Islamic	  finance	  are	  usually	  the	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  Shariah-­‐compliant	  financing.	  The	  best	  example	  is	  associating	  Islamic	  finance	  and	  hawala.”	  Hawala,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  some	  depth	  in	  later	  chapters,	  is	  an	  “informal	  remittance	  system”	  which	  goes	  by	  different	  names	  depending	  on	  the	  region	  involved.	  And	  as	  the	  same	  contributor’s	  article	  states,	  “Different	  features	  of	  hawala	  make	  it	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  ML/TF	  activities.	  However	  …	  
hawala	  is	  not	  an	  Islamic	  financial	  method.	  …	  Although	  hawala	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  ML/TF	  threat,	  it	  has	  no	  relation	  whatsoever	  with	  Islamic	  finance	  principles.”24	  	  	  Though	  this	  research	  focuses	  on	  UAE	  constitutional	  law,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that	  historically,	  the	  legal	  systems	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  Islamic	  Law,25Shariah26	  (ةﺓعﻉيﻱرﺭشﺵ	  ),	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  its	  application	  to	  their	  national	  legislations.27	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Qur’an28	  [also	  rendered	  by	  variant	  spellings,	  such	  as	  Koran]	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  Islamic	  Law,	  Shariah’s	  other	  sources	  include	  Sunnah,	  which	  refers	  to	  exemplary	  conduct	  of	  the	  Prophet,	  “the	  opinions	  and	  practice	  (athar	  and	  
amal)	  of	  Companions,”	  Qiyas	  or	  Quias	  (“analogical	  deduction”),	  and	  Ijma,	  which	  serves	  as	  “a	  check	  against	  the	  fallibility	  of	  Quias.”29	  Some	  purport	  that	  Islamic	  Law	  is	  primarily	  a	  manifestation	  of	  moral	  law	  or	  “God’s	  will.”30	  According	  to	  Schacht,	  the	  Qur’an	  merely	  applied	  religious	  and	  ethical	  principles	  to	  the	  existing	  legal	  norms	  and	  “only	  occasionally	  completed	  and	  modified”	  them	  based	  on	  religious	  and	  ethical	  grounds.”	  As	  he	  stated,	  “Koranic	  ‘legislation’	  ...	  stood	  outside	  the	  existing	  legal	  system	  on	  which	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Silva,	  “Islamic	  Banking	  Remarks,”	  206-­‐207.	  23	  Ilias,	  “Islamic	  Finance:	  Overview	  and	  Policy	  Concerns,”	  9;	  and	  Razavy,	  “Hawala:	  An	  underground	  haven	  for	  terrorists	  or	  social	  phenomenon?”	  278,	  281.	  	  24	  El	  Banna,	  “Islamic	  Finance,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Terrorist	  Financing.”	  For	  broad	  discussions	  of	  Islamic	  Finance,	  see	  Kammer	  et	  al,	  “Islamic	  Finance:	  Opportunities,	  Challenges,	  and	  Policy	  Options”;	  and	  Alam,	  “Islamic	  Finance	  An	  Alternative	  to	  the	  Conventional	  Financial	  System?”	  25	  “Islamic	  Law	  covers	  the	  entire	  system	  of	  law	  and	  jurisprudence	  associated	  with	  the	  religion	  of	  Islam”	  (Badar,	  “Islamic	  law	  (Shari’a)	  and	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  international	  criminal	  court,”	  414.	  26	  Shariah,	  or	  Islamic	  law,	  will	  appear	  across	  sources	  quoted	  herein	  in	  varied	  spellings:	  Sharia,	  Shari’a,	  Sharia’a.	  27	  Hamoudi,	  “Death	  of	  Islamic	  Law,”	  294-­‐300.	  28	  “The	  Qur’an	  is	  known	  to	  be	  the	  words	  of	  God	  and	  was	  revealed	  to	  the	  Prophet	  of	  Islam	  over	  a	  23	  year	  period.	  The	  Qur’an	  literally	  means	  recitation	  and	  reading.	  The	  Qur’an	  was	  revealed	  to	  the	  Prophet	  in	  fragments	  due	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  time.	  The	  earliest	  revelations	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  were	  not	  written	  down	  immediately	  because	  there	  were	  then	  very	  few	  adherents	  and	  disciples	  of	  Islam.	  However,	  this	  changed	  very	  soon	  through	  the	  development	  of	  Islam	  and	  an	  appropriate	  copy	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  was	  collected	  later	  and	  saved.	  The	  Qur’an	  was	  adjusted	  to	  the	  standard	  pronunciation	  prevailing	  in	  Mecca”	  (Malekian,	  Principles	  of	  Islamic	  International	  Criminal	  Law,	  66).	  29	  Ḥasan,	  “The	  Sources	  of	  Islamic	  Law,”	  177,	  179,	  180.	  30	  Hasan,	  “The	  Sources	  of	  Islamic	  Law,”	  165.	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imposed	  moral	  and	  …	  legal	  rules.”31	  The	  first	  attempts	  of	  Islamic	  law	  codification	  took	  place	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  during	  the	  era	  of	  Islamic	  legal	  modernism.32	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  mere	  principle	  of	  codification	  goes	  against	  Islamic	  doctrine.	  Schacht	  holds	  “traditional	  Islamic	  law”	  to	  be	  "a	  doctrine	  and	  a	  method"	  which	  any	  attempt	  to	  make	  more	  uniform	  or	  modernize	  will	  distort.33	  In	  the	  process	  of	  transitioning	  Shariah	  into	  statutory	  law,	  “divergence	  from	  traditional	  Shari'a	  rules	  was	  an	  inherent	  part	  of	  the	  codification	  process,”	  making	  “shari'a,	  in	  large	  part,	  less	  relevant	  than	  it	  has	  been.”34	  Consequently,	  some	  Muslim	  countries	  abolished	  Shariah	  in	  the	  criminal	  law	  and	  adopted	  Western	  codes.35	  The	  most	  recent	  attempt	  to	  insert	  Islamic	  law	  into	  the	  modern	  UAE	  legal	  system	  was	  the	  “Islamisation	  Programme”	  of	  1978	  –	  an	  attempt	  to	  codify	  and	  embed	  detailed	  Shariah	  criminal	  legal	  rules	  in	  the	  Draft	  Penal	  Code.	  The	  effort	  resulted	  in	  a	  conflict	  between	  Shariah	  doctrine	  and	  Penal	  Code;	  and	  was	  halted	  in	  due	  course.36	  	  Today	  each	  of	  the	  seven	  Emirates,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Civil	  Code,	  maintains	  a	  parallel	  system	  of	  Shariah	  courts,	  which	  adjudicate	  criminal	  and	  family	  law	  matters	  among	  Muslims	  and	  are	  supervised	  locally.	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  UAE	  Constitution	  provides	  for	  the	  position	  of	  Shariah	  within	  the	  state	  legal	  system.	  Some	  point	  out	  that	  the	  inherent	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  latter	  led	  to	  the	  division	  among	  the	  country’s	  jurists	  into	  Islamists	  and	  Liberals,	  based	  on	  their	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  article.	  The	  former	  read	  it	  as	  a	  declaration	  of	  Shariah	  above	  all	  other	  sources	  of	  law.	  As	  for	  the	  Liberals,	  who	  put	  
Shariah	  on	  an	  equal	  ground	  with	  other	  legal	  sources,	  “any	  law	  which	  conflicts	  with	  the	  
Shari’a	  should	  still	  be	  considered	  constitutional.”37	  By	  “considering	  Shariah	  as	  religious	  rules	  with	  no	  legal	  force	  unless	  codified	  by	  the	  legislature,”	  Article	  7	  “goes	  against	  the	  tenet	  that	  Shari'a	  is	  a	  divinely	  ordained	  system	  of	  law	  in	  which	  the	  human	  legislature	  has	  no	  right	  to	  intervene	  except	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  formulating	  administrative	  regulations	  for	  its	  application.”	  Hence	  it	  establishes	  a	  dual	  allegiance	  of	  Muslim	  Middle	  Eastern	  people.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  still	  evident	  and	  prevailing	  today,	  and	  can	  be	  partly	  attributed	  to	  the	  sources	  of	  law	  in	  the	  Arab	  jurisprudence,	  where	  the	  meaning	  of	  “formal	  or	  official	  sources”	  of	  law	  is	  synonymous	  with	  the	  term	  used	  in	  English	  legal	  vocabulary,	  while	  the	  “material	  or	  subjective”	  sources	  encompass	  different	  connotation.	  The	  formal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Schacht,	  “Problems	  of	  Modern	  Islamic	  Legislation,”	  106-­‐107.	  32	  Hamoudi,	  “Death	  of	  Islamic	  Law,”	  305-­‐311.	  	  33	  Schacht,	  “Problems	  of	  Modern	  Islamic	  Legislation,	  108,	  112-­‐113.	  34	  Hamoudi,	  “Death	  of	  Islamic	  Law,”	  307,	  310.	  35	  Badar,	  “Islamic	  law	  (Shari’a)	  and	  the	  Jurisdiction	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,”	  414.	  36	  Al-­‐Muhairi,	  “The	  Islamisation	  of	  Laws	  in	  the	  UAE:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code,”	  350-­‐371.	  37	  Al-­‐Muhairi,	  “The	  Position	  of	  Shari'a	  Within	  the	  UAE	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court's	  Application	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Clause	  Concerning	  Shari'a,”	  219,	  226-­‐230.	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sources	  of	  UAE	  law	  are	  “the	  written	  provisions	  of	  the	  law”	  and	  “Islamic	  Shari'a,	  followed	  by	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Imam	  Malik	  and	  Imam	  Ahmad	  bin	  Hanbal	  schools,	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Imam	  al-­‐Shafi'i	  and	  Imam	  Abu	  Hanifa	  schools	  and	  finally	  custom.”	  As	  for	  the	  material	  sources,	  “judicial	  precedent	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  are	  not	  considered	  binding,	  but	  rather	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  local	  customs	  and	  traditions,	  which	  are	  traced	  back	  to	  “the	  tribal	  customary	  law,	  combined	  with	  the	  application	  of	  Shari’a.”38	  The	  experts	  who	  headed	  the	  modernization	  of	  the	  UAE	  legal	  and	  judicial	  system,	  were	  unfamiliar	  with	  its	  indigenous	  traditions.	  Hence,	  from	  the	  start,	  the	  local	  governments	  and	  citizens	  questioned	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  system.39	  The	  new	  written	  legislation	  marked	  the	  movement	  toward	  secularization	  of	  the	  legal	  system,	  commemorated	  by	  establishment	  of	  the	  civil	  courts.	  Secular	  criminal	  code	  based	  on	  Western	  law	  superseded	  Shariah,	  restricting	  the	  latter	  only	  to	  personal	  affairs.	  In	  two	  articles	  published	  in	  1996,	  Al-­‐Muhairi	  traces	  the	  evolution	  of	  UAE	  secular	  law,	  noting	  that	  
Shariah	  has	  been	  assigned	  different	  levels	  and	  spheres	  of	  influence	  over	  time.	  As	  a	  result,	  currently	  in	  the	  UAE	  Shariah	  is	  applied	  only	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  criminal	  matters	  and	  does	  not	  cover	  commercial	  matters.40	  The	  UAE	  Federal	  Penal	  Code	  of	  1987	  considers	  Islamic	  criminal	  law	  in	  its	  traditional	  form	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  rules	  governing	  the	  offences	  of	  Hudud,41	  Qisas	  or	  Quesas	  (crimes	  against	  the	  person)	  and	  Diyah	  or	  
Diyya.42	  Financial	  crimes	  fall	  under	  Ta’zir,	  the	  third	  category	  of	  crimes	  under	  the	  
Shariah.	  The	  exact	  scope	  of	  Ta’zir	  is	  not	  specified	  in	  Qur’an	  and	  Sunnah,	  leaving	  it	  to	  the	  state	  to	  determine	  what	  amounts	  to	  Ta’zir.43	  	  	  Any	  form	  of	  financial	  crime	  is	  forbidden	  in	  Islam.44	  Some	  contend	  that	  money	  laundering	  is	  prohibited	  in	  Shariah	  with	  an	  even	  wider	  scale	  of	  injunction	  than	  in	  secular	  laws.	  Possession	  and	  use	  of	  wealth	  that	  endangers	  the	  interests	  of	  society	  or	  disturbs	  public	  order	  is	  condemned	  and	  prohibited.45	  In	  Islamic	  criminal	  law	  any	  activity	  funded	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Al-­‐Muhairi,	  The	  Position	  of	  Shari'a	  Within	  the	  UAE	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court's	  Application	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Clause	  Concerning	  Shari'a,”	  223-­‐225;	  and	  Al-­‐Muhairi,	  “The	  Development	  of	  the	  UAE	  legal	  system	  and	  unification	  with	  the	  Judicial	  System.”	  127.	  39	  Al-­‐Muhairi,	  “The	  development	  of	  the	  UAE	  Legal	  System	  and	  Unification	  with	  the	  Judicial	  System,”	  128-­‐138.	  40	  Al-­‐Muhairi,	  “The	  Position	  of	  Shari'a	  Within	  the	  UAE	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court's	  Application	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Clause	  Concerning	  Shari'a.”	  244.	  	  41	  Hudud	  crimes	  include	  ridda	  (apostasy);	  baghi	  (transgression);	  sariqa	  (theft);	  haraba	  (highway	  robbery);	  zena	  (illicit	  sexual	  relationship);	  qadhf	  (slander);	  and	  shorb	  al-­‐khamr	  (drinking	  alcohol).	  in	  Bassiouni,	  “Crimes	  and	  the	  Criminal	  Process,”	  269.	  42	  There	  are	  two	  categories	  of	  Qisas	  and	  Diyah	  crimes:	  homicide	  and	  battery	  (Bassiouni,	  Quesas	  Crimes,	  203-­‐209.	  43	  Jabbar,	  "Financial	  Crimes,”	  288.	  	  44	  Jabbar,	  “Financial	  Crimes,”	  288.	  45	  Ahmad,	  Islam,	  Poverty	  and	  Income	  Distribution,	  30-­‐31,	  33.	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illegally	  sourced	  money	  is	  forbidden.46	  Money	  or	  property	  derived	  from	  criminal	  activities	  as	  well	  as	  illicit	  gains	  associated	  with	  them	  are	  considered	  haram	  (مﻡاﺍَﺮَﺣ	  )	  meaning	  forbidden	  in	  Islam.	  The	  distinction	  between	  halal	  ()لﻝاﺍلﻝحﺡ,	  or	  permissible,	  and	  
haram	  requires	  that	  the	  source,	  usage	  and	  process	  of	  wealth	  acquisition	  must	  be	  lawful	  and	  morally	  right.47	  “Dealings	  in	  wealth	  that	  are	  haram	  are	  strictly	  prohibited”	  in	  Islam,48	  where	  even	  sadaqah	  (ةﺓقﻕدﺩصﺹ	  ),	  charity,	  and	  zakat	  (ةﺓاﺍكﻙزﺯ	  ),	  alms	  tax,	  stemming	  from	  illicit	  wealth	  are	  not	  acceptable.49	  Though	  administrative	  sanctions	  can	  be	  imposed	  on	  organizations	  in	  cases	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  and	  connection	  with	  money	  laundering,	  Islamic	  Law	  does	  not	  recognize	  corporate	  liability	  for	  any	  criminal	  offences,	  since	  institutions	  lack	  discretion	  and	  freedom	  of	  choice,	  which	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  accountability.50	  Under	  Islamic	  law,	  only	  individuals	  can	  be	  criminally	  liable,	  even	  if	  offences	  committed	  by	  them	  were	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  institutions.51	  	  	  Islamic	  international	  law,	  as	  with	  Islamic	  law	  at	  large,	  does	  not	  divide	  legal	  from	  moral	  values.	  Hence	  according	  to	  Malekian,	  the	  international	  moral	  standard	  signifies	  “the	  degree	  and	  level	  of	  mutual	  and	  multilateral	  cooperation	  between	  nations	  for	  the	  solving	  of	  international	  issues	  and	  conflicts.”52	  Financial	  institutions	  rendering	  services,	  either	  in	  countries	  with	  Shariah	  courts	  or	  in	  jurisdictions	  governed	  only	  by	  civil	  law,	  are	  not	  authorized	  to	  act	  against	  a	  country's	  constitutional	  law.	  They	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  regulations	  and	  supervision	  as	  are	  conventional	  financial	  entities.53	  While	  this	  thesis	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  Federal	  Laws,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  Islamic	  Law	  on	  formation	  of	  the	  modern	  civil	  judiciary	  system	  in	  the	  country.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  there	  are	  no	  contradictions	  or	  ambiguities	  in	  both	  Shariah	  and	  UAE	  constitutional	  law	  positions	  on	  financial	  crime,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  corporate	  liability	  mentioned	  above.	  	  	  As	  already	  established,	  hawala,	  not	  being	  an	  instrument	  of	  Islamic	  finance,	  but	  rather	  an	  Alternative	  Remittance	  System	  (ARS)	  used	  around	  the	  world,	  attracted	  regulators’	  attention	  in	  the	  post	  9/11	  era.	  Hawala	  and	  ARSs	  at	  large	  were	  identified	  as	  both	  the	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  Al	  Agha,	  “Money	  Laundering	  from	  Islamic	  Perspective,”	  406-­‐411.	  47	  Qureshi,	  The	  Economic	  and	  Social	  System	  of	  Islam,	  60;	  Ḥasan,	  “The	  Sources	  of	  Islamic	  Law,”	  165-­‐167.	  48	  Jabbar,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Laws	  and	  Principles	  of	  Shari'ah,”	  199.	  49	  Doi,	  Shari’ah:	  The	  Islamic	  Law,	  352.	  50	  Jabbar,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Laws	  and	  Principles	  of	  Shari'ah,”	  201-­‐202.	  51	  Shaheed,	  Criminal	  Law	  of	  Islam,	  II:94,	  95,	  131.	  	  52	  Malekian,	  Principles	  of	  Islamic	  International	  Criminal	  Law,	  24.	  53	  Cutler,	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primary	  money	  and	  value	  movement	  method	  in	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  a	  vehicle	  for	  moving	  proceeds	  of	  crime.54	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  uniformity	  in	  addressing	  and	  regulating	  hawala	  and	  other	  such	  remittance	  systems.	  While	  some	  jurisdictions	  criminalize	  all	  forms	  of	  informal	  remittance,	  others	  impose	  regulations	  of	  varying	  degrees	  or	  do	  not	  regulate	  them	  at	  all.	  This	  diversity	  “forces	  informal	  operators	  into	  the	  underground	  even	  in	  countries	  where	  they	  can	  operate	  above	  board	  (for	  example,	  how	  openly	  could	  a	  Bangladeshi	  hawala	  operator	  engage	  in	  business	  in	  the	  UAE,	  where	  hawala	  is	  legal	  and	  regulated,	  if	  his	  activities	  are	  illegal	  at	  his	  home	  country	  which	  he	  visits	  and	  invests	  in?)”55	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  efforts	  to	  regulate	  hawala	  are	  questioned	  in	  light	  of	  the	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  FATF	  recommendations	  on	  ARSs.	  The	  recommendations	  seek	  to	  influence	  national	  policies	  in	  this	  field,	  while	  ignoring	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  formal	  financial	  sector	  regulations	  on	  the	  informal	  sector,	  and	  also	  dismissing	  “important	  cultural,	  social	  and	  religious	  factors.”	  The	  UAE	  is	  not	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  problem.	  It	  and	  other	  countries	  have	  faced	  challenges	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  regulate	  hawala	  largely	  for	  analogous	  reasons.	  The	  mandated	  instruments,	  such	  as	  Suspicious	  Transaction	  Reports	  (STR)	  and	  Customer	  Due	  Diligence	  (CDD),	  are	  “ill-­‐suited	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  working	  modalities	  of	  an	  informal	  value	  transfer	  system.”	  Therefore	  they	  yield	  no	  results.56	  Registered	  
hawaladars	  have	  no	  incentives	  to	  file	  STRs,	  as	  their	  services	  rely	  on	  mutual	  trust	  to	  rule	  out	  any	  suspicions.	  The	  Banking	  Supervision	  and	  Examination	  Department	  (BSED)	  in	  the	  UAE	  notes:	  “the	  absence	  of	  any	  STRs	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  hawaladars’	  customers	  are	  typically	  people	  who	  are	  known	  personally	  to	  them	  through	  family	  or	  business	  contacts.”57	  What	  is	  more,	  trust	  is	  among	  “the	  primary	  features	  of	  hawala	  networks	  that	  distinguish	  it	  from	  other	  remittance	  systems.”58	  One	  study	  held	  that	  hawaladars	  tend	  to	  operate	  on	  a	  see-­‐,	  hear-­‐,	  and	  speak-­‐no-­‐evil	  principle,	  even	  when	  there	  may	  be	  cause	  for	  suspicion	  with	  a	  transaction.59	  	  
 Another	  impediment	  for	  regulating	  hawala	  is	  the	  high	  threshold	  for	  licensing.	  Many	  
hawala	  operators	  lack	  sufficient	  “financial	  resources	  required	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  open.”	  Hence	  they	  will	  continue	  operating	  in	  the	  shadow,	  providing	  a	  cheaper	  banking	  service	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  1-­‐21.	  55	  Passas,	  “Setting	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that	  is	  often	  the	  only	  one	  their	  clients	  can	  access.60	  Though	  hawaladar	  licensing	  is	  free	  in	  the	  UAE,	  the	  majority	  of	  hawala	  operators	  prefer	  to	  remain	  unregistered	  to	  avoid	  regulation	  and	  to	  protect	  their	  counterparts	  operating	  in	  jurisdictions	  where	  hawala	  is	  illegal.	  A	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  UAE	  population	  is	  comprised	  of	  temporary	  migrant	  workers,	  who	  rely	  on	  hawala	  to	  send	  money	  back	  home	  as	  a	  remittance.	  According	  to	  the	  UN,	  the	  UAE	  was	  second	  only	  to	  the	  USA	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  migrant	  worker	  numbers,	  gaining	  seven	  million	  during	  1990-­‐2013.61	  A	  large	  fraction	  of	  them	  come	  from	  countries	  with	  poor	  or	  non-­‐existent	  financial	  infrastructures,	  and	  thus	  turned	  to	  hawala.	  The	  UAE’s	  regulation	  of	  hawala,	  arguably	  far	  from	  comprehensive,	  was	  enacted	  due	  to	  international	  pressure	  over	  terror-­‐financing	  fears,	  and	  such	  controls	  were	  considered	  essential	  for	  the	  country’s	  AML/CFT	  efforts.62	  Hawala	  is	  discussed	  in	  greater	  details	  in	  Chapter	  3	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
 Such	  concerns	  about	  the	  funding	  of	  terrorism	  –	  or	  least	  about	  calming	  Western	  fears	  about	  its	  financial	  support	  via	  the	  UAE’s	  financial	  industry	  –	  were	  of	  course	  also	  present	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  2002	  AML	  law.	  And	  while	  laws	  criminalizing	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  were	  already	  in	  existence	  in	  the	  UAE,	  the	  country	  introduced	  a	  comprehensive	  legislative	  CFT	  effort	  two	  years	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  2002	  AML	  law.	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (1)	  of	  2004	  (On	  Combating	  Terrorism	  Offenses)	  also	  included	  an	  item,	  Article	  13,	  which	  spelled	  out	  specific	  prohibitions	  and	  penalties	  for	  money	  laundering	  used	  in	  such	  context.	  	  	  Concerns	  about	  AML/CFT	  carried	  over	  into	  further	  legislation	  that	  year,	  when	  the	  UAE	  passed	  a	  law,	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  2004,	  establishing	  “Financial	  Free	  Zones,”	  some	  of	  which	  were	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  operate	  their	  own	  civil	  and	  commercial	  court	  systems.	  The	  best	  known	  of	  these	  is	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Center	  (DIFC),	  which	  “operates	  under	  a	  separate	  legal	  regime	  from	  the	  UAE	  as	  a	  whole,	  although	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  are	  applicable	  within	  the	  DIFC.”63	  The	  DIFC’s	  AML	  regime	  is	  consistent	  with	  international	  standards	  set	  by	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force;	  Article	  3.1	  of	  the	  Financial	  Free	  Zones	  law	  made	  all	  such	  zones	  subject	  to	  the	  2002	  AML	  law,	  with	  member	  firms	  required	  to	  file	  STRs	  with	  both	  the	  AMLSCU	  and	  the	  zone’s	  own	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Wang,	  “Regulating	  Hawala,”	  221.	  61	  United	  Nations	  publication,	  “Number	  of	  International	  Migrants	  Worldwide	  Reaches	  232	  Million,”	  2.	  62	  Trautsolt	  and	  Johnsøn,	  “International	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulation	  of	  Alternative	  Remittance	  Systems.”	  	  63	  Reus,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering:	  A	  Guide	  For	  UAE	  Companies.”	  
	  	  	  
22	  
regulatory	  body:	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  DIFC,	  the	  regulatory	  body	  is	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Service	  Authority	  (DFSA).64	  The	  DFSA	  has	  special	  courts	  to	  handle	  civil	  and	  commercial	  cases	  there;65	  however,	  UAE	  authorities	  handle	  criminal	  cases.66	  	  Though	  this	  research’s	  timeframe	  is	  mainly	  from	  2002	  to	  2014,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  the	  2016	  emergence	  of	  the	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre.	  It	  was	  created	  through	  passage	  of	  Dubai’s	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2016,	  issued	  on	  18	  April	  of	  that	  year.	  According	  to	  a	  description	  given	  by	  a	  local	  law	  firm	  the	  Centre’s	  mission	  is	  “to	  assess	  and	  raise	  awareness	  of	  risks	  and	  to	  introduce	  new	  measures	  to	  protect	  the	  financial	  stability	  and	  investments	  in	  Dubai	  from	  crimes	  that	  may	  harm	  the	  economy.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Law	  is	  intended	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  recognition	  and	  reduction	  of	  financial	  risks	  and	  the	  combat	  against	  financial	  crimes	  in	  Dubai,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  investors	  with	  an	  attractive	  economic	  environment.”67	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  body	  has	  wide	  powers	  of	  jurisdiction	  in	  Dubai,	  including	  charities	  and	  even	  the	  DIFC.68	  	  The	  new	  legal	  requirements	  and	  tighter	  controls	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  changing	  corporate	  attitude.	  Ninety-­‐two	  percent	  of	  AML	  and	  compliance	  professionals	  from	  the	  MENA	  region	  consider	  money-­‐laundering	  exposure	  a	  high	  risk	  to	  their	  business.69	  According	  to	  a	  2015	  joint	  Thompson	  Reuters	  and	  Deloitte	  report,	  AML	  remains	  the	  most	  important	  priority	  for	  compliance	  officers	  in	  the	  MENA	  region.	  The	  majority	  (82.50	  percent)	  of	  surveyed	  practitioners	  identified	  that	  their	  organizations	  implemented	  AML	  policies.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  almost	  50	  percent	  doubted	  whether	  these	  policies	  could	  actually	  identify	  illicit	  activities.70	  This	  finding	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  this	  research,	  as	  it	  concerns	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  AML/CFT	  efforts.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  DIFC	  Non	  Financial	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering/Anti	  Terrorism	  Financing	  (AML/CFT)	  Regulations,	  5	  and	  passim.	  65	  Everington,	  “Dubai	  investigates	  Deutsche	  Bank	  over	  Anti-­‐Money-­‐Laundering	  Practices.”	  66	  DFSA,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering,	  Counter-­‐Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Sanctions	  Compliance”;	  and	  author’s	  interview	  with	  attorney	  Dr.	  Al-­‐Mulla,	  27	  April,	  2015,	  transcribed	  and	  translated	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah.	  Note	  that	  the	  author’s	  interview	  sources	  included	  two	  men	  with	  identical	  names	  and	  courtesy	  titles:	  Each	  was	  Dr.	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla.	  One	  is	  a	  practicing	  Dubai	  attorney;	  the	  other,	  a	  Dubai	  police	  official	  and	  author	  of	  a	  work	  on	  AML	  efforts	  in	  the	  UAE.	  To	  differentiate	  between	  them,	  the	  researcher	  has	  described	  them	  in	  the	  text	  as	  attorney	  or	  author	  as	  appropriate.	  67	  Lassoued	  and	  Eissa,	  “An	  Insight	  into	  the	  Newly-­‐Formed	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre.”	  68	  Townshend,	  “Dubai	  Sets	  Up	  Body	  to	  Fight	  Fraud,	  Money	  Laundering.”	  69	  KPMG,	  “Global	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Survey	  2014,”	  9.	  70	  Deloitte	  and	  Thompson	  Reuters,	  “Financial	  Crime	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  2015:	  The	  Need	  for	  Forward	  Planning,”	  6.	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The	  UAE	  Legal	  System:	  An	  Overview	  Understanding	  how	  UAE	  authorities	  handle	  these	  cases	  requires	  some	  background	  as	  to	  how	  the	  UAE’s	  court	  structure	  works.	  (Note	  that	  military	  courts	  are	  not	  discussed	  herein.)	  While	  the	  UAE,	  formed	  in	  1971,	  is	  a	  federation,	  only	  five	  of	  the	  seven	  emirates	  –	  Abu	  Dhabi,	  Ajman,	  Fujairah,	  Sharjah,	  and	  Umm	  Al	  Quwain	  –	  are	  part	  of	  the	  federal	  court	  system,	  overseen	  by	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court	  located	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  five	  emirates,	  there	  is	  a	  three-­‐tiered	  set	  of	  federally	  run	  courts:	  A	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance,	  a	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  and	  a	  Court	  of	  Cassation.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  remaining	  two	  emirates,	  Dubai	  and	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah,	  their	  courts	  function	  independently	  of	  the	  UAE	  Federal	  Court	  System.	  Therefore	  they	  do	  not	  ultimately	  answer	  to	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  based	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court,	  and	  “all	  matters	  within	  these	  Emirates	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  local	  Courts.”71	  However,	  their	  court	  systems	  (first	  instance,	  appeals,	  and	  cassation	  in	  Dubai;	  first	  instance	  and	  appeals	  in	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah)	  enforce	  the	  AML/CFT	  federal	  laws.	  	  That	  said,	  any	  proceedings	  involving	  national	  security	  are	  sent	  directly	  to	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi.	  This	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  case	  if	  a	  charge	  involved	  economic	  crimes	  related	  to	  terrorism.	  Otherwise,	  the	  prosecutor	  and	  court	  of	  a	  given	  emirate	  is	  responsible	  for	  adjudicating	  economic	  crimes	  allegedly	  committed	  within	  its	  boundaries.72	  This	  is	  the	  rule	  even	  though	  all	  UAE	  banks	  answer	  to	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi.73	  The	  individual	  emirates’	  prosecutors	  offices	  and	  police	  departments	  have	  special	  units	  designated	  to	  handle	  complaints	  and	  accusations	  regarding	  money	  laundering.	  The	  Dubai	  public	  prosecutor,	  for	  example,	  addresses	  money	  laundering	  and	  other	  economic	  crimes	  in	  that	  emirate	  through	  a	  Funds	  Prosecution	  Unit.74	  Dubai’s	  police	  department	  has	  an	  economic	  crimes	  unit	  that	  also	  does	  liaison	  work	  with	  foreign	  police	  organizations.	  There	  are	  also	  federal	  offices	  devoted	  to	  AML.	  In	  September	  2000,	  the	  UAE’s	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  created	  an	  “Economic	  Crime	  Suppression	  Division”	  as	  part	  of	  its	  Department	  of	  Security.	  This	  federal	  office	  works	  in	  close	  liaison	  with	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  police.75	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Price	  and	  Al	  Tamimi,	  UAE	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  Judgments,	  viii.	  72	  Interview	  with	  attorney	  Dr.	  Ibrahim	  Al-­‐Mulla,	  27	  April,	  2015,	  transcribed	  and	  translated	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah.	  	  73	  See	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (10)	  of	  1980.	  74	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Jurisdiction	  of	  Prosecutions	  Defined.”	  75	  Al	  Mulla,	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Money	  Laundering],	  312.	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While	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  authority	  over	  the	  courts	  in	  all	  the	  emirates	  except	  Dubai	  and	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah,	  it	  is	  also	  understood	  that	  the	  ruler	  of	  an	  emirate,	  if	  he	  so	  wishes,	  can	  intervene	  after	  a	  sentence	  has	  been	  passed.	  “By	  Sharia’a,	  a	  ruler	  is	  like	  a	  judge.	  He	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  forgive	  or	  pardon	  a	  defendant,”	  notes	  a	  UAE	  lawyer	  with	  experience	  in	  economic	  crime	  cases.	  The	  UAE	  president	  has	  also	  issued	  pardons	  to	  those	  convicted	  by	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court.76	  	  
AML/CFT	  Efforts	  in	  the	  UAE	  Though	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  “victimless”	  or	  “public	  order”	  crime	  has	  been	  debated,	  money	  laundering	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  topic	  of	  concern	  among	  UAE	  officials.77	  The	  2002	  law	  was	  amended	  in	  2014	  to	  bring	  it	  more	  into	  line	  with	  recommendations	  from	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (FATF)	  on	  Money	  Laundering.78	  In	  part,	  UAE	  officials	  are	  concerned	  about	  how	  their	  financial	  system	  is	  perceived	  internationally.	  This	  is	  something	  acknowledged	  in	  local	  media	  coverage.	  The	  major	  English-­‐language	  newspaper	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi,	  The	  National,	  reported	  in	  2014	  that	  “In	  the	  UAE,	  the	  US	  treasury	  department	  last	  year	  targeted	  an	  exchange	  house	  and	  a	  trading	  company	  for	  allegedly	  helping	  Iranian	  attempts	  to	  circumvent	  sanctions.	  Dubai	  has	  also	  been	  accused	  by	  the	  NGO	  Global	  Witness	  of	  trading	  in	  smuggled	  gold,	  while	  research	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  has	  alleged	  that	  Dubai	  has	  served	  as	  a	  funnel	  for	  funds	  linked	  to	  Somali	  piracy.”	  An	  official	  with	  the	  auditing	  firm	  KPMG,	  while	  praising	  the	  UAE’s	  “proactive	  steps,”	  also	  called	  the	  UAE	  “one	  of	  the	  highest	  risk	  areas	  for	  money	  laundering.”79	  More	  recently,	  at	  a	  2015	  forum	  in	  Dubai,	  a	  lawyer	  critiqued	  the	  UAE	  legal	  regimen	  as	  not	  strong	  enough,	  and	  argued	  that	  it	  did	  not	  have	  sufficient	  tools	  in	  place	  to	  mitigate	  risk.80	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Interview	  with	  attorney	  Dr.	  Ibrahim	  Al-­‐Mulla,	  27	  April	  2015,	  transcribed	  and	  translated	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah;	  and	  Duffy,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  –	  Media	  Law	  Supplement,	  12,	  15.	  77	  “Public	  order	  crime	  is	  now	  the	  preferred	  term	  for	  ‘victimless’	  crime,	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  always	  secondary	  victims	  such	  as	  family,	  friends,	  acquaintances,	  and	  society	  at	  large”	  (Unger,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Regulation:	  From	  Al	  Capone	  to	  Al	  Qaeda,”	  20).	  See	  also	  Groot,	  “Money	  Laundering,	  Drugs	  and	  Prostitution	  as	  Victimless	  Crimes,”	  57-­‐67.	  78	  “The	  FATF	  had	  been	  established	  by	  the	  G7	  at	  a	  Paris	  summit	  in	  1989	  because	  of	  growing	  concerns	  over	  the	  threat	  of	  money	  laundering	  to	  the	  international	  banking	  and	  financial	  system.	  By	  2012	  it	  would	  have	  thirty-­‐six	  members”	  (Zarate,	  
Treasury’s	  War,	  31).	  As	  of	  this	  writing	  its	  membership	  comprises	  34	  countries	  and	  two	  regional	  organizations,	  the	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	  (which	  includes	  the	  UAE)	  and	  the	  European	  Commission	  (FATF,	  “Members	  and	  Observers.”)	  79	  Arnold,	  “UAE	  Strengthens	  Enforcement	  Against	  Money	  Laundering.”	  80	  Stuart	  Paterson,	  partner,	  Herbert	  Smith	  Freehills,	  speaking	  at	  the	  IIF	  Professional	  Program:	  Identifying	  and	  Mitigating	  Financial	  Crime	  Risks,	  Dubai,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  2	  June	  2015	  (author’s	  notes).	  
	  	  	  
25	  
Assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  UAE	  legislative	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  is	  challenging.	  But	  the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  so	  doing	  with	  any	  national	  (or	  international)	  case	  study.	  As	  Joras	  Ferwerda	  noted,	  “Data	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  policy	  is	  more	  cumbersome	  to	  acquire.	  The	  information	  is	  quite	  hard	  to	  quantify	  and	  differs	  across	  countries.”81	  Another	  observer	  noted	  that,	  while	  more	  than	  two	  decades	  had	  passed	  since	  the	  UN	  first	  grappled	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  money	  laundering	  (via	  the	  1988	  Vienna	  Convention),	  “there	  is	  still	  a	  lack	  of	  convincing	  empirical	  evidence	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  measures	  adopted	  to	  combat	  it.”	  The	  same	  author	  continued	  by	  observing	  “that	  there	  is	  a	  close	  connection	  between	  these	  two	  knowledge	  gaps:	  since	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  counterpolicies	  should	  be	  assessed	  in	  terms	  of	  reduction	  of	  laundering	  activities,	  the	  inability	  to	  quantify	  the	  volume	  of	  the	  latter	  has	  hampered	  and	  still	  hampers	  understanding	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  policies	  have	  had	  on	  the	  phenomenon.”82	  	  	  Such	  clauses	  apply	  to	  this	  UAE-­‐based	  case	  study	  as	  well.	  While	  the	  statistical	  limitations	  will	  be	  noted	  throughout,	  this	  research	  will	  try	  to	  assess	  UAE	  legislative	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  in	  several	  stages,	  involving	  background,	  development	  of	  a	  research	  design,	  and	  its	  application	  to	  UAE-­‐relevant	  data.	  The	  opening	  chapters	  present	  background	  on	  money	  laundering	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  as	  a	  target	  of	  international	  legislation	  and	  regulation.	  The	  work	  will	  then	  shift	  to	  examine	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	  UAE.	  After	  this,	  using	  data	  gained	  from	  interviews	  with,	  and	  a	  later	  survey	  of,	  AML/CFT	  professionals,	  the	  researcher	  will	  seek	  to	  establish	  criteria	  for	  measuring	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  enforcement	  of	  such	  laws.	  Following	  this,	  the	  researcher	  will	  qualitatively	  apply	  those	  “markers”	  of	  effectiveness	  to	  available	  data	  on	  the	  development	  of	  AML/CFT	  regulation	  and	  legislation	  in	  the	  UAE	  from	  2004-­‐2014.	  	  	  Data	  on	  money-­‐laundering	  cases	  has	  been	  perceived	  as	  sensitive	  in	  the	  UAE,	  to	  say	  the	  least.	  The	  authors	  of	  a	  2014	  article	  on	  the	  subject	  commented	  on,	  among	  challenges,	  that	  “important	  secondary	  data	  such	  as	  official	  crime	  statistics	  and	  cases	  of	  money	  laundering	  in	  the	  UAE	  ...	  was	  limited,”	  most	  it	  either	  being	  “withheld	  for	  security	  reasons,	  i.e.	  ongoing	  cases	  or	  private	  considerations,	  i.e.	  protecting	  integrity	  of	  own	  company,	  which	  is	  understandable,	  and	  this	  was	  the	  most	  common	  theme...”	  Moreover,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Ferwerda,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Money	  Laundering,”	  41.	  82	  Vettori,	  “Evaluating	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Policies:	  Where	  Are	  We?,”	  474.	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the	  authors	  noted	  that	  data	  “recording	  practices	  need	  some	  attention	  before	  we	  can	  tackle	  the	  problem	  of	  money	  laundering	  from	  a	  policy-­‐type	  approach	  to	  disseminate	  practice	  within	  and	  across	  different	  sectors	  in	  the	  UAE	  that	  deal	  with	  money	  laundering.”83	  	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  quantitative	  data	  involved	  herein	  will	  be	  statistics	  provided	  through	  the	  courtesy	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  &	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit	  (AMLSCU).	  These	  invaluable	  data	  are	  drawn	  primarily	  from	  internal	  AMLSCU	  documents,	  specifically	  annual	  reports	  for	  2012	  and	  2013.	  An	  AMLSCU	  representative	  informed	  the	  author	  that	  these	  annual	  reports	  –	  not	  in	  general	  circulation	  –	  represented	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  data	  that	  could	  be	  legally	  provided.84	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  some	  data,	  especially	  before	  the	  critical	  2008	  MENA/FATF	  Evaluation	  report	  on	  the	  UAE,	  was	  never	  acquired	  and	  is	  simply	  not	  available.	  The	  available	  data	  vary	  in	  completeness	  for	  earlier	  periods;	  precise	  numbers	  on	  pre-­‐2004	  STRs,	  for	  instance,	  are	  not	  available.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  something	  officials	  in	  2004	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  problem	  because	  of	  bureaucratic	  overlaps.85	  While	  one	  author	  allowed	  that	  the	  FATF	  mutual	  evaluation	  reports	  provided	  the	  “only	  structured	  and	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  consistent	  information”	  available,86	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  MENA/FATF	  2008	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report	  (MER)	  on	  the	  UAE	  complained	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  statistics.87	  Ironically,	  the	  same	  complaint	  surfaced	  even	  in	  the	  MENA/FATF	  follow-­‐up	  report	  that	  ultimately	  released	  the	  UAE	  from	  requiring	  regular	  review	  to	  “biennial	  update”	  status.88	  	  In	  the	  work	  that	  follows,	  UAE-­‐specific	  data	  from	  MENA/FATF	  and	  available	  AMLSCU	  documents	  and	  other	  official	  sources	  (such	  as	  UAE	  laws	  and	  circulars)	  will	  be	  supplemented	  with	  information	  from	  news	  media	  (Arabic	  and	  English);	  interviews	  with	  legislative	  and	  law	  enforcement	  figures;	  and	  interviews	  with	  individuals	  involved	  with	  private-­‐sector	  compliance.89	  When	  contradictions	  were	  found	  between	  official	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Bin	  Belaisha	  and	  Brooks,	  “Money	  Laundering	  in	  Dubai,”	  351.	  84	  Correspondence	  with	  AMLSCU	  senior	  analyst	  Mahendran	  Raman,	  20	  April	  2015.	  In	  2008,	  MENA/FATF	  evaluators	  noted	  that	  the	  AMLSCU	  “had	  not	  published	  an	  annual	  report	  since	  its	  inception	  in	  2002	  and	  there	  was	  no	  contemplation	  of	  doing	  so	  in	  the	  future.”	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  42.	  A	  later	  MENA/FATF	  follow-­‐up	  document	  noted	  that	  such	  reports	  began	  appearing	  in	  2009.	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  25.	  85	  Carvalho,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Law	  'Highly	  Effective.'”	  	  86	  Ferwerda,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Money	  Laundering,”	  41.	  87	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  13.	  88	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  23-­‐25.	  89	  As	  will	  be	  noted	  below,	  as	  of	  2006	  at	  least,	  according	  to	  one	  study,	  no	  empirical	  models	  existed	  to	  determining	  how	  well	  an	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  “system	  works	  in	  suppressing	  crimes	  and	  preventing	  terrorist	  acts.”	  Levi	  and	  Reuter,	  “Money	  Laundering,”	  365.	  The	  author	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  find	  any	  such	  models	  published	  since	  that	  work,	  although	  some	  recent	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documents	  and	  media	  reports	  regarding	  figures,	  dates,	  and	  other	  statistical	  information,	  the	  work	  has	  generally	  favored	  the	  official	  source.	  	  Note	  that,	  as	  with	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  2014	  article	  on	  Dubai	  ML	  cited	  above,	  obtaining	  access	  or	  interviews	  with	  relevant	  figures	  in	  the	  UAE	  was	  and	  remains	  difficult.90	  The	  writer	  sent	  multiple	  requests	  (both	  via	  email	  and	  telephone)	  for	  interviews,	  access	  to	  data,	  and	  other	  information.	  Few	  queries	  received	  a	  response.	  As	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  article,	  those	  requests	  that	  worked	  generally	  followed	  a	  pattern	  of	  “negotiated	  access”	  through	  a	  personally	  known	  intermediary;	  not	  all	  such	  efforts	  proved	  successful.	  	  
Literature	  Review	  
UAE-­‐Specific	  Texts	  Noting	  that	  the	  internal	  AMLSCU	  reports	  cited	  above	  are	  not	  in	  general	  circulation,	  relatively	  little	  specific	  research	  has	  been	  published	  in	  English	  on	  economic	  crime	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  One	  “insider”	  book	  is	  Iqbal	  Ismail	  Hakim’s	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  
Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11,	  which	  reproduces	  images	  of	  many	  memos	  and	  documents	  in	  stating	  the	  case	  against	  lax	  financial	  regulation	  within	  the	  UAE	  prior	  to	  11	  September	  2001.	  As	  the	  book	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  challenged	  in	  court,	  it	  may	  be	  reasonably	  assumed	  that	  these	  documents	  are	  authentic.	  However,	  as	  much	  of	  the	  book’s	  text	  consists	  of	  the	  author’s	  personal	  attacks	  on	  perceived	  enemies	  (including	  senior	  figures	  at	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank)	  it	  therefore	  needs	  to	  be	  handled	  with	  great	  caution	  as	  a	  source.	  	  	  More	  mainstream	  titles	  are	  2009	  and	  2010	  works	  by	  a	  UAE	  police	  official,	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla.	  In	  the	  first	  of	  these	  especially,	  Al-­‐muwajaha	  al-­‐jenaeiah	  leqadaya	  ghasl	  al-­‐amwal	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Money	  Laundering],	  Al	  Mulla	  discusses	  early	  UAE	  legislative	  AML/CFT	  efforts,	  describes	  some	  early	  cases,	  and	  in	  some	  places	  critiques	  applications	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  penalties	  prescribed	  under	  it.	  [Dr.	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla	  consented	  to	  be	  interviewed	  by	  this	  researcher	  at	  the	  Dubai	  Police	  Academy	  (4	  October	  2015).	  Note	  that	  a	  UAE	  attorney	  also	  interviewed	  for	  this	  thesis	  (27	  April	  2015)	  has	  an	  identical	  name	  and	  academic	  title	  –	  Dr.	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla	  –	  and	  a	  similar	  field	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  papers	  have	  touched	  on	  empirical	  means	  of	  studying	  perception	  of	  effectiveness,	  using	  questionaires.	  See	  Huang	  et	  al,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Requirements	  –	  Perceived	  Effectiveness.”	  90	  Bin	  Belaisha	  and	  Brooks,	  “Money	  Laundering	  in	  Dubai.”	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expertise.	  When	  necessary,	  this	  text	  has	  differentiated	  between	  the	  author	  and	  the	  
attorney.]	  	  Another	  helpful	  document	  is	  a	  country-­‐specific	  2008	  report	  by	  MENA	  FATF	  (Middle	  East	  and	  North	  African	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force),	  which	  examines	  several	  elements	  of	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  money	  laundering.91	  UAE	  laws	  themselves	  are	  published	  in	  dual-­‐language	  Arabic	  and	  English	  booklets	  and	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  sources,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  a	  ten-­‐volume	  set	  first	  published	  in	  2008.92	  One	  helpful	  interpretative	  resource	  is	  the	  work	  of	  high-­‐profile	  Emirati	  lawyer,	  Essam	  Al	  Tamimi,	  who	  has	  published	  several	  useful	  books	  on	  UAE	  law.93	  His	  law	  firm	  also	  publishes	  regular	  updates	  on	  UAE	  law	  in	  HTML	  form	  for	  emailing	  to	  clients	  and	  other	  interested	  parties.94	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  area-­‐	  and	  topic-­‐specific	  work	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  a	  short	  but	  valuable	  2014	  article	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  Control.	  Built	  around	  interviews	  with	  anonymous	  officials	  in	  relevant	  UAE	  government	  and	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  the	  paper's	  goal	  was	  “to	  highlight	  present	  strategies	  to	  prevent	  money	  laundering	  in	  Dubai.”95	  Among	  the	  few	  other	  examples	  is	  a	  2012	  work,	  which	  included	  case	  studies	  involving	  the	  UAE	  and	  Afghanistan	  in	  its	  analysis	  of	  underground	  banking	  and	  its	  role	  in	  transnational	  crime.	  As	  was	  already	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  authors	  found	  that	  “the	  instruments	  designed	  for	  the	  formal	  banking	  sector	  were	  of	  little	  value	  used	  in	  the	  informal	  sector.”	  They	  also	  concluded	  that	  recommendations	  by	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (FATF)	  ignored	  the	  complex	  local	  context	  of	  hawala.96	  Hawala	  itself	  in	  the	  post-­‐	  9/11	  era	  sparked	  a	  large	  number	  of	  works.97	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008).	  92	  Al-­‐Qānūnīyah,	  UAE	  Federal	  Laws.	  93	  Such	  as	  Al	  Tamimi,	  Practical	  Guide	  to	  Litigation	  and	  Arbitration	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  94	  http://altamimi.newsweaver.ie/ddv0m72lkrxlwbmqk361fo?email=true&a=11&p=26673935	  95	  Bin	  Belaisha	  and	  Brooks,	  “Money	  Laundering	  in	  Dubai,”	  343-­‐354.	  96	  Troutsolt	  and	  Johnson,	  “International	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulations	  of	  Alternative	  Remittance	  Systems,”	  416-­‐417.	  97	  To	  cite	  only	  a	  few	  examples,	  see	  Passas,	  “Dirty	  Money?	  Tracing	  the	  Misuse	  of	  Hawala	  Networks,”	  and	  “Hawala	  and	  Money	  Laundering:	  a	  Malaysian	  Perspective”;	  Trehan,	  “Underground	  and	  Parallel	  Banking	  Systems”;	  Troutsolt	  and	  Johnson,	  “International	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulations	  of	  Alternative	  Remittance	  Systems”;	  and	  Van	  de	  Bunt,	  “A	  Case	  Study	  on	  the	  Misuse	  of	  Hawala	  Banking.”	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Broader	  Texts	  on	  Economic	  Crime	  Economic	  crime	  as	  a	  global	  topic	  has,	  of	  course,	  received	  much	  international	  attention	  and	  has	  been	  looked	  at	  from	  multiple	  angles	  in	  various	  publications.	  Much	  scholarly	  research	  initially	  focused	  on	  AML	  efforts	  directed	  at	  hindering	  the	  proceeds	  of	  illegal	  narcotics	  trafficking.	  Over	  time	  the	  research	  scope	  has	  widened,	  reflecting	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  complex	  economic	  criminal	  activities,	  including	  areas	  such	  as	  fraud,	  political	  corruption,	  terrorism	  financing,	  illegal	  weapons	  sales,	  and	  human	  trafficking.	  Many	  useful	  works	  have	  been	  general	  in	  nature,	  surveying	  the	  issue	  and	  developments	  in	  related	  legal	  fields.	  For	  example,	  John	  Walker	  has	  since	  1995	  made	  a	  series	  of	  efforts	  at	  estimating	  worldwide	  money	  laundering	  figures,	  as	  well	  as	  drug	  money	  flows.98	  Buehn	  and	  Schneider	  have	  tried	  to	  estimate	  the	  international	  flow	  of	  criminal	  proceeds	  using	  “multiple	  indicators,	  multiple	  causes	  estimation,”	  or	  MIMIC.99	  Schneiderthe	  and	  Windischbauer,	  in	  addition	  to	  defining	  and	  explaining	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  process,	  have	  made	  their	  own	  efforts	  to	  estimate	  the	  volume	  of	  money-­‐laundering	  activities	  worldwide,	  and	  measured	  the	  macroeconomic	  effects	  of	  national	  and	  international	  efforts	  to	  fight	  money	  laundering.100	  Simser	  explored	  emerging	  trends	  and	  threats	  in	  money	  laundering,	  pondering	  whether	  the	  current	  AML	  systems,	  which	  focus	  at	  large	  on	  traditional	  financial	  institutions,	  will	  fail	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  diverse	  emerging	  threats,	  such	  as	  “online	  gaming,	  piracy,	  football	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  (TBML).”101	  Masciandaro	  provided	  an	  economic	  analysis	  of	  money	  laundering,	  remarking	  on	  “how	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  regulation,	  due	  to	  a	  well-­‐designed	  system	  of	  incentives	  and	  costs	  for	  financial	  intermediaries,	  may	  evolve	  towards	  the	  achievement	  of	  higher	  effectiveness	  goals	  while	  improving	  its	  efficiency	  standards	  as	  well.”102	  And	  Blum	  at	  el	  examined	  the	  issue	  of	  banking	  secrecy	  and	  financial	  havens	  in	  context	  of	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  efforts.103	  	  Other	  works	  relevant	  to	  this	  study	  have	  explored	  various	  models	  and	  risk	  management	  of	  financial	  crime;104	  viewed	  the	  commonalities	  of	  international	  fraud	  cases;105	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  See	  Walker	  and	  Unger,	  “Measuring	  Global	  Money	  Laundering:	  The	  Walker	  Gravity	  Model.”	  99	  Buehn	  and	  Schneider,	  “A	  Preliminary	  Attempt	  to	  Estimate	  the	  Financial	  Flows	  of	  Transnational	  Crime	  using	  the	  MIMIC	  method.”	  100	  Schneider	  and	  Windischbauer,	  “Money	  Laundering:	  Some	  Facts.”	  101	  Simser,	  “Money	  Laundering:	  Emerging	  Threats	  and	  Trends,”	  47.	  102	  Masciandaro,	  “Money	  Laundering:	  The	  Economics	  of	  Regulation,”	  238.	  103	  Blum,	  Levi,	  Naylor,	  and	  Williams,	  Financial	  Havens,	  Banking	  Secrecy	  and	  Money-­‐Laundering.	  104	  Pickett	  and	  Pickett,	  Financial	  Crime	  Investigation	  and	  Control.	  105	  Matulich	  and	  Currie,	  eds.,	  Handbook	  of	  Frauds,	  Scams,	  and	  Swindles;	  Pickett	  and	  Pickett,	  Financial	  Crime	  Investigation	  and	  Control.	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provided,	  interpreted,	  and	  analyzed	  documentary	  materials	  that	  outline	  essential	  elements	  and	  notable	  instances	  of	  “white-­‐collar”	  and	  corporate	  crime.106	  An	  edited	  book	  provides	  a	  series	  of	  essays	  that	  explore	  issues	  of	  corporate	  governance,	  tax	  compliance,	  enforcement	  regime	  and	  wide	  corporate	  illegal	  activities	  in	  light	  of	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  for	  designing	  optimal	  legal	  policies.107	  Some	  works,	  such	  as	  a	  1997	  book	  edited	  by	  Rider,	  have	  given	  broad	  overviews	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  context	  of	  financial	  crime.108	  Other	  works	  have	  studied	  cultural	  perceptions	  of	  corruption,	  occasionally	  singling	  out	  money	  laundering.	  Representative	  titles	  include	  those	  by	  Beale	  and	  Esposito,109	  Lipset	  and	  Lenz,110	  and	  Osborne.111	  Others	  have	  addressed	  integrity-­‐based	  failings	  within	  the	  financial	  industry	  as	  a	  whole.112	  	  
Efforts	  at	  Assessing	  Effectiveness	  Some	  studies	  of	  AML	  (and	  sometimes	  CFT)	  efforts	  have	  sought	  simply	  (but	  importantly)	  to	  catalog	  such	  efforts.	  Reider-­‐Gordon	  and	  Butler,	  for	  example,	  compiled	  “a	  global	  survey	  of	  the	  largest	  or	  most	  significant	  AML	  enforcement	  actions	  and	  legal	  developments	  that	  occurred	  in	  2012.”113	  Other	  studies	  have	  analyzed	  the	  content	  of	  various	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  legislation	  efforts	  themselves.114	  And	  some	  –	  touching	  upon	  this	  thesis’	  objective	  have	  sought	  to	  measure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  AML	  legislation	  and	  regulations.	  A	  work	  by	  Stessens,	  for	  example,	  contained	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  international	  legal	  regulations	  and	  their	  perceived	  effectiveness	  to	  curb	  money	  laundering.115	  Stessens	  has	  also	  examined	  issues	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  FATF	  blacklisting	  of	  non-­‐cooperative	  countries	  and	  territories,	  arguing	  that	  “the	  success	  of	  the	  FATF’s	  efforts	  would	  have	  benefited	  if	  the	  FATF	  had	  been	  more	  critical	  of	  its	  own	  members.”116	  In	  similarly	  critical	  vein,	  Levi	  and	  Reuter	  went	  beyond	  describing	  the	  facts	  about	  and	  examining	  the	  evolution	  of	  global	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  regime,	  instead	  reviewing	  information	  on	  enforcement	  efforts,	  which	  by	  their	  opinion	  “has	  been	  given	  much	  less	  policy	  attention	  than	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations	  themselves.”	  In	  so	  doing,	  Levi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Geis,	  White-­‐Collar	  and	  Corporate	  Crime.	  107	  Sjofren	  and	  Skogh,	  eds.,	  New	  Perspective	  on	  Economic	  Crime.	  108	  Rider,	  ed.,	  Corruption:	  The	  Enemy	  Within.	  109	  Beale	  and	  Esposito,	  “Emergent	  International	  Attitudes	  Towards	  Bribery,	  Corruption	  and	  Money	  Laundering.”	  110	  Lipset	  and	  Lenz,	  “Corruption,	  Culture,	  and	  Markets,”	  112-­‐124.	  111	  Osborne,	  “Corruption	  as	  Counter-­‐Culture.”	  112	  Platt,	  Criminal	  Capital.	  113	  Reider-­‐Gordon	  &	  Butler,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering,”	  388.	  114	  Boran,	  “Money	  Laundering”;	  Bosworth-­‐Davies,	  “Money	  Laundering	  -­‐	  The	  Implication	  of	  Global	  Money	  Laundering	  Laws”;	  Lahey,	  “Money	  Laundering”;	  McCormick	  and	  Stekloff,	  “Money	  Laundering”;	  Newland,	  “Money	  Laundering”;	  Scruba,	  “Money	  Laundering”;	  Serafini,	  “Money	  Laundering.”	  115	  Stessens,	  Money	  Laundering:	  A	  New	  International	  Law	  Enforcement	  Model.	  116	  Stessens,	  “The	  FATF	  ‘Black	  List’	  of	  Non-­‐Cooperative	  Counries	  or	  Territories,”	  208.	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and	  Reuter	  identified	  gaps	  and	  challenges	  in	  corresponding	  research	  areas,	  offering	  the	  opinion	  that:	  “How	  well	  the	  [anti-­‐money	  laundering]	  system	  works	  in	  suppressing	  crimes	  and	  preventing	  terrorist	  acts	  is	  entirely	  a	  matter	  of	  speculation.	  No	  published	  papers	  make	  any	  claims	  to	  provide	  an	  empirical	  assessment.”117	  Three	  scholars	  from	  a	  university	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  produced	  a	  similarly	  critical	  paper	  in	  2005.118	  A	  2008	  paper	  asked	  rhetorically	  in	  its	  title,	  “Just	  How	  Effective	  is	  Money	  Laundering	  Legislation?”	  and	  its	  results	  emphasized	  the	  difficulty	  of	  measuring	  the	  efficacy	  of	  AML	  regulations	  in	  the	  context	  of	  often-­‐spurious	  assumptions	  about	  the	  extent	  and	  impact	  of	  the	  sums	  allegedly	  being	  laundered.119A	  2011	  work	  dismissed	  the	  imposition	  of	  global	  AML	  standards	  as	  not	  only	  ineffective	  but	  also	  damaging	  to	  private	  sector	  efforts	  in	  underdeveloped	  countries.120	  One	  of	  the	  editors	  of	  the	  2013	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  
Money	  Laundering	  –	  which	  brought	  together	  34	  chapters	  on	  varied	  AML/CFT-­‐related	  subjects	  –	  observed	  that	  debates	  currently	  rage	  not	  only	  over	  the	  size	  and	  scope	  of	  money	  laundering	  worldwide,	  but	  even	  whether	  it	  constituted	  a	  crime	  meriting	  punishment.121	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  results	  of	  a	  more	  recent	  study	  by	  Chong	  and	  Lopez-­‐De-­‐Silanes	  showed	  “large	  effects	  of	  regulation	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  enforcement	  in	  controlling	  money	  laundering.”	  The	  authors	  support	  their	  findings	  by	  showing	  the	  statistically	  significant	  impact	  of	  tough	  money	  laundering	  regulations	  on	  reduction	  of	  “the	  shadow	  economy,”	  across	  close	  to	  100	  countries,	  including	  the	  UAE.	  “The	  results	  show	  that	  criminalization	  of	  money	  laundering	  activities,	  similar	  to	  increasing	  liability	  standards,	  and	  higher	  levels	  of	  disclosure	  and	  transparency	  for	  banks	  are	  associated	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  money	  laundering.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  data	  suggest	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  increase	  of	  enforcement	  and	  international	  cooperative	  efforts.”122	  	  Some	  analyses	  of	  effectiveness	  have	  examined	  AML/CFT	  in	  the	  setting	  of	  compliance.	  Soudijn	  argued	  that	  money	  laundering	  “cannot	  be	  solved	  simply	  by	  generating	  more	  and	  more	  regulations,”	  arguing	  essentially	  in	  favor	  of	  placing	  more	  responsibility	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Levi	  and	  Reuter,	  “Money	  Laundering,”	  295,	  365.	  118	  Van	  Duyne,	  Groenhuijsen,	  and	  Schudelaro,	  “Balancing	  Financial	  Threats	  and	  Legal	  Interests	  in	  Money-­‐Laundering	  Policy.”	  119	  Harvey,	  “Just	  How	  Effective	  is	  Money	  Laundering	  Legislation?”	  120	  Sharman,	  The	  Money	  Laundry.	  121	  Unger,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Regulation:	  From	  Al	  Capone	  to	  Al	  Qaeda,”	  20-­‐22.	  122	  Chong	  and	  Lopez-­‐De-­‐Silanes,	  “Money	  Laundering	  and	  its	  Regulations,”	  115.	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financial	  facilitators.123	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  according	  to	  Reider-­‐Gordon	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  new	  laws	  and	  agreements	  enacted	  in	  2010	  had	  significant	  impact	  on	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  compliance	  actions	  both	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  around	  the	  world.124	  The	  emphasis	  on	  incorporating	  predicate	  offenses	  into	  AML	  legislation	  has	  echoed	  in	  some	  works	  as	  well.	  One	  recent	  title	  suggests	  that	  AML	  legislation	  and	  regulations	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  “a	  means	  to	  multiple	  ends,	  and	  not	  just	  directed	  at	  combating	  illegal	  drugs	  or	  organized	  crime.”	  Accordingly,	  this	  “means	  that	  assessing	  its	  effectiveness	  depends	  in	  part	  on	  the	  particular	  objective	  being	  considered.”	  Hence,	  “it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  multiple	  objectives	  require	  multiple	  indicators.”125	  Similarly,	  the	  author	  of	  a	  study	  examining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  AML	  regimen	  in	  Belgium	  observed	  “that	  the	  battle	  against	  money	  laundering	  has	  changed	  the	  policing	  landscape	  thoroughly,	  inserting	  a	  new	  type	  of	  public-­‐private	  divide	  (and	  not	  public-­‐private	  cooperation)	  on	  a	  global	  scale.”126	  For	  its	  part,	  the	  FATF	  by	  2013	  had	  developed	  a	  methodology	  for	  use	  in	  its	  mutual	  evaluation	  reports	  designed	  to	  measure	  the	  “extent	  to	  which	  a	  country	  is	  compliant	  with	  the	  FATF	  Standards	  and	  the	  level	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  its	  AML/CFT	  system.”127	  The	  FATF	  defines	  effectiveness	  as	  “the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  defined	  outcomes	  are	  achieved.”	  The	  new,	  2013	  methodology	  is	  designed	  to	  assess	  not	  only	  the	  technical	  compliance,	  which	  are	  set	  by	  the	  specific	  requirements	  of	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations,	  but	  also	  the	  effectiveness	  assessment	  of	  “the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  country’s	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  framework	  is	  producing	  the	  expected	  results.”	  Eleven	  Immediate	  Outcomes	  measure	  the	  effectiveness.128	  These	  outcomes	  will	  be	  further	  discussed,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  practitioner-­‐driven	  “markers	  of	  effectiveness”	  methodology	  employed	  herein,	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  
Assessing	  AML	  in	  International	  and	  Nation-­‐Specific	  Contexts	  Much	  research	  and	  literature	  published	  after	  2001	  on	  economic	  crime	  began	  to	  focus	  on	  linking	  (and	  in	  some	  cases	  critiquing	  the	  perceived	  links	  between)	  money	  laundering	  and	  international	  terrorist	  financing.	  Research	  centers	  such	  as	  the	  Terrorism,	  Transnational	  Crime,	  and	  Corruption	  Center	  (TraCCC),	  were	  established	  to	  investigate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Soudijn,	  “Resolving	  Excuses	  in	  Money	  Laundering,”	  161.	  124	  Reider-­‐Gordon,	  “U.S.	  and	  International	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering	  Development.”.	  125	  Reuter	  and	  Truman,	  Chasing	  Dirty	  Money,	  175-­‐176.	  126	  Verhage,	  The	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Complex	  and	  the	  Compliance	  Industry,	  145.	  127	  FATF,	  “FATF	  Issues	  New	  Mechanism	  to	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  Money	  Laundering	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  Terrorist	  Financing	  Compliance.”	  128	  FATF,	  “Methodology	  for	  Assessing	  Technical	  Compliance	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations	  and	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  AML/SFT	  Systems,”	  15,	  17.	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convergence	  between	  international	  terrorism	  and	  transnational	  organized	  crime.	  The	  TraCCC’s	  international	  applied	  research	  projects	  findings	  are	  published	  in	  their	  book	  series	  and	  other	  publications,	  and	  also	  were	  presented	  at	  conferences,	  workshops	  and	  lectures.129	  Paul	  Allan	  Schott	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  produced	  two	  editions	  of	  a	  book	  that	  can	  also	  be	  used	  as	  a	  reference	  guide	  with	  practical	  steps	  for	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  to	  establish	  and	  improve	  their	  legal	  and	  institutional	  frameworks	  for	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  (AML)	  and	  combating	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  (CFT)	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  standards.	  It	  also	  summarizes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  (WB)	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  in	  combating	  transnational	  economic	  crime.130	  A	  more	  recent	  book	  by	  de	  Willenbois	  et	  al	  guides	  countries	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  comply	  with	  international	  standards	  in	  combating	  transnational	  economic	  crime,	  including	  “grand”	  corruption,	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing.	  De	  Willenbois	  examines	  213	  international	  large-­‐scale	  corruption	  investigations	  from	  80	  different	  countries	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Grand	  Corruption	  Database	  Project	  to	  underline	  their	  commonalities	  in	  the	  use	  of	  corporate,	  legal,	  financial	  and	  administrative	  vehicles	  to	  facilitate	  and	  conceal	  corruption.131	  	  	  Transnational	  studies	  of	  economic	  crime	  still	  require,	  or	  stimulate,	  works	  that	  focus	  on	  individual	  countries.	  Favarel-­‐Garrigues’	  research	  shows	  the	  evolution	  of	  economic	  crime	  in	  Russia	  since	  1965	  to	  2006,	  linking	  it	  to	  continuous	  struggle	  for	  political	  power	  and	  hegemony.132	  A	  selection	  of	  works	  that	  examines	  problems	  of	  corruption,	  organized	  crime	  and	  terrorism	  in	  Russia	  provides	  unique	  empirical	  data	  generated	  by	  Russian	  scholars	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Terrorism,	  Transnational	  Crime,	  and	  Corruption	  Center	  (TraCCC).133	  Another	  study,	  after	  scrutinizing	  the	  functions	  and	  roles	  of	  the	  Belgian	  compliance	  officers	  play	  in	  fighting	  against	  money	  laundering,	  found	  that	  additional	  dimensions	  have	  to	  be	  added	  to	  criminal	  phenomenon	  when	  dealing	  with	  money	  laundering.	  Through	  the	  study	  has	  a	  defined	  geographic	  scope;	  its	  findings	  and	  conclusions	  have	  an	  international	  span.	  For	  example,	  Verhage	  states:	  “Private	  organizations	  are	  the	  gatekeepers	  to	  the	  preventative	  AML	  system	  and	  as	  such	  determine	  the	  input	  of	  the	  system.”134	  Nicaso	  and	  Lamonthe	  look	  at	  the	  specifics	  and	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  Such	  as	  Orttung	  and	  Latta,	  Russia's	  Battle	  with	  Crime,	  Corruption,	  and	  Terrorism.	  130	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide.	  131	  de	  Willebois,	  Halter,	  Harrison,	  Park,	  and	  Sharman,	  The	  Puppet	  Masters.	  132	  Favarel-­‐Garrigues,	  Policing	  Economic	  Crime	  in	  Russia.	  133	  Orttung	  and	  Latta,	  Russia's	  Battle	  with	  Crime,	  Corruption,	  and	  Terrorism.	  134	  Verhage,	  The	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering	  Complex	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  Industry,	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evolution	  of	  organized	  crime	  groups	  in	  different	  countries.135	  Shanmugam	  et	  al	  analyzed	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  Malaysian	  governments’	  efforts	  to	  curb	  growing	  money-­‐laundering	  activities	  in	  the	  country.136 	  Shifting	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Woodiwiss	  examined	  the	  evolution	  of	  organized	  crime	  in	  that	  country	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  organized	  crime	  in	  the	  world.	  He	  argued	  for	  drastic	  changes	  in	  national	  and	  international	  financial	  and	  legal	  systems	  to	  combat	  the	  opportunities	  for	  any	  organized	  crime	  activity.	  The	  causes	  of	  its	  growth,	  he	  argued,	  include	  economic	  and	  financial	  deregulation	  and	  lack	  of	  international	  policies	  to	  govern	  globalization.	  “Globalization	  has	  been	  mismanaged	  in	  many	  other	  ways	  that	  have	  multiplied	  criminal	  opportunities	  and	  increase	  the	  destructive	  capacity	  of	  organized	  crime.”	  Woodiwiss	  criticized	  national	  and	  international	  organized-­‐crime-­‐control	  policies	  as	  “woefully	  inadequate,”	  and	  also	  faulted	  the	  role	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  and	  the	  World	  Bank.	  According	  to	  Woodiwiss:	  “Leading	  global	  financial	  institutions,	  notably	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  have	  done	  little	  to	  combat	  opportunities	  for	  serious	  organized	  criminality.”137	  Two	  other	  researchers,	  Williams	  and	  Vlassis,	  contended	  “the	  international	  community	  must	  elevate	  the	  struggle	  against	  transnational	  organized	  crime	  to	  one	  of	  its	  highest	  priority	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  resource	  allocation	  and	  the	  development	  of	  appropriate	  strategies.”138	  Di	  Gennaro	  pointed	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  improving	  judicial	  cooperation	  and	  internationalization	  of	  police	  forces	  in	  combating	  transnational	  crime.139	  Finally,	  different	  aspects	  of	  organized	  crime	  have	  been	  analyzed	  by	  using	  economic	  theories	  in	  a	  collection	  of	  research	  papers.140	  The	  edited	  book	  by	  Farer	  examines	  relationship	  between	  the	  transnational	  organized	  crime	  (TOC)	  and	  national	  security	  of	  sovereign	  states	  and	  tries	  to	  identify	  an	  optimal	  policy	  to	  combat	  TOC.141	  	  Several	  studies	  have	  noted	  how	  economic	  globalization	  fosters	  transnational	  crime	  and	  human	  trafficking.142	  Organized	  transnational	  criminal	  syndicates	  have	  been	  seen	  as	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  Nicaso	  and	  Lamothe,	  Angels,	  Mobsters	  &	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  Shanmugam,	  Nair,	  and	  Suganthi,	  “Money	  Laundering	  in	  Malaysia.”	  137	  Woodiwiss,	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  138	  Williams	  and	  Vlassis,	  Combating	  Transnational	  Crime,	  1.	  139	  di	  Gennaro,	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  Transnational	  Crime.”	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  Fiorentini	  and	  Peltzman,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Organised	  Crime.	  141	  Farer,	  Transnational	  Crime	  in	  the	  Americas.	  142	  Naim,	  Illicit;	  Pomodoro,	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creating	  a	  framework	  for	  human	  smuggling	  and	  trafficking.143	  Koslowski	  argued	  that	  “increasing	  human	  smuggling	  may	  also	  be	  an	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  the	  stricter	  visa	  and	  border	  control	  policies	  adopted	  by	  individual	  states.”144	  Empirical	  examination	  of	  different	  facets	  of	  human	  trafficking	  and	  smuggling	  and	  the	  role	  of	  national	  and	  international	  legislation	  and	  policies	  that	  hinder	  or	  even	  facilitate	  it	  was	  presented	  in	  several	  papers	  in	  Global	  Human	  Smuggling.145	  Involvement	  of	  large	  multinational	  corporations	  in	  and	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  regulations	  and	  control	  of	  their	  subcontractors	  on	  human	  trafficking	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  cheap	  labor	  were	  examined	  in	  a	  series	  of	  essays	  edited	  by	  Quayson	  and	  Arhin.146	  	  	  Some	  other	  works,	  although	  not	  UAE-­‐specific,	  have	  introduced	  frameworks	  of	  analysis	  that	  might	  provide	  helpful	  criteria	  for	  assessing	  UAE	  efforts.	  One	  such	  area	  involves	  international	  cooperation.	  This	  was	  stressed	  in,	  for	  example,	  a	  2001	  work	  by	  Morris-­‐Cotterill,	  which	  called	  it	  “ironic	  that	  the	  international	  community	  would	  fail	  to	  produce	  a	  single,	  unified	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  take	  on	  a	  criminal	  activity	  that	  thrives	  precisely	  on	  exploiting	  differences	  in	  laws	  and	  regulations.”147	  Two	  other	  researchers,	  two	  years	  later,	  echoed	  this	  thought,	  observing	  that:	  “A	  convergence	  of	  multilateral	  and	  domestic	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  initiatives	  that	  incorporate	  rigorous	  compliance	  monitoring	  systems	  is	  necessary	  to	  combat	  money	  laundering.”148	  Similarly,	  the	  author	  of	  a	  2004	  work	  that	  examined	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  process	  and	  global	  efforts	  to	  address	  it,	  concluded	  that	  resolving	  “the	  problems	  it	  creates	  will	  require	  an	  extensive	  integrated	  solution,”	  which	  includes	  “co-­‐operative	  links	  among	  regulatory,	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  and	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  both	  within	  and	  across	  borders.”149	  	  	  The	  argument	  has	  been	  taken	  further	  and	  made	  more	  specific	  to	  involve	  closer	  examination	  of	  those	  international	  (or	  neighboring)	  bodies	  themselves.	  Alldridge,	  for	  instance,	  stated	  in	  a	  2008	  work	  that:	  “If	  the	  criminal	  law	  is	  to	  be	  set	  by	  supranational	  bodies	  than	  we	  need	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  organizations	  of	  international	  governance	  and,	  in	  particular,	  FATF	  must	  show	  far	  greater	  transparency	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and	  accountability	  than	  hitherto.”150	  In	  related	  vein,	  others	  have	  stressed	  the	  corresponding	  need	  for	  consistency	  across	  jurisdictions	  as	  to	  how	  money	  laundering	  (and	  other	  such	  economic	  crimes)	  are	  legally	  defined:	  “The	  persistent	  differences	  in	  defining	  predicate	  crimes	  among	  national	  jurisdictions	  hampers	  both	  the	  preventive	  efficacy	  of	  AML	  regulation	  and	  criminal	  investigations	  and	  prosecution.”151	  Another	  observer	  has	  criticized	  many	  existing	  statutes	  as	  focusing	  too	  much	  on	  the	  proceeds	  of	  crimes	  that	  have	  already	  been	  committed,	  rather	  than	  encouraging	  law	  enforcement	  bodies	  to	  ask:	  “What	  is	  the	  criminal	  planning	  to	  do	  with	  the	  money	  that	  he	  is	  going	  to	  such	  great	  lengths	  to	  conceal?”152	  	  
Methodology	  Overview	  The	  methodological	  triangulated	  study	  will	  be	  detailed	  in	  a	  later	  chapter,	  but	  may	  be	  described	  briefly	  as	  including	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  analysis	  elements.	  Overall,	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  identify	  “perceived	  markers	  of	  success”	  in	  AML/CFT	  legislation,	  and	  apply	  them	  to	  available	  data	  on	  UAE	  cases	  between	  2002-­‐2013	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  that	  country’s	  AML/CFT	  efforts,	  and	  chart	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  crafting	  of	  the	  2014	  amendment	  to	  the	  2002	  AML	  law	  and	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (7)	  of	  2014.	  	  	  The	  first	  round	  of	  methodological	  study	  was	  designed	  to	  identify	  “markers	  of	  perceived	  success”	  of	  AML	  legislation.	  A	  representative	  sample	  of	  25	  randomly	  selected	  stakeholders	  from	  the	  field	  were	  interviewed	  at	  the	  5th	  International	  ACAMS	  MENA	  AML	  and	  Financial	  Crime	  Conference	  in	  Dubai	  on	  18-­‐19	  January	  2015.	  Since	  the	  survey	  component	  was	  included	  into	  the	  interview,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  interviewees	  were	  representatives	  of	  regulatory	  authorities,	  compliance	  departments,	  law	  enforcement	  officials,	  intergovernmental	  institutions,	  software	  developers	  and	  government	  officials,	  with	  a	  range	  of	  years	  working	  in	  the	  AML	  field	  and	  coming	  from	  different	  jurisdiction.	  Qualitative	  data	  analysis	  software,	  NVivo,	  was	  then	  used	  to	  identify	  repeating	  themes	  and	  ultimately	  “markers	  of	  perceived	  success,”	  which	  were	  narrowed	  down	  to	  12.	  From	  these,	  randomly	  targeted	  participants	  at	  the	  20th	  International	  ACAMS	  AML	  and	  Financial	  Crime	  Conference	  in	  Hollywood,	  Florida,	  USA,	  on	  March	  17-­‐19,	  2015	  were	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asked	  to	  select	  the	  five	  most	  important	  in	  their	  opinion.	  The	  researcher	  received	  collected	  230	  completed	  responses.	  These	  were	  then	  processed	  using	  statistical	  analysis	  software	  (SPSS)	  to	  generate	  tabulated	  reports	  for	  descriptive	  statistics	  to	  identify	  the	  five	  principal	  “markers”	  along	  with	  relevant	  correlational	  data.	  	  	  In	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  analysis,	  these	  markers	  and	  correlational	  data	  would	  be	  applied	  to	  available	  data	  on	  AML	  cases	  in	  the	  UAE	  between	  2002	  and	  2013,	  including	  broad	  statistical	  analysis	  of	  annual	  figures	  for	  the	  years	  in	  which	  such	  data	  were	  available,	  and	  a	  sampling	  of	  high-­‐profile	  cases.	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2.	  Character	  and	  Significance	  of	  
Transnational	  Money	  Laundering	  Today	  	  	  While	  this	  thesis	  is	  concerned	  with	  money	  laundering	  in	  the	  context	  of	  legislation	  and	  enforcement	  in	  a	  specific	  Middle	  Eastern	  country	  –	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  –	  much	  modern	  and	  global	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  its	  treatment	  is	  derived	  from	  Western	  governmental	  and	  judicial	  standards.	  	  Money	  laundering,	  according	  to	  a	  publication	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  “involves	  disguising	  assets	  so	  they	  can	  be	  used	  without	  the	  detection	  of	  the	  illegal	  activity	  that	  produced	  them.”153	  As	  that	  short,	  one-­‐sentence	  definition	  makes	  plain,	  assets	  involved	  in	  money	  laundering	  are	  deemed	  to	  have	  originated	  in	  criminal	  purposes.	  “Money	  laundering	  is	  driven	  by	  criminal	  activities,”	  observes	  another	  US	  government	  publication.	  “It	  conceals	  the	  true	  source	  of	  funds	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  used	  freely.	  It	  is	  the	  support	  service	  that	  allows	  criminals	  to	  enjoy	  the	  fruits	  of	  their	  crimes.	  It	  allows	  crime	  to	  pay	  and	  often,	  pay	  well.”154	  The	  point	  of	  money	  laundering	  is	  to	  offer	  illicit	  funds	  a	  harbor	  from	  which	  they	  can	  reemerge	  clean	  and	  legitimate.	  	  However,	  some	  authors	  acknowledge	  the	  difficulty	  of	  estimating	  the	  financial	  flows	  of	  transnational	  crime,	  and	  question	  the	  reliability	  and	  accountability	  of	  various	  models	  developed	  and	  applied	  to	  do	  so;	  correspondingly,	  numerical	  inconsistences	  in	  reporting	  data	  should	  be	  expected.155	  And	  as	  one	  study	  observes,	  “it	  is	  hard	  to	  claim	  the	  existence	  of	  ‘the	  perfect	  model’	  to	  measure	  ML.”156	  In	  that	  light,	  numbers	  cited	  in	  most	  studies	  of	  ML	  are	  presented	  as	  estimates	  given	  to	  indicate	  potential	  scale.	  	  	  One	  such	  study	  estimated	  the	  size	  of	  global	  flows	  of	  illicit	  activities	  in	  the	  period	  of	  2000-­‐2001	  as	  US$1.0-­‐1.6	  trillion,	  with	  a	  low	  estimate	  of	  US$500	  billion	  a	  year	  coming	  from	  developing	  and	  transitional	  economies.157	  According	  to	  another	  analysis,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  FINCEN	  Advisory	  I:1	  (March	  1996),	  quoted	  in	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  ix.	  154	  U.S.	  Office	  of	  the	  Comptroller	  of	  the	  Currency,	  “Money	  Laundering:	  A	  Banker’s	  Guide	  to	  Avoiding	  Problems,”	  quoted	  in	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  x.	  155	  Buehn,	  and	  Schneider,	  “A	  Preliminary	  Attempt	  to	  Estimate	  The	  Financial	  Flow	  Of	  Transnational	  Crime	  Using	  the	  MIMIC	  method.”	  	  156	  Bafella,	  Busato,	  and	  Argentiero,	  “Using	  Dynamic	  Macroeconomics	  for	  Estimating	  Money	  Laundering:	  A	  Simulation	  for	  the	  EU,	  Italy	  and	  the	  United	  States,”	  222.	  157	  Baker,	  Capitalism's	  Achilles	  Heel.	  172	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volume	  of	  money	  laundering	  for	  20	  OECD	  countries	  in	  2006	  amounted	  to	  US$	  603	  billion.158	  Another	  statistic	  for	  the	  same	  year	  held	  that	  between	  US$858	  and	  1056	  billion	  left	  the	  developing	  countries	  illegally.159	  Washington-­‐based	  NGO	  Global	  Financial	  Integrity	  contended	  that	  between	  2004	  and	  2013,	  illicit	  financial	  flows	  from	  developing	  countries	  totaled	  an	  estimated	  US$7.8	  trillion.160	  Not	  all	  of	  these	  transferred	  funds	  necessarily	  originated	  with	  illegal	  activities,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  illicit	  flows	  have	  “serious,	  systematic	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  development	  of	  many	  of	  the	  poorest	  countries.”161	  	  
The	  Term	  and	  the	  Concept	  The	  term	  money	  laundering	  itself	  is	  “of	  recent	  and	  debated	  origin.”162	  In	  some	  circles,	  it	  is	  believed	  to	  have	  derived	  from	  the	  activities	  of	  early	  20th	  century	  American	  organized	  crime.	  Gangsters,	  including	  those	  affiliated	  with	  La	  Cosa	  Nostra	  and	  its	  various	  wings	  (such	  as	  the	  Chicago	  “Outfit”	  of	  Al	  Capone	  infamy),	  disguised	  their	  income	  sources	  by	  means	  of	  taking	  over	  and	  operating	  “business	  with	  high	  cash	  turnovers	  such	  as	  launderettes	  and	  car	  washes.	  Then	  they	  mingled	  their	  dirty	  cash	  with	  genuine	  clean	  cash	  receipts.	  This,	  whilst	  ‘laundering’	  today	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  washing	  of	  criminal	  funds,	  the	  original	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  related	  to	  the	  very	  real	  business	  of	  washing	  clothes.”163	  One	  scholar	  traces	  money-­‐laundering	  methods	  to	  Ancient	  Babylonia,	  where	  the	  practice	  was	  used	  to	  circumvent	  the	  world's	  first	  tax	  code	  established	  by	  Hammurabi.	  In	  Medieval	  Europe,	  money	  launderers	  disguised	  interest	  charges	  (not	  just	  criminal	  but	  sinful)	  by	  inflating	  exchange	  rates,	  risk-­‐compensation	  premiums,	  or	  late-­‐payment	  penalties.164	  Another	  scholar,	  citing	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary,	  linked	  the	  term	  money	  
laundering	  to	  the	  American	  Watergate	  scandal	  of	  the	  early	  1970s,	  adding	  that	  it	  was	  first	  cited	  in	  a	  US	  court	  in	  a	  1982	  federal	  case	  heard	  in	  Florida.165	  “There	  are	  similar	  terms	  in	  almost	  every	  language”	  –	  riciclaggio	  in	  Italian,	  blanqueo	  in	  Spanish,	  blanchiment	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  Buehn,	  and	  Schneider,	  “A	  Preliminary	  Attempt	  to	  Estimate	  the	  Financial	  Flow	  of	  Transnational	  Crime	  Using	  the	  MIMIC	  Method,”	  183.	  159	  Kar	  and	  Cartwright-­‐Smith,	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flows	  from	  Developing	  Countries:	  2002-­‐2006,	  21-­‐23.	  160	  Kar	  and	  Spanjers,	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flows	  from	  Developing	  Countries:	  2004-­‐2013,	  5,	  8.	  161	  Reuter	  and	  World	  Bank,	  Draining	  Development?,	  458.	  162	  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  laundering	  Control,”	  108.	  163	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  xii-­‐xiii.	  See	  also	  Unger,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Regulation:	  From	  Al	  Capone	  to	  Al	  Qaeda,”	  19.	  A	  literal	  money-­‐laundering	  example	  involves	  the	  Italian	  Red	  Brigades	  of	  the	  1970s,	  who	  discovered	  that	  banknotes	  received	  in	  a	  ransom	  payment	  “had	  all	  been	  stained	  with	  yellow	  ink	  and	  were	  thus	  unusable.	  Unwilling	  to	  give	  up	  the	  money,	  the	  kidnappers	  physically	  washed	  it.	  Three	  people	  spent	  days	  washing	  the	  banknotes	  one	  by	  one	  and	  drying	  them	  with	  a	  hair	  dryer	  in	  a	  damp	  Milan	  basement	  flat.”	  (Koh,	  Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  28,	  citing	  L.	  Napoleoni,	  Modern	  Jihad:	  Tracing	  the	  Dollars	  Behind	  the	  Terror	  Networks	  (London:	  Pluto	  Press,	  2003),	  54	  n.33.	  164	  Naylor,	  Wages	  of	  Crime,	  134-­‐135.	  165	  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  Control,”	  108;	  Robinson,	  The	  
Laundrymen,	  6.	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French.166	  The	  term	  in	  Arabic,	  لﻝسﺱغﻍ	  لﻝاﺍوﻭمﻡأﺃلﻝاﺍ,	  ghasl	  al-­‐amwal,	  literally	  means	  washing	  
money.	  Thus,	  UAE	  financial	  crime	  specialist	  Ibrahim	  Al-­‐Mulla	  entitled	  his	  book	  Al-­‐
muwajaha	  al-­‐jenaeiah	  leqadaya	  ghasl	  al-­‐amwal	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  
Money	  Laundering].	  	  As	  will	  be	  noted	  in	  a	  later	  chapter,	  the	  earliest	  UAE	  code	  concerning	  money	  laundering	  was	  faulted	  for	  its	  vague	  definition.	  However,	  many	  researchers	  contend	  “there	  is	  no	  universal	  or	  comprehensive	  definition	  of	  money	  laundering.”	  The	  variance	  in	  definitions	  is	  explained	  by	  differences	  in	  priorities	  and	  perspectives	  of	  “prosecutors	  and	  criminal	  intelligence	  agencies,	  businesspersons	  and	  companies,	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries.”167	  As	  Unger	  observed:	  “The	  choice	  of	  definition	  might	  also	  depend	  on	  the	  question	  posed.”168	  One	  scholar,	  for	  example,	  defined	  money	  laundering	  “as	  the	  process	  of	  manipulating	  legally	  or	  illegally	  acquired	  wealth	  in	  a	  way	  that	  obscures	  its	  existence,	  origin	  or	  ownership	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  avoiding	  law	  enforcement.”169	  Another	  concisely	  held	  that	  “criminal	  laundering	  is	  any	  concealing	  of	  the	  proceeds	  of	  crime.”170	  Another	  pointed	  out	  that	  before	  defining	  money	  laundering	  it	  has	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  a	  business	  function.	  In	  this	  view:	  “Money	  laundering	  in	  the	  criminal	  sense	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  criminal	  or	  illicit	  funds	  and	  assigns	  criminal	  liability	  to	  otherwise	  legitimate	  business	  practices.”	  The	  author	  explains	  further:	  “As	  a	  business	  activity,	  money	  laundering	  can	  further	  be	  divided	  between	  those	  who	  are	  ‘‘self-­‐employed,’’	  who	  launder	  funds	  for	  their	  own	  use,	  and	  ‘‘service	  providers’’	  who	  do	  it	  for	  others.171	  	  The	  internationally	  accepted	  definition	  of	  money	  laundering	  as	  an	  offence	  is	  that	  of	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  1988	  Vienna	  Convention.	  Its	  sections	  1(b)(i)	  and	  (ii)	  criminalize	  the	  following:	  	   i)	  The	  conversion	  or	  transfer	  of	  property,	  knowing	  that	  such	  property	  is	  derived	  from	  any	  offence	  or	  offences	  established	  in	  accordance	  with	  subparagraph	  a)	  of	  this	  paragraph	  [which	  set	  forth	  a	  series	  of	  drug-­‐related	  activities],	  or	  from	  an	  act	  of	  participation	  in	  such	  offence	  or	  offences,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  concealing	  or	  disguising	  the	  illicit	  origin	  of	  the	  property	  or	  of	  assisting	  any	  person	  who	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  commission	  of	  such	  an	  offence	  or	  offences	  to	  evade	  the	  legal	  consequence	  of	  his	  actions;	  ii)	  The	  concealment	  or	  disguise	  of	  the	  true	  nature,	  source,	  location,	  disposition,	  movement,	  rights	  with	  respect	  to,	  or	  ownership	  of	  property,	  knowing	  that	  such	  property	  is	  derived	  from	  an	  offence	  or	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  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  Control,”	  108.	  167	  Chaikin,	  “Money	  Laundering:	  An	  Investigatory	  Perspective,”	  468-­‐469.	  	  168	  Unger,	  The	  Scale	  and	  Impact	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  8.	  169	  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  Control,”	  109.	  170	  Levi,	  “Following	  the	  Criminal	  and	  Terrorist	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  Trails,”	  106.	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  Turner,	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  Laundering	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  3-­‐4.	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offences	  established	  in	  accordance	  with	  subparagraph	  a)	  of	  this	  paragraph	  or	  from	  an	  act	  of	  participation	  in	  such	  an	  offence	  or	  offences;172	  Conceptually,	  laws	  that	  target	  money-­‐laundering	  activities	  are	  usually	  aimed,	  not	  at	  that	  process	  itself,	  but	  at	  the	  processes	  from	  which	  such	  funds	  were	  derived.	  (As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  later	  chapter,	  this	  is	  another	  area	  where	  UAE	  lawmakers	  amended	  their	  early	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  based	  on	  concerns	  raised	  by	  outside	  evaluators.)	  Criminalization	  of	  money	  laundering	  “attaches	  criminal	  liability	  to	  acts	  exclusively	  concerned	  with	  the	  financial	  element	  of	  crime.”173	  “Money	  laundering	  law	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  tracing	  and	  retrieving	  a	  particular	  property;	  it	  is	  rather	  concerned	  with	  identifying	  value	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  detecting	  criminal	  activity,	  depriving	  the	  criminals	  of	  the	  value	  of	  their	  illicit	  efforts,	  or	  preventing	  this	  value	  from	  being	  used	  to	  promote	  further	  criminal	  activity.”174	  Hence,	  AML	  efforts	  tend	  to	  specify	  a	  large	  number	  of	  predicate	  offenses,	  the	  latter	  being	  (according	  to	  a	  World	  Bank	  publication)	  “the	  underlying	  criminal	  activity	  that	  generates	  proceeds	  that,	  when	  ‘laundered’,	  …	  lead	  to	  the	  offense	  of	  money	  laundering.	  The	  offense	  of	  money	  laundering	  cannot	  be	  committed	  without	  the	  prior	  commitment	  of	  a	  predicate	  offense	  (or	  underlying	  crime).	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  designate	  many	  crimes	  as	  predicate	  offenses	  for	  money	  laundering,	  so	  that	  the	  crime	  of	  money	  laundering	  can	  be	  used	  to	  fight	  the	  underlying	  crimes.”175	  According	  to	  a	  different	  observer,	  “[t]he	  direct	  effect	  of	  fighting	  money	  laundering	  is	  that	  the	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  have	  a	  second	  chance	  to	  catch	  the	  criminal.	  The	  criminal	  that	  got	  away	  might	  still	  reveal	  himself	  when	  he	  starts	  to	  invest	  the	  money	  he	  made	  from	  his	  crime.	  Even	  if	  the	  police	  are	  unable	  to	  prove	  the	  original	  crime,	  the	  criminal	  can	  still	  be	  convicted	  for	  money	  laundering,	  and	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  crime	  can	  be	  confiscated.”176	  The	  latter	  derives	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  money	  as	  value	  rather	  than	  tangible	  property.	  Though	  money	  is	  largely	  associated	  with	  tangible	  legal	  tender,	  Hudson	  argues,	  “money	  exists	  only	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  value,”	  especially	  evident	  in	  cases	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  markets,	  bank	  transfers,	  cross-­‐border	  transaction,	  etc.”	  According	  to	  Hudson,	  only	  viewing	  money	  as	  value	  allows	  tracing	  rights	  in	  complex	  cross-­‐border	  transactions.177	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  1988,	  3.	  173	  Gallant,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Proceeds	  of	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  13.	  174	  Shams,	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  50.	  175	  World	  Bank,	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism,	  Module	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  176	  Ferwerda,	  “The	  Effects	  of	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  Laundering,”	  38.	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ML	  efforts	  tend	  to	  ignore	  the	  actual	  value	  of	  the	  funds	  being	  laundered,	  and	  to	  define	  the	  offense	  as	  a	  “single	  act”	  rather	  than	  a	  continuous	  series.	  “Imposing	  a	  value	  limitation	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  money	  laundering	  will	  result	  in	  rendering	  money	  laundering	  law	  ineffective	  unless	  money	  laundering	  is	  approached	  as	  a	  continuous	  offence.	  The	  latter	  approach	  would	  increase	  the	  prosecutorial	  burden	  of	  proof	  substantially.”178	  Prosecutions	  for	  money	  laundering	  may	  involve	  mundane	  actions.	  US	  case	  law	  contains	  examples	  of	  money	  laundering	  prosecutions	  arising	  “from	  simple	  transactions	  such	  as,	  purchasing	  a	  vehicle,	  cashing	  stolen	  casino	  chips,	  cashing	  cheques,	  buying	  a	  cabin,	  simple	  wire	  transfers,	  depositing	  in	  bank	  accounts	  and	  drawing	  cheques	  on	  those	  accounts	  and	  using	  safe	  deposits.	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  paying	  the	  cash	  bond	  of	  $2500	  to	  bail	  his	  co-­‐conspirator	  out	  of	  prison	  was	  a	  ‘financial	  transaction’	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  money	  laundering	  statute	  and	  upheld	  the	  Defendant’s	  conviction	  for	  money	  laundering	  on	  [the]	  basis	  of	  this	  act.”179	  
Significance	  as	  a	  Transnational	  Problem	  But	  the	  cash	  involved	  in	  such	  banal	  activities	  may	  stem	  from	  criminal	  activities,	  and	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium	  money	  laundering	  was	  a	  major	  transnational	  issue	  for	  law	  enforcement.	  By	  some	  appraisals,	  it	  had	  become	  an	  enormous	  global	  phenomenon.180	  Informed	  estimates	  placed	  the	  amount	  of	  laundered	  money	  in	  given	  countries	  as	  equal	  to	  significant	  percentages	  of	  their	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP),	  with	  examples	  ranging	  from	  5	  percent	  (Mexico)	  to	  15	  percent	  (Thailand)	  to	  17	  percent	  (USA)	  to	  30	  percent	  (Belarus).181	  The	  only	  figure	  regarding	  the	  extent	  of	  ML	  in	  the	  UAE	  that	  this	  author	  has	  found	  was	  an	  estimate	  that	  as	  of	  2000,	  US$1	  billion	  was	  being	  laundered	  in	  the	  UAE,	  about	  1.32	  percent	  of	  the	  GDP.182	  However,	  this	  figure	  is	  questionable,	  and	  in	  this	  author’s	  view	  is	  likely	  an	  underestimate,	  as	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  2000	  paper	  citing	  unspecified	  press	  reports.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  later	  chapter,	  this	  was	  at	  a	  time	  when	  no	  specific	  AML	  legislation,	  law	  enforcement	  efforts,	  or	  STR	  regimens	  were	  in	  place	  in	  the	  UAE.	  Moreover,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  importance	  to	  AML	  studies	  transcends	  the	  actual	  monetary	  value,	  since	  the	  overall	  size	  of	  the	  UAE	  economy	  is	  considerably	  lower	  than	  that	  of	  the	  developed	  economies.	  A	  more	  recent	  statistic	  from	  2012,	  not	  necessarily	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  180	  For	  a	  discussion	  and	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  see	  Staple,	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  181	  Lilley,	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  31,	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  Alkaabi,	  Mohay,	  McCullagh,	  and	  Chantler,	  “A	  Comparative	  Analysis	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measuring	  money	  laundering	  but	  rather	  illicit	  funds,	  shows	  that	  illicit	  capital	  outflow	  from	  the	  UAE	  amounted	  to	  15	  percent	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP	  in	  the	  period	  of	  2001-­‐2010.183	  The	  latter	  was	  calculated	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  Global	  Financial	  Integrity	  Report	  of	  2012	  and	  has	  not	  been	  empirically	  examined.	  	  	  The	  country’s	  potential	  ML	  situation	  may	  be	  better	  seen	  in	  light	  of	  its	  close	  connections	  to	  questionable	  regimes	  and	  non-­‐state	  players.	  The	  UAE	  has	  figured	  in	  high-­‐profile	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  cases.	  It	  was	  one	  of	  only	  three	  countries	  that	  recognized	  the	  Taliban	  during	  1996-­‐2001	  as	  the	  legitimate	  government	  of	  Afghanistan.	  Al-­‐Qaida	  activists	  were	  reported	  to	  have	  spent	  time	  in	  the	  UAE.	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  UAE	  financial	  network	  used	  to	  help	  finance	  the	  9/11	  attacks,	  but	  two	  of	  the	  11	  hijackers	  involved	  were	  UAE	  nationals.184	  The	  UAE	  also	  figured	  in	  the	  arms	  trafficking	  case	  of	  Viktor	  Bout,	  also	  known	  as	  “The	  Merchant	  of	  Death.185	  From	  1993-­‐2002	  Bout	  operated	  from	  Sharjah	  and	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah,	  transporting	  cargo	  and	  arms	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  to	  Africa	  via	  the	  Middle	  East.186	  Bout	  himself	  described	  Sharjah	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  operation	  there	  as	  a	  place	  with	  "practically	  no	  law."187	  As	  a	  reminder	  of	  his	  presence,	  one	  of	  his	  planes	  mysteriously	  left	  in	  the	  desert	  can	  still	  be	  seen	  today.188	  The	  UAE	  has	  also	  the	  reputation	  of	  being	  a	  convenient	  hiding	  place	  for	  money	  launderers.	  As	  one	  source	  observed:	  “many	  wanted	  men	  reside	  in	  Dubai.”189	  A	  man	  wanted	  by	  India	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  12	  March	  1993	  Bombay	  Exchange	  bombings	  operated	  out	  of	  Dubai	  from	  1984.	  In	  2003	  the	  US	  and	  UN	  declared	  his	  involvement	  in	  narcotics	  smuggling	  and	  terrorist	  financing.190	  Among	  the	  latest	  to	  be	  publicly	  named	  is	  the	  mastermind	  or	  “the	  Controller”	  of	  a	  drug	  trafficking	  gang,	  charged	  with	  laundering	  £180	  million,	  who	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  based	  in	  Dubai.191	  	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  base	  one’s	  operations	  in	  the	  UAE.	  One	  can	  either	  pay	  a	  local	  businessman	  to	  use	  his	  business	  name,	  or	  enter	  into	  a	  partnership	  with	  a	  UAE	  national.	  In	  the	  latter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183	  Mossadak	  and	  Lahlou,	  “Empirical	  Investigation	  on	  the	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flow	  from	  MENA	  Region,”	  7.	  184	  Katzman,	  The	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (UAE):	  Issues	  for	  U.S.	  Policy,	  6.	  	  185	  Austin,	  “Illicit	  Arms	  Brokers,”	  203-­‐216.	  	  186	  Landesman,	  “Arms	  and	  the	  Man,”	  28-­‐57.	  187	  Schmidle,	  “Disarming	  Viktor	  Bout,”	  54.	  188	  Dennehy,	  "Shrouded	  in	  Mystery:	  The	  Russian	  Cargo	  Plane	  Abandoned	  in	  Umm	  Al	  Quwain."	  189	  Mathiason,	  “Dubai's	  Dark	  Side	  Targeted	  by	  International	  Finance	  Police.”	  190	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  the	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  Asian	  Criminal	  Network	  ‘D	  Company’”;	  Weinstein,	  “Mumbai's	  Development	  Mafias,”	  22-­‐39;	  Uncredited	  in	  The	  Telegraph,	  “Who’s	  Afraid	  of	  Dawood	  Ibrahim”;	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  “Security	  Council	  ISIL	  (Da’esh)	  and	  Al-­‐Qaida	  Sanctions	  Committee	  Amends	  One	  Entry	  on	  Its	  Sanctions	  List.”	  191	  Earlam	  and	  Armstrong,	  “Top	  Boss	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  Cash	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  Net	  After	  NCA	  Arrest	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arrangement,	  the	  local	  businessman	  will	  own	  at	  least	  51	  percent	  of	  the	  business192,	  while	  the	  other	  partner	  can	  undetectably	  fund	  the	  entire	  business.	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  reports:	  “There	  is	  often	  no	  record	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  foreign	  partner”	  making	  it	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  identify	  beneficial	  owners	  of	  businesses	  or	  assets.	  193	  The	  MENA/FATF	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report	  of	  2008	  confirms	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  procedure	  for	  declaration	  and	  verification	  of	  beneficial	  ownership	  when	  companies	  are	  registered	  in	  the	  UAE.	  It	  points:	  “there	  is	  clearly	  a	  considerable	  risk	  that	  foreign	  investors	  will	  seek	  to	  use	  nominees	  to	  hold	  the	  minimum	  51%	  equity	  that	  must	  be	  registered	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  UAE	  national.”194	  	  A	  Europol	  2013	  SOCTA	  (Serious	  and	  Organised	  Crime	  Threat	  Assessment)	  report	  classifies	  the	  UAE	  as	  a	  major	  segment	  in	  the	  drug	  trafficking	  route	  from	  East	  and	  South	  Africa	  to	  EU.195	  According	  to	  a	  2016	  International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Strategy	  Report	  (INCSR)	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State:	  “A	  portion	  of	  the	  money	  laundering/terrorist	  financing	  (ML/TF)	  activity	  in	  the	  UAE	  is	  likely	  related	  to	  proceeds	  from	  illegal	  narcotics	  produced	  in	  Southwest	  Asia.”196	  The	  most	  recent	  case	  of	  a	  major	  drug-­‐smuggling	  ring	  arrest	  was	  reported	  in	  a	  local	  paper	  on	  23	  January	  2017.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  seized	  drugs	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  AED	  46	  million	  (approximately	  US$12.5	  million).197	  In	  the	  same	  SOCTA	  report	  cited	  above,	  the	  UAE,	  and	  Dubai	  specifically,	  were	  identified	  as	  “an	  important	  location	  for	  VAT	  (Value	  Added	  Tax)	  fraudsters	  and	  money	  launderers”	  and	  “a	  source,	  transit	  and	  storage	  area	  for	  cigarettes	  and	  counterfeit	  goods	  destined	  for	  the	  EU.”198	  (As	  will	  be	  seen,	  the	  UAE	  has	  also	  been	  accused	  of	  facilitating	  illicit	  fund	  transfers,	  hence	  further	  enabling	  overall	  growth	  of	  transnational	  crime.)	  	  On	  a	  global	  level,	  in	  March	  1998	  it	  was	  estimated	  “that	  money	  laundering	  amounted	  to	  between	  2	  and	  5	  per	  cent	  of	  world	  GDP:	  in	  other	  words	  between	  $1	  and	  3	  trillion.”199	  Currently,	  the	  actual	  figures	  of	  worldwide	  money	  laundering	  are	  still	  hotly	  debated.200	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1984	  concerning	  Commercial	  Companies.	  	  193	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  “International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Strategy	  Report.”	  194	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  123.	  195	  Europol,	  Serious	  and	  Organised	  Crime	  Threat	  Assessment,	  6.	  	  196	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice:	  International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Strategy	  Report	  (INCSR),	  Volume	  II:	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Financial	  Crime,	  Countries/Jurisdictions	  of	  Primary	  Concern:	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  	  197	  Ali,	  “Drugs	  Worth	  Dh46m	  Seized	  in	  Sharjah.”	  198	  Europol,	  Serious	  and	  Organised	  Crime	  Threat	  Assessment,	  6,	  13.	  199	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  32.	  200	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  entries	  in	  Part	  V	  (159-­‐250)	  of	  Unger	  and	  van	  den	  Linde,	  eds.,	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  Money	  Laundering,	  
passim.	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some	  cases,	  global	  money	  laundering	  estimates	  have	  dwarfed	  the	  annual	  money	  turnover	  of	  corporations	  such	  as	  General	  Motors	  and	  the	  GDP	  of	  countries	  such	  as	  Switzerland.201	  It	  is	  challenging	  to	  compute	  the	  actual	  annual	  value	  for	  laundered	  money	  because	  it	  encompasses	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  criminal	  activities	  generating	  and	  profiting	  from	  or	  otherwise	  utilizing	  the	  laundered	  money,	  including	  drug	  trafficking,	  arms	  sales,	  prostitution,	  pornography,	  terrorism,	  corruption,	  fraud,	  forgery,	  large-­‐scale	  money	  and	  car	  theft,	  theft,	  blackmail	  and	  extortion,	  art	  and	  antique	  fraud,	  smuggling,	  human	  trafficking,	  and	  tax	  evasion.202	  One	  author	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  1990s,	  only	  a	  relative	  handful	  of	  cases	  were	  reported	  to	  the	  relevant	  authorities,	  since	  many	  of	  the	  “red	  flags”	  of	  money	  laundering	  were	  not	  understood.	  The	  same	  author,	  examining	  the	  reporting	  of	  suspicious	  transactions203	  from	  certain	  countries	  in	  the	  1990s,	  felt	  the	  numbers	  fell	  far	  short	  of	  the	  likely	  reality	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  same	  author	  summed	  up	  the	  issue	  by	  concluding	  that	  “it	  is	  not	  the	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  that	  are	  at	  fault:	  these	  reports	  are	  generated	  by	  banks,	  professionals	  and	  business.”204	  The	  latter	  phenomenon	  has	  been	  prevailing	  in	  the	  UAE.	  There	  are	  no	  available	  STR	  statistics	  in	  the	  UAE	  prior	  to	  2004.	  The	  1999	  HSBC	  case,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  later	  chapter,	  demonstrates	  that	  most	  finance	  professionals	  were	  unaware	  of	  their	  legal	  obligation,	  mandated	  by	  the	  1987	  law,	  to	  report	  suspicions	  activities	  to	  the	  authorities.	  Even	  later	  on,	  STR	  data	  from	  2012	  showed	  that	  only	  seven	  banks	  produced	  over	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  filed	  STRs,	  while	  15	  out	  of	  40	  banks	  did	  not	  file	  any	  STRs	  at	  all.205	  We	  can	  only	  speculate	  that	  these	  were	  large	  international	  banks,	  which	  are	  inspected	  under	  closer	  scrutiny	  because	  of	  their	  multiple	  regulatory	  obligations	  in	  different	  jurisdictions	  including	  their	  license	  issuing	  countries.	  That	  observation	  underscores	  the	  fact	  that	  banks,	  businesses,	  and	  financial	  firms	  themselves	  are,	  wittingly	  or	  not,	  significant	  players	  in	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  process.	  And	  their	  level	  of	  activity	  or	  passivity	  in	  scrutiny	  of	  transactions,	  accounts,	  and	  exchange	  and	  transfer	  of	  funds	  is	  key	  in	  helping	  law	  enforcement	  efforts	  at	  eradicating	  financial	  crime.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  32.	  202	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  7-­‐8.	  203	  As	  defined	  in	  the	  US	  Money	  Laundering	  Control	  Act	  of	  1986,	  “the	  term	  ‘transaction’	  includes	  a	  purchase,	  sale,	  loan,	  pledge,	  gift,	  transfer,	  delivery,	  or	  other	  disposition,	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  financial	  institution	  includes	  a	  deposit,	  withdrawal,	  transfer	  between	  accounts,	  exchange	  of	  currency,	  loan,	  extension	  of	  credit,	  purchase	  or	  sale	  of	  any	  stock,	  bond,	  certificate	  of	  deposit,	  or	  other	  monetary	  instrument,	  use	  of	  a	  safe	  deposit	  box,	  or	  any	  other	  payment,	  transfer,	  or	  delivery	  by,	  through,	  or	  to	  a	  financial	  institution,	  by	  whatever	  means	  effected”	  (18	  USC	  §1959a©(3).	  204	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  33-­‐34.	  205	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  38.	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This	  research	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  paradigm	  that	  fighting	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  crimes	  reflects	  and	  is	  guided	  by	  each	  country’s	  self-­‐interest:	  to	  protect	  its	  financial	  system	  and	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  from	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  criminal	  abuse.	  The	  generally	  accepted	  rationale	  (put	  forward	  by	  international,	  intergovernmental	  and	  supranational	  organizations	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  developed	  Western	  countries)	  promulgates	  the	  negative	  effects	  money	  laundering	  has	  on	  the	  world’s	  economy,	  security	  and	  societies.	  As	  Stessens	  writes:	  “Money	  laundering	  is	  rightly	  considered	  as	  a	  derivative	  from	  predicate	  (often	  organised)	  crime	  activities	  and	  as	  such	  it	  is	  able	  to	  spread	  the	  detrimental	  consequences	  of	  these	  criminal	  activities	  to	  many	  parts	  of	  society.”	  Stessens	  continues	  that	  due	  to	  its	  “corruptive	  influence	  on	  financial	  markets	  and	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  public's	  confidence	  in	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  it	  may	  entail,	  money	  laundering	  creates	  a	  certain	  risk	  of	  inherent	  instability	  for	  the	  world	  economy	  and	  even	  a	  potential	  for	  organised	  crime	  groups	  to	  destabilize	  a	  national	  economy.”206	  Another	  scholar,	  Unger,	  lists	  25	  effects	  of	  money	  laundering,	  including	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  crime,	  “which	  is	  the	  loss	  to	  the	  victims	  and	  gain	  to	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  crime.”	  The	  rest	  are	  considered	  indirect	  effects,	  which	  can	  be	  economic,	  social	  or	  political	  in	  nature.	  The	  researcher	  breaks	  these	  effects	  into	  two	  groups:	  short	  and	  long-­‐term.	  The	  short-­‐term	  effects,	  according	  to	  Unger,	  happen	  within	  one	  to	  two	  years	  and	  are	  predominantly	  economic,	  causing	  distortions	  of	  consumption,	  savings	  and	  investment,	  affecting	  financial,	  public	  and	  monetary	  sectors.	  The	  long-­‐term	  effects	  can	  be	  detected	  after	  more	  than	  four	  years,	  by	  when	  the	  economy	  is	  dominated	  by	  large-­‐scale	  criminal	  presences	  as	  a	  result	  of	  growing	  corruption.	  207	  	  	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  another	  school	  of	  thought	  exists	  that	  questions	  the	  necessity	  of	  stringent	  AML	  policies.	  It	  doubts	  ML	  has	  an	  overall	  negative	  effect	  on	  economic	  development,	  and	  challenges	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  and	  even	  the	  motives	  for	  AML	  policy	  implementation.	  This	  argument	  has	  arisen	  naturally	  given	  the	  interdisciplinary	  nature	  of	  AML/CFT,	  involving	  input	  from	  legal	  scholars,	  economists,	  social	  scientists	  and	  international	  organizations.	  It	  is	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  debate	  of	  the	  role	  of	  law	  as	  a	  moderator	  of	  human	  behavior.	  The	  “Law	  and	  Economics”	  movement	  of	  the	  later	  20th	  century	  applied	  economic	  reasoning	  to	  law,	  grounded	  in	  the	  proposition	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  Stessens,	  Money	  Laundering,	  84,	  87.	  207	  Unger,	  The	  Scale	  and	  Impact	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  109-­‐174.	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that	  “People	  respond	  to	  incentives.”208	  It	  has	  been	  applied	  for	  understanding	  and	  assessing	  law	  and	  policy	  through	  the	  utility	  rationalization	  lens.209	  Scholars	  varied	  on	  the	  incentive	  effects	  of	  law.	  Some	  thought	  that	  only	  punishments	  and	  rewards	  matter;	  some	  felt	  law	  influenced	  behavior	  in	  other	  ways;	  others	  felt	  behavior	  can	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  noneconomic,	  social	  variables	  which	  trigger	  conscience	  the	  same	  way	  law	  has	  to	  be	  used	  to	  do.	  An	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  position	  has	  been	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  legal	  scholar	  Stout,	  who	  noted:	  “The	  belief	  that	  material	  reward	  and	  punishments	  are	  the	  best	  and	  possibly	  only	  way	  to	  change	  human	  ways	  dominates	  public	  policy	  and	  many	  private	  institutions	  as	  well.”	  In	  her	  opinion,	  these	  institutions	  should	  instead	  be	  directed	  toward	  cultivating	  human	  consciences.210	  	  Crime	  and	  law	  enforcement	  has	  attracted	  academic	  attention	  from	  economists,	  who	  have	  examined	  it	  from	  an	  individual	  decision-­‐making	  process	  entailing	  choosing	  between	  criminal	  and	  non-­‐criminal	  activities.	  This	  decision	  process	  has	  been	  captured	  in	  formal	  mathematical	  modeling,	  initially	  by	  Becker,	  and	  consequently	  developed	  into	  the	  “economics	  of	  crime”	  theory.	  The	  deterrence	  hypothesis	  dominated	  the	  academic	  discussion.	  The	  ultimate	  question	  Becker	  posed	  involved	  what	  level	  of	  resources	  and	  how	  much	  punishment	  should	  be	  used	  to	  enforce	  deterrent	  laws,	  the	  goal	  being	  to	  determine	  optimal	  policies	  to	  combat	  illegal	  behavior.211	  Levitt	  used	  a	  similar	  approach	  in	  his	  study	  of	  juvenile	  crime,	  establishing	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  juvenile	  crime	  rate	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  punishment.	  His	  results	  demonstrated	  that	  juvenile	  crime	  is	  responsive	  to	  harsher	  sanction.212	  	  	  Economists	  tend	  to	  approach	  policy	  issues,	  Langsburg	  observes,	  by	  analyzing	  costs	  and	  benefits.213	  Accordingly,	  Ehrlich	  has	  used	  a	  “market	  model”	  which	  provides	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  societies	  cannot	  rely	  exclusive	  on	  harsh	  sanctions	  to	  achieve	  crime	  control,	  and	  that	  the	  marginal	  efficacy	  of	  positive	  incentives	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  deterrent	  effect	  on	  offenders.214	  He	  has	  found	  that	  individuals	  choose	  to	  commit	  crimes	  when	  the	  expected	  benefits	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  expected	  costs.215	  Using	  an	  occupational	  choice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208	  Landsburg,	  The	  Armchair	  Economist,	  3.	  209	  Posner,	  Economic	  Analysis	  of	  Law.	  210	  Stout,	  Cultivating	  Conscience,	  40.	  211	  Becker,	  “Crime	  and	  Punishment:	  An	  Economic	  Approach.”	  212	  Levitt,	  “Juvenile	  Crime	  and	  Punishment.”	  213	  Landsburg,	  The	  Armchair	  Economist,	  104.	  214	  Ehrlich,	  “Crime,	  Punishment,	  and	  the	  Market	  for	  Offenses.”	  215	  Ehrlich,	  “The	  Market	  Model	  of	  Crime:	  A	  Short	  Review	  and	  New	  Direction.”	  
	  	  	  
48	  
model,	  Ehrlich	  correlated	  crime	  deterrence	  to	  the	  tradeoff	  between	  illegitimate	  and	  legitimate	  activities	  based	  on	  expected	  cost	  and	  benefits	  of	  each,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  punishments.	  He	  suggested	  the	  issue	  is	  whether	  to	  spend	  resources	  to	  enforce	  existing	  laws,	  or	  explore	  alternative	  methods	  to	  combat	  crime.216	  However,	  when	  the	  same	  hypothesis	  was	  tested	  in	  107	  countries	  using	  jurimetrics	  analysis	  in	  the	  context	  of	  organized	  crime,	  the	  results	  contradicted	  Ehrlich’s	  findings.	  Reliance	  on	  traditional	  legal	  sanctions	  to	  counteract	  organized	  crime	  tends	  to	  create	  an	  incentive	  for	  criminal	  groups	  to	  expand	  and	  enhance	  their	  operational	  capacities,	  especially	  when	  judicial	  authorities	  did	  not	  obstruct	  their	  criminal	  assets.	  “This	  constitutes	  the	  paradox	  of	  criminal	  sanctions	  where	  more	  frequent	  and	  stiffer	  punishments	  applied	  to	  physical	  persons	  lead	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  organized	  crime	  and	  higher	  level	  corruption.”217	  	  	  Though	  the	  “economics	  of	  crime”	  field	  has	  produced	  many	  papers,	  few	  studies	  tested	  AML	  policies’	  deterring	  effects	  on	  both	  ML	  acts	  themselves	  and	  predicate	  offences	  as	  preceding	  elements.	  One	  that	  did	  was	  by	  Ferwerda,	  who	  used	  economic	  crime	  modeling	  to	  show	  that	  tougher	  AML	  policies	  and	  better	  international	  cooperation	  could	  reduce	  a	  country’s	  overall	  crime	  rate.218	  Masciandaro's	  “dynamic	  model”	  similarly	  showed	  that	  effective	  AML	  regulations	  and	  their	  enforcement	  resulted	  in	  “an	  increase	  of	  the	  overall	  public	  benefit.”219	  When	  comparing	  regulatory	  enforcement	  with	  criminal	  justice	  process,	  one	  study	  established	  that	  the	  deterrence	  effects	  of	  regulatory	  contraventions	  “can	  adequately	  be	  secured	  by	  non-­‐criminal	  processes,	  provided	  that	  financial	  penalties	  are	  available	  in	  that	  context.”220	  However,	  when	  analyzing	  drug	  markets	  and	  related	  policies,	  one	  author	  noted	  that	  they	  “have	  proven	  to	  be	  highly	  law	  enforcement-­‐resistant.”221	  Following	  this	  logic,	  effective	  regulations	  have	  to	  take	  into	  account	  continuously	  changing	  criminal	  behavior.	  	  Another	  study,	  grounded	  in	  the	  economics	  of	  crime	  theory,	  states	  that	  since	  criminals	  are	  profit-­‐motivated,	  the	  mere	  availability	  of	  services	  to	  conceal	  criminal	  sources	  of	  profits	  “is	  a	  key	  determinant	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  criminal	  output	  in	  a	  society.”	  It	  concluded	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that	  in	  a	  globalized	  setting,	  where	  predicate	  crime	  and	  laundering	  of	  its	  profits	  can	  easily	  be	  separated,	  “some	  countries	  have	  a	  higher	  incentive	  not	  only	  to	  tolerate	  money	  laundering,	  but	  to	  actively	  attract	  it.”	  The	  same	  study	  suggested:	  “...small	  countries	  are	  better	  positioned	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  their	  larger	  and	  more	  developed	  neighbours,	  because	  they	  obtain	  relatively	  more	  benefits,	  at	  a	  relatively	  lower	  share	  of	  the	  total	  social	  costs.	  Small,	  developing	  or	  transitional	  economies	  –	  which	  are	  often	  otherwise	  unattractive	  to	  legitimate	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  sources	  –	  have,	  we	  suggested,	  a	  lot	  to	  gain	  by	  attracting	  illicit	  criminal	  proceeds	  –	  that	  is,	  by	  opening	  dancing	  with	  the	  devil	  –	  and	  very	  little	  to	  lose	  from	  doing	  so.”	  222	  	  This	  underscores	  the	  fact	  that	  large	  developed	  countries	  bear	  the	  largest	  threat	  and	  cost	  from	  ML,	  while	  “	  the	  smaller	  countries	  bare	  the	  majority	  of	  benefits.”223	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  “not	  all	  countries	  will	  attempt	  to	  court	  criminal	  capital,	  because	  for	  some	  countries	  –	  the	  larger	  legitimate	  economies	  –	  the	  costs	  of	  doing	  so	  will	  outweigh	  the	  benefits.”224	  Unger,	  who	  listed	  25	  effects	  of	  ML,	  also	  admitted	  that	  there	  could	  be	  positive	  growth	  effects	  from	  it	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  country	  establishes	  itself	  as	  a	  
transit	  entrepôt	  attracting	  both	  criminal	  and	  lawful	  financial	  flows	  while	  keeping	  “externalities”	  outside	  of	  its	  jurisdiction.	  According	  to	  Unger,	  “for	  every	  one	  billion	  of	  additional	  laundered	  currency	  ...	  there	  will	  be	  0.1	  percent	  increase	  in	  annual	  growth,”	  as	  long	  as	  predicate	  offences	  generating	  these	  funds	  are	  only	  committed	  outside	  the	  country’s	  borders.225	  There	  are	  some	  who	  contend	  this	  phenomenon	  may	  help	  explain	  the	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  of	  the	  UAE	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000.	  One	  study	  concluded	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  AML	  laws	  in	  the	  Gulf	  countries	  (Saudi	  Arabia,	  Kuwait,	  Qatar,	  Bahrain,	  UAE	  and	  Oman)	  resulted	  in	  decreased	  GDP,	  suggesting	  that	  money	  laundering	  partially	  contributed	  to	  the	  UAE’s	  GDP	  prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  ML	  laws.	  It	  observes:	  “with	  the	  adoption	  of	  this	  [AML]	  law	  the	  GDP	  decreases	  and	  a	  partial	  part	  of	  illicit	  money	  have	  changed	  destination.”226	  Money	  laundering	  investigators	  frequently	  point	  to	  Dubai	  as	  a	  major	  centre	  for	  nesting	  criminal	  funds,	  whether	  it	  is	  US$1	  billion	  of	  funds	  looted	  from	  Afghanistan’s	  Kabul	  Bank,	  or	  the	  large	  portion	  of	  US$230	  million	  stole	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by	  a	  Russian	  official	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  Magnitsky	  case.227	  In	  2009	  Peters	  labeled	  the	  UAE	  “the	  financial	  world’s	  Wild	  West.”228	  	  Considering	  the	  above,	  some	  have	  questioned	  whether	  international	  attention	  should	  be	  focused	  on	  deterring	  the	  benefiting	  countries	  from	  welcoming	  criminal	  investments	  by	  giving	  them	  incentives	  to	  tighten	  their	  AML	  controls.229	  One	  question	  that	  can	  be	  asked	  in	  this	  context	  is	  how	  much	  threat	  ML	  actually	  poses	  to	  countries	  considering	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  range	  of	  ML	  as	  a	  legal	  concept,	  the	  accuracy	  of	  officially	  reported	  ML	  volumes,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  accepted	  methodology.230	  Naylor	  claims	  inflated	  numbers	  are	  politically	  motivated,	  and	  notes	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  ML	  figures	  and	  on	  the	  practice’s	  impact	  on	  society:	  Everyone	  agrees	  with	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  that	  criminals	  should	  not	  profit	  from	  their	  crimes.	  However,	  beyond	  that	  basic	  conviction,	  there	  is	  no	  real	  agreement	  about	  how	  large	  the	  problem	  of	  criminal	  money	  flows	  really	  is;	  about	  why	  society	  is	  actually	  worse	  off	  when	  criminals,	  rather	  than	  legitimate	  business	  people,	  consume,	  save,	  or	  invest;	  or	  about	  what	  level	  of	  collateral	  damage	  society	  should	  be	  called	  on	  to	  accept	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  war	  on	  crime	  profit.231	  One	  study	  found	  rich	  western	  EU	  countries	  “the	  most	  vulnerable/attractive”	  to	  dirty	  money,	  while	  poorer	  EU	  countries	  were	  significantly	  less	  threatened.232	  Another	  suggested	  that	  “because	  smaller	  economies	  are	  better	  able	  to	  insulate	  themselves	  from	  the	  costs	  of	  crime,	  smaller	  countries	  bear	  a	  smaller	  share	  of	  the	  total	  costs	  relative	  to	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  investment	  that	  money	  laundering	  offers,	  and	  so	  have	  a	  higher	  incentive	  to	  tolerate	  money	  laundering.”233	  Researchers	  have	  also	  questioned	  whether	  AML	  (and	  CFT)	  policies	  actually	  reduced	  predicate	  crime,	  and	  their	  general	  cost-­‐effectiveness.234	  One	  study	  emphasized	  the	  broad	  cost	  centers	  of	  an	  AML	  regime	  by	  breaking	  it	  into	  three	  categories:	  borne	  by	  the	  government;	  by	  private	  sector	  companies;	  and	  by	  private	  citizens.235	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  multiple	  studies	  have	  attempted	  to	  calculate	  the	  costs	  of	  such	  AML/CFT	  regimes,	  but	  acknowledge	  that	  such	  figures	  are	  based	  only	  on	  estimates	  due	  to	  the	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  quantifying	  the	  costs.	  Reuter	  and	  Truman	  roughly	  estimated	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  US	  AML	  regime	  in	  2003	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  Dawson,	  “Corrupt	  Money	  Hides	  in	  Dubai,	  Officials	  Turn	  Blind	  Eye	  –	  Eva	  Joly”;	  Ashin,	  “Dirty	  Money,	  Real	  Pain,”	  39.	  	  228	  Peters,	  Seeds	  of	  Terror,	  168.	  229	  Gnutzmann,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Unger,	  “Dancing	  with	  the	  Devil.”	  230	  See,	  for	  example,	  van	  Duyne,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Policy,”	  75. 231	  Naylor,	  Wages	  of	  Crime,	  286.	  232	  Brettl,	  “Measuring	  Money	  Laundering	  Threat,”	  95.	  233	  Gnutzmann,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Unger,	  “Dancing	  with	  the	  Devil,”	  247.	  234	  Sharman,	  The	  Money	  Laundry,	  37.	  235	  Reuter	  and	  Truman,	  Chasing	  Dirty	  Money.	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was	  $7	  billion.236	  One	  study	  qualified	  its	  cost	  calculations	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  USA	  using	  “Low,”	  “Best,”	  and	  “Top”	  estimates.237	  Due	  to	  lack	  of	  core	  data	  on	  direct	  cost	  allocation	  in	  AML/CFT	  compliance,	  a	  2014	  KPMG	  survey	  measured	  its	  perception.	  Based	  on	  their	  findings,	  the	  cost	  of	  AML	  compliance	  for	  banking	  institutions	  was	  rising	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  53	  percent,	  eight	  percentage	  points	  higher	  than	  in	  2011.	  The	  same	  study	  found	  this	  hike	  largely	  due	  to	  increasing	  expenditures	  in	  mandated	  by	  regulators’	  transaction-­‐monitoring	  systems.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  latter,	  according	  to	  the	  same	  survey,	  has	  declined	  since	  2011.238	  If	  so,	  why	  do	  banks	  continue	  spending	  on	  compliance?	  According	  to	  several	  senior	  bankers,	  “the	  fact	  they	  had	  spent	  massively	  on	  compliance	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  defense	  if	  any	  compliance	  issues	  arise	  –	  regardless	  of	  whether	  their	  spending	  was	  efficient	  or	  effective.”	  One	  bank	  insider	  admitted	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  Financial	  Times	  that	  overspending	  is	  a	  potential	  issue	  in	  compliance.239	  While	  large	  financial	  institutions	  can	  bear	  the	  growing	  compliance	  cost,	  small	  community	  banks	  are	  experiencing	  a	  backlash.	  A	  2015	  American	  Banker	  survey	  reported	  that	  more	  than	  46	  percent	  of	  American	  small	  banks	  surveyed	  had	  to	  reduce	  product	  offerings,	  including	  loan	  and	  deposit	  accounts,	  due	  to	  increased	  spending	  for	  regulatory	  compliance	  functions.	  The	  same	  survey	  also	  found	  that	  because	  of	  high	  compliance	  costs,	  customer	  service	  had	  suffered	  as	  community	  banks	  struggled	  to	  comply	  with	  growing	  regulations	  and	  fewer	  staff.240	  One	  author	  notes	  that	  the	  institutions	  are	  expanding	  compliance	  to	  protect	  themselves	  “ironically	  from	  the	  police	  rather	  than	  from	  the	  client,”	  risking	  a	  paranoiac	  approach	  that	  would	  diminish	  service	  and	  responsibility	  toward	  customers.241	  While	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  “formal	  AML	  enforcements	  are	  significantly	  related	  to	  bank	  failures”	  and	  that	  bank	  customers	  discipline	  noncompliant	  banks,	  the	  bank	  regulators	  “may	  be	  the	  only	  police	  of	  banks’	  AML	  obligations.”242	  As	  a	  result,	  “the	  need	  to	  have	  in	  place	  rigorous	  and	  effective	  systems	  designed	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  the	  relevant	  [regulatory]	  provisions	  is	  paramount,"	  for	  all	  regulated	  institutions.243	  Bank	  employees	  are	  expected	  to	  act	  “as	  front	  line	  ‘police’	  or	  financial	  investigators,	  rather	  than	  simply	  aiding	  the	  proper	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  and	  Truman,	  Chasing	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  Berendt,	  and	  Healy,	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  Requirements,	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  Face	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  American	  Banker,	  “Regulatory	  Risk	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  Naylor,	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  272.	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  Banks,”	  13	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authorities.”244	  In	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  failure	  to	  detect	  and	  report	  suspicious	  transactions	  will	  result	  in	  criminal	  charges	  against	  employees	  with	  a	  maximum	  term	  of	  5	  years	  imprisonment	  or	  a	  fine	  or	  both	  on	  indictment.245	  In	  response,	  as	  one	  author	  reports,	  the	  Money	  Laundering	  Reporting	  Officers	  (MLROs)	  in	  the	  UK	  banking	  industry	  are	  driven	  to	  use	  the	  protecting	  strategy	  to	  manage	  conflicting	  pressure	  from	  the	  regulators	  and	  the	  banks,	  rather	  than	  complying	  with	  regulation	  to	  prevent	  money	  laundering.246	  	  Similarly,	  the	  BSA	  imposes	  the	  role	  of	  gatekeeper	  on	  the	  U.S.	  banking	  system.	  Non-­‐compliance	  with	  filing	  suspicious	  activity	  reports	  in	  accordance	  with	  section	  5318(g)	  of	  Title	  31,	  United	  States	  Code247	  will	  result	  in	  “supervisory	  action.”248	  Under	  the	  BSA	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  a	  company’s	  failure	  to	  implement	  and	  maintain	  an	  effective	  AML	  program	  are	  liable	  for	  a	  civil	  money	  penalty	  of	  US	  $25,000	  for	  each	  day	  that	  the	  company	  lack	  an	  effective	  AML	  Program.249	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Treasury	  v.	  Thomas	  Haider	  exemplifies	  a	  larger	  enforcement	  trend	  where	  U.S.	  regulators	  use	  the	  threat	  of	  individual	  liability	  to	  ensure	  corporate	  compliance.	  250	  In	  2014	  FinCEN	  filed	  a	  civil	  enforcement	  action	  in	  New	  York	  federal	  court	  against	  Thomas	  E.	  Haider,	  the	  former	  Chief	  Compliance	  Officer	  of	  MoneyGram	  International,	  Inc.	  (“MoneyGram”),	  seeking	  enforcement	  of	  US$1,000,000	  civil	  money	  penalty	  as	  well	  as	  a	  judicial	  order	  enjoining	  “Haider	  from	  participating,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  affairs	  of	  any	  ‘financial	  institution”	  for	  the	  willful	  violations	  of	  the	  BSA,	  31	  U.S.C.	  §	  5311	  at	  seq.”251	  The	  penalty	  was	  based	  on	  the	  findings	  that	  Haider	  was	  personally	  responsible	  for	  the	  institution’s	  failure	  to	  implement	  and	  maintain	  an	  effective	  AML	  compliance	  program	  and	  to	  file	  timely	  Suspicious	  Activity	  Reports	  (SARs).252	  	  	  The	  U.S.	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	  reported	  that	  “From	  January	  2009	  to	  December	  2015,	  DOJ,	  FinCEN,	  and	  federal	  financial	  regulators	  (the	  Federal	  Reserve,	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  Whitehouse,	  “A	  Brave	  New	  World,”	  144.	  245	  Sections	  330	  of	  Part	  7	  of	  the	  Proceeds	  of	  Crime	  Act	  2002	  (POCA)	  states	  that	  a	  person	  employed	  in	  the	  regulated	  sector	  commits	  an	  offence	  if	  he	  “knows	  or	  suspects	  or	  has	  reasonable	  grounds	  for	  knowing	  or	  suspecting,	  that	  another	  person	  is	  engaged	  in	  money	  laundering”	  and	  he	  “does	  not	  make	  the	  required	  disclosure	  as	  soon	  as	  is	  practicable	  after	  the	  information	  or	  other	  matter	  comes	  to	  him.”	  	  246	  Bello,	  Improving	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Compliance,	  7.	  247	  Unites	  States	  Code,	  Titles	  3,	  Chapter	  31,	  Subchapter	  53,	  §	  5318(g),	  387-­‐388,	  	  248	  12	  CFR	  21.11.	  249	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  Titles	  31,	  Chapter	  31,	  Subchapter	  53,	  §	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  398-­‐401.	  250	  Levy,	  Federal	  Money	  Laundering	  Regulation,	  6-­‐55.	  251	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice	  ,	  “Manhattan	  U.S.	  Attorney	  Sues	  Thomas	  E.	  Haider,	  ….”	  	  252	  The	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Treasury	  v.	  Thomas	  E.	  Haider,	  United	  States	  District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  18	  December,	  2014.	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FDIC,	  OCC,	  and	  SEC),	  assessed	  about	  $5.2	  billion	  and	  collected	  about	  $5.1	  billion	  in	  penalties,	  fines,	  and	  forfeitures	  for	  various	  BSA	  violations.”	  These	  included	  the	  failure	  to	  develop	  and	  implement	  adequate	  AML	  programs,	  to	  identify	  and	  report	  suspicious	  activities,	  and	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  record-­‐keeping	  and	  retention	  requirements.	  253	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  legislations,	  the	  UAE’s	  New	  AML	  Law	  establishes	  that	  chairmen,	  directors,	  managers	  and	  employees	  of	  financial	  institutions	  may	  be	  personally	  subject	  to	  criminal	  punishment	  (imprisonment	  and/or	  fine)	  for	  failing	  to	  inform	  the	  Financial	  Information	  Unit	  in	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  any	  money	  laundering	  offence	  occurring	  within	  their	  institution.	  Article	  (15)	  of	  the	  law	  sets	  the	  fines	  and	  imprisonment	  sentence	  of	  unspecified	  duration	  for	  individuals	  for	  refraining	  from	  informing	  the	  Financial	  Information	  Unit	  despite	  of	  their	  awareness	  “of	  any	  offence,	  occurred	  within	  the	  establishments	  thereof;	  relating	  to	  money	  laundering,	  terrorism	  and	  terrorist	  organizations	  financing.”	  Notably,	  mere	  suspicion	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  a	  criminal	  offence	  to	  be	  committed.	  An	  accused	  has	  to	  be	  "aware	  of	  any	  offence”	  and	  fail	  to	  report	  it.254	  The	  latter	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  administrative	  sanctions	  for	  the	  breach	  of	  the	  regulatory	  requirements,	  where	  the	  suspicion	  test,	  not	  the	  actual	  knowledge,	  is	  employed.	  Moreover,	  the	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  AML	  regulations	  can	  still	  potentially	  constitute	  a	  crime.	  Article	  (19)	  of	  the	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002	  stipulates	  penalties	  for	  breaches	  of	  “any	  of	  the	  other	  provisions	  herein.”	  Violations	  under	  this	  provision	  are	  punishable	  either	  by	  imprisonment	  for	  an	  unspecified	  term	  or	  a	  fine.255	  Considering	  that	  the	  New	  AML	  Law	  did	  not	  amend	  Article	  (19)	  while	  adding	  Article	  (12bis),	  which	  imposes	  an	  obligation	  upon	  supervised	  entities	  to	  comply	  with	  money	  laundering	  regulations	  and	  directives,	  including	  reporting	  of	  suspicious	  transactions,	  a	  mere	  breach	  of	  AML/CFT	  regulations	  could	  potentially	  constitute	  a	  criminal	  offence	  under	  Article	  (19).256	  Though	  at	  the	  present	  time	  Article	  (19)	  has	  not	  been	  invoked	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  offers	  a	  prosecuting	  authority	  leeway	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  egregious	  regulatory	  breach.	  The	  Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  (DFSA)	  data	  on	  administrative	  sanctions	  for	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  AML/CFT	  regulations	  demonstrates	  a	  shift	  from	  private	  warnings	  of	  regulatory	  concerns	  to	  monetary	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  US	  Government	  Accountability	  Office,.	  “Financial	  Institutions:	  Fines,	  Penalties,	  and	  Forfeitures	  for	  Violations	  of	  Financial	  Crimes	  and	  Sanctions	  Requirements,”	  Report	  to	  Congressional	  Requester,	  11.	  	  254	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (9)	  of	  2014,	  Article	  (15).	  255	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002,	  Article	  (19).	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  UAE	  Federal	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sanctions;	  257	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  sanctions	  enforced	  on	  individuals.	  In	  2014,	  the	  DFSA	  issued	  four	  private	  warnings,258	  while	  in	  2015	  it	  imposed	  two	  institutional	  fines	  of	  US$640,000	  and	  US$8.4	  million	  and	  an	  individual	  fine	  of	  $45,000	  for	  compliance	  failure.259	  In	  2016	  fines	  of	  US$60,000	  and	  US$85,191	  were	  imposed	  on	  firms	  for	  the	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  AML	  Module	  of	  the	  DFSA	  Rulebook.	  260	  The	  same	  year,	  a	  fine	  of	  US$56,000	  was	  imposed	  on	  two	  individuals	  for	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  AML	  regulatory	  requirements.261	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  scope	  of	  AML	  regulations	  is	  continuously	  expanding.	  As	  Geiger	  and	  Wuensch	  point:	  “Over	  recent	  years,	  the	  strategy	  of	  FATF	  has	  been	  ”more	  of	  everything”:	  to	  move	  the	  fences	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  clean	  world	  shrinks	  and	  the	  criminal	  world	  grows.”262	  The	  burden	  of	  compliance	  has	  spilled	  beyond	  institutional	  boundaries.	  Banks	  are	  expected	  “to	  act	  as	  the	  de	  facto	  regulators”	  of	  its	  customers,	  such	  as	  the	  money	  services	  business	  industry.	  The	  latter	  expectation	  is	  a	  major	  cost	  driver	  and	  a	  cause	  of	  termination	  of	  relationships	  with	  these	  businesses,	  based	  on	  “the	  cost/benefit	  calculus”	  of	  maintaining	  these	  accounts.263	  “The	  cost	  of	  compliance	  is	  increasing	  rapidly	  but	  it	  would	  be	  a	  brave	  person	  who	  steps	  up	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  too	  high	  a	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  countering	  terrorism	  and	  serious	  crime.”264	  The	  financial	  industry	  is	  facing	  the	  risk	  of	  spending	  more	  resources	  on	  preventing	  operational	  risk	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  risk	  itself.265	  It	  is	  generally	  believed	  that	  noncompliance	  leads	  to	  reputational	  damages,	  potential	  penalties	  imposed	  by	  the	  regulator	  on	  the	  financial	  sector	  firms,	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  personal	  liability.	  Since	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  quantify	  the	  impact	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  on	  reputation,	  the	  only	  tangible	  risks	  remaining	  relevant	  are	  prospective	  penalties	  and	  personal	  liability.	  As	  there	  is	  no	  perceived	  reputation	  benefit	  for	  financial	  institutions	  to	  commit	  resources	  in	  money	  laundering	  controls,	  they	  ultimately	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  government-­‐mandated	  compliance.266	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  Harvey	  and	  Lau	  “compliance	  is	  undertaken	  to	  prevent	  a	  negative	  impact	  on,	  rather	  than	  as	  an	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  The	  DFSA	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  over	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  Centre	  (DIFC).	  See	  “DFSA	  in	  Action”	  Vol.	  13,	  1.	  258	  DFSA,	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  Report”	  (2014),	  57.	  259	  DFSA,	  “DFSA	  in	  Action”	  Vol.	  12,	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  “Annual	  Report”	  (2015),	  57.	  260	  DFSA	  (2016).	  Enforceable	  Undertaking,	  Razmala	  Investment	  Bank	  Limited,	  18	  September.	  DFSA	  (2016),	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  Notice,	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  Vol.	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  Kapparath	  Muraleedharan	  and	  Raphael	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  Geiger	  and	  Wuensch,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Money	  Laundering,”	  95.	  263	  Abernathy,	  testimony	  in	  “Bank	  Secrecy	  Act's	  Impact	  on	  Money	  Services	  Businesses.”	  264	  Whitehouse,	  “A	  Brave	  New	  World,”	  144.	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  Saunders	  and	  Cornett,	  Financial	  Institutions	  Management,	  372.	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  “Compliance	  and	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  Money	  Laundering	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enhancement	  to,	  reputation.”267	  Some	  suggest	  that	  reputational	  benefit	  of	  compliance	  is	  in	  providing	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  to	  a	  business	  in	  the	  form	  of	  preferential	  treatment	  by	  the	  regulators	  and	  high	  pressure	  from	  the	  large	  industry	  players.268	  This	  issue	  will	  be	  further	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  8	  of	  this	  doctoral	  thesis	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Compliance	  vs.	  Commitment	  paradigm.	  	  
It	  has	  been	  widely	  reported	  that	  compliance	  costs	  have	  undergone	  a	  “low	  double-­‐digit”	  percentage	  increase	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years,	  but	  “not	  all	  are	  convinced	  that	  the	  new	  rules	  will	  provide	  the	  intended	  transparency.”	  According	  to	  the	  CFO	  of	  a	  Swiss	  private	  bank:	  “I	  think	  we	  served	  our	  clients	  [well]	  before	  all	  these	  regulatory	  changes.	  All	  in	  all,	  I	  don't	  think	  clients	  feel	  the	  change	  in	  regulation	  other	  than	  they	  have	  to	  sign	  more	  forms.”269	  Along	  these	  arguments	  lies	  another	  criticism	  addressing	  the	  disproportionate	  gap	  between	  fewer-­‐than-­‐expected	  convictions,	  accompanied	  by	  the	  low	  volume	  of	  asset	  recovery	  (estimated	  to	  be	  0.2	  percent	  of	  all	  laundered	  funds	  in	  the	  United	  States),	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  AML	  regime.270	  	  
One	  of	  the	  earlier	  criticisms	  of	  a	  unified	  policy	  approach	  to	  ML	  questioned	  its	  applicability	  to	  and	  compatibility	  with	  developing	  countries.	  “The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  application	  of	  AML	  policy	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  often	  a	  question	  of	  going	  through	  the	  motion	  rather	  than	  reducing	  crime.”271	  It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  this	  criticism	  was	  prior	  to	  introduction	  of	  revised	  FATF	  Recommendations,	  which	  now	  take	  into	  account	  risk	  in	  the	  context	  of	  each	  country	  as	  part	  of	  its	  methodology.	  However,	  developing	  countries	  face	  higher	  direct	  and	  indirect	  AML	  costs	  in	  part	  because	  of	  corruption,	  “the	  greatest	  single	  sources	  of	  illicit	  funds	  laundered	  in	  these	  countries.”	  Such	  countries	  are	  not	  going	  to	  eradicate	  internal	  corruption,	  but	  may	  put	  forth	  an	  on-­‐paper	  AML	  regimen	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  off	  the	  FATF	  blacklist	  or	  seek	  to	  improve	  or	  protect	  their	  perception	  internationally.272	  That	  itself	  has	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  discussion	  of	  how	  an	  international	  policy	  establishing	  uniform	  incentives	  and	  punishments	  may	  motivate	  different	  responses	  and	  behaviors	  in	  different	  cultures.	  Penalties	  (in	  the	  AML	  case,	  fines	  imposed	  on	  financial	  institutions),	  introduced	  as	  a	  deterrent,	  can	  be	  treated	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as	  the	  price	  for	  avoiding	  ethical	  obligations.273	  Some	  have	  also	  questioned	  whether	  ML	  fines	  are	  actually	  damaging	  to	  financial	  institution.	  Data	  suggests	  that	  sometimes	  they	  are	  not.	  For	  example,	  UBS,	  which	  in	  2009	  paid	  US$780	  million	  in	  fines	  to	  US	  authorities	  for	  tax	  evasion	  charges,	  recovered	  by	  2014	  its	  previous	  position	  as	  highest	  valued	  private	  banking	  brand	  in	  the	  world.274	  	  Another	  argument	  put	  forward	  is	  that	  ML	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  “victimless	  crime.”	  Therefore	  its	  societal	  impact	  is	  questionable.	  The	  concept	  has	  been	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  political	  debate	  citing	  the	  “libertarian”	  arguments	  of	  philosopher	  John	  Stuart	  Mill.275	  One	  example	  might	  involve	  the	  decriminalization	  of	  drugs.	  The	  argument	  for	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  rationale	  that	  nobody	  is	  harmed	  in	  a	  drug	  transaction	  due	  to	  mutual	  consent	  from	  both	  sides.	  And	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  victimless	  crimes	  should	  be	  decriminalized	  took	  a	  new	  turn	  with	  application	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.276	  	  Decriminalization	  of	  money	  laundering	  as	  a	  result	  of	  liberalization	  of	  drugs,	  according	  to	  Groot,	  should	  be	  researched	  further,	  applying	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.277	  As	  Stessens	  has	  noted,	  “This	  fundamental	  fact	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  victim	  able	  to	  institute	  recovery	  claims	  against	  the	  alleged	  perpetrators	  of	  a	  crime	  has	  had	  a	  number	  of	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  on	  how	  the	  fight	  against	  money	  laundering	  has	  been	  shaped.”278	  In	  his	  latest	  book,	  Alldridge,	  after	  evaluating	  the	  trend	  in	  the	  international	  AML	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  initiative,	  reaches	  a	  conclusion	  that	  they	  serve	  only	  the	  interests	  on	  AML	  industry,	  since	  the	  purported	  issues	  related	  to	  and	  associated	  with	  money	  laundering	  are	  based	  on	  assumptions,	  impossible	  to	  measure,	  and	  hard	  to	  prove.279	  	  
Characteristics	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  As	  the	  act	  of	  laundering	  money	  itself	  usually	  constitutes	  a	  crime	  or	  a	  breach	  of	  banking	  regulations,	  the	  practice	  is	  primarily	  associated	  with	  criminal	  enterprise.280	  As	  noted	  above,	  such	  activities	  may	  include	  illegal	  drug	  trafficking,	  arms	  sales,	  prostitution,	  pornography,	  terrorism,	  corruption,	  fraud,	  forgery,	  large-­‐scale	  money	  and	  car	  theft,	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  What	  Went	  Wrong	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  Laundering	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  280	  As	  discussed	  further	  below,	  when	  HSBC	  officials	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  became	  aware	  of	  money	  laundering	  activities	  in	  several	  accounts	  in	  their	  Sharjah	  branch,	  they	  closed	  the	  accounts	  and	  eventually	  made	  a	  report	  to	  UK	  regulatory	  authorities,	  but	  also	  observed	  that	  no	  local	  laws	  had	  been	  broken,	  as	  (or	  so	  they	  thought)	  no	  money	  laundering	  law	  was	  then	  in	  place.	  Hakim,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11,	  22-­‐29,	  139.	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theft,	  blackmail	  and	  extortion,	  art	  and	  antique	  fraud,	  smuggling,	  human	  trafficking,	  and	  tax	  avoidance.281	  Examples	  “range	  from	  the	  very	  simple,	  e.g.,	  merely	  changing	  to	  larger	  denominations	  street-­‐level	  drug	  money	  to	  reduce	  the	  bulk	  and	  enhance	  portability,	  to	  the	  very	  complex	  involving	  multiple	  electronic	  fund	  transfers,	  use	  of	  false	  documentation	  and	  use	  of	  shell	  companies	  in	  offshore	  jurisdictions.	  …	  [T]he	  degree	  of	  sophistication	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  purpose	  that	  the	  launderer	  is	  seeking	  to	  achieve.”282	  	  While	  money	  laundering	  may	  have	  begun	  as	  a	  local	  activity,	  done	  to	  evade	  detection	  by	  domestic	  tax	  authorities,	  it	  has	  grown	  into	  a	  transnational	  phenomenon,	  and	  the	  internationality	  of	  the	  practice	  is	  the	  key	  issue	  for	  modern	  law	  enforcement.	  Perhaps	  the	  impetus	  for	  this	  shift,	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  international,	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  famous	  case	  of	  Al	  Capone.	  While	  law	  enforcement	  could	  not	  find	  enough	  evidence	  and	  witnesses	  to	  prosecute	  Capone	  for	  many	  alleged	  crimes,	  federal	  prosecutors	  ultimately	  took	  advantage	  of	  a	  1927	  Supreme	  Court	  ruling,	  which	  held	  that	  illegally	  earned	  income	  was	  still	  taxable.	  They	  ultimately	  convicted	  Capone	  on	  five	  tax	  charges.	  One	  outcome	  from	  this	  was	  that	  fellow	  gangster	  Meyer	  Lansky,	  learning	  a	  lesson	  from	  Capone’s	  downfall,	  discovered	  Swiss	  banks,	  thereby	  changing	  money-­‐laundering	  culture.283	  
Conclusion	  The	  preceding	  pages	  have	  tried	  to	  describe	  the	  character	  and	  significance	  of	  ML	  today,	  noting	  in	  passing	  that	  there	  is	  little	  consensus	  about	  methodologies	  to	  estimate	  the	  funds	  involved,	  or	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  AML	  (and	  CFT)	  regimens.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  pertinent	  that,	  while	  a	  broad	  consensus	  exists	  about	  the	  undesirability	  of	  ML	  (noting	  that	  the	  source	  of	  most	  ML	  funds	  in	  developing	  countries	  is	  corruption)	  observers	  have	  argued	  over	  the	  danger	  ML	  presents	  to	  society	  at	  large,	  and	  over	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  tradeoff	  of	  AML	  (and	  CFT)	  regimes.	  Having	  broadly	  examined	  some	  theory,	  the	  following	  chapter	  will	  look	  at	  practice,	  presenting	  the	  traditional	  money	  laundering	  model,	  and	  then	  following	  with	  examples	  of	  transnational	  money-­‐laundering	  techniques.	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3.	  The	  Traditional	  Money	  Laundering	  Model	  
and	  Standard	  Typologies	  	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  attempted	  to	  broadly	  assess	  scholarly	  and	  professional	  viewpoints	  on	  that	  character	  and	  significance	  of	  ML,	  along	  with	  a	  survey	  of	  views	  related	  to	  methodology	  and	  effectiveness	  issues.	  This	  chapter	  will	  present	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  model	  and	  techniques	  that	  are	  prevalent	  in	  the	  UAE	  and	  present	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  broader	  global	  community.	  	  	  Money-­‐laundering	  schemes	  may	  range	  from	  the	  relatively	  simple	  to	  the	  vastly	  complex.	  Money-­‐laundering	  “acts	  or	  transactions	  are	  limited	  only	  by	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  they	  are	  structured	  and	  the	  skill	  of	  the	  launderer.	  There	  is	  an	  almost	  unlimited	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  launderer	  can	  achieve	  his/her	  purpose.”284	  In	  similar	  vein,	  another	  expert	  noted	  that	  if	  it	  always	  followed	  a	  regular	  process,	  money	  laundering	  would	  be	  much	  easier	  to	  prevent.	  The	  same	  author	  also	  cautions:	  “there	  are	  some	  methods	  of	  money	  laundering	  that	  do	  not	  need	  to	  involve	  the	  banking	  system,	  such	  as	  dirty	  dealing	  in	  cash	  based	  economies.”285	  	  The	  classic	  schematic	  of	  the	  “traditional”	  money-­‐laundering	  process	  involves	  three-­‐stages:	  placement,	  layering	  and	  integration.	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  some	  scholars	  have	  questioned	  the	  adequacy	  of	  this	  model.	  According	  to	  van	  Duyne,	  “the	  process	  [of	  ML]	  can	  stop	  at	  any	  phase	  or	  earlier	  phase	  may	  be	  repeated.”	  He	  notes:	  “the	  actual	  sequence	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  crime-­‐enterprise	  or	  the	  administrative	  requirements.”286	  Despite	  such	  criticism,	  this	  study	  will	  outline	  the	  generally	  accepted	  money-­‐laundering	  process,	  since	  it	  has	  been	  used	  in	  the	  professional	  training	  programs.287	  The	  AML/CFT	  professionals	  interviewed	  and	  surveyed	  for	  this	  study	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  applied	  the	  three-­‐stage	  framework.	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  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  Control,”	  109.	  285	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  48.	  286	  van	  Duyne,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Policy:	  Fears	  and	  Facts,”	  79.	  287	  Professional	  certificate	  programs	  that	  offer	  AML	  training,	  either	  as	  a	  stand	  alone	  or	  part	  of	  another	  certificate,	  include	  the	  Association	  of	  Certified	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering	  Specialists	  (ACAMS),	  the	  International	  Compliance	  Association	  (ICA),	  the	  American	  Banker	  Association	  (ABA),	  the	  Conference	  of	  State	  Bank	  Supervisors	  (CABS),	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Financial	  Crime	  Specialists	  (AFCS).	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Placement	  involves	  “getting	  all	  proceeds	  of	  crime	  into	  the	  world’s	  banking	  system	  but	  simultaneously	  arousing	  no	  suspicion	  in	  doing	  so.”	  This	  usually	  requires	  the	  criminal	  enterprise	  to	  utilize	  businesses	  “that	  in	  the	  normal	  course	  of	  events	  have	  a	  high	  physical	  cash	  flow.	  Examples	  of	  these	  cash	  intensive	  businesses	  are	  casinos,	  bars,	  retail	  outlets,	  art	  dealers	  and	  restaurants.”288	  For	  example,	  the	  Lebanon-­‐based	  organization	  Hezbollah,	  which	  the	  United	  States	  has	  designated	  a	  terrorist	  organization,	  for	  a	  time	  relied	  on	  the	  services	  of	  Ayman	  Joumaa.	  A	  former	  assistant	  secretary	  of	  the	  US	  Treasury	  Department	  has	  described	  Joumaa	  as	  “an	  all-­‐purpose	  narcotics	  trafficker	  and	  money	  launderer.”	  In	  cleaning	  drug	  cash,	  he	  performed	  the	  placement	  stage	  of	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  process	  by	  having	  associates	  transfer	  funds,	  via	  Lebanese	  money	  exchange	  firms,	  into	  accounts	  in	  the	  (now	  defunct)	  Lebanese	  Canadian	  Bank.289	  	  The	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  process	  is	  variously	  termed	  layering,	  agitation,	  or	  co-­‐mingling.	  “As	  each	  of	  the	  terms	  implies,	  unless	  this	  stage	  is	  completed,	  the	  criminal	  money	  may	  have	  been	  placed	  in	  the	  banking	  system	  but	  it	  is	  still	  in	  one	  block	  and	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  such.	  The	  trick	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  to	  move	  money	  around:	  within	  the	  same	  financial	  institution;	  to	  other	  financial	  institutions;	  to	  other	  countries;	  into	  other	  currencies;	  to	  other	  types	  of	  investments	  (bonds,	  stocks,	  and	  travellers’	  cheques);	  or	  by	  investment	  in	  real	  estate.”290	  In	  the	  case	  cited	  above,	  Joumaa	  performed	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  process	  by	  using	  the	  money,	  which	  had	  been	  deposited	  in	  the	  Lebanese	  Canadian	  Bank,	  to	  finance	  mass	  purchases	  of	  used	  cars	  in	  the	  USA,	  which	  were	  then	  shipped	  overseas,	  often	  to	  West	  Africa.	  The	  method	  of	  sending	  the	  money	  used	  was	  electronic	  wire	  transfer.291	  As	  Shams	  observed,	  both	  the	  “instantaneous	  nature	  of	  these	  transactions	  and	  their	  daily	  volume	  ...	  make	  legal	  pursuit	  very	  difficult.”292	  This	  stage	  is	  where	  the	  UAE	  becomes	  especially	  vulnerable,	  when	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  conduit	  to	  international	  financial	  markets	  channeling	  proceeds	  of	  foreign	  criminal	  organizations	  and	  illegal	  activities	  to	  Dubai-­‐based	  companies.293	  Dubai	  has	  been	  a	  destination	  where	  proceeds	  of	  crime	  are	  often	  invested	  with	  a	  help	  of	  locally	  based	  financial	  facilitators,	  who	  help	  integrate	  criminal	  money	  in	  the	  legal	  economy.	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  method	  used	  was	  a	  loan-­‐back	  service.	  A	  company	  under	  control	  of	  the	  financial	  facilitator	  provided	  a	  loan	  to	  the	  criminal	  to	  buy	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  49.	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  Zarate,	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  War,	  359.	  290	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  50.	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  Zarate,	  Treasury’s	  War,	  359.	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  Shams,	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  and	  the	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  Department	  of	  State,	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a	  house.	  The	  provided	  loan	  was	  just	  the	  criminal’s	  own	  money.	  A	  financial	  facilitator	  could	  also	  construct	  fake	  employment	  for	  the	  criminal	  or	  his	  wife	  in	  a	  legitimate	  business	  when	  a	  house	  needed	  financing,	  creating	  a	  pay-­‐roll	  record	  with	  which	  the	  criminal	  could	  obtain	  a	  loan	  from	  a	  bank	  to	  finance	  his	  house.	  Since	  financial	  facilitators	  operate	  as	  small,	  independent	  businesses	  that	  provide	  financial	  tax	  advisory	  or	  administrative	  assistance,	  they	  are	  not	  formally	  regulated.	  In	  general	  financial	  facilitators	  are	  involved	  in	  setting	  up	  a	  string	  of	  businesses	  and	  money	  transfers.294	   The	  final	  step	  is	  integration.	  “The	  original	  proceeds	  of	  crime	  have	  now	  been	  washed	  and	  spun	  dry	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  introduced	  into	  a	  respectable	  financial	  environment.	  The	  money	  can	  also	  be	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  banking	  system	  for	  ‘legitimate’	  purchases	  without	  too	  many	  awkward	  questions	  being	  raised.”295	  In	  the	  Hezbollah	  case,	  the	  used	  cars,	  bought	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  sent	  overseas,	  were	  sold,	  with	  the	  proceeds	  “transmitted	  back	  to	  Lebanon	  for	  Joumaa	  and	  Hezbollah	  to	  use.	  So	  the	  drug	  money	  was	  laundered	  through	  used-­‐car	  sales,	  and	  the	  used	  cars	  themselves	  became	  literal	  money-­‐laundering	  vehicles.”296	  	  
Observations	  The	  techniques	  used	  in	  money	  laundering	  –	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  below	  –	  are	  ever	  evolving.	  Similarly,	  as	  a	  law-­‐enforcement	  issue	  the	  concept	  of	  money	  laundering	  itself	  is	  also	  fluid.	  The	  Hezbollah	  example	  cited	  above	  shows	  that	  much	  modern	  concern	  with	  money	  laundering	  has	  involved	  terrorism,	  and	  sometimes	  “narco-­‐terrorism”	  –	  the	  latter	  term	  referring	  to	  the	  process	  of	  money	  being	  raised	  through	  sales	  of	  illicit	  drugs,	  with	  the	  ultimate	  purpose	  of	  being	  used	  to	  fund	  terrorism.297	  Some	  observers	  have	  argued	  that	  much	  of	  this	  concern	  was	  media	  generated	  after	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  the	  United	  States	  on	  11	  September	  2001.298	  They	  have	  also	  questioned	  whether	  enhanced	  scrutiny	  of	  possible	  money-­‐laundering	  activities	  would	  have	  led	  to	  the	  prevention	  of	  those	  attacks.299	  	  
	  AML	  controls	  have	  also	  developed	  to	  a	  point	  where	  the	  money	  involved	  in	  an	  alleged	  money-­‐laundering	  operation	  no	  longer	  had	  to	  be	  gained	  through	  illegal	  enterprise.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294	  Soudijn,	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  208.	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“Money	  that	  is	  obtained	  by	  evading	  taxes	  is	  very	  often	  legally	  obtained,	  and	  money	  that	  is	  channeled	  towards	  terrorism	  could	  be	  raised	  from	  a	  legitimate	  source,”	  the	  latter	  including	  donations	  to	  ostensible	  charity	  organizations.300	  There	  are	  also	  arguments	  “that	  money	  that	  is	  derived	  from	  some	  civil	  wrong	  [as	  opposed	  to	  a	  criminal	  act]	  could	  qualify	  for	  money	  laundering	  purposes.”301	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  “civil	  wrong”	  might	  be	  a	  man	  hiding	  wealth	  “to	  avoid	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  court	  ruling	  against	  his	  assets	  in	  a	  divorce	  case.”302	  
ML	  Typologies	  (Techniques)	  and	  Areas	  of	  Concern	  	  A	  publication	  of	  the	  FATF	  notes	  that	  “[t]here	  are	  three	  main	  methods	  by	  which	  criminal	  organisations	  and	  terrorist	  financiers	  move	  money	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  disguising	  its	  origins	  and	  integrating	  it	  into	  the	  formal	  economy.	  The	  first	  is	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  financial	  system;	  the	  second	  involves	  the	  physical	  movement	  of	  money	  (e.g.	  through	  the	  use	  of	  cash	  couriers);	  and	  the	  third	  is	  through	  the	  physical	  movement	  of	  goods	  through	  the	  trade	  system.”303	  This	  section	  will	  broadly	  examine	  money-­‐laundering	  techniques	  that	  constitute	  immediate	  risk	  to	  the	  UAE	  and/or	  have	  been	  utilized	  within	  the	  UAE	  or	  by	  UAE-­‐located	  entities.	  
ML	  Using	  the	  Financial	  System	  and	  Financial	  Institutions	  
Electronic	  Fund	  Transfers	  (EFT)	  Apparent	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  UAE	  financial	  system	  were	  exploited	  to	  finance	  the	  9/11	  suicide	  attacks.	  A	  number	  of	  six-­‐figure	  sums	  were	  wired	  from	  Dubai	  to	  bank	  accounts	  in	  America.	  “All	  of	  the	  bank-­‐to-­‐bank	  transactions	  flowed	  through	  the	  UAE	  Exchange’s	  correspondent	  account	  at	  Citibank.”304	  High-­‐frequency	  and	  high-­‐value	  bank	  transfers	  are	  innate	  components	  of	  the	  UAE	  banking	  sector,	  reflecting,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  county's	  demographics.	  More	  than	  80	  percent	  of	  residents	  are	  expatriates,	  who	  rely	  on	  different	  types	  of	  money	  transfers,	  depending	  on	  the	  cost	  and	  the	  type	  of	  income	  earned.	  In	  addition	  to	  transfers	  conducted	  on	  behalf	  of	  individuals,	  the	  UAE	  banking	  sector	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  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  laundering	  Control,”	  110-­‐111;	  Unger,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Regulation:	  From	  Al	  Capone	  to	  Al	  Qaeda,”	  21.	  301	  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  laundering	  Control,”	  111,	  citing	  Rider,	  B	  (1998),	  “The	  Control	  of	  Money	  Laundering:	  A	  Bridge	  Too	  Far?,”	  5	  EUR.	  J.	  FIN.	  SERV.	  27.	  302	  Shams,	  “The	  Fight	  Against	  Extraterritorial	  Corruption	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Money	  laundering	  Control,”	  111.	  Fear	  of	  scrutiny	  by	  tax	  officials	  has	  prompted	  some	  individuals	  performing	  illegal	  activities	  to	  pay	  unnecessary	  taxes	  simply	  to	  keep	  up	  appearances.	  A	  Soviet	  agent	  spying	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  under	  the	  identity	  of	  “Erwin	  Van	  Haarlem”	  operated	  as	  a	  “self-­‐employed	  art	  dealer.	  This,	  however,	  was	  simply	  a	  cover	  profession	  which	  generated	  very	  little	  income;	  Van	  Haarlem	  paid	  tax	  on	  sales	  he	  had	  not	  made	  simply	  to	  keep	  up	  his	  cover”	  (Andrews,	  Defence	  of	  the	  Realm,	  727).	  303	  FATF,	  “Trade	  Based	  Money	  Laundering,”	  i.	  	  304	  9/11	  Commission,	  Monograph	  on	  Terrorist	  Financing,	  134.	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facilitates	  institutional	  money	  flow	  in	  and	  from	  the	  country.	  With	  45	  currently	  operating	  free	  zones	  and	  10	  more	  under	  construction,	  the	  growing	  international	  business	  presence	  strains	  the	  financial	  infrastructure	  and	  logistics,	  ultimately	  creating	  new	  risks	  for	  the	  country's	  and	  international	  banking	  sector.	  305	  In	  the	  country's	  context,	  the	  banks	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  great	  number	  of	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises	  (SMEs).	  According	  to	  a	  2013	  Dubai	  SME	  report,	  the	  SMEs	  represent	  95	  percent	  of	  all	  establishments	  in	  the	  Emirate	  and	  “contribute	  around	  40	  percent	  to	  the	  total	  value	  add	  generated	  in	  Dubai’s	  economy.”	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  SMEs,	  57	  percent,	  operates	  in	  the	  Trading	  sector	  and	  is	  inherently	  more	  export-­‐oriented,	  generating	  more	  than	  20	  percent	  of	  their	  revenue	  from	  the	  regional	  and	  international	  markets.	  The	  same	  study	  indicates	  that	  three-­‐fourths	  of	  SME	  exporters	  are	  exporting	  to	  other	  countries	  without	  having	  a	  physical	  presence	  in	  these	  markets.306	  The	  international	  commerce	  has	  to	  be	  facilitated	  by	  the	  local	  and	  foreign	  banks	  in	  the	  UAE.	  As	  of	  2013	  figures,	  every	  bank	  in	  the	  UAE	  offered	  Automated	  Teller	  Machine	  (ATM)	  services	  operating	  on	  a	  central	  “Switch”	  system,	  meaning	  that	  a	  customer	  of	  a	  particular	  bank	  can	  use	  any	  other	  bank’s	  ATM	  for	  conducting	  banking	  transactions.307	  	  	  To	  understand	  how	  criminals	  can	  exploit	  the	  unique	  nature	  of	  the	  UAE	  business	  environment,	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  SMEs	  and	  high	  international	  exposure,	  to	  transfer	  illegal	  funds,	  the	  general	  methods	  of	  electronic	  transfer	  need	  to	  be	  summarized.	  	  An	  electronic	  funds	  transfer	  (EFT)	  takes	  place	  over	  a	  computerized	  network,	  with	  the	  money	  value	  represented	  digitally.	  EFT	  examples	  include	  a	  Point-­‐of-­‐Sale	  (POS)	  system	  in	  retail	  stores,	  ATMs,	  telephone	  banking	  or	  Pay-­‐by-­‐Phone	  services,	  Automated	  Clearinghouses	  (ACH),	  wire	  transfers,	  and	  online	  banking.308	  EFTs	  facilitate	  fast	  transfer	  of	  money	  from	  one	  account	  to	  another,	  within	  a	  country	  or	  across	  borders.	  Trillions	  of	  dollars	  are	  transferred	  in	  millions	  of	  transactions	  each	  day.	  According	  to	  Fedwire®	  Funds	  Service	  -­‐	  Monthly	  Statistics,	  a	  daily	  average	  value	  of	  transfer	  in	  August	  2016	  was	  US$3,069,299	  million.309	  EFTs	  are	  attractive	  to	  criminals	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  they	  are	  attractive	  to	  legitimate	  businesses.	  It	  is	  “because	  they	  [EFTs]	  generally	  provide	  a	  secure	  and	  trusted	  means	  of	  sending	  large	  amounts	  of	  money	  quickly.”	  EFTs	  enable	  money	  launderers	  “to	  spirit	  their	  money	  beyond	  the	  grasp	  and	  sometimes	  out	  of	  the	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  Cherian,	  “45	  Free	  Zones	  in	  the	  UAE:	  Find	  the	  Right	  One	  for	  Your	  Business.”	  306	  Government	  of	  Dubai,	  “The	  State	  of	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises	  (SMEs)	  in	  Dubai,”	  4,	  12,	  17.	  307	  PwC	  and	  HSBC,	  “Doing	  business	  in	  the	  UAE,”	  21.	  308	  Colton	  et	  al,	  Computer	  Crime.	  309	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  Services,	  “Fedwire	  Fund	  Service	  -­‐-­‐	  Monthly	  Statistics,”	  accessed	  12	  October	  2016.	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sight	  of	  law	  enforcement.”	  Because	  they	  don't	  require	  any	  “actual	  physical	  movement	  of	  currency,	  they	  are	  a	  relatively	  rapid,	  reliable,	  and	  secure	  method	  for	  transferring	  funds	  without	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  large	  cash	  deposits	  or	  physical	  transportation	  of	  illicit	  monies.”310	  Terrorists	  use	  wire	  transfers	  to	  move	  funds	  around	  the	  globe	  to	  finance	  operations	  such	  as	  the	  attacks	  of	  9/11.	  The	  FATF	  uses	  the	  term	  wire	  or	  funds	  transfer	  when	  “referring	  to	  any	  financial	  transaction	  carried	  out	  for	  a	  person	  through	  a	  financial	  institution	  by	  electronic	  means	  with	  a	  view	  to	  making	  an	  amount	  of	  money	  available	  to	  a	  person	  at	  another	  financial	  institution.”	  According	  to	  the	  FATF	  “there	  are	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  indicators	  to	  help	  identify	  potential	  terrorist	  wire	  transfers,”	  because	  the	  complexity	  of	  wire-­‐transfer	  schemes	  creates	  a	  deliberately	  confusing	  audit	  trail	  to	  disguise	  the	  source	  and	  destination	  of	  funds.	  What	  complicates	  the	  matter	  more	  is	  that	  wire	  transfers	  can	  be	  sent	  through	  non-­‐bank	  institutions,	  such	  as	  money	  remitters	  or	  
bureaux	  de	  changes,	  that	  have	  different	  compliance	  requirements	  for	  recordkeeping	  and	  transmission	  of	  information.	  311	  These	  discrepancies	  exist	  in	  the	  UAE.	  For	  example,	  Article	  5.1	  of	  Regulation	  24/2000	  set	  significantly	  different	  thresholds	  for	  banks	  and	  money	  changes	  for	  verification	  of	  customer	  identity.	  For	  the	  banks	  it	  was	  approximately	  US$11,000	  and	  for	  moneychangers	  US$600.312	  This	  requirement	  was	  amended	  in	  2008,	  in	  response	  to	  criticism	  in	  the	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report.313	  But	  a	  discrepancy	  still	  remains	  under	  the	  new	  requirement,	  though	  with	  a	  difference	  of	  only	  about	  US$400,	  since	  the	  threshold	  for	  the	  banks	  was	  lowered	  to	  US$1,000.314	  Moreover,	  “the	  same	  international	  money	  transfer	  agents	  are	  controlled	  to	  a	  different	  extent	  in	  different	  countries.”315	  Often	  the	  perpetrators	  use	  false	  identities	  to	  avoid	  detection.316	  The	  UAE	  has	  been	  a	  link	  in	  many	  complex	  money	  laundering	  schemes	  involving	  electronic	  money	  transfers.	  However,	  there	  is	  “a	  lack	  of	  recognition	  by	  the	  authorities	  as	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  overseas	  criminal	  groups	  use	  the	  UAE	  financial	  system	  to	  launder	  money.”317	  The	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report	  of	  2008	  confirms	  that	  the	  country	  has	  “only	  very	  limited	  provisions	  in	  place	  with	  respect	  to	  wire	  transfers.”318	  The	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  regulations	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  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Treasury/FINCEN,	  “Feasibility	  of	  a	  Cross-­‐Border	  Electronic	  Funds	  Transfer	  Reporting	  Systemunder	  the	  Bank	  Secrecy	  Act,”	  3:4.	  311	  FATF,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Typologies,”	  4.	  312	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  Regulation	  No.	  24/2000	  -­‐	  Regulation	  Concerning	  Procedures	  for	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering.”	  313	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  75.	  314	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “Addendum	  to	  Circular	  No.	  24/2000	  -­‐	  Regulation	  concerning	  Procedures	  for	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering,”	  Notice	  No.	  2922/2008.	  315	  Unger,	  The	  Scale	  and	  Impact	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  96.	  	  316	  Williams,	  “Banker	  as	  Victim.”	  317	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  21.	  318	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  75.	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relating	  to	  wire	  transfers	  are	  too	  general	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  procedures	  for	  verification	  of	  identity	  and	  transmission	  of	  originator	  information.319	  	  
Structuring/Smurfing	  The	  UAE	  is	  a	  small	  country,	  with	  a	  population	  of	  only	  about	  nine	  million.	  However,	  operating	  in	  the	  country	  (approximately	  as	  of	  this	  writing)	  are	  140	  moneychangers,	  23	  national	  with	  1014	  branches	  and	  28	  foreign	  banks	  with	  170	  branches.	  Thus,	  the	  UAE	  is	  a	  perfect	  area	  to	  utilize	  structuring	  technique	  for	  laundering	  money.320	  The	  latter	  requires	  utilization	  of	  several	  different	  financial	  institutions	  for	  ML-­‐related	  transfers.321	  This	  process	  is	  known	  as	  structuring	  or	  smurfing	  and	  simply	  involves	  breaking	  a	  large	  transaction	  into	  a	  series	  of	  smaller	  multiple	  transactions	  (all	  under	  the	  reporting	  threshold)	  using	  any	  number	  of	  financial	  institutions	  and/or	  people.	  Basically,	  “a	  person	  deposits	  cash	  with	  a	  cash	  dealer	  in	  amounts	  less	  than	  the	  mandatory	  reportable	  amount”	  to	  avoid	  the	  trigger	  of	  detection	  and	  reporting.322	  Individuals	  involved	  in	  making	  these	  structured	  transfers	  or	  transactions	  are	  sometimes	  known	  as	  smurfs.	  The	  UAE,	  with	  its	  large	  population	  of	  migrant,	  often	  underpaid,	  workers	  is	  an	  ideal	  place	  to	  find	  candidates	  to	  pose	  as	  smurfs	  to	  make	  multiple	  transactions	  below	  the	  threshold	  requirement.323	  The	  modern	  question	  of	  “What	  does	  a	  smurf	  look	  like?”	  speaks	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  ML	  as	  a	  whole.	  A	  banker	  told	  one	  author	  that:	  “Years	  ago	  if	  someone	  came	  with	  a	  duffle	  bag	  of	  money	  and	  wearing	  some	  gold	  chains	  about	  their	  neck,	  we	  figured	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  do	  business	  with	  them	  because	  it	  seemed	  obvious	  that	  the	  person	  was	  a	  money	  launderer.	  Today	  they're	  very	  sophisticated.	  They	  wear	  conservative	  suits	  and	  button-­‐down	  shirts.”324	  Unger	  made	  a	  similar	  warning,	  cautioning	  that	  the	  ML	  archetype	  of	  “tattooed	  gangsters	  dealing	  in	  drugs,	  prostitution,	  people-­‐trafficking	  and	  racketeering	  is	  largely	  a	  myth.	  Money	  laundering	  also	  involves	  ‘white	  collar’	  crime.”325	  In	  this	  light,	  a	  retired	  priest	  in	  Massachusetts	  faced	  12	  counts	  of	  ML	  charges	  in	  2015	  for	  a	  series	  of	  international,	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  wire	  transfers	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  10.	  320	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “Moneychangers.”	  321	  FATF,	  “Report	  on	  Money	  Laundering	  Typologies	  2003-­‐2004.”	  322	  Chaikin,	  “Money	  Laundering:	  An	  Investigatory	  approach,”	  484;	  see	  also	  Welling,	  “Smurfing,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Federal	  Criminal	  Law:	  The	  Crime	  of	  Structuring	  Transactions.”	  	  323	  Augustine,	  “Money	  Exchanges	  Seek	  Standardisation	  of	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Efforts.”	  324	  Cocheo,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Panel:	  Stop	  the	  Smurfs,”	  32.	  325	  Unger,	  The	  Scale	  and	  Impact	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  188.	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Nigeria	  using	  Western	  Union.326	  We	  can	  only	  wonder	  how	  many	  structured	  transactions	  go	  undetected	  in	  the	  UAE.	  	  	  
Correspondent	  Banking	  The	  UAE’s	  economic	  and	  financial	  development	  is	  fueled	  through	  correspondent	  banking	  networks,	  providing	  access	  to	  financial	  services	  around	  the	  globe,	  supporting	  international	  trade	  and	  further	  strengthening	  financial	  inclusion.	  Correspondent	  banking	  occurs	  when	  a	  bank,	  to	  transfer	  money	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  clients,	  itself	  employs	  an	  account	  in	  a	  foreign	  bank.	  To	  move	  money	  across	  borders,	  a	  bank	  has	  to	  hold	  an	  account	  with	  a	  bank	  overseas,	  a	  relationship	  known	  as	  correspondent	  banking.	  Domestic	  banks	  around	  the	  world	  generally	  do	  not	  connect	  with	  one	  another	  directly.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  UAE	  bank	  customer	  wants	  to	  send	  a	  wire	  transfer	  to	  another	  country,	  the	  UAE	  bank	  transfers	  funds	  from	  the	  correspondent	  account	  it	  holds	  in	  the	  recipient	  country.327	  Correspondent	  banking	  relationships	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  misuse	  for	  money	  laundering,	  because	  correspondent	  bank	  is	  forced	  to	  rely	  on	  respondent	  bank	  to	  conduct	  all	  necessary	  due	  diligence	  in	  respect	  to	  its	  customers	  and	  suspicious	  transactions.	  Since	  in	  some	  jurisdictions	  these	  procedures	  are	  more	  lax	  than	  in	  others,	  “correspondent	  banking	  can	  be	  a	  gateway	  for	  illegal	  funds	  into	  the	  regular	  banking	  system.”328	  Correspondent	  banking	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	  scandal	  in	  1999,	  involving	  money	  laundering	  done	  through	  that	  bank’s	  correspondent	  accounts	  in	  Russia.329	  It	  also	  figured	  in	  the	  case	  of	  FBME	  Ltd.,	  formerly	  known	  as	  Federal	  Bank	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Ltd.,	  which	  the	  FinCEN	  in	  2014	  categorized	  as	  a	  financial	  institution	  of	  ML	  concern.	  The	  FBME	  was	  alleged	  to	  have	  allowed	  obscured	  transactions	  into	  the	  US	  financial	  system,	  principally	  through	  direct	  and	  indirect	  correspondent	  accounts,	  facilitating	  money	  laundering	  as	  well	  as	  terror	  financing.	  The	  FinCEN	  faulted	  the	  FBME	  for	  weak	  AML	  controls,	  encouraging	  its	  use	  by	  shell	  companies.	  The	  suspicious	  wire	  activity	  through	  other	  US	  institution	  totaled	  $387	  million	  between	  April	  2013	  and	  April	  2014.	  FinCEN	  eventually	  barred	  the	  FBME	  under	  the	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act	  from	  obtaining	  or	  using	  correspondent	  accounts	  with	  US	  financial	  institutions.	  330	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  Lee,	  “Worcester	  Retired	  Priest	  Faces	  Money	  Laundering	  Charges.”	  327	  Kobor,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Trends,”	  14.	  328	  Unger,	  The	  Scale	  and	  Impact	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  93-­‐94.	  329	  O'Brien,	  “Bank	  settles	  U.S.	  inquiry	  into	  money	  laundering,”	  and	  Cullison,	  “Russia	  sues	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	  over	  1990s	  scandal.”	  330	  This	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  following:	  USDOT/FINCEN,	  “Notice	  of	  Finding	  that	  FBME	  Bank	  Ltd.,	  Formerly	  Known	  as	  Federal	  Bank	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Ltd.,	  is	  a	  Financial	  Institution	  of	  Primary	  Money	  Laundering	  Concern,”	  42640;	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  In	  light	  of	  such	  cases	  and	  their	  corresponding	  risks,	  the	  United	  States	  toughened	  its	  regulatory	  regime	  for	  correspondent	  banks.331	  Under	  the	  US	  PATRIOT	  Act	  new	  and	  enhanced	  due	  diligence	  standards	  are	  required	  for	  US	  financial	  institutions	  that	  enter	  into	  correspondent	  banking	  relationships	  with	  foreign	  banks	  that	  operate	  under	  either	  an	  offshore	  banking	  license,	  or	  a	  banking	  license	  issued	  by	  states	  that	  have	  been	  designated	  either	  as	  uncooperative	  with	  AML	  procedures	  set	  by	  international	  groups	  of	  which	  the	  US	  is	  a	  member,	  or	  with	  which	  it	  concurs;	  or	  “by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury	  as	  warranting	  special	  measures	  due	  to	  money-­‐laundering	  concerns.”332	  	  	  In	  addition	  US	  financial	  institutions	  are	  prohibited	  from	  establishing,	  maintaining,	  administering,	  or	  managing	  correspondent	  accounts	  with	  “shell	  banks,”	  which	  may	  be	  broadly	  defined	  as	  those	  lacking	  a	  physical	  presence.	  Financial	  institutions333	  are	  responsible	  for	  taking	  “reasonable	  steps”	  to	  ensure	  that	  correspondent	  accounts	  are	  not	  used	  indirectly	  to	  provide	  financial	  service	  to	  foreign	  shell	  banks.334	  The	  tighter	  regulatory	  requirements	  ultimately	  increased	  cost	  of	  compliance,	  causing	  some	  leading	  U.S.	  banks	  to	  terminate	  their	  correspondent	  relationship	  with	  some	  UAE	  banks.	  This	  practice	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “de-­‐risking.”335	  According	  to	  the	  current	  governor	  of	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  Mubarak	  Rashid	  al-­‐Mansouri,	  “de-­‐risking	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  wholesale	  and	  indiscriminate	  for	  our	  financial	  institutions	  and	  that	  it	  is	  unduly	  hurting	  remittances	  from	  our	  large	  expat	  workforce	  to	  their	  home	  countries.”336	  The	  latest	  development	  in	  this	  field	  was	  JP	  Morgan's	  decision	  to	  cut	  its	  correspondent	  banking	  relationship	  with	  Emirates	  NBD,	  Dubai’s	  largest	  bank.337	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  de-­‐risking	  goes	  beyond	  the	  UAE	  borders.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  correspondent	  banking	  survey,	  conducted	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Board	  (FSB),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  USDOT/FINCEN,	  “Imposition	  of	  Special	  Measure	  Against	  FBME	  Bank	  Ltd.,	  Formerly	  Known	  as	  the	  Federal	  Bank	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  Ltd.,	  as	  a	  Financial	  Institution	  of	  Primary	  Money	  Laundering	  Concern.”	  	  331	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury/Financial	  Crimes	  Enforcement	  Network,	  “Customer	  Due	  Diligence	  Requirements	  for	  Financial	  Institutions.”	  332	  31	  U.S.C.	  §5318(i)	  2(A)(ii),	  389.	  333	  31U.S.C.	  §5312(a)(2)	  (A)-­‐(Z),	  379	  broadly	  defines	  “financial	  institutions”	  beyond	  the	  banking	  sector.	  334	  31	  U.S.C.	  §5318(i)	  2(A)(ii),	  389.	  335	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (Brisbane),	  “Drivers	  for	  ‘De-­‐Risking’	  Go	  Beyond	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering/Terrorist	  Financing.”	  336	  Reuters	  report,	  “Regulation	  Hits	  UAE	  Banks'	  Dealing	  with	  US	  banks.”	  337	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  Business,	  “JP	  Morgan	  Cuts	  Banking	  Ties	  with	  Emirates	  NBD.”	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show	  that	  about	  half	  of	  the	  emerging	  and	  developing	  economies	  surveyed	  have	  experienced	  a	  decline	  in	  correspondent	  banking	  services.338	  
 
Payable-­‐Through	  Accounts	  The	  “payable-­‐through	  account”	  technique	  has	  a	  documented	  history	  of	  usage	  in	  the	  UAE.	  According	  to	  US	  legal	  documents,	  “The	  term	  payable-­‐through	  account	  means	  a	  correspondent	  account	  maintained	  by	  a	  U.S.	  financial	  institution	  for	  a	  foreign	  financial	  institution	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  foreign	  financial	  institution	  permits	  its	  customers	  to	  engage,	  either	  directly	  or	  through	  a	  subaccount,	  in	  banking	  activities	  usual	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  business	  of	  banking	  in	  the	  United	  States.”339	  It	  is	  related	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  concept	  of	  “nesting.”	  Kobor	  noted	  that	  such	  an	  account	  “at	  a	  U.S.	  bank	  involves	  a	  foreign	  bank	  holding	  a	  checking	  account	  at	  the	  U.S.	  institution.	  The	  foreign	  bank	  can	  issue	  checks	  to	  its	  customers,	  allowing	  them	  to	  make	  payments	  from	  the	  U.S.	  account.”340	  Payable-­‐Through	  Accounts	  give	  the	  respondent's	  bank	  customers	  the	  ability	  to	  conduct	  business	  by	  executing	  their	  own	  transactions	  without	  needing	  to	  clear	  the	  transactions	  through	  the	  respondent	  bank.	  “For	  example,	  a	  launderer	  from	  Colombia	  can	  bank	  in	  the	  US	  if	  the	  Colombian	  bank	  has	  a	  payable-­‐through	  account	  with	  a	  US	  institution	  without	  having	  to	  notify	  the	  US	  financial	  authorities,	  which	  may	  require	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  evidence	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  funds.”341	  	  	  The	  vulnerability	  of	  these	  accounts	  to	  criminal	  abuse	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  involving	  Al	  Zarooni	  Exchange,	  one	  of	  six	  significant	  transnational	  criminal	  organization	  (TCO)	  cases	  targeted	  under	  Executive	  Order	  13581.342	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Treasury's	  Office	  of	  Foreign	  Assets	  Control	  (OFAC)	  “designated	  Dubai-­‐based	  money	  services	  business	  Al	  Zarooni	  Exchange	  under	  Executive	  Order	  (E.O.)	  13581	  for	  being	  owned	  or	  controlled	  by,	  or	  acting	  for	  or	  on	  behalf	  of,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  the	  Khanani	  MLO	  [Money	  Laundering	  Organization],	  and	  for	  materially	  assisting,	  sponsoring,	  or	  providing	  financial,	  material,	  or	  technological	  support	  for,	  or	  goods	  or	  services	  to	  or	  in	  support	  of,	  the	  Khanani	  MLO.”	  	  Prior	  to	  it,	  the	  Altaf	  Khanani	  Money	  Laundering	  Organization	  was	  designated	  pursuant	  to	  Executive	  Order	  1358,	  which	  targets	  transnational	  criminal	  organizations	  and	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338	  Financial	  Stability	  Board,	  “Report	  to	  the	  G20	  on	  Actions	  Taken	  to	  Assess	  and	  Address	  the	  Decline	  in	  Correspondent	  Banking.”	  	  339	  31	  CFR	  §	  561.307.	  340	  Kobor,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Trends,”	  14,	  15.	  341	  Unger,	  The	  Scale	  and	  Impact	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  94.	  342	  Obama,	  “Executive	  Order	  13581	  –	  Blocking	  Property	  of	  Transnational	  Criminal	  Organization”;	  codified	  as	  3	  CFR	  13581.	  
	  	  	  
68	  
supporters.	  According	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury,	  the	  Khanani	  MLO	  facilitated	  movement	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  organized	  crime	  proceeds	  annually	  between	  Pakistan,	  UAE,	  US,	  UK,	  Canada,	  Australia,	  and	  other	  countries,	  by	  exploiting	  its	  relationships	  with	  financial	  institutions.	  Moreover,	  “Altaf	  Khanani,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Khanani	  MLO,	  and	  Al	  Zarooni	  Exchange	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  movement	  of	  funds	  for	  the	  Taliban.	  343	  The	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  subsequently	  revoked	  Al	  Zarooni	  Exchange’s	  license	  due	  to	  AML	  compliance	  violations.	  The	  US	  Treasury	  praised	  both	  the	  bank	  and	  the	  Dubai	  Police	  General	  Headquarters	  for	  their	  cooperation	  and	  assistance.344	  	  
Private	  Banking	  	  Private	  banking	  caters	  to	  very	  wealthy	  individuals,	  offering	  personalized	  products	  and	  services,	  thereby	  making	  it	  an	  especially	  vulnerable	  area	  for	  exploitation	  in	  a	  high-­‐wealth	  country	  like	  the	  UAE.	  Private	  wealth	  in	  the	  GCC	  doubled	  from	  $1.1	  trillion	  to	  $2.2	  trillion	  during	  2010-­‐2013.	  During	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  private	  wealth	  in	  the	  UAE	  growth	  by	  25	  percent,	  the	  highest	  rate	  among	  the	  GCC	  countries.	  Together,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  the	  UAE	  control	  74	  percent	  of	  the	  region’s	  wealth.345	  According	  to	  a	  Boston	  Consulting	  Group	  survey,	  the	  UAE	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  source	  of	  offshore	  wealth	  in	  the	  MEA	  region.346	  While	  the	  global	  investors	  continuously	  favor	  invest	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  2014	  survey	  showed	  that	  28	  percent	  of	  global	  investors	  would	  prefer	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  UAE.	  Though	  in	  2015	  the	  number	  decreased	  to	  22	  percent,	  it	  still	  remains	  the	  most	  sought	  place	  for	  capital	  allocation.347	  Some	  argue	  the	  UAE	  has	  benefited	  economically	  from	  regional	  geopolitical	  tensions	  and	  the	  slowdown	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  Western	  hemisphere.348	  	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  according	  to	  one	  observer,	  personal	  banking	  or	  private	  banking	  has	  been	  the	  AML	  field’s	  most	  sensitive	  areas.	  Clients	  for	  such	  services	  likely	  have	  influential	  political	  links,	  and	  may	  dislike	  oversight.349	  Despite	  increasing	  competition	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury/Press	  Center,	  “Treasury	  Sanctions	  the	  Khanani	  Money	  Laundering	  Organization.”	  344	  Reuters	  report,	  “UAE	  Revokes	  Licence	  of	  Al	  Zarooni	  Exchange	  on	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Violations.”	  	  345	  Diemers	  and	  Khalil,	  “GCC	  Private	  Banking	  Study	  2015,”	  4-­‐7.	  346	  Beardsley	  et	  al.	  “Global	  Wealth	  2016,”11.	  	  347	  Emirates	  Investment	  Bank,	  “GCC	  Wealth:	  Insight	  Report.”(2014).	  25;	  and	  Emirates	  Investment	  Bank,	  “GCC	  Wealth:	  Insight	  Report	  ”(2015)	  33.	  348	  Arsenault,	  “Dubai	  Booms	  Again	  on	  Back	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring”;	  Weisenthal,	  “The	  Dubai	  Economy	  Is	  Going	  Nuts,	  And	  There's	  A	  Surprising	  New	  Factor	  Fueling	  The	  Boom”;	  Uncredited	  in	  Arabian	  Gazette,	  “Dubai	  Property	  Market	  Still	  Benefiting	  from	  Arab	  Spring,	  Euro	  and	  Cypriot	  crisis,”	  Arabian	  Gazette;	  Oxford	  Business	  Group,	  “The	  Report:	  Dubai	  2013,”	  159.	  349	  Turner,	  Money	  Laundering	  Prevention.	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regulatory	  scrutiny,	  private	  banking	  remains	  a	  lucrative	  banking	  segment	  and	  has	  considerably	  grown	  during	  recent	  years.350	  The	  UAE	  has	  not	  been	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  trend,	  with	  Dubai	  emerging	  as	  the	  regional	  hub	  for	  private	  banking,	  targeting	  mainly	  clients	  from	  Saudi	  Arabia	  or	  the	  Levant.351	  Private	  banking	  services	  are	  delivered	  through	  dedicated	  bank	  advisers	  whose	  clients,	  as	  one	  source	  observes,	  are	  “sensitive	  to	  confidentiality,	  trust,	  and	  service	  quality.	  Wealthy	  people	  normally	  don't	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  people	  they	  dislike	  or	  distrust,	  and	  usually	  they	  don't.”	  Indeed,	  “Confidentiality	  is	  a	  key	  attribute	  of	  private	  banking,”	  where	  “the	  watchword	  of	  the	  private	  banking	  profession	  is	  'discretion,	  discretion,	  discretion.”352	  	  The	  statutory	  definition	  of	  a	  private	  banking	  account	  in	  the	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act	  states	  that	  it	  is	  “an	  account	  (or	  any	  combination	  of	  accounts)	  that	  	   i. “requires	  a	  minimum	  aggregate	  deposits	  of	  funds	  or	  other	  assets	  of	  not	  less	  than	  $1,000,000;	  ii. is	  established	  on	  behalf	  of	  1	  or	  more	  individuals	  who	  have	  a	  direct	  or	  beneficial	  ownership	  interest	  in	  the	  account;	  and	  iii. is	  assigned	  to,	  or	  is	  administered	  or	  managed	  by,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  an	  officer,	  employee,	  or	  agent	  of	  a	  financial	  institution	  	  acting	  as	  a	  liaison	  between	  the	  financial	  institution	  and	  the	  direct	  or	  beneficial	  owner	  of	  the	  account.”353	  Because	  of	  the	  huge	  sums	  involved,	  and	  the	  inherent	  culture	  of	  discretion,	  private	  banking	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  highly	  competitive	  industry,	  in	  which	  bankers	  may	  feel	  pressured	  to	  bend	  rules	  or	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  clients	  whose	  financial	  wishes	  are	  outside	  of	  the	  law.	  In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  brother	  of	  former	  Mexican	  President	  Carlos	  Salinas,	  Raul	  Salinas,	  moved	  about	  US	  $100	  million	  in	  questionable	  funds	  using	  Citibank’s	  private	  banking	  services	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Europe;	  Citibank	  used	  three	  Panamanian	  shelf	  companies	  (more	  on	  this	  term	  below)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  venture.354	  In	  the	  same	  decade,	  American	  Express	  Bank	  International	  paid	  heavy	  fines	  to	  the	  US	  government	  when	  two	  of	  their	  private	  bankers	  were	  convicted	  of	  laundering	  funds	  through	  their	  employer.355	  The	  US	  Riggs	  Bank	  was	  also	  fined	  for	  regulatory	  and	  criminal	  violations	  arising	  from	  private	  banking	  it	  performed	  for	  the	  president	  of	  Equatorial	  Guinea	  and	  the	  former	  president	  of	  Chile.356	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  Monahan,	  “Private	  Banking:	  Wealth	  Management	  -­‐	  Private	  Banking:	  In	  Flux?”	  351	  Global	  Investor	  Report,	  “GCC	  Private	  Banking	  Developing	  Rapidly.”	  352	  Smith,	  Walter,	  and	  DeLong,	  Global	  Banking,	  252,	  257.	  353	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act	  (U.S.	  H.R.	  .62,	  Public	  Law	  107-­‐56),	  Title	  III,	  Subtitle	  A,	  Sec.	  312.	  	  354	  van	  der	  Does	  de	  Willebois	  et	  al,	  The	  Puppet	  Masters,	  37.	  355	  Richards,	  Transnational	  Criminal	  Organizations,	  Cybercrime,	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  91-­‐92.	  356	  Levi	  and	  Reuter,	  “Money	  Laundering,”	  302.	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Beneficial	  Ownership	  and	  Politically	  Exposed	  Persons	  (PEP)	  The	  above	  examples	  involving	  Citibank	  and	  Riggs	  Bank	  reveal	  another	  aspect	  about	  private	  banking:	  Potentially	  problematic	  customers	  include	  those	  conducting	  their	  banking	  in	  a	  country	  where	  they	  don't	  reside,	  and	  who	  also	  have	  links	  to	  government,	  adding	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  criminal	  as	  well	  as	  political	  sources	  of	  wealth.357	  Therefore,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘‘beneficial	  ownership’’	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  Private	  Banking	  Rule.	  358	  The	  term	  is	  defined	  as:	  “Beneficial	  owner	  of	  an	  account	  means	  an	  individual	  who	  has	  a	  level	  of	  control	  over,	  or	  entitlement	  to,	  the	  funds	  or	  assets	  in	  the	  account	  that,	  as	  a	  practical	  matter,	  enables	  the	  individual,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  to	  control,	  manage	  or	  direct	  the	  account.”359	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  major	  compliance	  concerns	  for	  private	  banks	  is	  dealing	  with	  the	  politically	  exposed	  person	  (PEP).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  that	  there	  is	  no	  internationally	  agreed-­‐upon	  definition	  of	  PEPs.	  Although	  often	  used	  interchangeably	  with	  PEPs,	  “Senior	  Foreign	  Political	  Figure	  (SFPF),”	  which	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations	  in	  title	  31,	  Part	  103,	  section	  175,	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  foreign	  persons	  of	  official	  rank.	  It	  defines	  senior	  foreign	  political	  figure	  as:	  	  	   i) A	  current	  or	  former:	  	  a. Senior	  official	  in	  the	  executive,	  legislative,	  administrative,	  military,	  or	  judicial	  branches	  of	  a	  foreign	  government	  (whether	  elected	  or	  not);	  	  b. Senior	  official	  of	  a	  major	  foreign	  political	  party;	  or	  	  c. Senior	  executive	  of	  a	  foreign	  government-­‐owned	  commercial	  enterprise;	  	  ii) A	  corporation,	  business,	  or	  other	  entity	  that	  has	  been	  formed	  by,	  or	  for	  the	  benefit	  of,	  any	  such	  individual;	  	  iii) An	  immediate	  family	  member	  of	  any	  such	  individual;	  and	  	  iv) A	  person	  who	  is	  widely	  and	  publicly	  known	  (or	  is	  actually	  known	  by	  the	  relevant	  covered	  financial	  institution)	  to	  be	  a	  close	  associate	  of	  such	  individual.360	  	  	  The	  UK	  Money	  Laundering	  Regulations	  2007	  (MLR)	  hold	  “a	  politically	  exposed	  person”	  as	  a	  non-­‐UK	  citizen	  and	  define	  the	  term	  in	  more	  detail	  but	  in	  generally	  similar	  ways	  to	  the	  American	  version.361	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  SFPF/PEP	  is	  a	  foreign	  individual	  holding	  (or	  who	  has	  been	  entrusted	  with)	  a	  prominent	  position	  or	  function,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  which	  can	  potentially	  be	  abused	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  laundering	  illicit	  funds	  or	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357	  See	  Smith,	  Walter,	  and	  DeLong,	  Global	  Banking,	  253-­‐254.	  358	  Gittleman	  and	  Sacks	  (2005),”Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulations,”	  20. 359	  31	  C.F.R.	  Chapter	  I	  (7–1–06	  Edition),	  §103.175(b.).	  360	  31	  C.F.R.	  (Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations)	  Chapter	  I	  (7–1–06	  Edition),	  §103.175(r.).	  361	  See	  UK	  Money	  Laundering	  Regulations	  2007,	  Schedule	  2,	  Paragraph	  (4),	  and	  UK	  Money	  Laundering	  Regulations	  2007,	  Section	  14(5),	  Paragraph	  (4).	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predicate	  offences	  such	  as	  corruption	  or	  bribery.	  However,	  the	  FATF	  broadens	  the	  category	  to	  include	  domestic	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  figures.	  Its	  definition	  section	  includes:	  	  	  
• Foreign	  PEPs:	  individuals	  who	  are	  or	  have	  been	  entrusted	  with	  prominent	  public	  functions	  by	  a	  foreign	  country,	  for	  example	  Heads	  of	  State	  or	  of	  government,	  senior	  politicians,	  senior	  government,	  judicial	  or	  military	  officials,	  senior	  executives	  of	  state	  owned	  corporations,	  important	  political	  party	  officials.	  
• Domestic	  PEPs:	  individuals	  who	  are	  or	  have	  been	  entrusted	  domestically	  with	  prominent	  public	  functions,	  for	  example	  Heads	  of	  State	  or	  of	  government,	  senior	  politicians,	  senior	  government,	  judicial	  or	  military	  officials,	  senior	  executives	  of	  state	  owned	  corporations,	  important	  political	  party	  officials.	  	  
• International	  organisation	  PEPs:	  persons	  who	  are	  or	  have	  been	  entrusted	  with	  a	  prominent	  function	  by	  an	  international	  organisation,	  refers	  to	  members	  of	  senior	  management	  or	  individuals	  who	  have	  been	  entrusted	  with	  equivalent	  functions,	  i.e.	  directors,	  deputy	  directors	  and	  members	  of	  the	  board	  or	  equivalent	  functions.	  	  	  It	  also	  covers	  “family	  members”	  (related	  by	  blood	  or	  civil	  partnership),	  and	  “close	  associates,”	  the	  latter	  being	  described	  as	  “individuals	  who	  are	  closely	  connected	  to	  a	  PEP,	  either	  socially	  or	  professionally.	  362	  	  	  PEPs	  may	  present	  a	  problem	  because	  of	  their	  “above	  the	  law”	  status	  in	  their	  home	  countries.	  As	  a	  recent	  work	  indicates:	  “Whether	  politically	  exposed	  persons	  (PEPs)	  can	  be	  prosecuted	  for	  money	  laundering	  or	  are	  under	  immunity	  is	  …	  differently	  regulated.	  This	  can	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  prosecute	  corrupt	  officials	  for	  money	  laundering.	  Especially	  in	  many	  Asian	  and	  African	  countries	  the	  PEPs	  cannot	  be	  prosecuted.”363	  The	  FATF	  Recommendations	  require	  application	  of	  additional	  AML/CFT	  measures	  to	  business	  relationships	  with	  PEPs.	  It	  notes	  carefully	  that	  “These	  requirements	  are	  preventive	  (not	  criminal)	  in	  nature,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  meaning	  that	  all	  PEPs	  are	  involved	  in	  criminal	  activity.”364	  Though	  PEPs	  are	  a	  major	  AML	  compliance	  concern	  for	  the	  private	  banking	  sector,	  all	  financial	  institutions	  have	  to	  apply	  these	  requirements	  when	  dealing	  with	  PEPs.	  The	  EU	  Fourth	  Money	  Laundering	  Directive	  noted	  that	  these	  requirements,	  in	  addition	  to	  customer	  due	  diligence	  measures,	  include	  the	  requirement	  to:	  	   (a)	  have	  in	  place	  appropriate	  risk	  management	  systems,	  including	  risk-­‐based	  procedures,	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  customer	  or	  the	  beneficial	  owner	  of	  the	  customer	  is	  a	  politically	  exposed	  person;	  	  (b)	  apply	  the	  following	  measures	  in	  cases	  of	  business	  relationships	  with	  politically	  exposed	  persons:	  	  	   (i)	  obtain	  senior	  management	  approval	  for	  establishing	  or	  continuing	  business	  relationships	  with	  such	  persons;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362	  FATF,	  “FATF	  Guidance	  –	  Politically	  Exposed	  Persons	  (Recommendations	  12	  and	  22),”	  3-­‐5.	  363	  Unger,	  “Money	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   (ii)	  take	  adequate	  measures	  to	  establish	  the	  source	  of	  wealth	  and	  source	  of	  funds	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  business	  relationships	  or	  transactions	  with	  such	  persons;	  	  	   (iii)	  conduct	  enhanced,	  ongoing	  monitoring	  of	  those	  business	  relationships.365	  	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  regulations	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  PEPs	  exclusively	  to	  “Foreign	  Politically	  Exposed	  Persons	  (FPEP),	  defined	  as	  senior	  figures	  in	  foreign	  executive,	  legislative,	  administrative,	  military	  or	  judicial	  branches;	  their	  immediate	  family;	  and	  close	  associates.366	  Interestingly,	  many	  banks	  have	  developed	  a	  definition	  that	  extends	  to	  a	  broader	  group	  than	  required	  by	  the	  standard	  setters	  or	  by	  national	  law	  or	  regulation.	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  potential	  risks	  associated	  with	  PEPs.367	  The	  Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority's	  (DFSA's)	  definition	  of	  PEPS	  is	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  The	  DFSA,	  the	  independent	  regulator	  of	  financial	  services	  in	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Center	  (DIFC),	  adopted	  a	  definition	  where	  PEPs:	  	  Means	  a	  natural	  person	  (and	  includes	  a	  family	  member	  or	  close	  associate)	  who	  is	  or	  has	  been	  entrusted	  with	  a	  prominent	  public	  function,	  domestically	  or	  in	  a	  foreign	  country	  or	  territory,	  for	  example	  a	  head	  of	  state	  or	  of	  government,	  senior	  politician,	  senior	  government,	  judicial	  or	  military	  official,	  ambassador,	  senior	  executive	  of	  a	  state	  owned	  co-­‐operation,	  an	  important	  political	  party	  official	  but	  not	  middle	  ranking	  or	  more	  junior	  individuals	  in	  these	  categories.368	  	  The	  UAE's	  political	  structure	  and	  geographic	  proximity	  to	  unstable	  regimes	  lacking	  transparency	  makes	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  PEPs	  crucial	  to	  protecting	  its	  financial	  system	  from	  criminal	  money.	  The	  “Arab	  Spring”	  of	  2010	  helped	  guide	  world	  attention	  to	  the	  rulers	  (and	  their	  families)	  of	  the	  affected	  countries,	  which	  placed	  greater	  focus	  on	  financial	  institutions	  in	  regards	  to	  possible	  involvement	  in	  assisting	  PEPs	  in	  moving	  assets	  out	  of	  those	  countries.	  The	  KPMG	  2011	  survey	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  MENA	  region,	  PEPs	  is	  an	  area	  providing	  significant	  challenges	  around	  compliance,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  identification.	  Exactly	  97	  percent	  (up	  from	  89	  in	  2007,	  one	  percentage	  point	  less	  than	  in	  North	  America)	  of	  MENA	  financial	  institutions	  participating	  in	  the	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  EU	  Directive,	  “Directive	  (EU)	  2015/849	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council,”	  Article	  20.	  366	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “Addendum	  to	  Circular	  No.	  24/2000	  -­‐	  Regulation	  concerning	  Procedures	  for	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering,”	  Notice	  No.	  2922/2008.	  	  367	  Greenberg,	  Gray,	  Schantz,	  Latham,	  and	  Gardner,	  Stolen	  Asset	  Recovery.	  368	  DFSA,	  “DFSA	  Rulebook:	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Counter-­‐Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Sanctions	  Module,”	  AML/VER12/08-­‐16,	  12.	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survey	  then	  used	  PEP	  status	  as	  a	  risk	  factor.369	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  in	  response	  to	  regional	  political	  and	  social	  unrest,	  the	  DFSA	  reminded	  DIFC-­‐registered	  Authorised	  Firms	  and	  Ancillary	  Service	  Providers	  (non-­‐financial	  institutions)	  “to	  be	  alert	  to	  the	  potential	  outflow	  of	  licit	  and	  illicit	  assets	  from	  these	  jurisdictions,”	  and	  to	  review	  the	  existing	  clients	  from	  these	  jurisdictions	  “to	  ensure	  proper	  classification,	  along	  with	  necessary	  systems	  and	  controls.”370	  	  	  In	  mounting	  regulatory	  requirements,	  some	  private	  banks	  are	  closing	  their	  operations	  in	  perceived	  high-­‐risk	  regions.	  For	  example,	  RBC	  exited	  a	  wealth-­‐management	  business	  in	  Latin	  America,	  closing	  all	  offices	  in	  the	  region	  along	  with	  its	  international	  wealth	  management	  business	  in	  the	  Caribbean.371	  In	  recent	  years,	  US	  giant	  Merrill	  Lynch	  retreated	  from	  international	  wealth	  management,	  while	  Morgan	  Stanley	  disposed	  of	  its	  wealth	  management	  arm	  in	  Europe,	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Africa.	  “Banks	  active	  outside	  their	  domestic	  markets	  have	  been	  faced	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  either	  significantly	  ramping	  up	  compliance	  efforts,	  including	  new	  reporting	  systems	  and	  procedures,	  or	  exiting	  the	  market.”372	  Starting	  from	  2010	  a	  few	  large	  international	  banks	  either	  completely	  pulled	  out	  of	  or	  began	  trimming	  their	  services	  in	  the	  UAE.	  Among	  them	  are	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland,373	  Lloyds,374	  Barclays375	  and	  Standard	  Chartered.	  The	  latter	  closed	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  business	  (SME)	  accounts	  in	  the	  UAE	  as	  part	  of	  an	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  settlement	  with	  US	  authorities.	  According	  to	  the	  settlement,	  the	  bank	  had	  failed	  to	  detect	  large	  numbers	  of	  “potentially	  high-­‐risk	  transactions”	  originating	  in	  SCB	  branches	  in	  the	  UAE	  (among	  other	  places.)376	  The	  bank's	  website	  explained	  its	  move	  as	  “part	  of	  its	  broader	  efforts	  to	  sharpen	  its	  strategic	  focus,	  withdrawing	  or	  re-­‐aligning	  non-­‐strategic	  businesses,	  including	  those	  where	  increased	  regulatory	  costs	  and	  risks	  undermine	  their	  economic	  viability.”377	  	  Recent	  UAE	  enforcements	  reflect	  the	  concerns.	  The	  Dutch	  bank,	  ABN	  Amro,	  was	  fined	  US$640,000	  by	  DFSA	  and	  €625,000	  by	  Dutch	  central	  bank	  De	  Nederlandsche	  Bank	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  KPMG,	  “Global	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Survey	  2011:	  How	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  Up	  The	  Change.”	  370	  DFSA,	  “The	  DFSA	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  to	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  Executive	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  Authorised	  Firms	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  the	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  371	  Trichur,	  “RBC	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  More	  Unit	  Sales.”	  372	  Pavoni,	  “Private	  Banking:	  Wealth	  Management	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  Is	  Private	  Banking	  a	  Global	  or	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  Game?”	  373	  The	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland,	  http://www.rbsbank.ae/UAE/index.htm.	  	  374	  McGinley,	  “Lloyds	  to	  Close	  Dubai	  Private	  Banking	  Business.”	  375	  Bianchi,	  and	  Nair,	  “Barclays	  Said	  to	  Cut	  About	  150	  Dubai	  Corporate	  Banking	  Jobs.”	  376	  Rushe	  in	  The	  Guardian,	  “Standard	  Chartered	  Fined	  $300m	  by	  US	  Financial	  Watchdog.”	  377	  Standard	  Chartered	  Bank,	  “New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Financial	  Services'	  Consent	  Order	  Relating	  to	  Standard	  Chartered.”	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(DNB)	  for	  perceived	  deficiencies	  in	  its	  AML	  systems.	  Its	  private	  banking	  division,	  which	  operates	  in	  the	  DIFC,	  contravened	  rules	  “requiring	  it	  to	  implement	  appropriate	  safeguards	  to	  prevent	  opportunities	  for	  money	  laundering.”	  The	  Decision	  Notice	  stated	  that	  the	  bank	  failed	  to	  identify	  on	  two	  occasions	  a	  PEP	  contented	  to	  its	  clients.378	  The	  DFSA	  observed	  that	  the	  fine	  would	  have	  been	  $1m	  was	  it	  not	  for	  the	  bank’s	  initiative	  to	  self-­‐report	  deficiencies	  and	  to	  fully	  cooperate	  with	  the	  DFSA’s	  investigation.379	  	  
Shell	  Companies	  One	  source	  has	  defined	  a	  shell	  company	  as	  one	  “that,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  incorporation,	  has	  no	  significant	  assets	  or	  operations.	  Shell	  companies	  can	  be	  set	  up	  domestically	  or	  offshore	  and	  the	  ownership	  structure	  of	  a	  shell	  company	  can	  take	  several	  forms.	  Shell	  companies	  have	  no	  physical	  presence,	  employees	  or	  products	  and	  may	  be	  owned	  by	  corporations,	  nominee	  owners	  and	  bearer	  shares,	  obscuring	  beneficial	  ownership.”380	  (The	  similar	  term	  shelf	  company	  refers	  to	  one	  that	  has	  been	  created	  and	  registered	  as	  an	  entity	  but	  has	  no	  activity,	  and	  can	  be	  sold	  “off-­‐the-­‐shelf”	  as	  an	  already-­‐registered	  firm.)381	  In	  its	  definition	  of	  shell	  companies	  the	  FATF	  emphasize	  that	  they	  are	  legitimate	  corporate	  entities	  used	  for	  holding	  stock	  or	  intangible	  assets	  of	  another	  business	  entity.	  Nonetheless	  it	  stresses	  that	  they	  can	  also	  have	  no	  legitimate	  commercial	  purpose	  and	  can	  be	  misused	  by	  criminals	  in	  ML	  operations,	  mutual-­‐fund	  schemes,	  tax	  fraud	  and	  internal	  business	  fraud.382	  Often	  these	  companies	  are	  used	  “to	  establish	  layers	  between	  the	  criminal	  and	  the	  laundering,	  fraudulent	  or	  corrupt	  transaction;	  and	  between	  the	  predicate	  crime	  and	  the	  criminal	  proceeds.”383	  There	  are	  endless	  examples	  when	  shell	  companies	  were	  used	  for	  the	  latter	  purposes.	  Siemens,	  among	  other	  methods,	  used	  shell	  companies	  to	  facilitate	  bribe	  payment	  of	  more	  than	  US$800	  million	  over	  the	  course	  of	  2001	  to	  2007.384	  To	  secure	  a	  contract	  valued	  at	  US$6	  billion,	  for	  construction	  of	  liquefied	  natural	  gas	  (LNG)	  facilities	  in	  Nigeria,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  TSKJ	  Consortium	  conspired	  to	  funnel	  over	  US$180	  million	  worth	  of	  bribes	  to	  Nigerians	  acting	  through	  a	  subsidiary	  shell	  company	  in	  Madeira,	  which	  served	  as	  conduits	  for	  the	  bribe	  money.385	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  DFSA,	  “Decision	  Notice,”	  F001198.	  379	  DFSA,	  “DFSA	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  AMRO	  for	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Deficiencies.”	  380	  Australian	  Government/Australian	  Transaction	  Reports	  and	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  Laundering	  Methods,”	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  381	  van	  der	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  Laundering:	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  76-­‐79.	  383	  FATF,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Using	  Trust	  and	  Company	  Service	  Providers,”	  35.	  384	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  “Transcript	  of	  Press	  Conference	  Announcing	  Siemens	  AG	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  Subsidiaries	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  Guilty.”	  	  385	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  One	  study	  demonstrated	  the	  ease	  of	  setting	  up	  a	  shell	  company	  with	  no	  requirements	  for	  official	  identification	  and	  low	  cost.	  Of	  the	  45	  corporate	  service	  providers	  approached	  in	  the	  study,	  “17	  were	  content	  to	  form	  the	  company	  without	  any	  independent	  confirmation	  of	  identity,	  requiring	  only	  a	  credit	  card	  and	  a	  shipping	  address	  for	  documents.”386	  The	  project,	  based	  on	  soliciting	  offers	  for	  shell	  companies,	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  is	  quite	  easy	  to	  obtain	  an	  untraceable	  shell	  company	  without	  producing	  formally	  required	  proof	  of	  customer	  identity.387	  	  	  PEPs	  have	  been	  major	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  shell	  companies	  in	  the	  globalized	  economy,	  using	  them	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  hiding	  wealth.388	  “PEPs,	  when	  involved	  in	  criminal	  activity,	  often	  conceal	  their	  illicit	  assets	  through	  networks	  of	  shell	  companies	  and	  off-­‐shore	  banks	  located	  outside	  the	  PEPs	  country	  of	  origin.”389	  One	  study	  of	  the	  laundering	  of	  corrupt	  precedes	  involving	  PEPs	  cases	  showed	  that	  more	  than	  half	  of	  analyzed	  cases	  shell	  companies	  were	  used	  primarily	  for	  laundering	  purposes.	  One	  of	  the	  cases	  involved	  a	  former	  Russian	  Minister	  of	  Atomic	  Energy,	  Yevgeny	  Adamov,	  who	  laundered	  through	  American	  shell	  companies	  US$9	  million	  of	  funds	  provided	  by	  the	  West	  for	  upgrading	  nuclear	  safety	  at	  15	  power	  plants	  in	  Russia	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.390	  The	  recent	  “Panama	  Papers”	  phenomenon	  brought	  about	  new	  interest	  in,	  and	  details	  on,	  the	  workings	  of	  shell	  companies.	  Though	  too	  recent	  to	  figure	  in	  peer-­‐reviewed	  journal	  articles	  and	  books,	  the	  term	  “Panama	  Papers”	  can	  be	  briefly	  described	  as	  referring	  to	  a	  database	  consisting	  of	  millions	  of	  documents	  leaked	  from	  Panamanian	  law	  firm	  Mossack	  Fonseca.	  These	  were	  prepared	  for	  the	  firm’s	  foreign	  clients	  and	  entities,	  in	  some	  cases	  detailing	  illegal	  or	  secret	  holdings	  concealed	  in	  shell	  companies	  created	  by	  the	  firm.	  The	  International	  Consortium	  of	  Investigative	  Journalists,	  which	  prepared	  a	  series	  of	  news	  stories	  on	  the	  subject,	  also	  operates	  a	  searchable	  “Panama	  Papers”	  database.391	  Major	  Middle	  East	  figures	  and	  PEPs,	  including	  from	  the	  UAE	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  are	  among	  those	  said	  to	  have	  had	  private	  financial	  data	  revealed	  in	  the	  database.392	  (It	  may	  be	  worth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386	  Sharman,	  “Shopping	  for	  Anonymous	  Shell	  Companies,”	  132.	  	  387	  Findley,	  Nielson,	  and	  Sharman,	  “Global	  Shell	  Games.”	  388	  Olatunde	  and	  Lauwo,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Offshore	  Financial	  Centres	  in	  Elite	  Money	  Laundering	  Practices:	  Evidence	  from	  Nigeria.”	  389	  FATF,	  “Report	  on	  Money	  Laundering	  Typologies	  2003-­‐2004,”	  1.	  390	  Gordon,	  “Laundering	  the	  Proceeds	  of	  Public	  Sector	  Corruption.”	  391	  https://panamapapers.icij.org/.	  	  392	  Lusher,	  “Panama	  Papers:	  12	  World	  Leaders	  Linked	  to	  Offshore	  Dealings	  –	  and	  the	  Full	  Allegations	  Against	  Them.”	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noting	  that	  the	  UAE	  currently	  has	  no	  tax	  system	  from	  which	  an	  Emirati	  of	  any	  status	  might	  feel	  a	  need	  to	  hide	  income.)	  	  Sheldon	  Whitehouse,	  a	  Democratic	  Party	  senator	  for	  Rhode	  Island,	  was	  quoted	  observing	  that	  “the	  international	  environment	  has	  shifted,”	  largely	  after	  the	  Panama	  Papers	  “shed	  a	  very	  cold	  light	  on	  the	  mischief	  that	  goes	  on	  behind	  these	  shell	  company	  screens,	  and	  that	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  opponents	  to	  create	  a	  credible	  argument.”393	  The	  Panama	  Papers	  have	  directed	  a	  rising	  national	  and	  global	  focus	  on	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  money	  laundering	  arising	  from	  the	  creation	  and	  use	  of	  shell	  companies.394	  	  	  Anonymity	  behind	  shell	  company	  ownership	  as	  a	  predicament	  has	  been	  recognized	  and	  addressed	  at	  the	  highest	  levels.	  Countries	  are	  under	  pressure	  for	  more	  detailed	  information	  at	  the	  time	  companies	  are	  formed.	  The	  lack	  of	  transparency	  over	  company	  ownership	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  points	  of	  discussion	  at	  the	  June	  2013	  G8	  summit.	  There	  the	  UK	  unveiled	  a	  proposal	  to	  create	  a	  central	  register	  of	  beneficial	  ownership	  to	  eliminate	  “anonymous”	  shell	  firms.395	  The	  US	  government	  proposed	  beneficial	  ownership	  legislation	  that	  will	  make	  it	  mandatory	  for	  all	  legal	  entities	  to	  disclose	  “adequate	  and	  accurate	  beneficial	  ownership	  information”	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury	  at	  the	  time	  of	  a	  company’s	  creation,	  and	  to	  regularly	  update	  the	  information,	  with	  penalties	  for	  failure	  to	  comply.	  The	  legislation	  would	  also	  create	  a	  central	  companies'	  beneficial	  ownership	  registry,	  run	  and	  updated	  by	  the	  FinCEN,	  initially	  accessible	  only	  by	  US	  law	  enforcement	  and	  some	  US	  government	  officials.396	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  the	  FinCEN	  announced	  the	  Customer	  Due	  Diligence	  (CDD)	  Final	  Rule,	  which	  made	  it	  compulsory	  for	  banks,	  brokers,	  mutual	  funds	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions	  to	  collect	  and	  identify	  the	  beneficial	  owners	  of	  companies,	  partnerships	  and	  trusts	  when	  these	  entities	  open	  new	  accounts	  from	  the	  date	  the	  CDD	  Final	  Rule	  takes	  effect,	  in	  May	  2018.397	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  Monahan,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering:	  US	  -­‐	  US	  Takes	  Aim	  at	  Shell	  Companies	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering.”	  394	  Hardy,	  Michel,	  and	  Murray	  (2016),	  “Is	  the	  United	  States	  Still	  a	  Tax	  Haven?	  The	  Government	  Acts	  on	  Tax	  Compliance	  and	  Money	  Laundering	  Risks.”	  395	  UK/G8,	  “Trade,	  Tax	  &	  Transparency:	  the	  2013	  UK	  G8	  Presidency	  Report,”	  3,	  10.	  396	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Treasury,	  “Treasury	  Announces	  Key	  Regulations	  and	  Legislation	  to	  Counter	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Corruption,	  Combat	  Tax	  Evasion.”	  397	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury/Financial	  Crimes	  Enforcement	  Network,	  “Customer	  Due	  Diligence	  Requirements	  for	  Financial	  Institutions.”	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One	  study	  suggests	  that	  imposing	  a	  legal	  duty	  with	  penalties	  for	  non-­‐compliance	  on	  Corporate	  Service	  Providers	  (CSPs),	  also	  known	  as	  Trust	  and	  Company	  Service	  Providers	  (TCSPs),	  is	  the	  most	  effective	  solution	  for	  this	  issue.398	  The	  CSPs	  include	  lawyers,	  notaries	  and	  accountants,	  who	  are	  intermediaries	  for	  their	  clients	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  management	  of	  shell	  companies.399	  Another	  work	  put	  forth	  banning	  shell	  companies	  among	  other	  possible	  solutions	  to	  fight	  money	  laundering.400	  While	  examining	  illicit	  flows	  from	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union,	  another	  researcher	  concluded:	  “the	  money	  laundering	  risk	  in	  connection	  with	  shell	  companies	  stems	  ultimately	  from	  the	  readiness	  of	  banks	  to	  work	  with	  them,”	  and	  “where	  there	  is	  a	  banking	  model	  built	  largely	  around	  their	  [shell	  companies’]	  use.”401	  	  	  While	  some	  jurisdictions	  permit	  shell	  companies	  under	  the	  corporate	  registration	  laws,	  the	  UAE	  prohibits	  the	  establishment	  of	  these	  entities.402	  The	  Dubai	  Multi	  Commodities	  Centre	  (DMCC),	  the	  largest	  free	  zone	  in	  the	  UAE,	  which	  regulates	  a	  range	  of	  commodities	  among	  which	  gold,	  diamond,	  precious	  metals,	  in	  its	  AML/CFT	  Policy	  states:	  “The	  granting	  of	  DMCC	  membership	  to	  shell	  companies	  is	  strictly	  forbidden.”403	  	  	  	  
Remittance	  and	  Exchange	  Systems,	  and	  Hawala	  
Hawala	  is	  of	  special	  interest	  to	  a	  study	  of	  the	  UAE	  because	  of	  its	  prevalence	  there.	  	  Dubai	  “has	  often	  been	  singled	  out	  as	  a	  location	  where	  many	  hawala	  transactions	  are	  consolidated	  and	  cleared.”404	  “The	  US	  Treasury	  Department	  has	  specifically	  identified	  Dubai,	  Pakistan,	  and	  India	  as	  the	  ‘hawala	  triangle,’	  because	  people	  living	  in	  these	  regions	  rely	  heavily	  on	  hawala	  networks,”	  one	  analyst	  observed	  in	  a	  2004	  journal	  article.405	  
Hawala	  is	  primarily	  seen	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  remittance	  transfer.	  It	  serves	  “millions	  of	  immigrants	  ...	  whose	  remittances	  are	  often	  desperately	  needed	  as	  a	  means	  of	  survival.”406	  The	  World	  Bank	  estimated	  in	  2006	  that	  while	  official	  banks	  annually	  transferred	  about	  $167	  billion	  in	  remittances,	  the	  underground	  or	  unofficial	  transfer	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  Findley,	  Nielson,	  and	  Sharman,	  “Global	  Shell	  Games.”	  399	  FATF,	  The	  Misuse	  of	  Corporate	  Vehicles,	  Including	  Trust	  and	  Company	  Service	  Providers.	  	  400	  He,	  “A	  Typological	  Study	  on	  Money	  Laundering.”	  401	  Stack,	  “Shell	  Companies,	  Latvian-­‐Type	  Correspondent	  Banking,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flows	  From	  Russia	  and	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union,”	  509.	  402	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  State,	  “Countries/Jurisdictions	  of	  Primary	  Concern:	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.”	  403	  Dubai	  Multi	  Commodities	  Center	  (DMCC)	  (2016),	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Combating	  the	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism	  Policy	  and	  Process,”	  11.	  	  404	  Wilson,	  “Hawala	  and	  Other	  Informal	  Payments	  Systems,”	  6.	  	  405	  Pathak,	  ‘The	  Obstacles	  to	  Regulating	  the	  Hawala,”	  2037.	  406	  Passas,	  “Formalizing	  the	  Informal?”	  8-­‐9.	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system	  handled	  a	  figure	  at	  least	  half	  that	  size.407	  An	  observer	  in	  the	  UAE	  noted	  in	  the	  post	  9/11	  environment	  that	  hawala	  operators	  fell	  into	  two	  basic	  categories:	  “those	  who	  do	  it	  for	  a	  living,	  and	  …	  those	  who	  have	  their	  normal	  business	  and	  the	  hawala	  is	  a	  small	  side	  business	  at	  best.”	  He	  continued:	  	  
Hawala	  operators	  usually	  are	  best	  at	  delivering	  money	  and	  receiving	  money	  from	  certain	  regions	  only,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  unlikely	  that	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  cover	  the	  entire	  length	  and	  breadth	  of	  one	  country.	  However,	  they	  do	  have	  a	  loose	  alliance	  [with]	  each	  other	  and	  'cross	  deliver'	  to	  each	  other	  for	  efficiency,	  though	  this	  is	  rare.408	  Money	  remittance	  services	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  UAE’s	  international	  money	  flows	  and	  at	  the	  same	  expose	  the	  country	  to	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  risks.	  A	  money	  remitter	  transfers	  money	  for	  clients	  without	  accessing	  formal	  banking	  networks.	  Remitters	  may	  be	  multinational	  franchises	  (such	  as	  Western	  Union);	  national	  franchises	  (in	  the	  UAE,	  UAE	  Exchange);	  or	  smaller	  operations.	  Their	  clients	  may	  need	  the	  alternative	  systems	  due	  to	  their	  own	  lack	  of	  bank	  access,	  or	  the	  lack	  of	  banking	  services	  at	  the	  desired	  destination.	  The	  formal	  operations	  may	  be	  regulated,	  and	  their	  clients'	  transfers	  perfectly	  legitimate.	  More	  problematic	  are	  what	  have	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  underground	  or	  informal	  (and	  therefore	  poorly-­‐	  or	  un-­‐regulated)	  remittance	  organizations	  or	  systems.	  The	  best	  known	  include	  the	  Chinese	  fei	  chi’en	  (“flying	  money”)	  system,	  and	  of	  more	  interest	  to	  this	  thesis,	  hawala	  (Urdu	  for	  “in	  the	  air”),	  a	  centuries-­‐old	  method	  that	  originated	  in	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent	  and	  spread	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  elsewhere.409	  	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  hawala	  is	  not	  synonymous	  with	  or	  a	  feature	  of	  Islamic	  Finance,	  although	  post-­‐9/11	  study	  of	  the	  former	  invited	  inspection	  of	  the	  latter.	  That	  same	  examination	  determined	  that	  hawala	  was	  Al-­‐Qaida’s	  favored	  money-­‐movement	  system	  after	  it	  moved	  to	  Afghanistan	  in	  1996.	  This	  was	  “because	  the	  banking	  system	  there	  was	  unreliable	  and	  formal	  banking	  was	  risky	  due	  to	  the	  scrutiny	  that	  Al-­‐Qaida	  received	  after	  the	  August	  1998	  East	  African	  Embassy	  bombings.	  It	  relied	  on	  the	  established	  hawala	  networks	  operating	  in	  Pakistan,	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  and	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Since	  9/11,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  the	  dependence	  of	  Al-­‐Qaida	  on	  the	  
hawala	  system	  has	  become	  even	  greater.”410	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407	  Van	  de	  Bunt,	  “A	  Case	  Study	  on	  the	  Misuse	  of	  Hawala	  Banking,”	  692	  408	  Sher,	  “Counter	  Point:	  Regulation	  of	  Hawala	  is	  a	  Step	  in	  the	  Right	  Direction.”	  409	  For	  a	  concise	  history,	  see	  Shehu,	  “The	  Asian	  Alternative	  Remittance	  Systems	  and	  Money	  Laundering,”	  176-­‐177	  410	  Koh,	  Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  28-­‐29.	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For	  several	  reasons,	  experts	  have	  begun	  to	  abandon	  earlier	  attempts	  at	  designation	  and	  start	  to	  classify	  hawala	  and	  other	  such	  systems	  as	  Informal	  Value	  Transfer	  Systems,	  or	  IVTS.	  For	  example,	  describing	  hawala	  as	  an	  “underground	  banking”	  system	  is	  common	  but	  not	  appropriate,	  because	  hawala	  dealers,	  or	  hawaladars	  “generally	  do	  not	  provide	  traditional	  financial	  services	  such	  as	  savings	  or	  checking	  accounts.	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  nothing	  really	  ‘underground’	  about	  these	  networks;	  the	  dealers	  often	  operate	  openly	  and	  legally,	  advertising	  their	  services	  in	  the	  ethnic	  press	  of	  many	  countries.	  Furthermore,	  describing	  the	  IVTS	  as	  ‘alternative’	  is	  misleading:	  in	  many	  nations,	  such	  informal	  arrangements	  represent	  the	  only	  financial	  system	  available.”411	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  hawala	  networks	  operate.412	  For	  example:	  	   Upon	  customer	  request	  a	  US-­‐based	  hawaladar	  –	  a	  hawala	  operator	  -­‐	  will	  call,	  fax,	  or	  email	  their	  
hawaladar	  associate	  in	  Pakistan,	  for	  example,	  with	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  transaction	  (i.e.	  amount	  and	  password	  only	  –	  no	  names	  are	  used).	  This	  Pakistan-­‐based	  hawaladar	  will	  then	  pay	  the	  requested	  amount	  out	  of	  his/her	  own	  funds,	  and	  in	  local	  currency,	  upon	  receiving	  the	  agreed	  upon	  password	  from	  the	  recipient.	  The	  only	  paper	  trail	  might	  be	  a	  notation,	  often	  encoded	  or	  in	  a	  little	  known	  dialect	  (e.g.	  Gujarati	  or	  Memoni),	  of	  the	  debt	  obligation	  in	  internal	  books.	  The	  funds	  are	  distributed,	  often	  delivered	  right	  to	  the	  door	  of	  the	  intended	  recipient	  all	  within	  a	  course	  of	  minutes,	  without	  receipts	  or	  paperwork,	  and	  all	  outside	  of	  formal	  financial	  institutions.413	  Notably,	  money	  never	  moves	  across	  borders.	  What	  moves	  are	  goods	  and	  liability	  positions.	  “[I]n	  larger	  transactions,”	  one	  observer	  notes,	  “some	  hawaladars	  (or	  their	  associates)	  utilize	  import/export	  businesses.	  Through	  these	  companies,	  ‘countervaluation’	  –	  the	  settling	  of	  accounts	  through	  trade	  rather	  than	  transfer	  –	  occurs.	  Countervaluation	  is	  done	  either	  by	  the	  underinvoicing	  or	  overinvoicing	  of	  product	  flows	  between	  these	  import/export	  businesses.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  hawaladar	  owed	  $25,000	  to	  a	  colleague	  in	  Bishkek,	  he	  might	  over-­‐invoice	  a	  shipment	  of	  carpets.	  The	  carpets,	  having	  a	  true	  value	  of	  $25,000	  would	  be	  invoiced	  at	  $50,000;	  $25,000	  would	  cover	  the	  legitimate	  cost	  of	  goods	  and	  the	  remaining	  $25,000	  would	  settle	  his/her	  debt.”414	  Sometimes	  these	  settlements	  are	  paid	  in	  gold.415	  The	  latter	  is	  especially	  prevalent	  since	  Dubai	  hosts	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  gold	  markets	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  South	  Asia.	  It	  has	  long	  been	  a	  favored,	  even	  “notorious,”	  point	  for	  gold	  smuggling.416	  Dubai	  even	  earned	  the	  nickname	  the	  “smugglers’	  supermarket.”417	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411	  Perkel,	  “Money	  Laundering	  and	  Terrorism:	  Informal	  Value	  Transfer	  Systems,”	  188.	  See	  also	  Borders,	  “Regulating	  and	  Combating	  Underground	  Banking,”	  98-­‐99.	  412	  El	  Qorchi,	  Maimbo,	  and	  Wilson,	  Informal	  Funds	  Transfer	  Systems,	  14-­‐15. 413	  Bowers,	  “Hawala,	  Money	  Laundering,	  and	  Terrorism	  Finance,”	  380-­‐381.	  414	  Bowers,	  “Hawala,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Terrorism	  Finance,”	  382.	  415	  Farah,	  “Al	  Qaeda's	  Road	  Paved	  with	  Gold.”	  416	  Naylor,	  Wages	  of	  Crime,	  196,	  229-­‐235;	  Allen,	  “The	  Veil	  Over	  Dirty	  Money	  in	  Dubai.”	  417	  Weinstein,	  “Mumbai's	  Development	  Mafias,”	  27,	  30.	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 The	  UAE	  has	  been	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  ongoing	  debate	  on	  the	  role	  of	  hawala	  in	  the	  modern	  financial	  system.	  The	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  has	  openly	  voiced	  its	  support	  of	  and	  recognizes	  the	  need	  for	  hawala	  networks.418	  In	  response	  to	  the	  international	  criticism,	  the	  UAE	  officials	  have	  promulgated:	  “We	  believe	  that	  hawala	  transactions	  originating	  in	  the	  UAE	  are	  innocent	  and	  reflect	  migrant	  workers’	  remittances	  to	  their	  home	  countries.”	  The	  country	  also	  recognizes	  its	  responsibility	  “to	  ensure	  that	  criminals,	  money	  launderers,	  and	  terrorists	  do	  not	  misuse	  this	  system	  of	  hawala.”	  419	  Both	  statements	  reflect	  the	  country’s	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  position.	  The	  country’s	  reliance	  on	  migrant	  workers	  and	  its	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  investments	  require	  political	  and	  economic	  stability	  as	  a	  guarantor	  for	  economic	  integration.	  The	  benefits	  of	  the	  hawala	  system	  were	  publically	  acknowledged.	  As	  a	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  official	  observed,	  “The	  transaction	  can	  be	  completed	  very	  fast,	  sometimes	  in	  15	  minutes,	  and	  in	  almost	  all	  cases	  the	  hawaladar	  back	  home	  sends	  the	  money	  directly	  to	  the	  worker’s	  house.”420	  Observers	  have	  summarized	  hawala’s	  advantages	  to	  its	  users	  as	  being	  “fast,	  cheap	  reliable,	  easy	  discrete	  and	  accessible.”421	  And,	  again	  in	  a	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  official’s	  words,	  “the	  
hawala	  rate	  is	  better	  than	  the	  official	  banking	  exchange	  rate;	  and	  …	  it	  can	  be	  used	  in	  rural	  areas	  which	  in	  some	  countries	  lack	  formal	  banking	  facilities.”422	  Another	  observer	  noted:	  “In	  terms	  of	  cost,	  hawala	  commission	  ranges	  from	  0.25	  to	  1.25	  per	  cent,	  which	  is	  significantly	  lower	  than	  commissions	  charged	  by	  the	  formal	  banking	  sector.	  The	  low	  cost	  is	  primarily	  due	  to	  low	  overheads	  and	  favourable	  exchange	  rates	  as	  well	  as	  integration	  with	  existing	  business	  activities,”423	  while	  “[e]xchanges	  in	  the	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  are	  frequent.”424	  In	  the	  UAE,	  their	  customers	  are	  migrant	  workers:	  mostly	  taxi	  drivers	  and	  labourers,	  who	  send	  home	  on	  average	  around	  US$400	  every	  month.	  Many	  use	  the	  hawaladars	  as	  banks,	  “making	  regular	  deposits	  and	  letting	  them	  know	  how	  much	  to	  send	  home	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month.”425	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	  Beckett,	  “Informal	  Money-­‐Movement	  System	  in	  UAE	  is	  Likely	  Uncontrollable.”	  	  419	  Al-­‐Hamiz,	  “Hawala:	  A	  UAE	  Perspective,”	  32.	  420	  Al-­‐Hamiz,	  “Hawala:	  A	  UAE	  Perspective,”	  31.	  421	  Borders,	  “Regulating	  and	  Combating	  Underground	  Banking,”	  103,	  citing	  Passas,	  “Dirty	  Money,”	  42.	  422	  Al-­‐Hamiz,	  “Hawala:	  A	  UAE	  Perspective,	  32.	  423	  Keene,	  “Hawala	  and	  Related	  Informal	  Value	  Transfer	  Systems	  –	  An	  Assessment	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Organized	  Crime	  and	  Terrorist	  Finance:	  Is	  There	  Cause	  for	  Concern?”	  188.	  424	  Looney,	  “Hawala:	  The	  Terrorist’s	  Financial	  Mechanism,”165.	  425	  Maayeh,	  “Hawala	  Money	  Transfers	  Defy	  Regulation	  Efforts.”
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However,	  that	  the	  transfer	  process	  can	  be	  used	  for	  both	  legitimate	  and	  illegitimate	  purposes	  has	  prompted	  some	  to	  refer	  to	  “white”	  and	  “black”	  hawala.426	  Investigating	  suspected	  cases	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  hindered	  by	  the	  difficulty	  in	  tracing	  the	  flow	  of	  funds.	  “Specifically,”	  a	  modern	  study	  notes,	  “an	  IVTS	  operates	  not	  by	  exchanging	  money,	  which	  would	  be	  traceable,	  but	  rather	  through	  the	  exchanging	  of	  debts,	  where	  the	  only	  tracking	  method	  is	  a	  balance	  sheet.	  In	  transacting	  these	  debt	  transfer,	  an	  ITVS	  agent	  will	  often	  use	  untraceable	  actions	  like	  false	  pricing	  on	  imports	  or	  exports,	  in-­‐kind	  payments,	  trade	  diversion	  schemes,	  or	  the	  use	  of	  pre-­‐paid	  phone	  cards.”427	  All	  of	  these	  activities	  are	  classic	  money	  laundering	  typologies,	  as	  is	  the	  use	  of	  gold	  or	  precious	  stones,	  which	  is	  sometimes	  the	  medium	  by	  which	  hawala	  accounts	  are	  settled.428	  It	  works	  the	  following	  way.	  Hawaladars	  maintain	  accounts	  in	  different	  jurisdictions	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  clearing	  purposes.	  Major	  hawala	  hubs	  are	  located	  in	  traditionally	  in	  large	  trade	  cities,	  such	  as	  London,	  New	  York,	  Islamabad,	  New	  Delhi,	  Tehran,	  Dubai,	  etc.429	  Once	  hawala	  funds	  reach	  such	  accounts,	  they	  are	  used	  to	  purchase	  gold.	  The	  gold	  is	  then	  exported	  to	  Dubai,	  from	  where	  it	  is	  smuggled	  to	  and	  sold	  in	  the	  black	  market	  in	  India.	  The	  same	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  employed	  with	  any	  other	  commodity	  including	  precious	  stones.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  also	  commonly	  used	  for	  avoiding	  import	  duties.430	  Hawala	  is	  often	  utilized	  to	  circumvent	  regulations	  in	  other	  countries.431	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  paper	  trail	  it	  is	  a	  perfect	  mechanism	  for	  tax	  evasion.432	  	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  another	  observer,	  “the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  IVTS	  networks	  is	  that	  it	  is	  practically	  impossible	  to	  track	  the	  funds	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  dollars	  passing	  through	  an	  IVTS	  are	  legitimate	  and	  clean.	  In	  the	  IVTS	  networks,	  clean	  money	  is	  sent	  through	  a	  system	  populated	  by	  mostly	  ‘clean’	  money,	  and	  the	  funds	  reach	  their	  illegal	  purpose	  when	  used	  for	  terrorism.”	  433	  Tradition	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  that	  has	  made	  hawala	  a	  sensitive	  industry	  to	  regulate:	  there	  is	  also	  religion	  to	  consider.	  In	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Asia,	  “Many	  people	  use	  hawala	  networks	  for	  cultural-­‐religious	  reason	  because	  under	  Islamic	  law,	  the	  use	  of	  certain	  banking	  systems	  is	  considered	  sinful	  if	  it	  makes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426	  See	  Daudi,	  “The	  Invisible	  Bank:	  Regulating	  the	  Hawala	  System	  in	  India,	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,”	  630-­‐632.	  427	  Guiora	  and	  Field,	  “Using	  and	  Abusing	  the	  Financial	  Markets:	  Money	  Laundering	  as	  the	  Achilles’	  Heel	  of	  Terrorism,”	  64.	  428	  Pathank,	  ‘The	  Obstacles	  to	  Regulating	  the	  Hawala,”	  2012.	  429	  Maimbo,	  The	  Money	  Exchange	  Dealers	  of	  Kabul,	  4,	  7,	  24,	  	  430	  Passas,	  “Hawala	  and	  Other	  Informal	  Value	  Transfer	  Systems,”	  55-­‐56;	  Thompson,	  “The	  Nexus	  Of	  Drug	  Trafficking	  And	  
Hawala	  in	  Afghanistan,”	  159.	  431	  Jost	  and	  Sandhu,	  “The	  Hawala	  Alternative	  Remittance	  System	  And	  Its	  Role	  In	  Money	  Laundering,”	  11.	  432	  Shanmugam,	  “Hawala	  and	  Money	  Laundering,”	  39-­‐40,	  42.	  433	  Guiora	  and	  Field,	  “Using	  and	  Abusing	  the	  Financial	  Markets:	  Money	  Laundering	  as	  the	  Achilles’	  Heel	  of	  Terrorism,”	  76.	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interest	  from	  money.	  The	  Qu’ran	  encourages	  followers	  to	  build	  financial	  relationships	  based	  on	  trust	  rather	  than	  contract.434	  Hawala	  networks	  then,	  are	  used	  by	  millions	  of	  Muslims	  who	  are	  simply	  following	  Qu’ranic	  scripture	  and	  cultural	  norms.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  hawala	  network	  is	  a	  financial	  system	  governed	  by	  cultural	  values	  and	  religious	  tenets.”435	  When	  a	  hawaladar	  collects	  money	  for	  a	  client	  for	  a	  transaction,	  the	  code	  he	  or	  she	  supplies	  to	  provide	  the	  payout	  at	  the	  other	  end	  is	  “often	  a	  random	  word	  or	  phrase	  from	  the	  Koran.”436	  	  There	  is	  also,	  perhaps	  ironically,	  a	  culture	  of	  trust	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  process.	  As	  one	  researcher	  on	  the	  subject	  observer:	  “The	  intriguing	  aspect	  of	  hawala	  banking	  is	  that,	  as	  far	  as	  its	  customers	  are	  concerned,	  a	  maximum	  of	  trust	  is	  engendered	  despite	  a	  minimum	  of	  transparency	  and	  formality	  …	  [E]ven	  a	  request	  of	  a	  receipt	  is	  offensive	  because	  it	  would	  doubt	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  informal	  banker.	  Clients	  interviewed	  seemed	  uninterested	  in	  a	  receipt	  even	  if	  one	  was	  available.	  Considering	  the	  lack	  of	  formal	  procedures,	  the	  trust	  placed	  by	  clients	  in	  hawala	  bankers	  is	  remarkably	  high.	  When,	  for	  instance,	  Surinamese	  immigrants	  in	  The	  Netherlands	  were	  asked	  why	  they	  use	  hawala	  bankers	  instead	  of	  official	  banks	  or	  money	  transfer	  agencies	  such	  as	  Money	  Gram,	  they	  mentioned	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  hawala	  bankers	  as	  an	  important	  consideration.”	  437	  	  Though	  hawala	  operations	  often	  lack	  state	  oversight,	  it	  was	  observed	  of	  those	  operating	  in	  the	  period	  after	  9/11	  that	  “[c]ontrary	  to	  Western	  misperceptions,	  the	  hawaladars	  also	  kept	  meticulous	  records	  –	  in	  detailed	  ledgers	  and	  computers	  –	  because	  their	  business	  depended	  on	  it.”438	  Others	  have	  noted,	  however,	  that	  those	  records	  are	  not	  kept	  to	  be	  user-­‐friendly	  to	  law	  enforcement.	  “Hawala	  ledgers	  are	  often	  insubstantial	  and	  in	  idiosyncratic	  shorthand.	  Initials	  or	  numbers	  that	  are	  meaningful	  to	  the	  hawaladar	  are	  useless	  if	  they	  reveal	  nothing	  about	  transactions,	  amounts,	  time,	  and	  names	  of	  people	  or	  organizations.	  The	  cooperation	  of	  hawaladars	  in	  such	  cases	  is	  of	  vital	  importance.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434	  Alternate	  spellings	  for	  Qu’ran,	  such	  as	  Koran,	  also	  appear	  herein.	  435	  Pathank,	  ‘The	  Obstacles	  to	  Regulating	  the	  Hawala,”	  2026-­‐2027.	  436	  Razavy,	  “Hawala:	  An	  Underground	  Haven	  for	  Terrorists	  or	  Social	  Phenomenon?”	  279.	  Hawala	  differs	  from	  Fei-­‐chin	  primarily	  in	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  a	  code	  while	  the	  latter	  employs	  a	  token	  or	  chit	  to	  trigger	  payment.	  “A	  sugar	  cube	  with	  a	  certain	  sign	  taken	  to	  a	  Chinese	  gold	  ship	  might	  represent	  payment	  of	  a	  million	  dollars	  and	  the	  gold	  shop	  owner	  would	  move	  gold	  worth	  one	  million	  dollars	  from	  one	  shelf	  account	  to	  another	  shelf	  account;	  after	  that,	  the	  sugar	  cube	  could	  be	  just	  swallowed.”	  Trehan,	  “Underground	  and	  Parallel	  Banking	  Systems,”	  77.	  437	  Van	  de	  Bunt,	  “A	  Case	  Study	  on	  the	  Misuse	  of	  Hawala	  Banking,”	  694.	  438	  Zarate,	  Treasury’s	  War,	  95.	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Personal	  ledgers	  are	  sometimes	  destroyed	  within	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  especially	  in	  countries	  where	  hawala	  is	  criminalized.”	  The	  same	  writer	  added:	  	   In	  some	  cases,	  particularly	  when	  hawaladars	  know	  that	  their	  clients	  are	  breaking	  the	  law,	  no	  notes	  or	  records	  are	  kept	  at	  all.	  In	  other	  cases,	  hawaladars	  may	  serve	  customers	  without	  asking	  many	  questions	  about	  their	  true	  identity,	  the	  origin	  of	  their	  money	  or	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  transfer.	  In	  such	  cases,	  even	  if	  hawala	  operators	  decided	  to	  cooperate	  with	  authorities,	  they	  would	  have	  no	  knowledge	  or	  useful	  information	  to	  share.439	  These	  features	  make	  hawala	  challenging	  to	  regulate.	  The	  UAE	  adopted	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  licensing	  and	  supervision	  of	  hawala	  operators,	  with	  their	  registration	  with	  the	  Central	  Bank.	  Due	  to	  strict	  confidentiality	  rules	  there	  is	  no	  publically	  available	  list	  of	  registered	  hawala	  operators,	  largely	  because	  the	  hawaladars'	  counterparts	  in	  many	  countries	  are	  operating	  outside	  their	  domestic	  law.440	  The	  registration	  process	  is	  free;	  and	  requires	  the	  application	  for	  a	  certificate	  and	  an	  interview	  by	  the	  Central	  Bank	  officials.	  441	  The	  Central	  Bank	  was	  encouraging	  hawala	  operators	  to	  register.	  By	  2005,	  124	  hawala	  operators	  were	  granted	  certificates.	  Certified	  hawaladars	  are	  expected	  to	  perform	  basic	  CDD,	  keep	  records	  of	  transfers,	  and	  report	  suspicious	  transactions.442	  As	  an	  incentive,	  registered	  hawaladars	  receive	  a	  certificate,	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  access	  the	  formal	  banking	  and	  remittance	  system.443	  In	  reality	  though,	  this	  incentive	  is	  diluted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  unregistered	  hawaladars	  use	  the	  formal	  banking	  system	  with	  no	  restrictions.444	  The	  hawala	  registration	  policy	  did	  not	  produce	  anticipated	  results.	  The	  new	  reporting	  and	  licensing	  requirements	  for	  hawala	  brokers	  did	  not	  stop	  criminal	  activity.	  In	  2006,	  local	  newspapers	  reported	  a	  crackdown	  on	  hawala	  operators	  in	  Dubai	  resulting	  in	  shutting	  some	  of	  their	  offices,	  confiscating	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  and	  a	  number	  of	  arrests.	  Consequently,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  directed	  all	  UAE	  banks	  and	  moneychangers	  to	  freeze	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  suspects	  and	  those	  believed	  to	  be	  helping	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  nine	  companies	  involved.445	  Two	  years	  later,	  another	  local	  newspaper	  reported	  on	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  the	  hawala	  registration	  policy,	  noting	  that	  many	  
hawaladars	  continued	  operating	  without	  registering.	  According	  to	  the	  newspaper’s	  sources	  there	  were	  no	  incentives	  to	  register	  and	  no	  penalties	  for	  running	  an	  unregistered	  hawala.	  Hawaladars	  also	  revealed	  how	  easy	  it	  is	  to	  continue	  their	  business	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under	  the	  radar.446	  There	  is	  no	  information	  available	  on	  how	  many	  current	  hawaladars	  are	  trading	  without	  a	  license.	  	  	  
Complicity	  among	  Professionals	  (Bank	  Employees,	  Attorneys,	  etc.)	  Concerns	  about	  insider	  activity	  –	  corrupted	  employees	  working	  inside	  a	  financial	  institution	  –	  and	  corresponding	  FATF	  recommendations	  have	  prompted	  AML	  specialists	  to	  increasingly	  recommend	  that	  financial	  institutions	  screen	  their	  employees.447	  Writing	  of	  the	  UAE,	  Emirati	  author/educator	  Dr.	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla	  noted	  that	  money	  laundering	  in	  the	  GCC	  and	  elsewhere	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  types	  of	  criminals	  inside	  the	  country’s	  financial	  sector.	  “These	  are	  not	  your	  typical	  criminals	  as	  they	  include	  bankers,	  accountants,	  lawyers,	  businessmen	  and	  other	  professionals	  who	  practice	  the	  profession	  of	  ML.	  As	  shown,	  these	  types	  of	  criminals	  are	  white-­‐collar	  workers.	  There	  are	  many	  reasons	  and	  motives	  that	  drive	  these	  workers	  to	  commit	  such	  crimes.”	  A	  principal	  motive	  is	  profit,	  which	  according	  to	  Al	  Mulla	  rose	  dramatically	  over	  time.	  Money	  laundering	  transactions	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1980s	  yielded	  6-­‐8%,	  rising	  to	  20%	  in	  the	  mid	  80’s	  to	  the	  90’s.448	  Another	  observer	  of	  the	  country’s	  financial	  industries	  felt	  that	  corrupt	  professionals	  were	  “a	  dime	  a	  dozen	  in	  the	  UAE.”449	  	  Two	  Dutch	  scholars,	  Nelen	  and	  Lankhorst,	  studied	  the	  role	  of	  lawyers	  and	  notaries	  in	  helping	  organized	  crime	  figures	  to,	  among	  other	  things,	  launder	  money.	  They	  described	  these	  relationships	  as	  “inherently	  non-­‐transparent.”	  While	  lawyers	  may	  offer	  legal	  advice	  to	  criminals,	  the	  advice	  may	  involve	  ways	  to	  avoid	  detection	  or	  prosecution,	  and	  they	  can	  also	  “provide	  the	  expertise	  needed	  to	  launder	  criminal	  proceeds.”	  Furthermore,	  “[t]o	  the	  outside	  world,	  the	  participation	  of	  a	  lawyer	  and	  notary	  in	  a	  transaction	  can	  create	  the	  impression	  of	  legitimacy.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  criminal	  network,	  the	  most	  important	  surplus	  value	  of	  the	  professional	  concerns	  the	  confidential	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  and	  the	  privilege	  of	  non-­‐disclosure.”	  The	  cases	  they	  examined	  turned	  up	  examples	  reflecting	  “the	  involvement	  of	  lawyers	  with	  regard	  to	  giving	  advice	  on	  beneficial	  ways	  to	  transfer	  money,	  thinking	  up	  (fake)	  constructions,	  and	  passing	  criminal)	  money	  through	  their	  accounts.	  In	  a	  number	  of	  cases,	  the	  lawyer	  was	  inserted	  into	  a	  chain	  of	  financial	  transactions	  and	  provided	  several	  of	  the	  aforementioned	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  447	  Chaikin,	  “Commercial	  Corruption	  and	  Money	  Laundering,”	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  Money	  Laundering	  Crimes],	  40-­‐41,	  as	  summarized	  and	  translated	  for	  the	  author	  by	  Hamda	  Faidallah	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services.	  They	  not	  only	  stored	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  clients,	  but	  also	  passed	  money	  through	  their	  own	  person	  or	  business	  accounts	  to	  other	  accounts,	  and	  thought	  of	  complex	  financial	  constructions	  to	  mislead	  the	  judicial	  and	  fiscal	  authorities.”450	  	  
Physical	  Movement	  of	  Money	  Cross-­‐border	  cash	  smuggling	  has	  been	  a	  serious	  issue	  for	  the	  UAE,	  caused	  in	  part	  by	  the	  country	  being	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  illegal	  drug	  cultivation	  zones.	  In	  a	  2010	  news	  article,	  the	  United	  States	  ambassador	  to	  Afghanistan,	  Anthony	  Wayne,	  stated	  that	  every	  day	  ten	  million	  dollars	  in	  cash	  was	  being	  smuggled	  from	  Kabul	  to	  Dubai	  in	  briefcases;	  most	  of	  which	  came	  from	  the	  Afghan	  heroin	  trade.	  He	  added	  that	  the	  US	  investigators	  had	  a	  case	  when	  just	  in	  18	  days	  $190	  million	  in	  cash	  was	  smuggled	  to	  Dubai.	  Insider	  source	  and	  expert	  linked	  this	  phenomenon	  to	  the	  ease	  of	  obtaining	  a	  UAE	  passport	  for	  opening	  a	  bank	  account	  and	  of	  circumventing	  airport	  customs	  in	  some	  of	  the	  Emirates.	  A	  UK	  financier	  living	  in	  Dubai	  told	  a	  reporter	  in	  2010	  that	  the	  situation	  had	  not	  changed	  despite	  new	  regulations.	  “Russians	  are	  still	  coming	  with	  suitcases	  of	  cash	  to	  buy	  flats	  which	  they	  never	  live	  in,”	  the	  individual	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying.	  “It's	  easy	  to	  get	  resident	  permits.	  These	  sorts	  of	  stories	  are	  rife.	  Russia	  is	  the	  biggest	  source.	  A	  lot	  of	  it	  is	  mafia.”451	  Smuggling	  cash	  is	  a	  “traditional	  and	  extremely	  basic	  money	  laundering	  method,”	  and	  one	  which	  terrorist	  groups	  often	  employ.452	  It	  has	  been	  described	  as,	  alongside	  hawala,	  a	  principal	  financing	  tool	  of	  Taliban	  and	  Al-­‐Qaida.453	  An	  FATF	  publication	  sets	  forth	  the	  basic	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  practice:	  	   The	  movement	  of	  cash	  across	  borders	  is	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  electronic	  banking	  system	  remains	  embryonic	  or	  is	  little	  used	  by	  the	  populace.	  Large	  parts	  of	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  have	  predominantly	  cash-­‐based	  societies,	  and	  this	  naturally	  lends	  itself	  to	  cash	  flows	  using	  alternative	  remittance	  systems	  or	  by	  courier.	  Analysis	  of	  a	  number	  of	  terrorism	  cases	  has	  shown	  that	  money	  couriers	  are	  active	  even	  within	  Europe	  and	  between	  countries	  with	  a	  well	  functioning	  financial	  system.	  In	  most	  cases	  couriers	  are	  involved	  in.	  Moving	  funds	  generated	  outside	  the	  financial	  system	  and	  kept	  out	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  to	  avoid	  detection.454	  The	  FATF	  Recommendations	  (discussed	  in	  a	  later	  chapter)	  that	  set	  standards	  for	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  procedures	  includes	  a	  section	  (Recommendation	  32	  in	  the	  current	  set)	  urging	  member	  countries	  to	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  “the	  physical	  cross-­‐border	  transportation	  of	  currency	  and	  bearer	  negotiable	  instruments,	  including	  through	  a	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  129-­‐130,	  135.	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  453	  Zarate,	  Treasury’s	  War,	  15,	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declaration	  system	  and/or	  disclosure	  system.”	  It	  also	  requires	  members	  to	  maintain	  the	  legal	  authority	  to	  interrupt	  suspicious	  or	  falsely	  declared	  transactions,	  and	  to	  enact	  “effective,	  proportionate	  and	  dissuasive	  sanctions.”455	  The	  recommendation	  is	  amplified	  in	  several	  pages	  of	  interpretive	  notes.456	  	  	  While	  the	  latter	  observes	  that,	  “[f]or	  the	  purposes	  of	  Recommendation	  32,	  gold,	  precious	  metals	  and	  precious	  stones	  are	  not	  included,”	  it	  cautions	  that	  “unusual	  cross-­‐border	  movement”	  of	  such	  items	  should	  trigger	  Customs	  Service	  suspicion.	  457	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  a	  2008	  FATF	  publication	  observed,	  “It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  some	  groups	  have	  converted	  cash	  into	  high-­‐value	  and	  hard-­‐to-­‐trade	  commodities	  such	  as	  gold	  or	  precious	  stones	  in	  order	  to	  move	  assets	  out	  of	  the	  financial	  system.”458	  Terrorists	  are	  said	  to	  favor	  gold	  “because	  its	  value	  is	  easy	  to	  determine	  and	  remains	  relatively	  consistent	  over	  time,”	  and	  the	  Taliban	  and	  Al-­‐Qaida	  are	  both	  said	  to	  have	  converted	  some	  of	  their	  resources	  into	  gold	  for	  smuggling	  out	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  late	  2001.	  Such	  use	  dovetails	  into	  the	  practices	  of	  Hawaladars,	  who	  (as	  also	  noted	  above)	  are	  said	  to	  “routinely	  have	  gold,	  rather	  than	  currency,	  placed	  around	  the	  globe.”459	  Another	  reason	  why	  gold	  might	  be	  favored	  is	  the	  logistics	  involved	  in	  moving	  currency	  itself.	  “One	  million	  dollars	  in	  ‘street	  cash’	  (i.e.	  bills	  in	  $5,	  $10,	  and	  $20	  denominations)	  weighs	  approximately	  256	  pounds.”460	  Nonetheless,	  a	  2003	  article	  reported	  that	  “It	  is	  estimated	  that	  about	  $2.3m	  is	  hand-­‐carried	  daily	  by	  couriers	  from	  Karachi	  to	  Dubai.	  Though	  most	  of	  this	  could	  be	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  purchasing	  gold	  (considering	  the	  thriving	  gold	  business	  between	  the	  two	  countries),	  some	  could	  be	  for	  other	  criminal	  purposes.”461	  The	  UAE	  remains,	  of	  course,	  an	  important	  trading	  center	  for	  gold;	  Dubai	  traded	  $70	  billion	  of	  the	  precious	  metal	  in	  2012.462	  	  The	  UAE	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  world's	  largest	  trading	  centers	  for	  diamonds.	  In	  less	  than	  a	  decade	  diamond	  trade	  in	  Dubai	  grew	  from	  $5	  billion	  to	  $40	  billion.	  For	  one	  author	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  tremendous	  growth	  are	  obvious:	  “It	  [Dubai]	  offers	  traders	  a	  free-­‐trade	  zone	  with	  no	  taxes	  on	  imports	  and	  exports,	  backed	  by	  a	  government	  that	  tries	  not	  to	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  461	  Shehu,	  “The	  Asian	  Alternative	  Remittance	  Systems	  and	  Money	  Laundering,”	  175.	  462	  Doran	  in	  The	  National,	  “Dubai	  Gold	  Trade	  Grows	  to	  $70bn.”	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interfere	  with	  business.	  By	  contrast,	  rival	  Antwerp	  has	  had	  to	  cope	  with	  now-­‐lifted	  sanctions	  on	  Marange	  diamonds,	  and	  faces	  a	  possible	  E.U.	  prohibition	  on	  Russian	  gems.	  Dubai	  has	  none	  of	  those	  concerns.”463	  As	  one	  source	  observes,	  “the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  the	  trading	  through	  Dubai	  is	  the	  artificial	  ‘value	  change.’”464	  A	  2011	  FATF/Egmont	  report	  found	  an	  unexplained	  74	  percent	  markup	  on	  the	  average	  per	  carat	  for	  export	  over	  the	  import	  price.	  “These	  are	  the	  same	  rough	  stones	  going	  in	  and	  out	  only	  they	  are	  sold	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  price,	  an	  increase	  that	  perhaps	  includes	  more	  than	  the	  entire	  production	  chain	  mark-­‐up.”465	  And	  in	  the	  words	  of	  another	  report,	  “Companies,	  individuals	  or	  criminal	  networks	  seeking	  to	  disguise	  problematic	  diamonds	  will	  initially	  ship	  their	  stones	  to	  Dubai,	  where	  the	  parcels	  can	  then	  be	  mixed	  with	  other	  shipments.”	  The	  report	  continues:	  	   From	  there,	  stones	  are	  shipped	  on	  to	  other	  jurisdictions	  for	  cutting	  and	  polishing,	  only	  this	  time	  they	  are	  accompanied	  by	  a	  KP	  [Kimberly	  Process]	  certificate	  from	  Dubai,	  rather	  than	  the	  initial	  country	  of	  origin.	  By	  repeating	  this	  process	  such	  diamonds	  become	  extremely	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  trace.	  This	  practice	  is	  problematic	  not	  only	  because	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  disguise	  purchases	  from	  legal,	  yet	  reputationally	  challenged	  sources	  (like	  Zimbabwe’s	  Marange	  diamond	  fields);	  it	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  hide	  the	  origins	  of	  diamonds	  which	  do	  not	  meet	  KP	  certification	  requirements.466	  Others	  explain	  rapid	  development	  of	  the	  diamond	  market	  in	  the	  UAE	  by	  citing	  radical	  groups	  and	  militant	  organizations	  that	  preferred	  purchasing	  diamonds	  in	  its	  less	  regulated	  market.	  Direct	  charter	  flights	  from	  Congo’s	  diamond	  and	  gold	  areas	  to	  Dubai	  attested	  to	  how	  unregulated	  the	  diamond	  trade	  was	  in	  the	  early	  days.	  A	  senior	  diplomat	  from	  Kinshasa	  was	  quoted	  in	  the	  Washington	  Post	  saying:	  "Borders	  here,	  in	  terms	  of	  control,	  are	  a	  joke.	  Who	  is	  going	  to	  control	  charter	  flights	  from	  diamond	  fields	  when	  there	  are	  not	  even	  radars	  to	  cover	  most	  of	  the	  country?	  Basically	  this	  is	  a	  country	  without	  authority."467	  These	  diamonds	  were	  destined	  for	  less	  regulated	  markets,	  including	  Dubai,	  where	  there	  was	  little	  transparency.468	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  has	  been	  believed	  to	  use	  the	  “conflict	  diamond”	  smuggling	  route	  to	  launder	  its	  own	  proceeds,	  purchasing	  them	  in	  Africa	  and	  converting	  them	  into	  cash	  as	  needed.469	  Mounting	  international	  pressure	  made	  the	  UAE	  the	  first	  Arab	  country	  to	  implement	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  Certification	  Scheme,	  becoming	  part	  of	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (13)	  of	  2004.470	  The	  Dubai	  Multi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463	  Bates	  in	  JCK	  Magazine,	  “Dubai	  Under	  Fire.”	  464	  Even-­‐Zohar,	  C.	  (2005),	  “Under-­‐Valued	  Rough	  Diamond	  Imports	  into	  Dubai	  Trigger	  Filing	  of	  Suspicious	  Activities	  Reports.”	  465	  FATF/Egmont	  Group,	  “Money	  Laundering	  and	  Terrorist	  Financing	  through	  Trade	  in	  Diamonds,”	  32	  466	  Partnership	  Africa	  Canada,	  “United	  Arab	  Emirates.”	  467	  Farah,	  “Digging	  up	  Congo’s	  Dirty	  Gems.”	  468	  Passas	  and	  Jones,	  “Commodities	  and	  Terrorist	  Financing,”	  12.	  469	  Tidwell	  and	  Lerche,	  “Globalization	  and	  Conflict	  Resolution,”	  50.	  470	  Union	  Law	  No.	  (13)	  of	  2004,	  Regarding	  Supervision	  of	  Import/Export	  and	  transit	  of	  Rough	  Diamonds.	  
	  	  	  
88	  
Commodities	  Centre	  (DMCC)	  is	  today	  the	  only	  place	  of	  import	  and	  export	  for	  rough	  diamonds	  within	  the	  UAE.471	  	  	  Despite	  these	  efforts,	  UAE	  officials	  regularly	  report	  cases	  of	  diamond	  smuggling	  into	  Dubai.	  In	  2008,	  customs	  officials	  at	  Dubai	  International	  Airport	  detained	  an	  African	  woman	  trying	  to	  smuggle	  uncut	  diamonds	  worth	  over	  $1	  million	  on	  her	  body.472	  In	  2012,	  two	  passengers	  were	  caught	  at	  the	  same	  airport	  trying	  to	  smuggle	  over	  a	  kilogram	  of	  rough	  diamonds,	  carrying	  them	  inside	  their	  guts.473	  Dubai	  may	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  place	  to	  source	  uncut	  diamonds	  bound	  for	  other	  destinations.	  In	  2006,	  Russian	  customs	  officials	  apprehended	  an	  air	  passenger	  from	  Dubai	  trying	  to	  smuggle	  2.5	  kilograms	  of	  diamonds	  into	  the	  country.	  There	  are	  also	  reports	  that	  diamonds	  are	  increasingly	  being	  used	  as	  a	  medium	  to	  provide	  counter	  valuation	  in	  hawala	  transfers,	  particularly	  between	  Dubai	  and	  Mumbai.	  474	  
ML	  Using	  Trade-­‐Based	  Techniques	  and	  Non-­‐Financial	  Businesses	  and	  
Professions	  Trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  is	  increasingly	  gaining	  attention	  from	  the	  international	  community.	  From	  2004-­‐2013,	  Kar	  and	  Spanjers	  estimated	  that	  “misinvoicing”	  in	  the	  context	  of	  trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  in	  drug-­‐producing	  and	  drug-­‐trafficking	  countries	  reached	  US$654.7	  billion	  per	  year,	  with	  greater	  prevalence	  in	  drug	  transit	  countries	  rather	  than	  in	  drug	  producing	  countries.	  (The	  UAE’s	  role	  in	  the	  global	  drug	  trafficking	  as	  a	  transit	  country	  was	  discussed	  earlier.)	  The	  same	  report	  values	  the	  total	  “misinvoicing”	  in	  the	  UAE	  at	  US$807,055	  million,	  making	  it	  the	  third	  largest	  after	  Mexico	  and	  Russia.475	  It	  does	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise.	  Trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  relies	  on	  a	  country’s	  external	  trade	  to	  move	  illicit	  funds	  both	  into	  and	  out	  of	  that	  country.	  Although	  the	  size	  of	  its	  domestic	  market	  is	  small,	  the	  UAE	  has	  become	  the	  largest	  re-­‐exporting	  country	  in	  the	  region.	  With	  an	  area	  of	  83,600	  Sq.	  km	  and	  a	  population	  of	  8.19	  million,	  the	  UAE	  is	  a	  home	  to	  five	  major	  ports	  and	  five	  airports.	  In	  2016,	  the	  UAE	  was	  ranked	  13th	  among	  160	  nations	  and	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  for	  its	  logistics	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471	  Dubai	  Multi	  Commodities	  Center	  (DMCC),	  "U.A.E.	  Kimberley	  Process	  2011	  Annual	  Report,”	  1.	  472	  Morris,	  “Diamond	  Smuggler	  Caught	  in	  Dubai.”	  	  473	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Customs	  Agents	  Catch	  Diamond	  Smugglers.”	  	  474	  US	  Department	  of	  State/Bureau	  of	  International	  Narcotics	  and	  Law	  Enforcement	  Affairs,	  “International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Strategy	  Report	  (INCSR),	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.”	  475	  Kar	  and	  Spanjers,	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flows	  from	  Developing	  Countries:	  2004-­‐2013,	  1,	  17-­‐18,	  45.	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performance.476	  Pearls,	  precious	  metals	  and	  precious	  stones	  remain	  the	  country’s	  top	  import	  and	  export	  commodity.477	  One	  author	  notes:	  “The	  majority	  of	  commodities	  that	  are	  traded	  and	  smuggled	  in	  the	  African	  region	  ...	  originate	  from	  or	  transit	  Dubai.”	  Smuggling	  is	  so	  prevalent	  in	  the	  UAE,	  that	  even	  the	  stream	  running	  through	  the	  port	  of	  Dubai	  has	  been	  dubbed	  “Smugglers	  Creek.”478	  With	  annual	  trade	  of	  US$17,035	  million,	  Iran	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  trading	  partners	  for	  the	  UAE.479	  One	  source	  notes:	  “Dubai	  is	  Iran’s	  lifeline	  to	  the	  world.	  Several	  hundred	  thousand	  Iranians	  reside	  in	  Dubai	  and	  more	  than	  10,000	  Iranian-­‐run	  businesses	  operate	  in	  Dubai	  and	  many	  of	  them	  are	  ‘import-­‐export’	  variety.”480	  A	  bare	  volume	  of	  trade	  is	  overgrowing	  the	  country’s	  monitoring	  capacities.	  Levitt	  and	  Jacobson	  observed	  that	  the	  UAE	  export-­‐control	  related	  actions	  were	  taken	  primarily	  in	  response	  to	  the	  US	  pressure	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  trade	  with	  Iran.481	  	  	  Much	  trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  relies	  on	  techniques	  meant	  to	  disguise	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  transactions	  themselves	  meant	  to	  provide	  cover	  for	  the	  movement	  of	  cash	  obtained	  through	  criminal	  enterprise.	  Trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  “the	  process	  of	  disguising	  the	  proceeds	  of	  crime	  and	  moving	  value	  through	  the	  use	  of	  trade	  transactions	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  legitimize	  their	  illicit	  origin.	  In	  practice,	  this	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  misrepresentation	  of	  the	  price,	  quantity	  or	  quality	  of	  imports	  or	  exports.”	  Its	  “basic	  techniques”	  involve:	  	  •	  over-­‐	  and	  under-­‐invoicing	  of	  goods	  and	  services;	  •	  multiple	  invoicing	  of	  goods	  and	  services;	  •	  over-­‐	  and	  under-­‐shipments	  of	  goods	  and	  services;	  and	  •	  falsely	  described	  goods	  and	  services.482	  	  Such	  practices	  “vary	  in	  complexity,”	  the	  most	  basic	  ones	  involving	  “fraudulent	  trade	  practices	  (e.g.	  under-­‐	  or	  over-­‐invoicing	  of	  receipts).”483	  A	  chapter	  by	  Zdanowicz	  in	  the	  2013	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  Money	  Laundering	  gives	  a	  detailed	  example	  of	  how	  this	  works,	  using	  a	  fictional	  foreign	  exporter	  who	  buys	  10,000	  razors	  for	  ten	  cents	  each,	  or	  $1,000.	  They	  are	  then	  exported	  to	  a	  domestic	  importer	  for	  $100	  each,	  or	  $1,000,000.	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  World	  Bank,	  Logistic	  Performance	  Index,	  “Global	  Ranking	  2016.”	  	  477	  UAE	  Ministry	  of	  Economy,	  “Annual	  Economic	  Report	  2015,”	  27-­‐28.	  	  478	  Cassara,	  Trade-­‐Based	  Money	  Laundering,	  100,	  132.	  479	  World	  Integrated	  Trade	  Solution,	  “United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Trade	  at	  a	  Glance	  :	  Most	  Recent	  Values.”	  480	  Cassara,	  Trade-­‐Based	  Money	  Laundering,	  134.	  481	  Levitt	  and	  Jacobson,	  “The	  U.S.	  Campaign	  to	  Squeeze	  Terrorists'	  Financing,”	  72.	  482	  FATF,	  “Trade	  Based	  Money	  Laundering,”	  3-­‐4.	  483	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  Based	  Money	  Laundering,”	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The	  end	  result	  is	  that	  $1,000,000,	  less	  the	  $1,000	  required	  for	  the	  original	  purchase,	  has	  been	  moved	  to	  a	  foreign	  country.	  The	  process	  can	  be	  reversed	  to	  involve	  undervaluing	  imports,	  in	  which	  200	  gold	  watches,	  bought	  for	  a	  total	  of	  $1,000,000	  dollars,	  are	  then	  sold	  to	  a	  foreign	  importer	  for	  only	  $1,000.	  After	  selling	  the	  watches	  off	  at	  their	  original	  price	  of	  $5,000	  each,	  a	  million	  dollars	  has	  been	  moved,	  less	  the	  $1,000	  involved	  in	  the	  invoice	  payment.	  Several	  methodologies	  have	  been	  used	  to	  analyze	  anomalies	  in	  international	  trade	  pricing.	  These	  include	  weighing	  the	  country	  average	  price	  vs.	  that	  of	  the	  world	  average;	  and	  tracking	  those	  goods	  priced	  at	  50	  percent	  above	  or	  below	  an	  “average	  country	  price.”	  Due	  to	  criticism	  of	  the	  latter	  methodology	  –	  “In	  some	  cases	  the	  50	  percent	  filter	  may	  have	  been	  too	  low	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  it	  might	  have	  been	  too	  high”	  –	  the	  US	  Internal	  Revenue	  Service	  has	  “stipulated	  that	  the	  inter-­‐quartile	  price	  range	  should	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  validity	  of	  transfer	  prices	  in	  international	  trade.”484	  
	  
Black	  Market	  Peso	  Exchange	  (BMPE)	  	  The	  UAE	  has	  figured	  in	  several	  Black	  Market	  Peso	  Exchange	  (BMPE)	  cases.	  One	  of	  them	  involved	  the	  country’s	  offshore	  companies,	  which	  were	  used	  by	  the	  Iranian	  business	  to	  circumventing	  foreign	  exchange	  controls,	  country	  sanctions	  and	  correspondent	  banking	  restrictions	  imposed	  on	  Iranian	  financial	  institutions.485	  Another	  scheme	  implicated	  Turkish	  front	  companies	  and	  banks,	  an	  Iranian	  bank	  and	  money-­‐exchangers	  in	  Dubai.	  Through	  made-­‐up	  invoices	  Iranian	  banks	  gained	  access	  to	  hard	  currency	  from	  Iran’s	  oil	  sales	  that	  was	  locked	  in	  escrow	  accounts	  overseas.486	  The	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  also	  reports	  that	  trade	  goods	  in	  Dubai	  are	  being	  purchased	  through	  narcotics-­‐driven	  systems	  similar	  to	  the	  BMPE.487	  	  A	  specialized	  variant	  of	  this	  common	  ML	  process	  is	  the	  Black	  Market	  Peso	  Exchange	  (BMPE).	  It	  provides	  what	  an	  FATF	  publication	  calls	  “a	  useful	  illustration	  of	  how	  a	  number	  of	  different	  money	  laundering	  techniques	  can	  be	  combined	  into	  a	  single	  criminal	  operation.”	  The	  same	  publication	  set	  forth	  its	  description	  in	  a	  set	  of	  eight	  bullet	  points,	  using	  a	  Colombian	  drug	  cartel’s	  financial	  operations	  as	  its	  example	  (although	  the	  technique	  can	  be	  and	  has	  been	  used	  in	  other	  scenarios).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484	  Zdanowicz,	  “International	  Trade	  Mispricing:	  Trade-­‐Based	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Tax	  Evasion,”	  254,	  256-­‐258.	  485	  Ping,	  “Iranian	  Black	  Market	  Currency	  Exchange.”	  	  486	  Uncredited	  in	  The	  Economist,	  “Trade	  and	  Money	  Laundering:	  Uncontained.”	  487	  US	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury/FinCEN,	  “Advisory	  to	  Financial	  Institutions	  on	  Filing	  Suspicious	  Activity	  Reports	  Regarding	  Trade-­‐Based	  Money	  Laundering,”	  3.	  
	  	  	  
91	  
•	  First,	  the	  Colombian	  drug	  cartel	  smuggles	  illegal	  drugs	  into	  the	  United	  States	  and	  sells	  them	  for	  cash;	  •	  Second,	  the	  drug	  cartel	  arranges	  to	  sell	  the	  US	  dollars	  at	  a	  discount	  to	  a	  peso	  broker	  for	  Colombian	  pesos;	  •	  Third,	  the	  peso	  broker	  pays	  the	  drug	  cartel	  with	  pesos	  from	  his	  bank	  account	  in	  Colombia	  (which	  eliminates	  the	  drug	  cartel	  from	  any	  further	  involvement	  in	  the	  arrangement);	  •	  Fourth,	  the	  peso	  broker	  structures	  or	  ‘smurfs’	  the	  US	  currency	  into	  the	  US	  banking	  system	  to	  avoid	  reporting	  requirements	  and	  consolidates	  this	  money	  in	  his	  US	  bank	  account;	  •	  Fifth,	  the	  peso	  broker	  identifies	  a	  Colombian	  importer	  that	  needs	  US	  dollars	  to	  purchase	  goods	  from	  a	  US	  exporter;	  •	  Sixth,	  the	  peso	  broker	  arranges	  to	  pay	  the	  US	  exporter	  (on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Colombian	  importer)	  from	  his	  US	  bank	  account;	  •	  Seventh,	  the	  US	  exporter	  ships	  the	  goods	  to	  Colombia;	  and	  •	  Finally,	  the	  Colombian	  importer	  sells	  the	  goods	  (often	  high-­‐value	  items	  such	  as	  personal	  computers,	  consumer	  electronics	  and	  household	  appliances)	  for	  pesos	  and	  repays	  the	  peso	  broker.	  This	  replenishes	  the	  peso	  broker’s	  supply	  of	  pesos.488	  	  Unlike	  other	  techniques,	  such	  exchange	  does	  not	  require	  importers	  and	  exporters	  to	  collude	  in	  fraudulent	  transactions:	  “Instead,	  the	  prices	  and	  quantities	  of	  the	  goods	  can	  be	  correctly	  reported	  to	  customs	  agencies	  and	  value	  can	  still	  be	  transferred	  across	  borders.”489	  	  
Real	  Estate	  As	  the	  author	  of	  a	  chapter	  in	  the	  2013	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  Money	  Laundering	  notes,	  real	  estate	  is	  a	  potential	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  “where	  does	  all	  this	  [laundered]	  money	  go?”490	  Real	  estate	  is	  an	  attractive	  ML	  option,	  inviting	  large,	  multiple	  financial	  transactions	  (including	  loans,	  trust/escrow	  accounts	  and	  deposits,	  and	  even	  shell	  and	  property	  management	  companies),	  which	  can	  help,	  obscure	  the	  source	  of	  funds	  involved.491	  Real	  estate	  figured	  in,	  for	  example,	  30-­‐40	  percent	  of	  52	  Dutch	  ML	  cases	  analyzed	  in	  one	  2003	  study.492	  The	  UAE	  has	  not	  been	  an	  exception.	  According	  to	  a	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  report,	  “The	  proceeds	  of	  Afghanistan	  corruption	  or	  opiate	  trafficking	  related	  proceeds	  are	  laundered	  in	  real	  estate	  in	  neighbouring	  countries,	  particularly	  in	  commercial	  and	  residential	  real	  estate	  in	  Dubai	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UAE”493	  Dubai	  was	  the	  first	  of	  the	  emirates	  allowing	  foreigners	  to	  acquire	  property	  in	  the	  emirate.494	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488	  FATF,	  “Trade	  Based	  Money	  Laundering,”	  7-­‐8.	  489	  FATF,	  “Trade	  Based	  Money	  Laundering,”	  8.	  490	  Ferwerda	  and	  Unger,	  “Detecting	  Money	  Laundering	  in	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Sector,”	  268.	  491	  FATF,	  “Money	  Laundering	  and	  Terrorist	  Financing	  through	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Sector,”	  5,	  7,	  8,11,	  13-­‐15	  492	  Ferwerda	  and	  Unger,	  “Detecting	  Money	  Laundering	  in	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Sector,”	  269,	  citing	  Meloen,	  et	  al,	  Buit	  en	  
Besteding.	  493	  World	  Economic	  Forum/Global	  Agenda	  Council	  on	  Organized	  Crime,	  “2010-­‐2011	  Term	  Report,”	  11.	  	  494	  Not	  all	  emirates	  allow	  foreign	  ownership	  of	  land	  and	  real	  estate	  property.	  In	  2005,	  Abu	  Dhabi	  and	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah	  followed	  Dubai’s	  suit	  and	  introduced	  legislation	  allowing	  foreign	  ownership	  of	  real	  estate	  in	  these	  Emirates.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  same	  year,	  Sharjah	  extended	  the	  right	  to	  own	  property	  to	  the	  GCC	  Nationals.	  In	  2006,	  Umm	  Al	  Quwain	  allowed	  foreigners	  to	  own	  building	  floors	  without	  land.	  To	  date,	  Fujairah	  does	  not	  have	  specific	  laws	  regarding	  property	  registration	  and	  ownership	  in	  this	  Emirate.	  (Sources:	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Law	  No.	  (19)	  of	  2005	  introduced	  the	  creation	  of	  Investment	  Zones	  (currently	  12	  in	  number),	  as	  areas	  of	  land	  within	  Abu	  Dhabi	  in	  which	  foreign	  nationals	  were	  entitled	  to	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2002,	  when	  HH	  Sheikh	  Mohammed	  Bin	  Rashid	  Al	  Maktoum	  issued	  a	  decree	  allowing	  foreigners	  to	  buy	  and	  own	  freehold	  property	  in	  select	  areas	  of	  Dubai,	  there	  were	  no	  specialized	  laws	  and	  regulations	  in	  place	  to	  accommodate	  Dubai’s	  expanding	  real	  estate	  market.	  The	  decree	  commenced	  demand	  for	  residential	  and	  commercial	  property	  leading	  to	  disproportionate	  growth	  of	  construction	  market	  and	  real	  estate	  prices.	  International	  criminal	  syndicates	  began	  investing	  in	  property	  in	  Dubai,	  contributing	  to	  skyrocketing	  of	  real	  estate	  prices.	  That	  was	  the	  time	  when	  “gangsters	  bought	  business	  properties	  openly	  in	  Dubai,	  Sharjah,	  and	  Abu	  Dhabi,”	  thanks	  to	  “no	  question	  asked	  approach”	  practiced	  by	  the	  government.495	  Some	  of	  international	  mafia	  organization	  had	  been	  running	  a	  highly	  profitable	  property	  development	  business,	  constructing	  retail	  and	  residential	  buildings	  in	  Dubai.	  The	  latter	  includes,	  earlier	  discussed	  the	  D-­‐Company.496	  Since	  foreigners	  were	  first	  allowed	  to	  buy	  homes	  in	  2002,	  the	  UAE	  property	  showed	  over	  300	  percent	  cumulative	  average	  appreciation	  during	  the	  following	  five	  years.497	  In	  2008	  property	  prices	  in	  Dubai	  reached	  record	  levels.498	  The	  Dubai	  Land	  Department	  estimates	  that	  the	  value	  of	  real-­‐estate	  transactions	  in	  Dubai	  rose	  from	  US$10.5	  billion	  in	  2002	  to	  US$126	  in	  2007.499	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  first	  regulatory	  efforts	  were	  made	  by	  Dubai	  in	  2007.	  Dubai’s	  Real	  Estate	  Regulatory	  Authority	  (“RERA”)	  was	  formed	  to	  oversee	  Dubai’s	  real	  estate	  regulatory	  framework	  and	  development.500	  In	  2011,	  The	  Dubai	  Land	  Department	  issued	  a	  circular	  prohibiting	  for	  foreign	  offshore	  companies	  to	  own	  property	  in	  Dubai.	  Foreign	  companies	  and	  free	  zone	  companies	  incorporated	  in	  the	  UAE	  were	  not	  affected	  by	  this	  ruling,	  as	  these	  companies	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  offshore.501	  	  	  As	  Dubai’s	  real	  estate	  market	  expanded,	  well-­‐publicized	  real	  estate	  corruption	  scandals	  accompanied	  this	  process.	  In	  2008,	  a	  number	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  senior	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  real	  property	  rights,	  including	  ownership	  rights	  to	  land,	  which	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  than	  Dubai.	  Decision	  No.	  (20)	  of	  2005	  allowed	  all	  nationalities	  to	  own	  property	  in	  specific	  investment	  projects	  provided	  they	  purchase	  the	  property	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  company	  that	  was	  established	  in	  the	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah	  Free	  Zone	  or	  Al	  Hamra	  Free	  Zone.	  Two	  years	  later,	  the	  rule	  was	  relaxed	  by	  Decision	  No.	  (12)	  of	  2007,	  allowing	  non-­‐UAE	  nationals	  and	  companies	  to	  own	  freehold	  title	  to	  property	  in	  projects	  owned	  by	  RAKIA,	  Al	  Hamra	  and	  Rakeen,	  without	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  company	  in	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah.	  Sharjah	  Executive	  Council	  Resolution	  No.	  (32)	  of	  2005	  Concerning	  the	  Sale	  of	  Properties	  in	  the	  Emirate	  of	  Sharjah.	  Umm	  Al	  Quwain,	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  2006	  on	  Property	  Ownership.)	  	  495	  Singh,	  “The	  Risks	  to	  Business	  Presented	  by	  Organised	  and	  Economically	  Motivated	  Criminal	  Enterprises,”	  81.	  496	  Weinstein,	  “Mumbai’s	  Development	  Mafias,”	  23.	  	  497	  Al	  Mal	  Capital,	  “UAE	  Real	  Estate	  Sector,”	  2.	  
498	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  “United	  Arab	  Emirates:	  Economic	  Performance:	  Downturn	  in	  Dubai	  Housing	  Market	  Less	  Sharp	  Than	  Feared.”	  499	  Bianchi,	  “Dubai	  Property	  Sector	  Loses	  Luster.”	  	  500	  Dubai	  Law	  No.	  (16)	  of	  2007,	  “Establishing	  the	  Real	  Estate	  Regulatory	  Agency.”	  501	  Government	  of	  Dubai,	  Land	  Department,	  “Dubai	  Real	  Estate	  Legislation”;	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Ask	  the	  Expert:	  Property	  Registration.”	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developers	  across	  Dubai	  were	  arrested	  in	  high-­‐profile	  fraud	  cases,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  government’s	  effort	  to	  clean	  up	  the	  property	  sector.	  The	  real	  estate	  scandals	  included	  public-­‐	  as	  well	  as	  government-­‐owned	  constriction	  companies.	  Several	  executives	  of	  Deyaar	  Development,	  one	  of	  Dubai's	  largest	  publicly	  traded	  developers,	  were	  detained	  by	  police	  over	  accusations	  of	  fraud	  at	  the	  company.502	  Zack	  Shahin,	  the	  chief	  executive,	  has	  been	  incarcerated	  since	  March	  2008	  on	  charges	  of	  bribery	  and	  embezzlement	  worth	  Dh237	  (US$64.5)	  million.503	  When	  bailed	  out	  in	  2012,	  he	  tried	  to	  flee,	  but	  was	  detailed	  in	  Yemen.	  He	  was	  charged	  and	  convicted	  to	  a	  ten-­‐year	  jail	  sentence	  in	  2014	  on	  charges	  relating	  to	  theft	  and	  fraud.504	  The	  same	  year,	  several	  officials	  from	  Sama	  Dubai	  and	  Mizin,	  property	  developers	  owned	  by	  Dubai	  Holding,505	  were	  arrested	  under	  alleged	  bribery	  charges.506	  In	  2009,	  senior	  managers	  at	  Dubai	  Waterfront	  Company,507	  one	  of	  the	  emirate’s	  property	  developments,	  were	  arrested	  as	  part	  of	  an	  investigation	  into	  bribery	  allegations.508	  Nakheel,	  a	  Dubai	  government-­‐owned	  property	  developer,	  widely	  known	  for	  offshore	  ventures,	  figured	  in	  fraud	  allegations	  the	  same	  year.509	  These	  cases	  were	  widely	  reported	  in	  local	  media,	  the	  angle	  being	  that	  Dubai	  was	  to	  be	  praised	  for	  efforts	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  Dubai's	  Public	  Prosecutor	  was	  quoted	  in	  a	  regional	  publication	  saying:	  "The	  government	  will	  continue	  to	  have	  a	  strict	  stance	  against	  all	  aspects	  of	  corruption	  and	  will	  take	  legal	  measures	  against	  violators."510	  	  	  However,	  not	  all	  scandals	  get	  the	  same	  publicity	  as	  the	  ones	  above.	  That	  involving	  a	  property	  development	  firm,	  Al	  Fajer	  Properties	  and	  its	  marketing	  agency,	  Dynasty	  Zarooni,	  was	  not	  covered	  by	  local	  media,	  which	  were	  allegedly	  silenced	  by	  senior	  representatives	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Dubai	  due	  to	  the	  company’s	  links	  to	  the	  ruling	  family	  of	  Dubai.	  Al	  Fajer	  Properties,	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Al	  Fajer	  Group,	  ran	  by	  the	  Dubai	  ruler’s	  brother-­‐in-­‐law,	  was	  accused	  of	  deceiving	  investors	  on	  the	  construction	  progress.511	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  “Economic	  Performance:	  Scandals	  Hit	  the	  Dubai	  Property	  Scene.”	  503	  Mustafa,	  “Nine	  Deyaar	  Executives	  Charged	  in	  Dh237m	  Fraud	  Cause.”	  504	  Al	  Amir,	  “Former	  Deyaar	  Chief	  Jailed	  in	  Dubai	  Over	  Dh20m	  Bribery	  Case”;	  Uncredited	  in	  Arabian	  Business.com	  “Ex-­‐Deyaar	  CEO	  Sentenced	  to	  10	  Yrs	  in	  Jail.”	  	  505	  The	  ultimate	  majority	  shareholder	  of	  Dubai	  Holding	  LLC	  is	  His	  Highness	  Sheikh	  Mohammed	  Bin	  Rashid	  Al	  Maktoum.	  PwC,	  “Independent	  Auditor	  Report,”	  9.	  	  506	  Franco,	  “Police	  Arrest	  4	  Sama	  Dubai	  Employees	  Over	  Alleged	  Corruption”;	  Za’za,	  “Dubai	  Islamic	  Banks,	  Dh1.8b	  Fraud	  Case	  Referred	  to	  Court.”	  	  507	  Dubai	  Waterfront	  Company	  is	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  Nakheel	  LLC,	  which	  owns	  a	  51	  percent	  stake	  in	  the	  company.	  The	  Government	  of	  Dubai	  has	  owned	  Nakheel,	  a	  former	  subsidiary	  of	  Dubai	  World	  Corporation,	  since	  2011,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Dubai	  World	  restructuring.	  See	  Fitch,	  “Dubai	  to	  Take	  Over	  Limitless,	  Nakheel.”	  	  508	  Al	  Ghalib,	  “Two	  Ex-­‐Nakheel	  Employees	  Sent	  for	  Trial.”	  	  509	  Kerr,	  S.	  (2009,	  11	  Feb.),	  “Three	  Held	  in	  Dubai	  Corruption	  Probe,”	  Financial	  Times,	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  available	  at	  https://www.ft.com/content/1e120b28-­‐f7c5-­‐11dd-­‐a284-­‐000077b07658.	  	  510	  Sambidge	  and	  Billing,	  “Dubai	  Zero	  Tolerance	  Pledge	  on	  Corruption.”	  	  511	  Chohan,	  “Dubai	  Property	  Scandal	  Claim	  Emerges	  Amid	  Media	  Blackout.”	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However,	  only	  Kabir	  Mulchandani,	  chairman	  of	  development	  company	  Dynasty	  Zarooni,	  faced	  legal	  charges	  of	  "fraud	  and	  embezzlement."	  Mulchandani	  was	  accused	  of	  defrauding	  investors	  of	  more	  than	  $100	  million.	  So	  far,	  that	  was	  the	  biggest	  case	  to	  grow	  out	  of	  Dubai's	  efforts	  to	  regulate	  a	  weakening	  property	  market.512	  	  	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  crackdown	  on	  the	  real	  estate	  sector	  corruption,	  one	  local	  analyst	  observed:	  “A	  lot	  of	  the	  people	  implicated	  are	  Emirati	  nationals	  with	  close	  links	  to	  the	  authorities.	  Arresting	  these	  people	  is	  one	  thing,	  making	  them	  actually	  do	  time	  is	  another.”	  The	  latter	  reflects	  a	  general	  position	  of	  critics	  who	  believe	  that	  “the	  anti-­‐corruption	  drive	  merely	  addresses	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg,	  ignoring	  some	  of	  the	  underlying	  problems	  of	  doing	  business	  in	  Dubai,	  where	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  rarely	  issue	  economic	  data	  and	  regulations	  are	  sometimes	  applied	  unevenly.”513	  It	  is	  important	  to	  reiterate	  that	  the	  country’s	  “rentier	  pact”	  assumes	  distribution	  of	  land	  among	  important	  local	  families	  in	  exchange	  for	  loyalty	  and	  support.	  Furthermore,	  government	  property	  development	  contracts	  are	  awarded	  strategically	  to	  loyal	  citizens.514	  	  
ML	  Using	  Charities	  and	  Non-­‐Profits	  Charities,	  a	  2008	  FATF	  publication	  notes,	  are	  attractive	  targets	  for	  co-­‐opting,	  compromising,	  and	  abuse	  by	  terror	  networks.	  	  Many	  thousands	  of	  legitimate	  charitable	  organizations	  exist	  all	  over	  the	  world	  that	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  societies,	  and	  often	  transmit	  funds	  to	  and	  from	  highly	  distressed	  parts	  of	  the	  globe.	  Terrorist	  abuses	  of	  the	  charitable	  sector	  have	  including	  using	  legitimate	  transactions	  to	  disguise	  terrorist	  cash	  traveling	  to	  the	  same	  destination;	  and	  broad	  exploitation	  of	  the	  charitable	  sector	  by	  charities	  affiliated	  with	  terrorist	  organizations.	  The	  sheer	  volume	  of	  funds	  and	  other	  assets	  held	  by	  the	  charitable	  sector	  means	  that	  the	  diversion	  of	  even	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  these	  funds	  to	  support	  terrorism	  constitutes	  a	  grave	  problem.515	  A	  recent	  study	  of	  terrorist	  financing	  notes	  that	  the	  Irish	  Republican	  Army	  “secured	  funding	  through	  donations	  from	  the	  US”	  in	  the	  1960s-­‐70s,	  largely	  through	  Irish	  Northern	  Aid	  (Noraid),	  an	  ostensible	  charity	  organization	  which	  “achieved	  a	  budget	  of	  US	  $7	  million,	  funding	  more	  than	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  IRA’s	  cash	  needs.”516	  In	  its	  description	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  al	  Qaeda,	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  9/11	  Commission	  noted	  that	  anti-­‐Soviet	  jihadists	  in	  Afghanistan	  drew	  on	  “a	  financial	  support	  network	  that	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Golden	  Chain,’”	  sustained	  by	  “charities	  or	  other	  nongovernmental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512	  Bianchi,	  S.	  (2009,	  26	  Jan.),	  “Dubai	  Property	  Scandal	  Expands,”	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  Europe,	  Brussels,	  20.	  	  513	  Uncredited	  in	  Globe	  and	  Mail	  ,“Corruption	  Scandals	  Plague	  Fast-­‐Growing	  Dubai.”	  514	  Hvidt,	  “The	  Dubai	  Model,”	  401.	  515	  FATF,	  “Terrorist	  Financing,”	  25.	  516	  Koh,	  Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  21.	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organization.”517	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  when	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  re-­‐established	  himself	  in	  Afghanistan,	  “Al	  Qaeda	  and	  its	  friends	  took	  advantage	  of	  Islam’s	  strong	  calls	  for	  charitable	  giving,	  zakat.	  These	  financial	  facilitators	  also	  appeared	  to	  rely	  on	  heavily	  on	  certain	  imams	  at	  mosques	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  divert	  zakat	  donations	  to	  al	  Qaeda’s	  cause.	  Al	  Qaeda	  also	  collected	  money	  from	  employees	  of	  corrupt	  charities.”518	  The	  report’s	  authors	  added	  that	  bin	  Laden’s	  organization	  “took	  two	  approaches	  to	  using	  charities	  for	  fund-­‐raising.”	  	   One	  was	  to	  rely	  on	  al	  Qaeda	  sympathizers	  in	  specific	  foreign	  branch	  offices	  of	  large	  international	  charities	  –	  particularly	  those	  with	  law	  external	  oversight	  and	  ineffective	  internal	  controls,	  such	  as	  the	  Saudi-­‐based	  al	  Haramain	  Islamic	  Foundation.519	  Smaller	  charities	  in	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  globe	  were	  funded	  by	  these	  large	  Gulf	  charities	  and	  had	  employees	  who	  would	  siphon	  the	  money	  to	  al	  Qaeda.	  In	  addition,	  entire	  charities,	  such	  as	  the	  al	  Wafa	  organization,520	  may	  have	  wittingly	  participated	  in	  funneling	  money	  to	  al	  Qaeda.	  In	  those	  cases,	  al	  Qaeda	  operatives	  controlled	  the	  entire	  organization,	  including	  access	  to	  bank	  accounts.	  Charities	  were	  a	  source	  of	  money	  and	  also	  provided	  significant	  cover,	  which	  enabled	  operatives	  to	  travel	  undetected	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  working	  for	  a	  humanitarian	  organization.521	  Given	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  problem,	  when	  the	  FATF	  issued	  Special	  Recommendations	  not	  long	  after	  the	  11	  September	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  one	  of	  them	  advocated	  special	  scrutiny	  for	  non-­‐profit	  organizations.	  This	  suggestion	  is	  now	  embodied	  in	  Recommendation	  Eight	  of	  the	  current	  (2012)	  set	  of	  FATF	  Recommendations.522	  
Conclusion	  Money	  laundering	  is	  a	  global	  problem	  with	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  techniques	  at	  the	  launderer’s	  disposal.	  These	  may	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  loopholes	  in	  the	  financial	  system;	  the	  physical	  movement	  of	  money	  itself	  or	  goods	  through	  otherwise	  legitimate	  trading	  channels;	  and	  even	  the	  misuse	  and/or	  exploitation	  of	  charitable	  operations.	  In	  many	  cases,	  modern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517	  9/11	  Commission,	  The	  9/11	  Commission	  Report,	  55.	  518	  9/11	  Commission,	  The	  9/11	  Commission	  Report,	  170.	  Koh	  notes	  that	  zakat	  “is	  a	  religious	  donation	  of	  at	  least	  2.5	  per	  cent	  of	  one’s	  accumulated	  wealth	  held	  for	  a	  full	  year	  for	  charitable	  purposes”	  (Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  
Laundering,	  21-­‐22).	  519	  Of	  Al	  Haramain,	  “the	  US	  Treasury	  stated	  in	  September	  2004	  that	  there	  were	  direct	  links	  between	  the	  US	  branch	  of	  this	  charity	  and	  Osama	  Bin	  laden.	  In	  addition,	  the	  relevant	  affidavit	  alleges	  that	  the	  branch	  criminally	  violated	  tax	  laws	  and	  engaged	  in	  other	  money	  laundering	  offences.	  Information	  shows	  that	  individuals	  associated	  with	  the	  branch	  tried	  to	  conceal	  the	  movement	  of	  funds	  intended	  for	  Chechnya	  by	  omitting	  them	  from	  tax	  returns	  and	  mischaracterizing	  their	  use,	  which	  they	  claimed	  was	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  prayer	  house	  in	  Springfield,	  Missouri.	  This	  charity	  is	  on	  the	  UN	  ‘blacklist’	  and	  in	  2003	  there	  were	  13	  countries	  where	  it	  was	  listed	  as	  operating.	  Only	  two	  countries	  reported	  that	  assets	  had	  ben	  frozen;	  three	  did	  not	  submit	  a	  relevant	  report	  to	  the	  UN;	  eight	  did	  submit	  a	  report	  relating	  to	  [UN	  anti-­‐terrorism]	  Security	  Council	  Sanction	  1455	  but	  failed	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  this	  charity”	  (Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  139).	  520	  Al	  Wafa	  is	  among	  those	  organizations	  listed	  in	  Bush,	  Executive	  Order	  13224.	  521	  9/11	  Commission,	  The	  9/11	  Commission	  Report,	  170-­‐171.	  522	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  13.	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technologies	  are	  augmenting	  the	  problem.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  present	  an	  overview	  of	  AML	  legislative	  efforts,	  which	  in	  some	  cases	  have	  been	  sparked	  by	  related	  CFT	  concerns.	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4:	  International	  Initiatives	  Against	  Proceeds	  
of	  Transnational	  Money	  Laundering	  	  	  While	  beginning	  on	  a	  relatively	  local	  scale	  (as	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter),	  money	  laundering	  evolved	  into	  a	  transnational	  problem	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  In	  part	  this	  was	  due	  to	  a	  general	  erosion	  of	  national	  measures	  meant	  to	  control	  currency	  flow	  across	  borders,	  some	  of	  which	  had	  been	  in	  place	  for	  centuries.	  (Restrictions	  in	  England,	  for	  example,	  on	  currency	  import	  and	  export	  dated	  to	  at	  least	  1299.)523	  By	  the	  early	  1980s,	  legal	  expert	  George	  Staple	  noted,	  the	  elimination	  of	  exchange	  control	  mechanisms	  made	  it	  “possible	  instantly	  to	  transfer	  money	  of	  any	  amount	  or	  denomination	  virtually	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world.”	  This	  innovation	  posed	  significant	  problems	  for	  law	  enforcement	  of	  financial	  crimes:	  “[B]ecause	  criminal	  law	  is	  territorially	  based,	  and	  differs	  across	  jurisdictions,	  the	  investigation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  fraud	  and	  the	  related	  offences	  of	  money	  laundering	  and	  corruption	  are	  particularly	  dependent	  upon	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  between	  states.”	  Staple	  set	  forth	  several	  parameters	  of	  the	  problem:	  The	  activities	  of	  these	  criminals	  usually	  span	  several	  jurisdictions.	  They	  have	  no	  regard	  for	  international	  frontiers.	  Indeed	  they	  are	  adept	  at	  exploiting	  the	  territorial	  nature	  of	  national	  laws.	  There	  is	  ample	  scope	  for	  the	  commission	  of	  offences	  partly	  in	  one	  jurisdiction	  and	  partly	  in	  others.	  Often	  witnesses,	  such	  as	  bankers	  and	  professional	  advisers,	  together	  with	  the	  documentary	  evidence,	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  jurisdictions.	  Suspects	  are	  frequently	  not	  in	  the	  jurisdiction	  in	  which	  they	  should	  be	  brought	  to	  trial.	  The	  proceeds	  of	  the	  crime	  can	  be	  in	  yet	  another	  jurisdiction,	  while	  the	  victims,	  who	  are	  seldom	  remembered	  in	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  can	  be	  somewhere	  else	  again.	  524	  According	  to	  Stessens,	  the	  "internationalisation"	  of	  money	  laundering	  impacts	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering	  (AML)	  measures,	  which,	  according	  to	  him,	  is	  possible	  only	  with	  international	  harmonisation	  of	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  criminal	  as	  well	  as	  preventative	  legislation	  and	  establishment	  of	  effective	  international	  co-­‐operation	  mechanisms	  deployed	  to	  co-­‐operate	  in	  the	  prevention	  and	  prosecution	  of	  money	  laundering	  and	  in	  international	  "proceeds-­‐hunting."525	  In	  analyzing	  the	  history	  of	  AML	  measures,	  we	  can	  witness	  application	  of	  the	  above	  rationale	  in	  legislative	  arena.	  	  Before	  we	  move	  to	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  AML	  efforts,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  the	  commonalities	  behind	  the	  impetuses	  for	  fighting	  money	  laundering.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523	  “The	  UK	  Exchange	  Control:	  A	  Short	  History,”	  245.	  524	  Staple,	  “Combating	  Transnational	  Financial	  Crime,”	  169.	  525	  Stessens,	  Money	  Laundering.	  94.	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Stessens	  identified	  the	  three	  main	  drivers	  for	  AML	  legislation	  as	  enabling	  law	  enforcement	  to	  confiscate	  criminal	  proceeds	  “in	  those	  situations	  where	  confiscation	  might	  otherwise	  not	  be	  possible”;	  gathering	  evidence	  against	  senior	  organized	  crime	  figures;	  and	  preventing	  ML’s	  effects	  on	  legitimate	  economy	  and	  financial	  sectors.526	  The	  latter	  explains	  the	  over-­‐expanding	  scope	  of	  predicate	  offences	  for	  money	  laundering.	  	  In	  summarizing	  the	  history	  of	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  (AML)	  measures,	  this	  chapter	  will	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  one	  scholar’s	  breakdown	  of	  that	  history	  into	  four	  phases.	  527	  The	  author	  of	  this	  thesis	  added	  a	  fifth	  phase	  to	  this	  timeline.	  These	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	  incorporating	  materials	  from	  other	  authors	  and	  sources	  as	  well.	  	  
The	  First	  Phase:	  The	  1970s	  Prior	  to	  1970,	  laws	  did	  exist	  that	  allowed	  the	  prosecution	  of	  “what	  would	  be	  described	  today	  as	  money	  laundering,”	  although	  that	  term	  was	  not	  yet	  in	  use.	  Section	  22	  of	  the	  UK’s	  1968	  Theft	  Act	  allowed	  the	  successful	  prosecution	  of	  a	  man	  involved	  with	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  robbery	  of	  £26	  million	  worth	  of	  bullion	  from	  Heathrow	  Airport’s	  Brink’s-­‐Mat	  warehouse.	  “The	  scope	  of	  this	  provision,	  however,	  was	  limited	  in	  two	  respects.	  First,	  it	  applied	  only	  to	  theft-­‐related	  money	  laundering;	  and	  secondly,	  it	  required	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  actual	  stolen	  property	  or	  other	  goods	  representing	  the	  stolen	  property.”528	  	  The	  USA’s	  1970	  Banking	  Secrecy	  Act	  has	  been	  described	  as	  an	  “early	  starting	  point”	  of	  law	  enforcement	  efforts	  against	  ML.529	  While	  a	  domestic	  law,	  a	  primary	  US	  concern	  about	  ML	  was	  its	  international	  nature;	  in	  passing	  the	  BSA	  the	  US	  Congress	  “was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  financial	  assets	  held	  abroad	  and	  criminal	  proceeds	  roaming	  the	  interstate	  channels	  of	  commerce.”530	  The	  BSA,	  another	  observer	  wrote,	  was	  aimed	  at	  US	  organized	  crime,	  and	  was	  “the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  to	  require	  the	  reporting	  of	  extraordinary	  cash	  activity.”	  It	  required	  American	  banks	  to	  file	  a	  Currency	  Transaction	  Report	  (CTR)	  on	  transactions	  over	  $10,000,	  and	  any	  individual	  or	  corporation	  to	  report	  (using	  a	  Currency	  and	  Monetary	  Instrument	  Report,	  or	  CMIR),	  the	  transporting	  of	  more	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  Stessens,	  Money	  Laundering.	  85-­‐86.	  527	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  17-­‐40.	  528	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  17,	  32;	  for	  background	  on	  the	  case,	  see	  Connett,	  “Police	  Traced	  Laundered	  Money	  Around	  the	  World.”	  529	  Unger,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Regulation:	  From	  Al	  Capone	  to	  Al	  Qaeda,”	  23.	  530	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  26-­‐27.	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than	  $100,000	  into	  or	  out	  of	  the	  US.	  None	  of	  these	  transfer	  actions	  became	  illegal,	  but	  it	  became	  “illegal	  to	  do	  so	  without	  reporting	  the	  transaction	  as	  required	  by	  the	  BSA.”	  The	  relevant	  forms	  require	  basic	  data	  meant	  to	  identify	  those	  conducting	  the	  transaction	  and	  indicate	  ownership	  of	  the	  money.	  The	  intent	  is	  “to	  identify	  the	  ‘source	  and	  origin’	  of	  unusually	  large	  cash	  activity.	  The	  US	  government	  can	  then	  use	  this	  information	  for	  law	  enforcement,	  tax	  administration	  or	  regulatory	  purposes.”531	  	  Three	  years	  later,	  in	  1973,	  the	  US	  and	  Switzerland	  signed	  a	  Mutual	  Legal	  Assistance	  Treaty	  (MLAT)	  which	  “marked	  an	  obvious	  departure	  from”	  earlier	  arrangements	  that	  confined	  themselves	  to	  countries	  sharing	  borders	  and	  legal	  traditions	  (i.e.,	  civil	  or	  common).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  US	  had	  a	  common	  or	  case	  law	  basis	  (i.e.,	  with	  court	  decisions	  establishing	  authoritative	  precedent	  along	  the	  concept	  of	  stare	  decisis),	  while	  the	  Swiss	  was	  a	  civil	  law	  system.	  The	  MLAT	  initiative	  between	  the	  two	  countries/systems	  was	  fueled	  by	  US	  “concern	  over	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Swiss	  financial	  sector	  to	  hide	  assets	  from	  US	  law	  enforcement.”	  This	  was	  a	  common	  issue	  with	  many	  other	  countries,	  whose	  pursuits	  of	  alleged	  criminal	  activities	  frequently	  “came	  repeatedly	  crashing	  against	  the	  Swiss	  financial	  secrecy	  walls.”	  This	  perhaps	  peaked	  with	  the	  1977	  “Chiasso	  Affair,”	  in	  which	  the	  director	  of	  a	  Credit	  Suisse	  branch	  had	  been	  involved	  with	  the	  reinvestment	  in	  Liechtenstein	  of	  2.2	  billion	  Swiss	  francs	  “constituting	  the	  proceeds	  of	  [a]	  violation	  of	  Italian	  currency	  restrictions.”	  In	  that	  same	  year,	  the	  Swiss	  Union	  of	  Banks	  and	  the	  Swiss	  National	  Bank	  signed	  an	  “Agreement	  on	  the	  Observance	  of	  Care	  by	  the	  Banks	  in	  Accepting	  Funds	  and	  on	  the	  Practice	  of	  Banking	  Secrecy.”	  Similar	  in	  intention	  to	  the	  US	  Bank	  Secrecy	  Act,	  the	  Agreement	  was	  “a	  private	  self-­‐regulatory	  response,”	  obliging	  Swiss	  banks	  “the	  duty	  to	  identify	  their	  customers	  and	  the	  beneficial	  owners	  of	  assets	  deposited	  with	  them.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  obligation	  was	  effectively	  to	  outlaw	  anonymous	  bank	  accounts.”	  While	  amendments	  to	  the	  agreement	  (in	  1982,	  1987,	  and	  1992)	  loosened	  its	  strictness,	  the	  original’s	  significance	  “should	  not	  be	  underestimated,”	  as	  “some	  of	  the	  obligations	  that	  were	  first	  established	  in	  this	  agreement	  eventually	  found	  their	  way	  into	  Swiss	  law,”	  and	  “inspired	  subsequent	  criminalization	  of	  money	  laundering”	  in	  Switzerland.	  532	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531	  McDonald,	  Money	  Laundering,	  2-­‐3.	  532	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  21-­‐24.	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The	  Second	  Phase:	  The	  1980s	  In	  the	  same	  year	  the	  Agreement	  on	  the	  Observance	  of	  Care	  was	  signed,	  1977,	  a	  select	  committee	  within	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  began	  to	  study	  what	  it	  termed	  “the	  illicit	  transfer	  of	  funds	  of	  criminal	  origin	  frequently	  used	  for	  the	  perpetration	  of	  further	  crime.”	  In	  June	  1980,	  their	  work	  culminated	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  recommendation	  entitled	  “Measures	  Against	  the	  Transfer	  and	  Safekeeping	  of	  Funds	  of	  Criminal	  Origin.”	  This	  Council	  of	  Europe	  document	  became	  “the	  first	  international	  instrument,	  albeit	  an	  unbinding	  one,	  to	  address	  explicitly	  the	  problem	  of	  money	  laundering.”	  Its	  adoption	  heralded	  a	  new	  stage	  of	  AML	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  “criminalization	  and	  internationalization.”	  (One	  of	  the	  first	  developments	  was	  “the	  adoption	  of	  the	  term	  ‘money	  laundering’	  in	  legal	  language,”	  arising	  from	  a	  1982	  federal	  case	  in	  Florida.533)	  The	  Council	  of	  Europe	  recommendation	  has	  been	  called	  “probably	  ahead	  of	  its	  time”;	  indeed,	  it	  “failed	  to	  find	  a	  receptive	  audience	  and	  was	  not	  widely	  implemented.”	  Yet	  the	  document	  “fully	  embraces	  the	  philosophy	  of	  prevention	  so	  central	  the	  programme	  of	  countermeasures	  subsequently	  adopted	  by	  the	  FATF.”	  The	  recommendations	  included	  the	  “know	  your	  customer”	  rule,	  urging	  banks	  to	  check	  identities	  whenever	  accounts	  were	  opened,	  safe	  deposits	  rented,	  and	  large	  transactions	  made.534	  	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  decade	  some	  in	  the	  US	  had	  concluded	  that	  the	  1970	  Bank	  Secrecy	  Act	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  offset	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  international	  narcotics	  traffic	  and	  the	  organized	  criminal	  organizations	  that	  ran	  it.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  former	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice	  official:	  Even	  gigantic	  drug	  profits	  are	  worthless	  to	  organized	  crime	  if	  they	  can	  be	  readily	  traced	  and	  seized	  by	  drug	  enforcement	  authorities.	  Organized	  crime	  must,	  therefore,	  have	  the	  means	  for	  disguising	  their	  ill-­‐gotten	  gains.	  The	  volume	  of	  cash	  apparently	  exceeds	  that	  which	  organized	  crime	  can	  satisfactorily	  launder	  by	  the	  myriad	  transactions	  of	  money	  couriers	  who	  handle	  just	  under	  $10,000	  each	  day,	  the	  present	  reporting	  threshold.	  Criminal	  enterprises	  have	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  legitimate	  financial	  channels	  to	  accept	  large	  cash	  deposits,	  which	  may	  then	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  stock,	  be	  transferred	  to	  accounts	  in	  other	  domestic	  banks,	  or	  be	  moved	  out	  of	  the	  country.	  Officials	  of	  banks,	  currency	  exchanges,	  brokerage	  houses,	  and	  casinos	  are	  involved	  in	  these	  money-­‐laundering	  schemes,	  often	  unwittingly,	  but	  sometimes	  knowingly.	  The	  President’s	  Commission	  on	  Organized	  Crime	  has	  estimated	  that	  the	  narcotics	  traffic	  alone	  is	  the	  source	  for	  $5-­‐15	  billion	  in	  illegal	  profits	  channeled	  abroad,	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  which	  transits	  through	  domestic	  financial	  institutions.	  Concluding	  from	  its	  investigations	  that	  the	  Bank	  Secrecy	  Act	  does	  not	  provide	  sufficient	  authority	  to	  prosecute	  and	  to	  penalize	  money-­‐laundering	  activity,	  the	  Commission	  recommended	  that	  money	  laundering	  be	  made	  a	  criminal	  offense	  and	  that	  casinos	  be	  made	  subject	  to	  the	  Act.535	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  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  26-­‐27.	  534	  Gilmore,	  Dirty	  Money,	  123,	  citing	  Nilsson,	  “The	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Laundering	  Convention,”	  419,	  423.	  535	  Frost,	  “Drug	  Trafficking,	  Organized	  Crime,	  and	  Terrorism,”	  191.	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The	  first	  specific	  AML	  law	  was	  passed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  1986,	  the	  Money	  Laundering	  Control	  Act.	  It	  is	  broken	  into	  two	  key	  sections,	  1956	  and	  1957.	  Section	  1956(a)(1)	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  stating	  that	  money	  laundering	  has	  taken	  place	  if	  the	  defendant	  knowingly	  conducts	  or	  attempts	  (in	  the	  words	  of	  Stefan	  Cassella)	  “to	  conduct	  a	  financial	  transaction	  affecting	  interstate	  commerce”	  using	  money	  or	  property	  gained	  through	  a	  “specified	  unlawful	  activity”	  or	  SUA	  with	  an	  effort	  to	  hide	  their	  illegal	  nature,	  avoid	  reporting	  the	  transaction,	  or	  continue	  the	  illegal	  activity	  itself.536	  Another	  section,	  1956	  (a)(2),	  made	  it	  an	  offense	  to	  send	  money	  “into	  or	  out	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  promote	  an	  SUA	  offense,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  money,	  itself,	  is	  the	  proceeds	  of	  any	  unlawful	  activity.”	  537	  Section	  1956(a)(3)	  “was	  added	  to	  the	  money	  laundering	  statute	  in	  1988,	  to	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  prosecute	  persons	  who	  engage	  in	  the	  laundering	  of	  ‘sting	  money,’	  i.e.,	  money	  that	  is	  not	  really	  criminal	  proceeds	  but	  is	  represented	  as	  such	  by	  a	  law	  enforcement	  officer,	  or	  a	  person	  acting	  at	  his	  or	  her	  direction.”538	  Section	  1957	  “makes	  it	  an	  offense	  for	  any	  person	  to	  conduct	  any	  monetary	  transaction	  involving	  more	  than	  $10,000	  in	  ‘criminally	  derived	  property.’	  Its	  purpose	  is	  to	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  wrongdoers	  to	  spend	  their	  ill-­‐gotten	  gains,	  or	  to	  place	  them	  in	  the	  banking	  system,	  by	  making	  it	  a	  criminal	  offense	  for	  a	  third-­‐party	  to	  do	  business	  with	  them.	  …	  [It]	  is	  designed	  to	  freeze	  criminal	  proceeds	  out	  of	  the	  banking	  system.”539	  Another	  observer	  noted	  that	  the	  1986	  US	  law	  also	  “had	  an	  ‘extraterritorial	  reach’	  provision	  that	  permits	  the	  US	  law	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  any	  foreign	  national	  in	  cases	  where	  any	  part	  of	  a	  financial	  transaction	  touches	  the	  US.	  The	  mere	  check	  clearance	  procedure	  through	  a	  US	  bank	  or	  wire	  transfer	  in	  US	  dollars	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another	  is	  considered	  sufficient	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘touching	  the	  US.’”540	  	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  the	  UK	  introduced	  the	  Drug	  Trafficking	  Offences	  Act	  (DTOA)	  “rendering	  it	  a	  criminal	  offence	  to	  enter	  an	  arrangement	  whereby	  the	  proceeds	  of	  another’s	  drug	  trafficking	  activities	  are	  laundered.”	  The	  impetus	  for	  this	  law	  was	  a	  House	  of	  Lords	  decision	  in	  the	  1980	  case	  of	  R	  v	  Cuthbertson	  which	  “revealed	  the	  failure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536	  Cassella,	  “The	  Money	  Laundering	  Statutes	  (18	  U.S.C.	  §	  §	  1956	  and	  1957),”	  21.	  537	  Cassella,	  “The	  Money	  Laundering	  Statutes	  (18	  U.S.C.	  §	  §	  1956	  and	  1957),”	  28.	  538	  Cassella,	  “The	  Money	  Laundering	  Statutes	  (18	  U.S.C.	  §	  §	  1956	  and	  1957),”	  28.	  A	  sting	  is	  “an	  elaborate	  confidence	  game;	  
specific:	  such	  a	  game	  worked	  by	  undercover	  police	  in	  order	  to	  trap	  criminals”	  (Merriam-­‐Webster’s	  Collegiate	  Dictionary,	  1155-­‐1156).	  539	  Cassella,	  “The	  Money	  Laundering	  Statutes	  (18	  U.S.C.	  §	  §	  1956	  and	  1957),”	  29.	  540	  McDonald,	  Money	  Laundering,	  4.	  This	  occurs	  in	  §	  1956(b)(2),	  “Jurisdiction	  over	  foreign	  persons.”	  McDonald’s	  text	  is	  a	  May	  2000	  lecture	  delivered	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  which	  was	  then	  developing	  its	  first	  comprehensive	  AML	  legislation.	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of	  forfeiture	  laws,	  as	  they	  were	  at	  the	  time,	  to	  deprive	  the	  offender	  of	  the	  proceeds	  of	  one’s	  criminal	  conduct	  once	  they	  have	  taken	  an	  intangible	  form.”	  Subsequently,	  the	  Howard	  League	  for	  Penal	  Reform	  –	  “an	  independent	  body	  concerned	  with	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system”	  –	  established	  a	  committee	  led	  by	  Justice	  Sir	  Derek	  Hodgson	  to	  help	  “close	  the	  legislative	  loopholes	  that	  permitted	  offenders	  to	  retain	  the	  gains	  of	  their	  crimes.”	  The	  resulting	  Drug	  Trafficking	  Offences	  Act	  of	  1986	  introduced	  measures	  to	  allow	  confiscation	  of	  drug-­‐related	  proceeds	  and	  criminalized	  money	  laundering	  in	  such	  cases.	  While	  its	  scope	  was	  limited	  to	  drug	  trafficking,	  two	  years	  later,	  in	  1988,	  the	  UK	  passed	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  Act	  (CJA).	  This	  “extended	  the	  scope	  of	  confiscation	  orders	  to	  ‘relevant	  criminal	  conduct,’	  defined	  as	  including	  all	  indictable	  offences	  as	  well	  as	  a	  lists	  of	  less	  serious	  offences,”	  but	  did	  not	  do	  the	  same	  regarding	  money	  laundering.	  (Such	  scope	  would	  be	  widened	  to	  include	  money	  laundering	  involving	  terrorist	  groups	  in	  the	  1989	  Prevention	  of	  Terrorism	  (Temporary	  Provisions)	  Act,	  and	  much	  more	  broadly	  in	  the	  UK’s	  1993	  Criminal	  Justice	  Act.)541	  	  Money	  laundering	  did	  figure	  prominently	  in	  two	  other	  1988	  legislative	  efforts.	  One	  was	  the	  Australian	  Financial	  Transaction	  Reports	  (FTR)	  Act,	  which,	  similar	  to	  the	  BSA,	  required	  the	  reporting	  of	  transactions	  exceeding	  $10,000.542	  It	  would	  become	  the	  basis	  for	  increasingly	  tougher	  Australian	  AML	  efforts.	  The	  other	  1988	  document	  is	  one	  that	  has	  been	  termed	  the	  “definitive	  step	  of	  internationalization.”543	  This	  was	  the	  December	  1988	  “Vienna	  Convention”	  treaty,	  formally	  known	  as	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Illicit	  Traffic	  in	  Narcotic	  Drugs	  and	  Psychotropic	  Substances.	  Its	  provisions	  required	  member	  states	  to	  “adopt	  such	  measures	  as	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  identify,	  trace,	  and	  freeze	  or	  seize	  proceeds,	  property,	  instrumentalities	  or	  any	  other	  things	  [used	  in	  drug	  trafficking]	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  eventual	  confiscation.”544	  In	  one	  scholar’s	  words:	  “The	  significance	  of	  this	  instrument	  [the	  Vienna	  Convention	  document]	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  imposed	  an	  obligation	  on	  all	  parties	  to	  criminalise	  the	  laundering	  of	  drug	  proceeds.	  Although	  the	  Convention	  did	  not	  use	  the	  term	  ‘money	  laundering,’	  its	  definition	  of	  money	  laundering	  offences	  became	  the	  accepted	  definition	  in	  all	  the	  subsequent	  instruments.”545	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  28,	  32,	  33,	  34.	  542	  McLean,	  International	  Cooperation	  in	  Civil	  and	  Criminal	  Matters,	  287.	  543	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  28.	  544	  Article	  5(2)	  in	  United	  Nations,	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Illicit	  Traffic	  in	  Narcotic	  Drugs	  and	  Psychotropic	  Substances,	  5.	  545	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  28.	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  At	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Basel	  (Switzerland)	  Committee	  on	  Banking	  Supervision	  issued	  its	  “Statement	  of	  Principles	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Criminal	  Use	  of	  the	  Banking	  System	  for	  the	  Purpose	  of	  Money	  Laundering.”	  The	  1988	  Basel	  Principles	  “are	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  banks	  are	  being	  used	  unwittingly	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  money	  laundering	  and	  that	  the	  cooperation	  of	  financial	  institutions	  with	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  will	  be	  very	  useful	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preventing	  this	  use.”	  The	  document	  advised	  banks	  to	  adopt	  measures	  that	  “(i)	  ensure	  the	  identification	  of	  any	  customer	  that	  enters	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  bank;	  (ii)	  prevent	  the	  engagement	  of	  the	  bank	  in	  transactions	  that	  appear	  illegitimate;	  and	  (iii)	  secure	  close	  cooperation	  with	  law	  enforcement.”	  While	  banking	  regulators	  hitherto	  “were	  ambivalent	  about	  their	  role	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  money	  laundering,”	  the	  Basel	  Principles	  established	  a	  consensus	  “amongst	  its	  members	  by	  attempting	  to	  create	  a	  prudential	  interest	  in	  suppressing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  financial	  system	  for	  money	  laundering	  purposes.”546	  
The	  Third	  Phase:	  1989-­‐2001	  The	  Vienna	  Convention	  led	  the	  way	  into	  the	  third	  phase	  of	  AML	  efforts	  that	  have	  been	  described	  as	  “supra-­‐nationalization.”547	  To	  help	  “oversee	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Convention,”	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  in	  1989	  created	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (FATF)	  on	  Money	  Laundering.548	  Based	  in	  Paris,	  its	  mission	  has	  been	  concisely	  described	  as	  “to	  coordinate	  and	  encourage	  nations	  to	  sign	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  and	  draft	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  laws.”549	  It	  has	  functioned	  by	  bringing	  together	  experts	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  fields,	  disciplines,	  and	  government	  agencies,	  including	  law	  enforcement;	  a	  result	  of	  this	  holistic	  approach	  is	  that	  observers	  have	  characterized	  it	  as	  fluid	  and	  flexible,	  able	  to	  “evolve	  and	  mature”	  over	  time.550	  It	  currently	  (2013)	  describes	  itself	  as	  “an	  independent	  inter-­‐governmental	  body	  that	  develops	  and	  promotes	  policies	  to	  protect	  the	  global	  financial	  system	  against	  money	  laundering,	  terrorist	  financing	  and	  the	  financing	  of	  proliferation	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction.	  The	  FATF	  Recommendations	  [40	  in	  total]	  are	  recognized	  as	  the	  global	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  (AML)	  and	  counter-­‐terrorist	  financing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  37-­‐38.	  547	  Shams,	  Legal	  Globalization,	  39.	  548	  http://people.exeter.ac.uk/watupman/undergrad/ron/international%20conventions.htm	  549	  McDonald,	  Money	  Laundering,	  5.	  550	  Gilmore,	  Dirty	  Money,	  81-­‐82.	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(CFT)	  standard.”551	  These	  are	  disseminated,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  by	  regional	  organizations	  called	  FATF-­‐Style	  Regional	  Bodies,	  or	  FSRBs,	  which	  are	  also	  expected	  to:	  
• “devise	  systems	  for	  combating	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  in	  their	  respective	  regions.”	  
• Evaluate	  the	  AML	  and	  general	  anti-­‐terrorism	  financing	  “systems	  of	  the	  member	  states	  and	  make	  recommendations	  for	  their	  improvement.”	  
• Study	  “typologies	  –	  the	  most	  common	  schemes	  used	  by	  criminals	  for	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing.	  Based	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  typological	  research,	  the	  best	  practices	  are	  disseminated	  to	  the	  private	  sector,	  oversight	  and	  regulatory	  bodies,	  law	  enforcement	  and	  the	  scientific	  community.”552	  	  Member	  countries	  are	  expected	  to	  adhere	  to	  FATF	  recommendations,	  and	  “their	  implementation	  of	  the	  forty	  Recommendations	  [are]	  monitored	  through	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  approach:	  an	  annual	  self-­‐assessment	  exercise	  and	  the	  more	  detailed	  mutual	  evaluation	  process	  under	  which	  each	  member	  country	  is	  subject	  to	  an	  on-­‐site	  examination.	  In	  addition,	  the	  FATF	  carries	  out	  cross-­‐country	  reviews	  of	  measures	  taken	  to	  implement	  particular	  Recommendations.”553	  The	  aforementioned	  FSRBs	  figure	  in	  these	  evaluation	  approaches.	  It	  issued	  its	  first	  set	  of	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  recommendations	  upon	  its	  creation	  in	  1989.	  These	  40	  guidelines	  were	  intended	  to	  “formulate	  an	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  protocol.”554	  The	  recommendations	  have	  been	  since	  modified;	  the	  original	  set	  included,	  besides	  some	  preliminary	  general	  ones,	  specific	  recommendations	  regarding	  areas	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  sections.555	  	  
a)	  “Customer	  identification	  and	  record	  keeping	  rules”	  Items	  12-­‐14	  discouraged	  the	  keeping	  of	  anonymous	  accounts,	  and	  encouraged	  “reasonable	  measures”	  to	  be	  made	  to	  correctly	  identify	  account	  holders	  and	  transaction	  makers.	  This	  was	  to	  be	  done	  particularly	  “in	  the	  case	  of	  domiciliary	  companies	  (i.e.,	  institutions,	  corporations,	  foundations,	  trusts,	  etc.,	  that	  do	  not	  conduct	  any	  commercial	  or	  manufacturing	  business	  or	  any	  other	  form	  of	  commercial	  operation	  in	  the	  country	  where	  their	  registered	  office	  is	  located).”	  In	  addition,	  financial	  institutions	  should	  keep	  transaction	  and	  customer	  identification	  records	  for	  at	  least	  five	  years,	  and	  make	  them	  available	  “to	  domestic	  competent	  authorities	  in	  the	  context	  of	  relevant	  criminal	  prosecutions	  and	  investigations.”	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  FATF,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012-­‐2013),	  1.	  552	  http://www.eurasiangroup.org/fsrb.php.	  553	  FATF,	  “The	  Forty	  Recommendations”	  (1996),	  1.	  554	  McDonald,	  Money	  Laundering,	  5.	  555	  The	  recommendations	  cited	  below	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  FATF’s	  1990	  annual	  report,	  officially	  titled	  “Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  on	  Money	  Laundering	  –	  Report,”	  31-­‐35.	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b)	  “Increased	  diligence	  of	  financial	  institutions”	  Item	  15	  recommended	  that	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions	  “pay	  special	  attention	  to	  all	  complex,	  unusual	  large	  transactions,	  and	  all	  unusual	  patterns	  of	  transactions	  which	  have	  no	  apparent	  economic	  or	  visible	  lawful	  purpose.	  The	  background	  and	  purpose	  of	  such	  transactions	  should,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  be	  examined,	  the	  findings	  established	  in	  writing,	  and	  be	  available	  to	  help	  supervisors,	  auditors	  and	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.”	  Items	  16-­‐20	  subsequently	  recommended	  that	  those	  institutions	  report	  any	  suspicions	  “to	  the	  competent	  authorities”;	  prohibit	  employees	  from	  warning	  customers	  of	  such	  reports	  being	  made;	  deny	  customers	  access	  to	  any	  accounts	  under	  investigation;	  and	  develop	  their	  own	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  programs.	  The	  latter	  “should	  include,	  as	  a	  minimum:	  a) “the	  development	  of	  internal	  policies	  procedures	  and	  controls,	  including	  the	  designation	  of	  compliance	  officers	  at	  management	  level,	  and	  adequate	  screening	  procedures	  to	  ensure	  high	  standards	  when	  hiring	  employees;	  b) “an	  ongoing	  employee	  training	  program;	  c) “an	  audit	  function	  to	  test	  the	  system.”	  	  	  
c)	  “Measures	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  countries	  with	  no	  or	  insufficient	  anti-­‐money	  
laundering	  measures”	  Items	  21-­‐22	  stated	  that	  the	  previous	  section’s	  recommendations	  about	  diligence	  should	  also	  be	  followed	  when	  dealing	  with	  individuals	  and	  companies	  “from	  countries	  which	  do	  not	  or	  insufficiently	  apply	  these	  recommendations;”	  and	  that	  should	  local	  laws	  prevent	  an	  institution	  from	  complying,	  then	  “competent	  authorities	  in	  the	  country	  of	  the	  mother	  institution	  should	  be	  informed	  by	  the	  financial	  institutions	  that	  they	  cannot	  apply	  these	  recommendations.”	  	  
d)	  “Other	  measures	  to	  avoid	  currency	  laundering”	  Recommendations	  23-­‐25	  involved	  border	  checks	  of	  cash	  transportation;	  implementation	  of	  a	  transaction	  regulation	  system	  similar	  to	  the	  US	  Bank	  Secrecy	  Act;	  and	  “the	  development	  of	  modern	  and	  secure	  techniques	  of	  money	  management	  …	  as	  a	  means	  to	  encourage	  the	  replacement	  of	  cash	  transfers.”	  	  
e)	  “Implementation,	  and	  role	  of	  regulatory	  and	  other	  administrative	  authorities”	  Items	  26-­‐29	  recommended	  that	  supervising	  banks	  or	  other	  authorities	  should	  implement	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  programs,	  and	  be	  prepared	  to	  act	  in	  cooperation	  with	  local	  law	  enforcement;	  ensure	  adequate	  supervision	  and	  regulation	  of	  all	  cash-­‐based	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prevent	  “criminals	  or	  their	  confederates”	  from	  obtaining	  control	  of	  a	  financial	  institution.	  	  
f)	  “Administrative	  cooperation”	  This	  area	  encompasses	  items	  30-­‐32,	  and	  was	  broken	  into	  two	  segments.	  The	  first,	  “Exchange	  of	  general	  information”	  (items	  30-­‐31),	  recommended	  countries	  record	  cash	  flow	  data	  and	  provide	  it	  to	  the	  IMF	  and	  BIS;	  and	  suggested	  that	  international	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  central	  banks,	  and	  financial	  regulators	  disseminate	  information	  about	  the	  latest	  money	  laundering	  techniques.	  The	  second	  part	  –“Exchange	  of	  information	  relating	  to	  suspicious	  transactions”	  (Recommendation	  32)	  –	  is	  more	  specific,	  directing	  countries	  to	  “make	  efforts	  to	  improve	  a	  spontaneous	  of	  ‘upon	  request’	  international	  information	  exchange	  relating	  to	  suspicious	  transactions,	  persons	  and	  corporations	  involved	  in	  those	  transactions	  between	  competent	  authorities.”	  	  
g)	  “Cooperation	  between	  legal	  authorities”	  This	  final	  segment	  of	  the	  recommendations	  document,	  concerning	  items	  33-­‐40,	  is	  also	  broken	  into	  two	  segments.	  In	  the	  first,	  “Basis	  and	  means	  for	  cooperation	  in	  confiscation,	  mutual	  assistance,	  and	  extradition”	  (items	  33-­‐35),	  countries	  are	  encouraged	  to	  ensure	  that	  different	  “knowledge	  standards”	  (i.e.,	  definitions)	  of	  money	  laundering	  infractions	  do	  not	  affect	  their	  ability	  to	  cooperate;	  create	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  agreements	  to	  ensure	  cooperation	  on	  “generally	  shared	  legal	  concepts”;	  and	  support	  international	  conventions	  on	  confiscating	  proceeds	  from	  money	  laundering	  ventures.	  	  The	  final	  four	  items,	  36-­‐40,	  are	  listed	  under	  the	  heading:	  “Focus	  of	  improved	  mutual	  assistance	  on	  money	  laundering	  issues.”	  They	  simply	  encourage	  cooperation	  among	  countries	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  obtaining	  records,	  seizing	  proceeds,	  determining	  jurisdiction	  venues,	  and	  extradition.	  
Observations	  Before	  proceeding	  to	  the	  fourth	  phase	  of	  AML	  regulation	  efforts,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  modern	  AML	  regulatory	  practices	  were	  slow	  to	  evolve.	  This	  –	  like	  the	  general	  recommendations	  on	  cooperation	  cited	  above	  –	  speaks	  in	  part	  to	  the	  transnational	  nature	  of	  modern	  money	  laundering.	  As	  author	  Peter	  Lilley	  observed,	  “Although	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  has	  promoted	  best-­‐practice	  principles	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  all	  countries,	  the	  simple	  truth	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  uniformity	  across	  the	  world	  in	  relation	  to	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anti-­‐money	  laundering	  regulations	  and	  legislation.”	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  financial	  transactions	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  made,	  something	  which	  application	  of	  the	  FATF’s	  recommendations	  may	  significantly	  slow	  down.	  And	  this	  would	  affect	  legitimate	  clients	  as	  well	  as	  illegitimate	  ones.	  In	  Lilley’s	  words:	  “It	  is	  frequently	  said	  that	  if	  an	  organization	  tries	  rigorously	  to	  apply	  and	  enforce	  all	  money	  laundering	  regulations,	  the	  time	  involved	  is	  exorbitant	  and	  it	  becomes	  almost	  impossible	  to	  do	  any	  business.”556	  	  With	  that	  said,	  international	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  efforts	  did	  gain	  ground	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  FATF.	  It	  produced	  a	  revised	  and	  amended	  set	  of	  recommendations	  in	  1996.	  Item	  35,	  for	  instance,	  encouraged	  member	  countries	  to	  ratify	  the	  1990	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  on	  Laundering,	  Search,	  Seizure	  and	  Confiscation	  of	  the	  Proceeds	  from	  Crime.	  It	  included	  an	  annex	  that	  listed	  “financial	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  business[es]	  or	  professions	  which	  are	  not	  financial	  institutions.”	  And	  it	  also	  included	  a	  set	  of	  “interpretative	  notes”	  meant	  to	  define	  and	  clarify	  some	  elements	  in	  the	  revised	  list	  of	  recommendations.	  557	  By	  1999,	  the	  FATF	  was	  showing	  it	  meant	  business	  with	  its	  recommendations,	  blacklisting	  Russia	  “for	  its	  lack	  of	  anti-­‐money-­‐laundering	  laws	  and	  measures.”558	  In	  February	  2000	  it	  further	  “published	  a	  report	  on	  countries	  and	  territories	  that	  were	  ‘Non-­‐Cooperative’	  with	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  regulations,”	  with	  a	  list	  naming	  names	  (including	  offshore	  financial	  centers,	  and	  countries	  such	  as	  Liechtenstein)	  emerging	  in	  June	  2000.559	  But	  the	  same	  report	  also	  acknowledged	  (in	  Peter	  Lilley’s	  words)	  “a	  number	  of	  issues	  that	  were	  undermining	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  progress.”	  Most	  involved	  areas	  covered	  in	  the	  1989	  Forty	  Recommendations,	  and	  represented	  basic	  AML	  measures.	  They	  included	  (in	  Lilley’s	  words):	  
• Lack	  of	  or	  inadequate	  regulations	  and	  supervision	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  
• Inadequate	  rules	  for	  the	  licensing	  and	  creation	  of	  financial	  institutions	  –	  particularly	  in	  offshore	  jurisdictions.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  FATF	  drew	  attention	  to	  organized	  criminal	  groups	  taking	  over	  or	  buying	  banking	  licenses.	  
• Problems	  with	  customer	  identification	  caused	  by	  anonymous	  accounts,	  accounts	  in	  fictitious	  names	  and	  non-­‐retention	  of	  relevant	  records.	  
• The	  increased	  number	  of	  territories	  offering	  bank	  secrecy.	  
• Countries	  with	  no	  effective	  system	  for	  reporting	  suspicious	  transactions.	  
• Inadequate	  or	  non-­‐existent	  requirements	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  beneficial	  owners	  or	  corporate	  entities.	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  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  4.	  557	  FATF,	  “The	  Forty	  Recommendations”	  (1996).	  558	  Zarate,	  Treasury’s	  War,	  159.	  559	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  61,	  93.	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• Lack	  of	  resources	  in	  business,	  law	  enforcement	  and	  other	  relevant	  areas.	  	  The	  report	  concluded	  by	  acknowledging	  “that,	  as	  long	  as	  these	  glaring	  loopholes	  exist,	  money	  will	  be	  washed	  by	  launderers	  entering	  the	  international	  financial	  system	  through	  such	  jurisdictions	  or	  using	  such	  lax	  territories	  to	  escape	  and	  evade	  investigation	  in	  more	  mainstream	  and	  regulated	  environments.”560	  	  As	  the	  millennium	  turned,	  another	  UN	  document	  expanded	  on	  the	  precepts	  of	  the	  1988	  Vienna	  Convention.	  This	  emerged	  from	  the	  2000	  International	  Convention	  Against	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	  (the	  Palermo	  Convention).	  Schott	  summarized	  it	  as	  containing	  “a	  broad	  range	  of	  provisions	  to	  fight	  organized	  crime	  and	  commits	  countries	  that	  ratify	  this	  convention	  to	  implement	  its	  provisions	  through	  passage	  of	  domestic	  laws.”	  Its	  key	  AML	  recommendations,	  as	  Schott	  summarized	  them	  in	  his	  words,	  were	  that	  member	  countries:	  
• Criminalize	  money	  laundering	  and	  include	  all	  serious	  crimes	  as	  predicate	  offenses	  of	  money	  laundering,	  whether	  committed	  in	  or	  outside	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  permit	  the	  required	  criminal	  knowledge	  or	  intent	  to	  be	  inferred	  from	  objective	  facts;	  
• Establish	  regulatory	  regimes	  to	  deter	  and	  detect	  all	  forms	  of	  money	  laundering,	  including	  customer	  identification,	  record-­‐keeping	  and	  reporting	  of	  suspicious	  transactions;	  
• Authorize	  the	  cooperation	  and	  exchange	  of	  information	  among	  administrative,	  regulatory,	  law	  enforcement	  and	  other	  authorities,	  both	  domestically	  and	  internationally,	  and	  consider	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  financial	  intelligence	  unit	  to	  collect,	  analyze	  and	  disseminate	  information;	  and	  	  
• Promote	  international	  cooperation.	  	  Signed	  by	  147	  countries	  and	  ratified	  by	  82	  of	  them,	  the	  convention’s	  document	  became	  effective	  29	  September	  2003.	  Schott	  wrote	  that	  “The	  Palermo	  Convention	  is	  important	  because	  its	  AML	  provisions	  adopt	  the	  same	  approach	  previously	  adopted	  by	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  on	  Money	  Laundering	  (FATF)	  in	  its	  Forty	  Recommendations	  
on	  Money	  Laundering.”561	  According	  to	  Betti,	  it	  was	  the	  first	  successful	  attempt	  to	  adopt	  an	  instrument	  dealing	  with	  transnational	  organized	  crime,	  due	  to	  its	  broad	  definition	  of	  a	  criminal	  organization,	  its	  broad	  applicability	  to	  criminal	  offenses,	  and	  its	  “multidisciplinary	  character.”562	  
The	  Fourth	  Phase:	  Post	  9/11-­‐	  2010	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Palermo	  Convention	  had	  gone	  into	  effect,	  the	  Islamic	  extremist	  attacks	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  11	  September	  2001	  had	  brought	  about	  a	  new	  urgency	  regarding	  the	  funding	  of	  terrorism,	  raising	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  link	  to	  the	  latter	  of	  economic	  crimes.	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  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  61-­‐62.	  561	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  III:4.	  562	  Betti,	  “New	  Prospects	  for	  Inter-­‐State	  Co-­‐Operation	  in	  Criminal	  Matters:	  The	  Palermo	  Convention,”	  152-­‐153.	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Thus	  emerged	  the	  fourth	  historical	  phase	  of	  AML	  efforts,	  which	  might	  be	  called	  the	  AML/CFT	  phase.	  It	  saw	  a	  number	  of	  post-­‐9/11	  efforts,	  the	  most	  significant	  of	  which	  may	  have	  been	  the	  October	  2001	  passage	  of	  the	  American	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act;	  and	  the	  November	  2001	  extension	  of	  the	  FATF	  mandate	  with	  new	  recommendations	  addressing	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism.	  As	  discussion	  began	  of	  a	  “War	  on	  Terror”	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  9/11,	  “[a]	  consensus	  immediately	  emerged,	  or	  rather	  seemed	  to	  exist,	  that	  going	  after	  the	  terrorist	  money	  is	  a	  key	  instrument	  in	  this	  war.	  Such	  consensus	  translated	  into	  amendments	  to	  money	  laundering	  laws	  in	  the	  form	  of	  extending	  criminal	  liability	  and	  expending	  financial	  institutions’	  policing	  duties	  and	  obligations.”563	  Experts	  in	  US	  and	  international	  law	  enforcement	  had	  been	  warning	  about	  links	  between	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorism	  for	  years	  prior	  to	  9/11,	  often	  with	  drug	  proceeds	  and	  organized	  crime	  added	  to	  the	  mix.	  In	  1984,	  for	  example,	  the	  UN	  International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Board	  contended	  that	  drug	  trafficking,	  given	  the	  money	  involved	  and	  the	  collusion	  of	  organized	  crime,	  was	  a	  threat	  to	  some	  countries’	  national	  security.	  In	  August	  of	  that	  year,	  a	  US	  Senate	  Subcommittee	  on	  Alcoholism	  and	  Drug	  Abuse	  “explored	  the	  links	  between	  drug	  traffic	  and	  terrorism”	  used	  by	  insurgencies	  to	  achieve	  political	  aims	  or	  to	  destabilize	  their	  host	  country.	  Examples	  cited	  in	  testimony	  of	  groups	  allegedly	  involved	  with	  drugs,	  drug	  smuggling,	  and	  drugs-­‐for-­‐arms	  dealing	  included	  insurgents	  and	  officials	  in	  Burma,	  Colombia,	  Cuba,	  and	  Peru,	  although	  there	  was	  little	  consensus	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  “trafficker-­‐terrorist	  cooperation.”	  A	  DEA	  official,	  writing	  in	  1986,	  observed	  that	  unmentioned	  “in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  drug-­‐terrorism	  link”	  were	  the	  Afghan	  
mujaheddin,	  who	  were	  “officially	  regarded	  as	  anti-­‐Soviet	  ‘freedom	  fighters’	  rather	  than	  as	  insurgents	  or	  terrorists.	  The	  omission	  is	  all	  the	  more	  curious	  because	  Afghanistan	  produces,	  by	  US	  estimates,	  a	  whopping	  400-­‐575	  metric	  tons	  of	  opium.	  It	  seems	  likely	  that	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  this	  sizable	  tonnage	  is	  produced	  with	  the	  approval	  and	  encouragement	  of	  leaders	  of	  mujaheddin	  groups.”	  564	  	  This	  drug	  connection	  was	  reexamined	  15	  years	  later,	  after	  the	  9/11	  atrocities	  were	  traced	  to	  al	  Qaeda	  extremists	  based	  in	  Afghanistan,	  where	  that	  country’s	  Taliban	  leadership	  sheltered	  them.	  The	  9/11	  Commission	  Report	  observed	  that	  while	  the	  Afghan	  drug	  trade	  “was	  a	  source	  of	  income	  for	  the	  Taliban,	  it	  did	  not	  serve	  the	  same	  purpose	  for	  al	  Qaeda,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reliable	  evidence	  that	  [Al	  Qaeda	  leader	  Osama]	  Bin	  Ladin	  was	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involved	  in	  or	  made	  his	  money	  through	  drug	  trafficking.”565	  While	  drug	  dealing	  did	  not	  emerge	  as	  a	  principal	  form	  of	  al	  Qaeda	  funding,	  terrorist	  funding	  in	  general	  became	  an	  issue.	  As	  money	  laundering	  had,	  in	  1999,	  become	  a	  high-­‐profile	  topic,	  fueled	  by	  scandal	  at	  the	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	  involving	  Russian	  organized	  crime	  proceeds,	  much	  attention	  was	  now	  given	  to	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  banks	  to	  terrorist	  use.	  The	  9/11	  Commission	  Report	  observed	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  attacks	  in	  the	  US,	  that	  country’s	  Treasury	  Department	  “did	  not	  consider	  terrorist	  financing	  important	  enough	  to	  mention	  in	  its	  national	  strategy	  for	  money	  laundering.”566	  Its	  panel	  of	  authors	  added	  in	  a	  footnote:	  	  Although	  there	  was	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  money	  laundering,	  several	  significant	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  initiatives	  designed	  to	  close	  vulnerabilities	  in	  the	  U.S.	  financial	  system	  failed	  to	  gain	  traction.	  Some	  of	  these,	  such	  as	  a	  move	  to	  control	  foreign	  banks	  with	  accounts	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  died	  as	  a	  result	  of	  banking	  industry	  pressure.	  Others,	  such	  as	  the	  regulation	  of	  money	  remitters	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  were	  mired	  in	  bureaucratic	  inertia	  and	  a	  general	  antiregulatory	  environment.567	  One	  result	  of	  reflection	  on	  this	  situation	  was	  that,	  as	  Lilley	  observed,	  post-­‐9/11	  media	  fallout	  was	  particularly	  “highly	  critical	  of	  previous	  US	  efforts	  to	  halt	  and	  identify	  domestic	  money	  laundering.”568	  However,	  the	  next	  line	  of	  the	  9/11	  Commission	  Report	  excerpt	  given	  above	  was	  a	  cautionary	  message:	  “In	  any	  event,	  it	  is	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  such	  legislative	  or	  regulatory	  initiatives	  would	  have	  significantly	  harmed	  al	  Qaeda,	  which	  generally	  made	  little	  use	  of	  the	  U.S.	  financial	  system	  to	  move	  or	  store	  its	  money.”569	  In	  light	  of	  future	  AML/CFT	  efforts,	  such	  as	  the	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act	  of	  October	  2001,	  other	  observers	  have	  also	  noted	  that	  money	  laundering,	  and	  its	  lack	  of	  regulation,	  played	  no	  role	  in	  the	  11	  September	  atrocities,	  Lilley	  writing	  that	  the	  perpetrators	  “exhibited	  no	  suspicious	  money	  laundering	  characteristics	  whatsoever.”570	  That	  being	  said,	  post-­‐9/11	  initiatives	  against	  economic	  crimes,	  including	  money	  laundering,	  were	  part	  of	  a	  broad	  campaign	  against	  terrorist	  funding.571	  And	  the	  subsequent	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act	  “ushered	  in	  the	  most	  sweeping	  expansion	  of	  the	  US	  AML	  regime	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  1970	  Bank	  Secrecy	  Act.”572	  As	  another	  observer	  pointed	  out,	  “The	  template	  for	  the	  financial	  war	  was	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  apparatus	  in	  place	  since	  the	  war	  on	  drugs	  of	  the	  1980s.	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	  surveillance	  and	  control	  of	  financial	  flows	  was	  twofold:	  first,	  they	  could	  untangle	  money	  puzzles	  and	  yield	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  information	  about	  subversive	  and	  otherwise	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shadowy	  groups;	  second,	  the	  use	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  tools	  –	  embargoes,	  asset	  seizures,	  and	  the	  like	  –	  would	  eventually	  ‘take	  profit	  out	  of	  crime.’573	  While	  the	  new	  measures,	  of	  course,	  were	  meant	  to	  deal	  with	  organizations	  interested	  in	  ideology	  rather	  than	  profits	  per	  se,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  possibility	  or	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  such	  groups.	  As	  a	  RAND	  political	  scientist	  has	  noted,	  “Criminal	  organizations	  can	  become	  ideological	  over	  time.”	  He	  added:	  Terrorist	  groups	  rely	  upon	  organized	  crime	  for	  the	  weaponry	  and	  munitions	  they	  require	  for	  terrorist	  attacks	  and	  insurgencies.	  …	  The	  two	  groups	  are	  further	  connected	  by	  the	  drug	  trade:	  both	  are	  financially	  dependent	  on	  narcotrafficking	  …	  Finally,	  terrorist	  groups	  and	  criminal	  networks	  both	  depend	  upon	  corrupt	  officials,	  to	  help	  hem	  hide	  their	  activities	  from	  the	  government,	  and	  both	  prefer	  to	  operate	  in	  areas	  with	  weak	  law	  enforcement.574	  The	  new	  regulations	  comprised	  the	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act’s	  Title	  III,	  which	  itself	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  International	  Money	  Laundering	  Abatement	  and	  Anti-­‐Terrorist	  Financing	  Act	  of	  2001.	  It	  has	  been	  described	  as	  basically	  amending	  and	  expanding	  the	  1970	  Bank	  Secrecy	  Act	  and	  the	  1986	  Money	  Laundering	  Control	  Act.	  Among	  its	  key	  provisions	  is	  the	  requirement	  that	  all	  financial	  institutions	  develop	  and	  implement	  AML	  programs	  which	  include	  development	  of	  internal	  policies,	  procedures	  and	  controls;	  designation	  of	  a	  compliance	  officer;	  ongoing	  training;	  and	  an	  independent	  audit	  function.	  Congress’	  intention,	  according	  to	  Phillips,	  was	  that	  “each	  Financial	  Institution	  should	  have	  the	  flexibility	  to	  tailor	  the	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  program	  to	  its	  structure	  and	  address	  particular	  money-­‐laundering	  risks	  or	  vulnerabilities.”	  The	  US	  Treasury	  Department	  was	  tasked	  with	  formulating	  appropriate	  regulations	  and	  requirements.	  Each	  program	  would	  be	  required	  to	  have	  a	  “designated	  compliance	  officer,	  an	  ongoing	  training	  program,	  and	  an	  independent	  audit	  function.	  …	  The	  training	  program	  requirement	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  employees	  who	  are	  often	  the	  first	  line	  of	  defense	  in	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  programs	  are	  fully	  trained	  to	  recognize	  suspicious	  account	  activity	  and	  know	  how	  to	  report	  such	  activity	  to	  a	  supervisor.	  The	  independent	  audit	  function	  requirement	  is	  intended	  to	  test	  the	  Financial	  Institution's	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  program	  to	  determine	  its	  efficacy	  in	  detecting	  and,	  if	  applicable,	  reporting	  such	  suspicious	  activity.	  The	  audit	  should	  also	  determine	  the	  Financial	  Institution's	  compliance	  with	  certain	  recordkeeping	  requirements.	  Currently,	  there	  is	  no	  regulatory	  requirement	  that	  an	  auditing	  firm	  conduct	  a	  Financial	  Institution's	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  audit.	  The	  regulators	  have	  indicated	  that	  the	  audit	  may	  be	  conducted	  internally;	  provided,	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however,	  that	  the	  audit	  is	  conducted	  by	  officers	  and	  employees	  other	  than	  those	  persons	  designated	  as	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  compliance	  officers	  and	  staff.”575	  	  Akin	  to	  the	  BSA,	  the	  Act	  also	  required	  financial	  institutions	  “to	  implement	  procedures	  that	  are	  reasonably	  designed	  to	  verify	  the	  identity	  of	  customers	  at	  the	  time	  an	  account	  is	  opened	  and	  to	  check	  the	  list	  of	  customers	  to	  determine	  if	  any	  customers	  are	  included	  on	  a	  list	  of	  known	  or	  suspected	  terrorists.“	  The	  first	  such	  list	  was	  issued	  on	  24	  September	  2001,	  to	  accompany	  an	  Executive	  Order	  that	  required	  “the	  freezing	  of	  assets	  and	  blocks	  transactions	  with	  the	  list	  of	  individuals	  and	  organizations	  identified	  in	  the	  order.”	  A	  second	  such	  document,	  the	  Specially	  Designated	  Nationals	  List	  (SDNL)	  and	  is	  published	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  Foreign	  Assets	  Control	  (OFAC),	  and	  Phillips	  noted	  that	  “Each	  time	  a	  new	  list	  is	  published,	  which	  can	  be	  as	  often	  as	  weekly,	  the	  entire	  customer	  database	  must	  be	  rechecked.”	  The	  list	  was	  to	  be	  circulated	  to	  a	  “senior-­‐level	  person”	  in	  each	  financial	  institution	  who	  would	  “act	  as	  the	  single	  point	  of	  contact.”	  576	  	  Additionally,	  while	  previous	  regulations	  had	  required	  “depository	  institutions	  and	  their	  affiliates”	  to	  file	  Suspicious	  Activity	  Reports	  (SARs),	  the	  USA	  Patriot	  Act	  now	  required	  this	  of	  broker-­‐dealers	  as	  well.	  “In	  general,”	  wrote	  Phillips,	  “the	  proposed	  rule	  includes	  two	  triggering	  events	  that	  require	  a	  broker-­‐dealer	  to	  submit	  a	  SAR.	  The	  first	  event	  is	  any	  known	  or	  suspected	  violation	  of	  law	  or	  regulation.	  The	  second	  event	  is	  where	  the	  broker-­‐dealer	  knows,	  suspects	  or	  has	  reason	  to	  suspect	  the	  transactions	  involve	  money	  laundering,	  involve	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  BSA,	  or	  appear	  to	  serve	  no	  lawful	  purpose.	  Thus,	  the	  proposed	  regulation	  incorporates	  a	  due	  diligence	  standard	  and	  requires	  broker-­‐dealers	  to	  monitor	  customer	  transactions	  to	  detect	  these	  types	  of	  activities.”	  Phillips	  added	  that	  “For	  reasons	  that	  have	  not	  been	  disclosed,	  the	  proposed	  rule	  for	  broker-­‐dealers	  does	  not	  exactly	  parallel	  the	  existing	  rule	  for	  depository	  institutions	  and,	  in	  many	  ways,	  the	  proposed	  rule	  includes	  reporting	  requirements	  that	  are	  broader	  than	  the	  requirements	  for	  banks.	  For	  example,	  under	  the	  existing	  rules,	  a	  depository	  institution	  must	  submit	  a	  SAR	  for	  any	  activity	  that	  involves	  at	  least	  $5,000	  and:	  (i)	  any	  known	  or	  suspected	  violation	  of	  federal	  law;	  (ii)	  a	  suspicious	  transaction	  related	  to	  money	  laundering;	  or	  (iii)	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  BSA.	  Under	  the	  proposed	  rule	  applicable	  to	  broker-­‐dealers,	  the	  reporting	  requirement	  is	  triggered	  by	  ‘any	  suspicious	  transaction	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575	  Phillips,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Initiatives	  Under	  the	  USA	  Patriot	  Act.”	  576	  Phillips,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Initiatives	  Under	  the	  USA	  Patriot	  Act.”	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relevant	  to	  a	  possible	  violation	  of	  law	  or	  regulation.’”	  SARs	  would	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  Financial	  Crimes	  Enforcement	  Network	  (FinCEN),	  and	  while	  those	  submitting	  could	  not	  disclose	  that	  fact	  to	  the	  suspect,	  they	  were	  given	  a	  legal	  “safe	  harbor	  from	  liability,	  including	  securities	  arbitration.”577	  	  Another	  key	  provision	  of	  the	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act	  was	  that	  it	  required	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury	  to	  (in	  Phillips’	  summation)	  “adopt	  regulations	  that	  will	  encourage	  the	  cooperation	  among	  Financial	  Institutions,	  their	  regulatory	  authorities,	  and	  law	  enforcement	  authorities	  regarding	  information	  relating	  to	  individuals	  or	  organizations	  that	  are	  ‘reasonably	  suspected	  based	  on	  credible	  evidence	  of	  engaging	  in	  terrorist	  acts	  or	  money	  laundering	  activities.’”578	  
New	  FATF	  Recommendations	  On	  its	  part,	  the	  FATF	  in	  late	  October	  2001	  met	  in	  Washington	  D.C.,	  and	  ultimately	  issued	  Eight	  Special	  Recommendations	  for	  combating	  terrorist	  financing.	  (A	  ninth	  –	  concerning	  cash	  smuggling	  by	  couriers	  –	  would	  be	  added	  in	  October	  2004,	  yielding	  an	  expanded	  list).579	  In	  one	  author’s	  summary,	  member	  countries	  were	  advised	  to:	  1) “[R]atify	  and	  implement	  relevant	  UN	  instruments.”	  2) “[C]riminalize	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism,	  terrorist	  acts	  and	  terrorist	  organizations.”	  3) Freeze,	  seize,	  and	  confiscate	  terrorist	  assets.	  4) Report	  “suspicious	  transactions	  relating	  to	  terrorism.	  …	  [T]he	  types	  of	  entities	  that	  should	  report	  such	  suspicions	  are	  …	  not	  only	  banks	  but	  also	  non-­‐bank	  financial	  institutions	  (which,	  as	  a	  minimum,	  should	  include	  bureau	  de	  change,	  stockbrokers,	  insurance	  companies	  and	  money	  remittance/transfer	  services).”	  5) Cooperate	  internationally,	  by	  fostering	  the	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  and	  other	  government	  contacts;	  denying	  “‘safe	  haven’	  to	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  terrorist	  financing”;	  and	  permitting	  extradition,	  with	  a	  specific	  recommendation	  that	  claims	  “of	  political	  motivation	  are	  not	  recognized	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  refusing	  requests	  to	  extradite	  persons	  alleged	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  terrorist	  financing.”	  6) Regulate	  “alternative	  remittance”	  areas	  “such	  as	  the	  black	  market	  peso	  exchange,	  hawala	  or	  hundi	  systems,	  and	  other	  methods	  prevalent	  in	  China	  and	  East	  Asia.”	  FATF	  members	  should	  require	  licensing/registration	  of	  such	  methods,	  which	  themselves	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  FATF	  recommendations,	  and	  open	  to	  “sanctions	  …	  if	  providers	  fail	  to	  obtain	  a	  license	  or	  register	  and	  fail	  to	  comply	  with	  relevant	  FATF	  recommendations.”	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  Phillips,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Initiatives	  Under	  the	  USA	  Patriot	  Act.”	  578	  Phillips,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Initiatives	  Under	  the	  USA	  Patriot	  Act.”	  579	  Koh,	  Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  124-­‐125.	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7) Regulate	  wire	  transfers	  by	  requiring	  “financial	  institutions	  to	  include	  originator	  information	  on	  funds	  transfers	  sent	  within	  or	  from	  the	  jurisdiction.”	  Transfers	  attempted	  without	  such	  originator	  information	  were	  to	  be	  closely	  scrutinized.	  8) Scrutinize	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  (such	  as	  charities)	  “to	  prevent	  their	  misuse	  for	  terrorist	  financing	  purposes.”580	  	  The	  ninth	  point	  is	  now	  Recommendation	  32	  in	  the	  revised	  FATF	  guidelines.	  It	  advises	  member	  countries	  to	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  cash	  transfers	  by	  courier,	  regulate	  and	  stop	  suspected	  “bearer-­‐negotiable	  instruments,”	  and	  have	  legal	  penalties	  in	  place	  for	  those	  caught	  lying	  about	  such	  transfers.581	  	  In	  June	  2003,	  the	  FATF	  issued	  a	  new	  set	  of	  Forty	  Recommendations,	  which	  did	  not	  as	  yet	  encompass	  the	  Special	  Recommendations.	  A	  scholar	  has	  noted	  that	  “the	  revised	  Forty	  Recommendations	  are	  not	  separated	  from	  the	  Nine	  Special	  Recommendations,	  but	  should	  be	  read	  together,	  thus	  providing	  a	  combined	  set	  of	  enhanced	  measures	  to	  combat	  terrorist	  financing.”582	  (The	  FATF	  would,	  however,	  later	  consolidate	  the	  recommendations	  in	  their	  2012	  report.	  583)	  One	  analysis	  of	  the	  “general	  framework”	  provided	  by	  the	  two,	  then-­‐separate	  sets	  of	  recommendations	  included	  the	  following	  observations:	  1) The	  FATF	  had	  begun	  “to	  make	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  in	  its	  standards,”	  and	  its	  recommendations’	  subtitles	  “afford	  equal	  footing	  to	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing.”	  2) The	  “scope	  of	  application	  ratione	  personae584	  has	  been	  substantially	  extended	  to	  include	  non-­‐financial	  institutions	  with	  explicit	  enumeration,	  such	  as	  casinos,	  real	  estate	  agents,	  dealers	  in	  precious	  metals	  and	  stones,	  lawyers,	  notaries,	  other	  independent	  legal	  professionals	  and	  accountants,	  and	  trust	  and	  company	  service	  providers.”	  3) The	  “standards	  themselves	  had	  also	  become	  more	  sophisticated	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  detailed	  provisions	  on	  customer	  due	  diligence	  (CDD)	  measures	  in	  general	  and	  specifications	  on	  the	  CDD	  procedures	  in	  relation	  to	  individual	  categories	  of	  subjects	  and	  activities	  such	  as	  politically	  exposed	  persons,	  intermediaries	  and	  cross-­‐border	  correspondent	  banking.”	  4) “[A]ttempts	  have	  also	  been	  made	  to	  alleviate	  the	  consequent	  burden	  in	  terms	  of	  implementation	  and	  in	  supervision,	  such	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  risk-­‐based	  approach;	  the	  exemption	  of	  non-­‐financial	  institutions	  from	  the	  strict	  application	  of	  ‘no	  professional	  secrecy	  privilege’	  in	  respect	  of	  suspicious	  transaction	  reports;	  lenient	  standards	  of	  ‘no-­‐tipping	  off’	  for	  non-­‐financial	  institutions;	  and	  the	  narrowing	  down	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  activities	  of	  non-­‐financial	  institutions	  that	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580	  As	  summarized	  and	  paraphrased	  in	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  150-­‐152.	  581	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  25.	  582	  Koh,	  Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  125.	  583	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  11-­‐30.	  A	  table	  showing	  how	  the	  items	  were	  consolidated	  appears	  on	  4-­‐5.	  584	  The	  act	  an	  individual	  commits,	  “whether	  in	  an	  official	  or	  in	  a	  private	  capacity”	  (Dinstein,	  War,	  Aggression	  and	  Self-­‐
Defence,	  156).	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subject	  to	  the	  reporting	  of	  suspicious	  transactions.”	  Koh	  suggested	  that	  the	  effort	  represented	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  “duplication	  of	  resources	  and	  the	  resistance	  from	  related	  sectors.”	  5) The	  “concept	  of	  the	  FIU	  [Financial	  Intelligence	  Unit]585	  has	  been	  explicitly	  dealt	  with	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  main	  text	  of	  the	  Forty	  Recommendations.”	  6) Reference	  was	  increased	  to	  specific	  “standards	  set	  by	  other	  organizations,”	  such	  as	  the	  1999	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Suppression	  of	  the	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism	  (ICSFT);	  the	  UN’s	  2001	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1373	  on	  terrorism	  and	  terrorist	  financing;	  the	  “Core	  Principles”	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  2000	  Palermo	  Convention;	  and	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Convention	  against	  Terrorism	  of	  2002.586	  	  At	  this	  stage	  AML	  reporting	  requirements	  have	  spilled	  beyond	  financial	  institution,	  covering	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  professionals	  such	  as	  lawyers,	  accountants,	  and	  dealers	  in	  precious	  metals/stones.	  The	  latter	  created	  issues	  for	  law	  professionals	  in	  the	  context	  of	  consent	  process	  and	  tipping	  off	  in	  the	  UK.587	  	  
The	  Fifth	  Phase:	  2010	  to	  Present	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Bajrektarevic:	  “Having	  dealt	  with	  the	  Narcotic	  Drugs,	  Organized	  Crime,	  Terrorism	  Financing	  and	  Corruption	  related	  treaties,	  the	  international	  community	  is	  now	  turning	  its	  attention	  to	  forms	  of	  the	  private/corporate	  sector	  and	  of	  individual	  or	  non-­‐organized	  crime.”588	  Strategies	  of	  targeting	  financial	  elements	  of	  crime	  began	  to	  morph	  into	  a	  civil	  legal	  approach.	  Gallant	  describes	  it	  as	  “transportation	  of	  attributes	  associated	  with	  civil	  proceedings	  onto	  criminal	  processes,	  and	  legal	  frameworks,	  which	  permit	  the	  recovery	  of	  criminal	  proceeds	  through	  wholly	  civil	  legal	  processes.”589	  This	  stage	  is	  marked	  by	  escalating	  attention	  to	  tax	  and	  wealth	  disclosure	  with	  a	  general	  shift	  from	  domestic	  to	  international	  issues.	  One	  study	  defines	  it	  as	  “the	  war	  against	  aggressive	  tax	  planning,	  tax	  evasion	  and	  tax	  avoidance	  in	  the	  era	  of	  global	  fiscal	  transparency.“590	  The	  international	  community	  is	  confronting	  tax	  evasion	  through	  information	  sharing.	  This	  period	  has	  seen	  a	  gradual	  shift	  from	  bilateral	  tax	  treaties	  to	  a	  single	  multilateral	  standard	  implemented	  through	  automatic	  exchange	  of	  information	  in	  tax	  matters.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585	  The	  term	  FIU,	  used	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  is	  a	  governmentally	  created	  body	  meant	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  private	  sector	  and	  law	  enforcement	  (Koh,	  Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  41-­‐42).	  Its	  US	  equivalent	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  Treasury	  Department’s	  Financial	  Crimes	  Enforcement	  Network	  (FinCEN).	  586	  Koh,	  Suppressing	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Money	  Laundering,	  126-­‐128.	  587	  Campbell	  and	  Campbell,	  “Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Consent	  Regime	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  –	  Time	  For	  Change,”	  485-­‐495.	  	  588	  Bajrektarevic,	  “The	  Justice-­‐Home	  Affairs	  Diplomacy:	  The	  Palermo	  Convention,	  Ten	  Years	  After	  -­‐	  Towards	  the	  Universal	  Criminal	  Justice,”	  121.	  	  589	  Gallant,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Proceeds	  of	  Crime,	  18.	  590	  Kristoffersson	  and	  Pistone,	  “Policy	  Issues,	  Historical	  Development,	  General	  Legal	  Framework,”	  2.	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The	  OECD	  identified	  tax	  crime	  as	  one	  of	  the	  top	  three	  sources	  of	  money	  laundering.	  Hence,	  tax	  administrations	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  detecting	  and	  deterring	  the	  practice.591	  In	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  new	  directive	  on	  July	  5	  2016,	  the	  European	  Commission	  made	  the	  fight	  against	  tax	  avoidance	  a	  priority	  alongside	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorism	  financing.592	  Its	  broader	  drive	  to	  boost	  tax	  transparency	  and	  tackle	  tax	  abuse	  is	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Directive	  requirement	  to	  establish	  national	  registers	  of	  beneficial	  owners	  of	  companies	  and	  some	  trusts.593	  A	  FATF	  handbook	  states	  that	  its	  standards	  on	  transparency	  and	  beneficial	  ownership,	  designed	  to	  prevent	  money	  laundering	  or	  terrorist	  financing,	  can	  support	  efforts	  to	  prevent	  and	  detect	  tax	  crimes	  and	  corruption.594	  An	  FATF	  recommendation	  (discussed	  later)	  also	  advocates	  such	  correlation	  between	  tax	  crime	  and	  money	  laundering	  by	  treating	  tax	  crime	  as	  a	  predicate	  offence	  to	  money	  laundering.595	  	  	  This	  link	  has	  its	  critics,	  some	  of	  whom	  suggest	  that	  the	  causational	  relationship	  between	  tax	  evasion	  and	  money	  laundering	  was	  proposed	  to	  add	  impetus	  to	  the	  AML	  industry	  by	  raising	  the	  value	  of	  laundered	  proceeds.596 Others	  contend	  that	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  tax	  havens	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  international	  security,	  because	  “[i]nternational	  crime,	  international	  terrorism,	  and	  money	  laundering	  also	  benefit	  from	  bank	  secrecy	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  hide	  billions	  of	  dollars	  in	  offshore	  accounts.”597	  Yet,	  some	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  fallacy	  “to	  aggregate	  laundering	  and	  tax	  evasion	  into	  a	  general	  problem	  category	  of	  'offshore'.”598	  However,	  many	  would	  agree	  that	  international	  tax	  evasion	  contributes	  significantly	  to	  the	  tax	  gap.599	  Multiple	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  estimate	  the	  size	  of	  offshore	  wealth	  and	  tax	  revenue	  losses	  due	  to	  tax	  evasion.	  Zucman	  estimated	  that	  in	  2013	  about	  US$7.6	  and	  in	  2014	  US$8	  trillion	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  wealth	  of	  households	  was	  held	  in	  tax	  havens,	  with	  three-­‐quarters	  being	  unrecorded.	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  his	  estimate	  is	  lower	  than	  US$8.9	  trillion	  of	  the	  Boston	  Consulting	  Group,	  and	  US$32	  trillion	  of	  Henry’s	  estimate	  for	  2012.	  The	  highest	  tax	  revenue	  losses	  due	  to	  tax	  evasion	  fall	  on	  Europe	  (78	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591	  OECD,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Awareness	  Handbook.”	  	  592	  European	  Commission	  (2016,	  5	  July),	  “Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  Amending	  Directive	  (EU)	  2015/849	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  the	  Use	  of	  the	  Financial	  System	  for	  the	  Purpose	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  or	  Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Amending	  Directive	  2009/101/EC.”	  593	  EU	  Directive	  (EU)	  2015/849	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council,	  (4th	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Directive)	  20	  May,	  2015,	  Chapter	  1,	  Article	  3(4)(f).	  594	  FATF	  ,“FATF	  Guidance	  to	  Transparency	  and	  Beneficial	  Ownership,”	  4.	  595	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  116.	  596	  Alldridge,	  “Tax	  Avoidance,	  Tax	  Evasion,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  ‘Offshore’,”	  324-­‐331.	  597	  Kerzner	  and	  Chodikoff,	  International	  Tax	  Evasion	  in	  the	  Global	  Information	  Age,	  3.	  598	  Alldridge,	  “Money	  Laundering	  and	  Globalization,”	  447.	  599	  The	  tax	  gap	  is	  the	  “difference	  between	  actual	  revenue	  collection	  and	  an	  estimation	  of	  potential	  collection”	  (Shome,	  “The	  Control	  of	  Tax	  Evasion	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Tax	  Administration,”	  40).	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percent)	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (35	  percent).600	  Despite	  a	  link	  between	  tax	  gaps	  and	  illegal	  behavior,	  the	  tax	  gap	  is	  not	  entirely	  comprised	  of	  the	  underground	  economy.601	  The	  tax	  gap	  estimates	  of	  developed	  nations	  are	  comparatively	  lower	  than	  that	  of	  developing	  nations.	  In	  the	  developed	  nations	  the	  average	  gap	  is	  approximately	  eight	  percent,	  while	  in	  developing	  countries’	  figures	  are	  much	  higher.602	  	  	  Sharing	  tax	  information	  is	  not	  a	  novel	  concept.	  Information	  in	  tax	  matters	  has	  been	  exchanged	  between	  different	  countries	  for	  many	  years.	  Article	  26	  of	  the	  OECD	  Model	  Tax	  Convention,603	  the	  UN	  Model	  Tax	  Convention,604	  the	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Administrative	  Assistance	  in	  Tax	  Matters,605	  the	  EU	  Directive	  on	  Savings	  Income	  Taxation	  (EU	  Savings	  Directive),606	  thousands	  of	  double	  tax	  treaties,607	  and	  Tax	  Information	  Exchange	  Agreements	  (TIEAs)608	  were	  all	  designed	  for	  tax	  information	  exchange.	  Even	  developing	  countries,	  with	  less	  sophisticated	  tax	  authorities,	  initiated	  tax	  information	  sharing	  initiatives.609	  
 Some	  suggest	  that	  the	  current	  intensified	  political	  pressure	  for	  tax	  transparency	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  “States	  cannot	  afford	  to	  lose	  billions	  in	  potential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600	  Zucman,	  “Taxing	  Across	  Borders,”	  139,	  and	  Zucman,	  “The	  Missing	  Wealth	  of	  Nations,”	  passim.	  According	  to	  one	  “conservative”	  estimate,	  in	  2010	  between	  US$21	  and	  US$32	  trillion	  was	  invested	  in	  80	  offshore	  secret	  jurisdictions	  (Henry,	  “The	  Price	  of	  Offshore	  Revisited,”	  5).	  601	  Rifkin,	  “A	  Primer	  on	  the	  Tax	  Gap	  and	  Methodologies	  for	  Reducing	  It,”	  378-­‐379.	  602	  Schneider,	  “Shadow	  Economies	  Around	  the	  World”;	  Phua,	  “Convergence	  in	  Global	  Tax	  Compliance.”	  603	  “The	  competent	  authorities	  of	  the	  Contracting	  States	  must	  exchange	  such	  information	  as	  is	  foreseeably	  relevant	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Convention	  or	  to	  the	  administration	  or	  enforcement	  of	  the	  domestic	  laws	  concerning	  taxes	  of	  every	  kind	  and	  description	  imposed	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Contracting	  States,	  or	  of	  their	  political	  subdivisions	  or	  local	  authorities,	  insofar	  as	  the	  taxation	  thereunder	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  Convention”	  (OECD,	  "Article	  26	  of	  the	  OECD	  Model	  Tax	  Convention	  on	  Income	  and	  on	  Capital	  and	  its	  Commentary,”	  81).	  604	  According	  to	  its	  text,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Model	  Double	  Taxation	  Convention	  (the	  United	  Nations	  Model	  Tax	  Convention)	  is	  a	  treaty	  between	  Developed	  and	  Developing	  Countries	  aimed	  at	  eliminating	  double	  taxation.	  605	  According	  to	  its	  text,	  the	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Administrative	  Assistance	  in	  Tax	  Matters,	  developed	  jointly	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  is	  a	  multilateral	  instrument	  to	  foster	  tax	  co-­‐operation	  and	  to	  tackle	  tax	  evasion	  and	  avoidance.	  	  606	  The	  EU	  Directive	  on	  Savings	  Income	  Taxation	  is	  based	  on	  a	  system	  of	  automatic	  exchange	  of	  information,	  imposing	  a	  withholding	  tax	  on	  interest	  income	  earned	  by	  European	  residents	  in	  a	  number	  of	  cooperating	  tax	  havens.	  It	  is	  “applied	  by	  all	  EU	  Member	  States	  apart	  Austria	  and	  Luxembourg,	  has	  shifted	  the	  power	  to	  tax	  cross-­‐border	  savings	  from	  the	  source	  to	  the	  country	  of	  residence	  of	  the	  investors”	  (Gérard	  and	  Granelli,	  “From	  the	  EU	  Savings	  Directive	  to	  the	  US	  FATCA,	  Taxing	  Cross	  Border	  Savings	  Income,”	  15).	  Johannesen	  and	  Zucman,	  “The	  End	  of	  Bank	  Secrecy?”	  89.	  607	  A	  double	  taxation	  treaty	  is	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  between	  two	  severing	  states	  with	  an	  objective	  among	  others	  to	  combat	  tax	  evasion	  and	  fiscal	  fraud.	  There	  are	  about	  2,600	  double	  tax	  treaties	  worldwide	  (Zarb,	  “Double	  Tax	  Treaties,”;	  Braun	  and	  Zagler,	  “An	  Economic	  Perspective	  on	  Double	  Tax	  Treaties	  With(In)	  Developing	  Countries.”)	  608	  As	  part	  of	  the	  OECD	  standards	  countries	  are	  expected	  to	  sign	  tax	  information	  exchange	  agreements	  (TIEAs)	  with	  other	  countries.	  Currently	  tax	  havens	  are	  required	  to	  sign	  a	  minimum	  of	  12	  TIEAs	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  economic	  sanctions.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  TIEAs	  signed	  since	  2000	  is	  600	  (Bilicka	  and	  Fuest,	  “With	  Which	  Countries	  do	  Tax	  Havens	  Share	  Information?”	  177;	  Johannesen	  and	  Zucman,	  “The	  End	  of	  Bank	  Secrecy?,”	  66.) 609	  The	  2004	  Andean	  Community	  Income	  and	  Capital	  Tax	  Convention	  (The	  Andean	  Model)	  is	  an	  arrangement	  to	  avoid	  double	  taxation	  and	  prevent	  fiscal	  evasion	  among	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Andean-­‐Group	  (Andean	  Community	  Income	  and	  Capital	  Tax	  Convention,	  Decision	  578;	  Velayos,	  Barreix,	  and	  Villela,	  “Regional	  Integration	  and	  Tax	  Harmonization:	  Issues	  and	  Recent	  Experiences,”	  95-­‐98.	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tax	  revenue	  due	  to	  poor	  collection	  of	  taxes.”610	  Starting	  in	  2008	  with	  the	  UBS	  case,611	  the	  DOJ	  and	  the	  IRS	  “are	  using	  both	  carrots	  and	  sticks	  to	  coax	  taxpayers	  to	  bring	  their	  money	  back	  into	  the	  "system."	  So	  far,	  three	  rounds	  of	  the	  Offshore	  Voluntary	  Disclosure	  Program	  (OVDP),612	  FATCA,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice’s	  Swiss	  Bank	  Program,	  in	  Nanavati’s	  and	  Thornton’s	  view,	  confirm	  “the	  urgency	  to	  the	  crackdown”	  to	  fix	  government’s	  fiscal	  difficulties.613	  The	  recent	  tax	  leaks	  and	  scandals	  refocused	  public	  attention	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  offshore	  tax	  evasion,	  corruption,	  and	  international	  money	  laundering.	  The	  most	  recent	  one	  is	  the	  financial	  data	  leak	  obtained	  by	  the	  International	  Consortium	  of	  Investigative	  Journalists	  (ICIJ),	  the	  Panama	  Papers.	  There	  has	  also	  been	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  tax	  issues	  by	  the	  international	  media.	  According	  to	  the	  EY	  report,	  topics	  of	  tax	  avoidance	  and	  tax	  havens	  gained	  attention	  of	  international	  media	  and	  received	  a	  wide	  coverage	  in	  the	  world	  press.	  Just	  during	  one	  week	  in	  2013	  articles	  on	  this	  topic	  appeared	  in	  the	  national	  press	  of,	  amongst	  others,	  Egypt,	  India,	  New	  Zealand,	  Pakistan,	  South	  Korea,	  Spain,	  Taiwan,	  the	  UK,	  Australia,	  Belgium,	  France,	  Germany,	  Malaysia,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  US.614	  Headlines	  circulating	  in	  mass-­‐media	  publications	  during	  the	  past	  few	  years	  include	  “Top	  25	  Corporate	  Tax	  Dodgers,”615	  “2,500	  New	  Inspectors	  to	  Chase	  Tax	  Evaders,”616	  and	  “Target	  Tax	  Evaders.”617	  In	  2011,	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  published	  a	  series	  “But	  Nobody	  Pays	  That,”	  in	  which	  business	  reporter	  David	  Kocieniewski	  “devoted	  a	  year	  to	  digging	  out	  and	  exposing	  the	  obscure	  provisions	  that	  businesses	  and	  the	  wealthiest	  Americans	  exploit	  to	  drive	  their	  tax	  bills	  down	  to	  rock	  bottom.”618	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
610	  Kristoffersson	  and	  Pistone,	  “Policy	  Issues,	  Historical	  Development,	  General	  Legal	  Framework,”	  19.	  611	  From	  2000-­‐2007,	  UBS	  assisted	  U.S.	  clients	  in	  concealing	  their	  offshore	  accounts	  from	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Service	  (IRS)	  by	  helping	  them	  open	  accounts	  in	  the	  names	  of	  fake	  companies	  to	  act	  as	  foreign	  beneficial	  owners	  of	  the	  accounts.	  The	  bank	  was	  accused	  of	  not	  only	  assisting	  in	  these	  tax-­‐evasion	  schemes,	  but	  also	  of	  purposefully	  marketing	  these	  strategies	  to	  wealthy	  Americans.	  On	  18	  February,	  2009,	  UBS	  entered	  into	  a	  Deferred	  Prosecution	  Agreement	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Justice	  on	  18	  February,	  2009.	  Ultimately,	  the	  dispute	  between	  the	  DOJ	  and	  UBS	  transformed	  into	  a	  dispute	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Swiss	  governments	  and	  was	  resolved	  out	  of	  court.	  The	  settlement	  involve	  the	  disclosure	  of	  identities	  of	  4,450	  (eventually	  on	  10,000)	  UBS	  account-­‐holders	  suspected	  of	  using	  offshore	  accounts	  to	  evade	  taxes.	  (Szarmach,	  “Piercing	  the	  Veil	  of	  Bank	  Secrecy,”	  410-­‐413.	  See	  also,	  Cantley,	  “The	  UBS	  Case,”	  15-­‐24.	  612	  The	  first	  OVDP	  was	  available	  for	  a	  short	  time	  in	  2009	  for	  US	  taxpayers	  to	  disclose	  voluntary	  the	  unreported	  income	  from	  hidden	  offshore	  accounts	  to	  escape	  criminal	  prosecution	  and	  annual	  civil	  penalties	  for	  a	  price	  of	  20	  percent	  of	  their	  highest	  account	  balance	  during	  an	  eight-­‐year	  look-­‐back	  period.	  The	  second	  OVDP	  was	  available	  in	  2011	  and	  provided	  the	  same	  benefits	  for	  a	  higher	  price	  of	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  taxpayer's	  highest	  account	  balance.	  Finally,	  the	  third,	  current	  one,	  was	  offered	  in	  2012.	  Though	  it	  has	  a	  higher	  penalty	  rate	  than	  the	  previous	  programs,	  but	  offers	  clear	  benefits	  to	  encourage	  taxpayers	  to	  disclose	  foreign	  accounts	  now	  rather	  than	  risk	  detection	  by	  the	  IRS	  and	  possible	  criminal	  prosecution	  (US	  IRS,	  “IRS	  Offshore	  Voluntary	  Disclosure	  Efforts	  Produce	  $6.5	  Billion;	  45,000	  Taxpayers	  Participate.”)	  613	  Nanavati	  and	  Thornton,	  “DOJ	  and	  IRS	  Use	  ‘Carrot	  'N	  Stick’	  to	  Enforce	  Global	  Tax	  Laws,”	  5.	  614	  Ernst	  &	  Young,	  “Tax	  Transparency:	  Seizing	  the	  initiative,”	  16.	  615	  Kristof,	  “Top	  25	  Corporate	  Tax	  Dodgers.”	  616	  Campbell,	  “2,500	  New	  Inspectors	  to	  Chase	  Tax	  Evaders.”	  617	  Uncredited	  in	  Vancouver	  Sun,	  “Target	  Tax	  Evaders,”	  B6.	  618	  Kocieniewskji,	  D.	  (2011).	  “But	  Nobody	  Pays	  That,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  available	  at	  http://topics.nytimes.com/top/features/timestopics/series/but_nobody_pays_that/index.html.	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The	  Foreign	  Account	  Tax	  Compliance	  Act	  (FATCA)	  The	  Foreign	  Account	  Tax	  Compliance	  Act	  (FATCA),	  an	  offset	  provision	  of	  the	  ‘‘Hiring	  Incentives	  to	  Restore	  Employment	  Act’’(HIRE	  Act)	  of	  2010,	  was	  enacted	  by	  the	  US	  Congress	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  combat	  tax	  evasion.	  It	  requires	  foreign	  financial	  Institutions	  (FFIs)	  and	  certain	  non-­‐financial	  entities	  to	  report	  on	  the	  foreign	  assets	  held	  by	  their	  U.S.	  account	  holders.	  These	  include	  financial	  accounts	  held	  by	  U.S.	  taxpayers	  or	  by	  foreign	  entities	  in	  which	  U.S.	  taxpayers	  hold	  a	  substantial	  ownership	  interest.619	  FATCA	  is	  a	  unilateral	  system	  in	  which	  automatic	  information	  reporting	  is	  used	  to	  enforce	  US	  tax	  law	  with	  respect	  to	  US	  residents’	  foreign	  accounts;	  foreign	  governments	  do	  not	  receive	  information	  on	  their	  residents’	  US	  (or	  other	  offshore)	  accounts.620	  While	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  take	  effect	  in	  2013,	  implementation	  of	  the	  final	  regulations	  was	  delayed	  until	  2014,	  due	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  its	  extraterritorial	  reach.621 	  Under	  the	  act,	  FFIs	  are	  encouraged	  to	  either	  directly	  register	  with	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Services	  (IRS)	  to	  comply	  with	  FATCA	  regulations,	  or	  comply	  with	  FATCA	  Intergovernmental	  Agreements	  (IGA)	  treated	  as	  in	  effect	  in	  their	  jurisdictions.622	  FFIs	  that	  do	  not	  both	  register	  and	  agree	  to	  report	  face	  a	  30%	  withholding	  tax	  on	  certain	  U.S.-­‐source	  payments	  made	  to	  them.”623	  The	  HIRE	  Act	  also	  contained	  legislation	  requiring	  U.S.	  persons	  to	  report,	  depending	  on	  the	  value,	  their	  foreign	  financial	  accounts	  and	  foreign	  assets.	  Under	  FATCA,	  U.S.	  taxpayers	  holding	  financial	  assets	  outside	  the	  United	  States	  must	  report	  those	  assets	  to	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Services	  (IRS).	  Penalties	  are	  imposed	  for	  not	  reporting	  these	  financial	  assets.624	  FATCA’s	  other	  provisions	  also	  impose	  tax	  penalties	  on	  understatements	  related	  to	  undisclosed	  foreign	  assets;	  U.S.	  taxpayers	  who	  do	  not	  report	  on	  their	  annual	  returns	  offshore	  account	  assets	  that	  exceed	  $50,000;	  and	  bearer	  bonds	  sold	  to	  offshore	  investors.625	  In	  2011,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  FATCA	  requirements,	  the	  US	  government	  introduced	  another	  measure	  –	  a	  parallel	  disclosure	  requirement	  by	  the	  BSA	  –	  requiring	  a	  United	  States	  person	  that	  has	  a	  financial	  interest	  in	  or	  signature	  authority	  over	  foreign	  financial	  accounts	  to	  file	  the	  FinCEN	  Form	  114,	  Report	  of	  Foreign	  Bank	  and	  Financial	  Accounts	  (FBAR),	  if	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619	  Public	  Law	  111–147,	  18	  March,	  2010.	  	  620	  Dharmapala,	  “Cross-­‐Border	  Tax	  Evasion	  Under	  A	  Unilateral	  FATCA	  Regime,”	  29-­‐37.	  621	  Hirschfeld,	  “FATCA	  Update,”	  688.	  622	  US	  Department	  of	  Treasury,	  “Foreign	  Account	  Tax	  Compliance	  Act	  (FATCA),”	  available	  at	  https://www.treasury.gov/resource-­‐center/tax-­‐policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx.	  623	  US	  IRS,	  “FATCA	  Information	  for	  Foreign	  Financial	  Institutions	  and	  Entities.”	  624	  US	  IRS,	  “Summary	  of	  FATCA	  Reporting	  for	  U.S.	  Taxpayers.”	  625	  Public	  Law	  111–147,	  March18,	  2010,	  Title	  V,	  Subtitle	  A,	  Part	  I,	  Chapter	  4,	  Sections	  1471-­‐1474.	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aggregate	  value	  of	  the	  foreign	  financial	  accounts	  exceeds	  $10,000.626	  The	  deadline	  for	  filing	  this	  form	  has	  been	  extended	  seven	  times.	  The	  current	  due	  date	  for	  filing	  is	  15	  April	  2017.627	  It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  introduction	  of	  the	  FATCA	  was	  received	  with	  resentment	  by	  the	  EU	  financial	  industry.	  One	  concern	  raised	  was	  the	  potential	  burden	  of	  compliance	  for	  European	  financial	  institutions.628	  In	  response,	  the	  US	  Treasury	  issued	  multiple	  notification	  guidelines	  to	  clarification	  to	  process	  of	  reporting,	  to	  minimize	  some	  of	  the	  obligations	  imposed	  on	  foreign	  financial	  institutions	  and,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  to	  postpone	  the	  date	  when	  penalties	  would	  apply.629	  Another	  controversy	  FATCA	  caused	  was	  its	  incompatibility	  and	  noncompliance	  with	  other	  countries’	  provisions	  on	  banking	  secrecy	  and	  data	  protection	  laws.630	  Canadian	  officials	  noted,	  for	  instance,	  that:	  “The	  flow	  of	  information	  from	  Canadian	  financial	  institutions	  directly	  to	  the	  IRS	  that	  is	  required	  by	  FATCA	  would	  violate	  a	  number	  of	  laws	  in	  Canada.”631	  The	  common	  perception	  that	  “[n]ational	  sovereignty	  and	  foreign	  laws	  are	  completely	  disregarded	  under	  the	  FATCA	  regime,”	  has	  been	  echoed	  by	  multiple	  sources.632	  	  
 Another	  US	  measure	  introduced	  in	  2013	  was	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice’s	  Swiss	  Bank	  Program,	  which	  targeted	  the	  entire	  banking	  sector	  of	  Switzerland	  for	  disclose	  of	  US	  taxpayers	  who	  evade	  taxes.	  Under	  this	  program,	  though	  the	  banks	  don’t	  have	  to	  disclose	  names	  of	  US	  customers,	  they	  must	  turn	  over	  sufficient	  information	  about	  their	  accounts	  “to	  allow	  the	  US	  government	  to	  make	  a	  treaty	  request	  for	  the	  customers’	  names.”	  The	  DOJ	  announced	  that	  106	  of	  approximately	  300	  Swiss	  banks	  have	  chosen	  to	  enter	  the	  program.633	  The	  Department	  of	  Justice	  expects	  to	  collect	  more	  than	  US$1.36	  billion	  from	  80	  Swiss	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  firms	  that	  have	  acknowledged	  assisting	  US	  taxpayers	  with	  undeclared	  accounts.634	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  31	  CFR	  103.24.	  US	  DOT/FinCEN,	  “BSA	  Electronic	  Filing	  Requirements	  For	  Report	  of	  Foreign	  Bank	  and	  Financial	  Accounts	  (FinCEN	  Form114).”	  627	  US	  DOT/FinCEN,	  “Notice	  2015-­‐1	  FBAR	  Filing	  Requirements	  –	  Extending	  Filing	  Date	  Related	  to	  Notice	  2014-­‐1.”	  US	  IRS,	  “Current	  FBAR	  Guidelines,”	  Report	  of	  Foreign	  Bank	  and	  Financial	  Accounts	  (FBAR).	  628	  Uncredited	  in	  Structured	  Products	  ,	  “EU	  Adds	  Voice	  to	  Protests	  Against	  US	  FATCA	  Tax.”	  629	  US	  IRS,	  “FATCA	  -­‐-­‐	  Regulations	  and	  Other	  Guidance.”	  630	  Brodzka,	  “FATCA	  from	  the	  European	  Union	  Perspective,”	  7-­‐13.	  631	  Christians	  and	  Cockfield,	  “Submission	  to	  Finance	  Department	  on	  Implementation	  of	  FATCA	  in	  Canada,”	  1.	  632	  Grant,	  “It	  Is	  About	  Control:	  Progressivism,	  FATCA	  and	  Global	  Law,”	  E91.	  	  633	  Nanavati	  and	  Thornton,	  “DOJ	  and	  IRS	  Use	  ‘Carrot	  'N	  Stick’	  to	  Enforce	  Global	  Tax	  Laws,”	  7.	  	  Letzing,	  “Swiss	  Banks	  Use	  Carrot	  and	  Stick	  in	  Addressing	  Hidden	  Accounts.”	  634	  Uncredited	  in	  The	  Economist,	  “Tackling	  Tax	  Evasion,”,	  62-­‐63.	  	  Kerzner	  and	  Chodikoff,	  International	  Tax	  Evasion	  in	  the	  Global	  Information	  Age,	  198-­‐200.	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OECD:	  Common	  Reporting	  Standards	  (CRS)	  US	  implementation	  of	  the	  much-­‐criticized	  FATCA	  regime	  has	  pushed	  the	  Automatic	  Exchange	  to	  the	  center	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  stage.635	  In	  2013,	  the	  G20	  announced	  its	  commitment	  to	  seeing	  Automatic	  Exchange	  become	  the	  new	  global	  standard	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015.636	  In	  2014,	  drawing	  extensively	  on	  the	  intergovernmental	  approach	  to	  implement	  FATCA,	  the	  OECD	  and	  G20	  countries	  developed	  the	  Common	  Reporting	  Standards	  (CRS),	  that	  represents	  an	  international	  consensus	  on	  Automatic	  Exchange	  of	  financial	  account	  information	  for	  tax	  purposes	  on	  a	  reciprocal	  basis.	  The	  goal	  of	  CRS	  is	  to	  allow	  tax	  authorities	  to	  obtain	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  financial	  assets	  held	  abroad	  by	  their	  residents.	  Despite	  some	  similarities	  with	  FATCA,	  CRS	  requires	  a	  broader	  scope	  for	  reporting,	  to	  cover:	  
• “…	  different	  types	  of	  investment	  income	  including	  interest,	  dividends	  and	  similar	  types	  of	  income;	  and	  also	  address	  situations	  where	  a	  taxpayer	  seeks	  to	  hide	  capital	  that	  itself	  represents	  income	  or	  assets	  on	  which	  tax	  has	  been	  evaded	  (e.g.	  by	  requiring	  information	  on	  account	  balances).”	  
• “…	  shell	  companies,	  trusts	  or	  similar	  arrangements,	  including	  taxable	  entities	  to	  cover	  situations	  where	  a	  taxpayer	  seeks	  to	  hide	  the	  principal	  but	  is	  willing	  to	  pay	  tax	  on	  the	  income.”	  
• “…	  not	  only	  banks	  but	  also	  other	  financial	  institutions	  such	  as	  brokers,	  certain	  collective	  investment	  vehicles,	  and	  certain	  insurance	  companies.”637	  In	  2015,	  53	  jurisdictions	  signed	  an	  agreement	  to	  automatically	  exchange	  information	  based	  on	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Administrative	  Assistance	  in	  Tax	  Matters.638	  By	  January	  2017,	  the	  list	  of	  signatories	  grew	  to	  108.639	  	  	  The	  CRS	  were	  also	  a	  result	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Global	  Forum	  on	  Transparency	  and	  Exchange	  of	  Information	  for	  Tax	  Purposes	  (Global	  Forum).	  Established	  in	  the	  early	  2000	  under	  the	  OECD	  umbrella,	  its	  role	  was	  to	  ensure	  implementation	  of	  internationally	  agreed	  standards	  of	  transparency	  and	  exchange	  of	  information	  in	  the	  tax	  area.	  Annually,	  it	  conducts	  in-­‐depth	  peer	  reviews	  among	  its	  139	  members	  to	  assess	  their	  level	  of	  compliance	  with	  the	  CRS.640	  	  	  
The	  UK	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill	  2016-­‐2017	  The	  effort	  to	  fight	  tax	  evasion	  took	  a	  shaper	  turn	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill,	  an	  amendment	  the	  Proceeds	  of	  Crime	  Act	  2002,	  by	  the	  UK	  Government	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635	  Kerzner	  and	  Chodikoff,	  International	  Tax	  Evasion	  in	  the	  Global	  Information	  Age,	  287.	  636	  G20,	  “G20	  Meeting	  of	  Finance	  Ministers	  and	  Central	  Bank	  Governors,”.	  5-­‐6;	  Editorial	  Board	  in	  New	  York	  Times,	  “The	  Group	  Of	  20	  Tackles	  Tax	  Avoidance.”	  637	  OECD,	  “Standard	  for	  Automatic	  Exchange	  of	  Financial	  Account	  Information	  in	  Tax	  Matters,”	  9-­‐12.	  638	  The	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Administrative	  Assistance	  in	  Tax	  Matters	  ("the	  Convention")	  was	  developed	  jointly	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  in	  1988	  and	  amended	  by	  Protocol	  in	  2010.	  OECD,	  “The	  Multilateral	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Administrative	  Assistance	  in	  Tax	  Matters:	  Amended	  by	  the	  2010	  Protocol,”	  Chapter	  III,	  Section	  I,	  Article	  6,	  14.	  	  639	  OECD	  and	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  “Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Administrative	  Assistance	  in	  Tax	  Matters.”	  640	  OECD,	  “Tax	  Transparency	  2016:	  Report	  on	  Progress,”	  9.	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14	  October	  2016.	  In	  addition	  to	  changes	  of	  certain	  aspects	  on	  the	  AML/CFT	  framework,	  this	  draft	  legislation	  proposes	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  offence	  of	  failing	  to	  prevent	  the	  facilitation	  of	  tax	  evasion.	  In	  its	  current	  draft,	  criminal	  facilitation	  constitutes	  either	  a	  UK	  tax	  evasion	  offence	  or	  an	  equivalent	  offence	  under	  foreign	  law.	  641	  Both	  offences	  have	  extraterritorial	  application,	  though	  the	  foreign	  tax	  evasion	  requires	  for	  the	  entity	  or	  the	  facilitator	  to	  have	  links	  with	  the	  UK.642	  The	  bill	  also	  introduces	  the	  “Unexplained	  Wealth	  Order,”	  which	  requires	  individuals	  to	  explain	  the	  origin	  of	  assets	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  disproportionate	  to	  their	  known	  income.	  This	  information	  will	  be	  made	  available	  for	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  to	  use	  against	  any	  person	  suspected	  of	  links	  to	  serious	  crime	  and	  overseas	  politically	  exposed	  persons.	  643	  Though	  legal	  professionals	  suggest	  “the	  main	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  offences	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  compliance-­‐related,”	  experts	  at	  PWC	  warn	  “the	  criminal	  acts	  of	  individual	  employees	  could	  result	  in	  criminal	  liability	  and	  significant	  financial	  penalties	  for	  the	  company."644 	  	  
Stronger	  Powers	  For	  Tax	  Authorities	  Recently,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  noticeable	  push	  to	  expand	  the	  role	  of	  tax	  authorities	  beyond	  detection	  of	  tax	  evasion	  and	  toward	  identification	  of	  and	  reporting	  other	  suspected	  serious	  crimes	  such	  as	  bribery,	  corruption,	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorism	  financing.	  The	  2015	  OECD	  Report	  highlights	  potential	  benefits	  of	  sharing	  STRs	  with	  tax	  authorities,	  pointing	  out	  that	  some	  jurisdictions	  successfully	  use	  STRs	  for	  civil	  purposes	  already,	  and	  concluding	  that	  tax	  administrations	  should	  have	  the	  fullest	  possible	  access	  to	  the	  STRs	  received	  by	  the	  FIU	  in	  their	  jurisdiction	  to	  tackle	  financial	  crime	  with	  maximum	  effectiveness.	  The	  report	  concludes:	  “There	  are	  potentially	  significant	  financial	  and	  efficiency	  gains	  to	  be	  realised	  by	  both	  tax	  administrations	  and	  money	  laundering	  authorities	  from	  increasing	  their	  levels	  of	  co-­‐operation,	  information	  sharing	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  in	  taking	  a	  joint	  approach	  to	  analyzing	  and	  utilizing	  STRs.”645	  	  
	  
Relevance	  to	  the	  UAE	  In	  2010,	  the	  UAE	  joined	  the	  Global	  Forum	  on	  Transparency	  and	  Exchange	  of	  Information	  for	  Tax	  Purposes,	  following	  the	  country’s	  decision	  on	  implementation	  of	  the	  G20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641	  UK	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill	  [As	  Amended	  in	  Public	  Bill	  Committee]	  (The	  Bill)	  (22	  November,	  2016),	  Part	  3:	  Corporate	  Offences	  of	  Failure	  to	  Prevent	  Facilitation	  of	  the	  Tax	  Evasion,	  Section	  40(4)	  and	  Section	  41(1),	  House	  of	  Commons,	  available	  at	  https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-­‐2017/0097/17097.pdf.	  642	  UK	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill,	  Part	  3,	  Section	  41(2).	  643	  UK	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill,	  Chapter	  1.	  	  644	  Pickworth,	  Carroll,	  and	  Anderson,	  “Follow	  the	  Money	  –	  The	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill”;	  Morse,	  “PwC	  Comments	  on	  the	  
Implications	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill	  -­‐	  Corporate	  Offences	  of	  Failure	  to	  Prevent	  Facilitation	  of	  Tax	  Evasion.”	  	  645	  OECD,	  “Improving	  Co-­‐Operation	  Between	  Tax	  and	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Authorities,”	  31.	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resolutions	  for	  the	  exchange	  of	  information	  for	  tax	  purposes.	  In	  2012,	  the	  UAE	  Cabinet	  instructed	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  to	  gather	  information	  on	  natural	  or	  legal	  persons,	  including	  free	  zones,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  tax	  information	  exchange.	  The	  same	  year,	  the	  UAE	  signed	  a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MoU)	  with	  the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  Global	  Forum	  on	  Transparency	  and	  Exchange	  of	  Information	  for	  Tax	  Purposes.	  Starting	  in	  2013	  two	  workshops	  were	  conducted	  on	  frameworks	  for	  standards	  of	  transparency	  and	  exchange	  of	  information	  for	  tax	  purposes	  in	  the	  MENA	  region.646	  Despite	  the	  country’s	  verbal	  commitment	  to	  transparency	  and	  exchange	  of	  information,	  the	  2016	  Global	  Forum	  Peer	  Review	  indicated:	  “the	  UAE	  has	  not	  exchanged	  information	  in	  every	  case	  where	  it	  was	  requested,	  in	  the	  Peer	  Review	  Report.”	  The	  country’s	  was	  rated	  as	  Partially	  
Compliant	  with	  the	  international	  standard.	  The	  UAE’s	  delays	  on	  establishing	  an	  EOI	  unit	  created	  a	  backlog	  of	  requests	  on	  an	  urgent	  basis,	  as	  did	  the	  country’	  difficulties	  in	  setting	  an	  EOI	  framework.	  Issues	  related	  to	  poor	  communication	  were	  also	  raised:	  “The	  UAE’s	  EOI	  partners	  have	  reported	  difficulties	  in	  communicating	  with	  the	  UAE	  Competent	  Authority.	  Status	  updates	  were	  never	  sent,	  and	  even	  where	  partial	  responses	  were	  sent	  no	  explanation	  was	  offered	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  missing	  information.”	  Another	  identified	  shortcoming	  was	  dispersion	  of	  information	  among	  local	  authorities.	  Additionally,	  the	  UAE	  was	  faulted	  for	  delaying	  signing	  TIEAs	  with	  jurisdictions	  interested	  in	  entering	  into	  information	  exchange	  arrangements.647	  The	  FATF	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  of	  2008	  earlier	  raised	  similar	  criticism	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  record-­‐keeping	  fragmentation	  and	  poor	  cooperation.	  	  	  In	  2015,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UAE	  signed	  a	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  to	  improve	  international	  tax	  compliance	  and	  implement	  FATCA.	  The	  latter	  requires	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  to	  obtain	  information	  on	  all	  “U.S.	  Reportable	  Accounts”	  and	  to	  exchange	  this	  information	  annually	  with	  the	  United	  States	  on	  an	  automatic	  basis.648	  The	  bilateral	  agreement	  between	  the	  US	  government	  and	  the	  UAE	  has	  been	  in	  force	  since	  February	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
646	  UAE	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  “UAE	  Joins	  Membership	  of	  the	  Global	  Forum	  on	  Transparency	  and	  Exchange	  of	  Information.”	  647	  OECD,	  “Global	  Forum	  on	  Transparency	  and	  Exchange	  of	  Information	  for	  Tax	  Purposes	  Peer	  Reviews:	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  2016,	  Phase	  2:	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Standard	  in	  Practice,”	  7-­‐9.	  12.	  648	  “The	  term	  ‘U.S.	  Reportable	  Account’	  means	  a	  Financial	  Account	  maintained	  by	  a	  Reporting	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Financial	  Institution	  and	  held	  by	  one	  or	  more	  Specified	  U.S.	  Persons	  or	  by	  a	  Non-­‐U.S.	  Entity	  with	  one	  or	  more	  Controlling	  Persons	  that	  is	  a	  Specified	  U.S.	  Person.”	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  America	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  to	  Improve	  International	  Tax	  Compliance	  and	  to	  Implement	  FATCA,”	  Article	  2(1),	  5.	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2016.649	  Based	  on	  the	  agreement,	  all	  financial	  institutions	  located	  within	  the	  UAE	  were	  required	  to	  register	  with	  the	  IRS	  by	  2017.	  By	  that	  date,	  the	  UAE	  is	  required	  to	  obtain	  information	  on	  the	  “US	  Reportable	  Accounts”	  from	  the	  reporting	  financial	  institutions.	  “In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  UAE	  will	  implement	  local	  laws	  to	  impose	  reporting	  obligations	  on	  UAE	  Financial	  Institutions	  and	  branches	  of	  non	  UAE	  financial	  institutions	  resident	  in	  the	  UAE.”650	  The	  local	  press	  publicized	  the	  FATCA	  Agreement	  in	  the	  usual	  optimistic	  way.	  For	  example:	  in	  Gulf	  News:	  “Saeed	  Al	  Hamiz,	  assistant	  governor	  for	  banking	  supervision	  at	  the	  UAE’s	  Central	  Bank,	  said	  that	  there	  were	  positive	  results	  regarding	  the	  banks’	  readiness	  to	  send	  information	  to	  the	  IRS.”651	  According	  to	  the	  press,	  the	  local	  financial	  institutions	  have	  started	  to	  warn	  their	  customers	  about	  new	  international	  tax	  compliance	  measures,	  and	  with	  the	  usual	  optimistic	  forecast	  for	  implementation	  and	  compliance.	  652	  With	  the	  large	  number	  of	  US	  persons	  living	  in	  the	  UAE,	  FATCA	  compliance	  is	  important	  to	  both	  UAE	  financial	  institutions	  and	  to	  US	  individuals	  and	  entities	  holding	  accounts	  with	  such	  institutions.653	  However,	  the	  country’s	  reporting	  authorities	  and	  FFIs	  have	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  systems	  are	  set	  to	  collect	  and	  share	  the	  necessary	  information	  in	  timely	  matter	  to	  avoid	  the	  earlier	  criticism	  posed	  by	  the	  Global	  Forum	  Peer	  Review.	  	  
The	  Current	  (2012)	  Forty	  Recommendations	  In	  2012,	  the	  FATF	  reviewed	  and	  updated	  its	  recommendations,	  doing	  so	  in	  collaboration	  with	  FATF-­‐Style	  Regional	  Bodies	  (FSRBs),	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  128-­‐page	  document	  that	  included	  not	  only	  a	  revised	  set	  of	  Forth	  Recommendations,	  but	  also	  an	  extensive	  set	  of	  Interpretive	  Notes.	  They	  represent,	  as	  of	  this	  writing,	  the	  definitive	  international	  initiative	  against	  transnational	  money	  laundering.	  The	  recommendations	  are	  broken	  into	  six	  sections,	  headed	  A	  through	  G,	  some	  of	  which	  contain	  subsections.	  The	  main	  sections	  are:	  A. AML/CFT	  Policies	  and	  Coordination	  B. Money	  Laundering	  and	  Confiscation	  C. Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Financing	  of	  Proliferation	  D. Preventive	  Measures	  E. Transparency	  and	  Beneficial	  Ownership	  of	  Legal	  Persons	  and	  Arrangements	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649	  US	  DOT/UAE,	  “Memorandum	  of	  Understanding,	  17	  June	  2015”	  ;	  US	  DOT/UAE,	  “Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  to	  Improve	  International	  Tax	  Compliance	  and	  to	  Implement	  FATCA”;	  UAE	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  “Tax	  Compliance.”.	  	  650	  UAE	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  “Guidance	  Notes	  on	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Agreement	  between	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  and	  the	  United	  States,”	  8.	  651	  Dias,	  “UAE	  Banks	  to	  Comply	  with	  FTCA	  Before	  Deadline.”	  652	  Kassem,	  “UAE	  Banks	  Warn	  Customers	  on	  New	  International	  Tax	  Compliance	  Measures”;	  Maceda,	  “UAE	  Banks	  Notify	  Expats	  on	  Anti-­‐Tax	  Evasion	  Policy”;	  Dias,	  “UAE	  Banks	  to	  Comply	  with	  FTCA	  Before	  Deadline.”	  653	  In	  2015,	  there	  were	  about	  50,000	  US	  citizens	  living	  in	  the	  UAE	  (Snoj,	  “UAE	  Population	  –	  By	  Nationality.”	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F. Powers	  and	  Responsibilities	  of	  Competent	  Authorities	  and	  Other	  Institutional	  Measures	  G. International	  Cooperation	  	  Besides	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  previous	  Forty-­‐plus-­‐Nine	  Recommendations,	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  report	  noted	  that	  the	  “revisions	  address	  new	  and	  emerging	  threats,	  clarify	  and	  strengthen	  many	  of	  the	  existing	  obligations,	  while	  maintaining	  the	  necessary	  stability	  and	  rigour	  in	  the	  Recommendations.	  The	  FATF	  Standards	  have	  also	  been	  revised	  to	  strengthen	  the	  requirements	  for	  higher	  risk	  situations,	  and	  to	  allow	  countries	  to	  take	  a	  more	  focused	  approach	  in	  areas	  where	  high	  risks	  remain	  or	  implementation	  could	  be	  enhanced.”	  This	  “risk-­‐based	  approach,”	  the	  authors	  continued,	  “allows	  countries,	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  FATF	  requirements,	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  flexible	  set	  of	  measures,	  in	  order	  to	  target	  their	  resources	  more	  effectively	  and	  apply	  preventive	  measures	  that	  are	  commensurate	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  risks,	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  their	  efforts	  in	  the	  most	  effective	  way.”654	  	  
AML/CFT	  Policies	  and	  Coordination	  (Recommendations	  1	  and	  2)	  This	  risk-­‐based	  element	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  revised	  Recommendation	  1,	  in	  which	  member	  countries	  are	  advised	  to	  assess	  their	  own	  AML/CFT	  risks,	  and	  take	  action	  by	  “designation	  and	  authority	  or	  mechanism	  to	  coordinate	  actions	  to	  assess	  risks,	  and	  apply	  resources,	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  the	  risks	  are	  mitigated	  effectively.”	  Besides	  creating	  or	  designating	  this	  competent	  authority,	  member	  countries	  should	  require	  their	  financial	  institutions	  and	  relevant	  professions	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  presumably	  within	  their	  own	  industries.	  Recommendation	  2	  announces	  the	  expectation	  that	  the	  aforementioned	  authorities	  will	  establish	  and	  carry	  out	  relevant	  policies;	  member	  countries	  are	  also	  instructed	  to	  require	  their	  FIU,	  along	  with	  law	  enforcement	  and	  other	  relevant	  bodies,	  to	  have	  appropriate	  AML/CFT	  policies	  in	  place,	  and	  to	  ensure	  coordination	  between	  them.655	  	  
Money	  Laundering	  and	  Confiscation	  (Recommendations	  3-­‐4)	  Recommendation	  3	  requires	  that	  money	  laundering	  be	  criminalized	  along	  Vienna	  Convention	  and	  Palermo	  Convention	  standards,	  “with	  a	  view	  to	  including	  the	  widest	  range	  of	  predicate	  offences.”	  The	  latter	  (according	  to	  the	  interpretive	  note)	  “should,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  include	  a	  range	  of	  offences	  within	  each	  of	  the	  designated	  categories	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  8.	  655	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  11.	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offences.	  The	  offence	  of	  money	  laundering	  should	  extend	  to	  any	  type	  of	  property,	  regardless	  of	  its	  value,	  that	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  represents	  the	  proceeds	  of	  crime.	  When	  proving	  that	  property	  is	  the	  proceeds	  of	  crime,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  necessary	  that	  a	  person	  be	  convicted	  of	  a	  predicate	  offence.”656	  Recommendation	  4	  requires	  countries	  to	  apply	  the	  same	  conventions’	  standards	  to	  allow	  the	  confiscation	  and	  seizure	  of	  property	  and	  proceeds	  involved	  with	  AML/CFT	  law	  enforcement	  charges,	  “without	  prejudicing	  the	  rights	  of	  bona	  fide	  third	  parties.”	  Subsequent	  paragraphs	  require	  the	  introduction	  of	  relevant	  related	  authority,	  and	  include	  the	  adoption	  of	  laws	  that	  allow	  ”non-­‐conviction	  based	  confiscation,”	  and	  place	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  alleged	  offender	  to	  prove	  proceeds’	  lawful	  origin.657	  	  
Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Financing	  of	  Proliferation	  (Recommendations	  5-­‐8)	  Recommendations	  5	  through	  8	  criminalize	  terrorist	  financing	  acts,	  organizations,	  and	  individual	  terrorists;	  require	  member	  states	  to	  freeze	  assets	  of	  persons	  or	  entities	  designated	  by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  as	  terrorists	  or	  involved	  with	  the	  proliferation	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction;	  and	  instruct	  countries	  to	  review	  their	  laws	  so	  that	  charities	  and	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  cannot	  be	  misused	  for	  purposes	  related	  to	  terrorism.	  658	  	  
Preventive	  Measures	  (Recommendations	  9-­‐23)	  Recommendation	  9,	  entitled	  “Financial	  institution	  secrecy	  laws,”	  states	  only	  that:	  Countries	  should	  ensure	  that	  financial	  institution	  secrecy	  laws	  do	  not	  inhibit	  implementation	  of	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations.”659	  It	  has	  no	  interpretive	  notes.	  Recommendation	  10	  is	  regarding	  “Customer	  due	  diligence.”	  It	  bars	  financial	  institutions	  “from	  keeping	  anonymous	  accounts	  or	  accounts	  in	  obviously	  fictitious	  names”;	  requires	  institutions	  to	  undertake	  CDD	  measures	  when	  establishing	  accounts,	  a	  suspicion	  emerges	  about	  financing,	  or	  when	  there	  are	  doubts	  about	  a	  customer’s	  identity	  data.	  CDD	  requirements	  also	  kick	  in	  when	  carrying	  out	  transactions	  above	  USD/EUR	  15,000,	  and	  in	  a	  range	  of	  circumstances	  regarding	  wire	  transfers	  specified	  in	  the	  Interpretive	  Note	  to	  Recommendation	  16.660	  The	  recommendation	  also	  advises	  institutions	  to	  take	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  12,	  34.	  	  657	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  12.	  658	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  13.	  659	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  14.	  660	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  14,	  71-­‐76.	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risk-­‐based	  approach	  to	  its	  implementation.	  The	  last	  recommendation	  in	  this	  section,	  11	  “Record-­‐keeping,”	  requires	  financial	  institutions	  to	  maintain	  records	  on	  accounts	  and	  transactions	  for	  five	  years,	  and	  to	  make	  them	  “available	  to	  domestic	  competent	  authorities	  upon	  appropriate	  authority.”	  661	  	  A	  subsection	  entitled	  “Additional	  Measures	  for	  Specific	  Customers	  and	  Activities”	  (Recommendations	  12-­‐16)	  addresses	  special	  cases	  involving	  diligence	  toward	  Politically	  Exposed	  Persons	  (PEPs),	  correspondent	  banking,	  money-­‐or-­‐value	  transfer	  services	  (such	  as	  hawala),	  and	  wire	  transfers.	  Recommendation	  15	  broadly	  addresses	  new	  technologies,	  advising	  member	  states	  and	  their	  institutions	  to	  assess	  money-­‐laundering	  risks	  arising	  from	  ongoing	  technology	  changes,	  whether	  they	  involve	  new	  delivery	  systems	  or	  a	  modification	  to	  existing	  ones.	  662	  	  The	  subsection	  “Reliance,	  Controls	  and	  Financial	  Groups”	  (Recommendations	  17-­‐19)	  sets	  forth	  CDD	  requirements	  on	  third	  parties	  involved	  in	  banking	  transactions,	  such	  as	  foreign	  branches	  and	  subsidiaries,	  and	  requiring	  “enhanced	  due	  diligence”	  in	  “higher-­‐risk	  countries”	  as	  designated	  by	  the	  FATF.	  663	  Recommendations	  20	  and	  21	  are	  grouped	  under	  the	  subheading	  “Reporting	  of	  Suspicious	  Transactions,”	  and	  establish	  requirements	  of	  reporting	  to	  the	  relevant	  FIU	  (Financial	  Intelligence	  Unit),	  while	  including	  “safe	  harbor”	  protection	  for	  those	  individuals	  and	  institutions	  doing	  so.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Recommendation	  21(b)	  holds	  that	  a	  member	  country’s	  law	  should	  prohibit	  any	  employee	  or	  official	  from	  disclosing	  the	  reporting	  of	  a	  suspicious	  transaction	  to	  the	  FIU.664	  	  The	  last	  two	  recommendations	  in	  this	  section,	  22	  and	  23,	  concern	  DNFBPs	  (Designated	  Non-­‐Financial	  Businesses	  and	  Professions.”	  The	  first	  recommendation	  extends	  DNFBP	  status	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  (generally	  involving	  transaction	  size)	  to	  casinos,	  real	  estate	  agents,	  dealers	  in	  jewelry	  and	  precious	  metals,	  lawyers,	  and	  trust	  and	  company	  service	  providers.665	  The	  latter	  recommendation	  spells	  out	  circumstances	  under	  which	  those	  DNFBPs	  should	  be	  required	  to	  report	  certain	  transactions	  as	  suspicious.666	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
661	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  15.	  662	  FATF,”	  Recommendations”	  (2012),	  16-­‐17.	  663	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  18-­‐19.	  664	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  19.	  665	  Trust	  and	  company	  service	  providers	  are	  those	  persons	  or	  businesses	  not	  covered	  by	  other	  recommendations,	  “which	  as	  a	  business,	  provide	  any	  of	  the	  following	  services	  to	  third	  parties: acting	  as	  a	  formation	  agent	  of	  legal	  persons;	  acting	  as	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Transparency	  and	  Beneficial	  Ownership	  of	  Legal	  Persons	  and	  Arrangements	  
(Recommendations	  24-­‐25)	  These	  two	  recommendations	  require	  the	  prevention	  of	  “the	  misuse	  of	  legal	  persons	  for	  money	  laundering	  or	  terrorist	  financing,”	  and	  the	  same	  regarding	  legal	  arrangements.	  667	  	  
Powers	  and	  Responsibilities	  of	  Competent	  Authorities	  and	  Other	  Institutional	  Measures	  
(Recommendations	  26-­‐35)	  This	  section	  is	  broken	  down	  into	  four	  subsections.	  The	  first,	  “Regulation	  and	  Supervision”	  (Recommendations	  26	  and	  27)	  holds	  member	  countries	  to	  ensure	  they	  have	  adequate	  regulation	  in	  place	  along	  FATF	  guidelines;	  prohibit	  shell	  banks;	  require	  licensing/registration	  of	  financial	  institutions;	  give	  supervising	  and	  regulatory	  bodies	  adequate	  authority	  to	  acquire	  relevant	  data	  from	  financial	  institutions;	  and	  hold	  DNFBPs	  to	  adequate	  standards	  of	  registration	  and	  supervision.668	  The	  second	  section	  is	  entitled	  “Operational	  and	  Law	  Enforcement”	  (Recommendations	  29-­‐32).	  Its	  first	  (29)	  recommendation	  requires	  establishment	  of	  an	  FIU	  in	  each	  country.	  Its	  second	  (30	  requires	  that	  law	  enforcement	  has	  the	  appropriate	  authority	  to	  investigate	  both	  money	  laundering	  and	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  predicate	  offenses,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  freeze	  and	  seize	  property	  that	  may	  become	  judicially	  recognized	  as	  criminal	  proceeds.	  Also,	  “[C]ountries	  should	  ensure	  that,	  when	  necessary,	  cooperative	  investigations	  with	  appropriate	  competent	  authorities	  in	  other	  countries	  take	  place.”	  669	  Recommendation	  31	  mandates	  that	  competent	  authorities	  “should	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  access	  to	  all	  necessary	  documents	  and	  information	  for	  use	  in	  those	  investigations,	  and	  in	  prosecutions	  and	  related	  actions.	  This	  should	  include	  powers	  to	  use	  compulsory	  measures….”	  Recommendation	  32,	  on	  Cash	  Couriers,	  remains	  largely	  as	  it	  appeared	  as	  the	  ninth	  Special	  Recommendation.	  670	  Four	  pages	  of	  corresponding	  Interpretive	  Notes	  discuss,	  among	  other	  things,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (or	  arranging	  for	  another	  person	  to	  act	  as)	  a	  director	  or	  secretary	  of	  a	  company,	  a	  partner	  of	  a	  partnership,	  or	  a	  similar	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  legal	  persons;	  providing	  a	  registered	  office;	  business	  address	  or	  accommodation,	  correspondence	  or	  administrative	  address	  for	  a	  company,	  a	  partnership	  or	  any	  other	  legal	  person	  or	  arrangement;	  acting	  as	  (or	  arranging	  for	  another	  person	  to	  act	  as)	  a	  trustee	  of	  an	  express	  trust	  or	  performing	  the	  equivalent	  function	  for	  another	  form	  of	  legal	  arrangement;	  acting	  as	  (or	  arranging	  for	  another	  person	  to	  act	  as)	  a	  nominee	  shareholder	  for	  another	  person.”	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),113-­‐114. 666	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  19-­‐21.	  667	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  22.	  668	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  23.	  669	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  24-­‐25.	  670	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  25.	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declaration/disclosure	  systems	  for	  travellers,	  and	  the	  trafficking	  of	  precious	  metals	  and	  stones;	  a	  mini-­‐glossary	  also	  introduces	  several	  specific	  legal	  definitions.671	  Recommendations	  33	  and	  34	  are	  grouped	  together	  under	  the	  subheading	  “General	  Requirements.”	  Respectively,	  they	  require	  countries	  to	  “maintain	  comprehensive	  statistics	  on	  matters	  relevant	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  of	  their	  AML/CT	  systems”;	  and	  “establish	  guidelines,	  and	  provide	  feedback”	  to	  help	  financial	  institutions	  and	  DNFBPs	  “in	  applying	  national	  measures	  to	  combat	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  in	  detecting	  and	  reporting	  suspicious	  transactions.”	  The	  final	  recommendation	  in	  this	  section,	  35	  (“Sanctions”)	  is	  placed	  in	  a	  subsection	  of	  the	  same	  name	  and	  requires	  countries	  to	  “ensure	  that	  there	  is	  a	  range	  of	  effective,	  proportionate	  and	  dissuasive	  sanctions”	  in	  place	  to	  deal	  with	  violations.	  None	  of	  these	  three	  recommendations	  has	  any	  Interpretive	  Notes	  attached	  to	  it.672	  	  
International	  Cooperation	  (Recommendations	  36-­‐40)	  The	  last	  four	  recommendations	  are	  grouped	  together	  under	  the	  subheading	  “International	  Cooperation,”	  and	  reflect	  a	  challenging	  part	  of	  the	  AML/CFT	  process.	  Recommendation	  36	  requires	  countries	  to	  join	  and	  implement	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  and	  several	  other	  international	  treaties;	  it	  encourages	  ratification	  of	  several	  other	  such	  conventions,	  including	  the	  2001	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  on	  Cybercrime,	  when	  applicable.	  Recommendation	  37	  on	  “Mutual	  Legal	  Assistance”	  requires	  countries	  to	  “have	  an	  adequate	  legal	  basis	  for	  providing	  assistance	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	  should	  have	  in	  place	  treaties,	  arrangements	  or	  other	  mechanisms	  to	  enhance	  cooperation.”	  Members	  are	  expected	  to,	  among	  other	  things,	  refrain	  from	  restricting	  mutual	  legal	  assistance;	  be	  able	  to	  prioritize	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  requests;	  and	  keep	  such	  requests	  confidential	  (i.e.,	  to	  avoid	  alerting	  a	  suspect).	  The	  next	  two	  recommendations	  (38-­‐39)	  cover	  freezing/confiscation	  and	  extradition,	  while	  the	  last	  (40	  –	  “Other	  forms	  of	  international	  cooperation”)	  notes	  among	  other	  things	  that	  Memoranda	  of	  Understanding	  (MOU)	  may	  be	  used	  to	  facilitate	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  cooperation	  between	  competent	  authorities.	  673	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  99-­‐102.	  672	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  26.	  673	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  27-­‐30.	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Conclusion	  	  The	  history	  of	  AML	  law	  shows	  it	  beginning	  with	  regulatory	  efforts	  such	  as	  the	  BSA,	  which,	  though	  domestic,	  also	  attempted	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  international	  dimension	  of	  the	  problem.	  That	  this	  was	  seen	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  BSA	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  subsequent	  US-­‐Swiss	  MLAT,	  itself	  the	  forerunner	  of	  the	  Swiss	  BSA-­‐like	  “Agreement	  on	  the	  Observance	  of	  Care.”	  Over	  time,	  domestic	  regulations	  tightened	  into	  criminal	  statutes	  with	  “extraterritorial	  reach”	  such	  as	  the	  US	  1986	  Money	  Laundering	  Control	  Act	  (to	  mention	  only	  one	  example);	  and	  soon	  morphed	  into	  major	  international	  efforts	  such	  as	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  and	  the	  subsequent	  FATF	  recommendations	  series.	  While	  concern	  at	  drug	  trafficking	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  many	  of	  these	  efforts,	  post-­‐9/11	  AML	  legislative	  efforts	  have	  tended	  to	  link	  the	  practice	  to	  combating	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  (CFT)	  and	  weapons	  proliferation.	  This	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  2012	  version	  of	  the	  FATF	  Forty	  Recommendations,	  which	  is	  currently	  the	  principal	  international	  legislative	  response	  to	  the	  problem.	  By	  2010	  tax	  evasion	  as	  a	  criminal	  offence	  had	  become	  a	  top	  priority	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  money	  laundering	  and	  corruption.	  Several	  legislative	  initiatives,	  requiring	  transparency	  and	  exchange	  of	  information	  for	  tax	  purposes	  among	  jurisdiction,	  were	  introduced,	  some	  raising	  controversies.	  The	  UK	  Criminal	  Finance	  Bill,	  the	  latest	  development	  in	  this	  scenario,	  though	  still	  evolving	  before	  its	  final	  signing,	  has	  taken	  a	  new	  turn	  by	  introducing	  criminal	  liability	  for	  the	  facilitation	  of	  tax	  evasion.	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5:	  Economic	  Implications	  of	  Transnational	  
Money	  Laundering	  on	  the	  UAE	  and	  the	  World	  
at	  Large	  	  In	  his	  book,	  the	  title	  of	  which	  can	  be	  translated	  as	  Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  
Money	  Laundering,	  Emirati	  author	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla	  listed	  four	  factors	  he	  felt	  made	  the	  UAE	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  this	  activity:	  high	  income;	  geographic	  location;	  economic	  climate;	  and	  proximity	  to	  drug	  cultivation/production	  areas.	  While	  not	  the	  only	  factors	  at	  issue,	  all	  of	  these	  made	  the	  UAE	  an	  ideal	  target	  for	  money-­‐laundering	  operations.	  And	  as	  Al	  Mulla	  noted,	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  beyond	  the	  UAE	  worked	  to	  craft	  AML	  laws	  and	  regulations	  meant	  to	  put	  the	  country	  in	  step	  with	  United	  Nations	  treaties	  and	  FATF	  recommendations.674	  His	  observations	  indicate	  that,	  despite	  its	  critics,	  the	  country	  has	  long	  at	  least	  been	  aware	  of	  its	  vulnerabilities.	  	  While	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  legislation	  will	  be	  described	  in	  greater	  detail	  elsewhere,	  evidence	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  criminalize	  money	  laundering	  goes	  back	  to	  a	  Penal	  Code	  article	  of	  1987.	  And	  while	  the	  UAE’s	  first	  AML-­‐specific	  legislation	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  in	  early	  2002,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  concerns	  over	  terrorism	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  were	  helping	  to	  accelerate	  the	  creation	  and	  passage	  of	  such	  laws,	  the	  UAE	  had	  prioritized	  AML	  legislation	  well	  before	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  11	  September	  2001.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  that	  tragedy,	  however,	  the	  lack	  of	  specific	  AML	  legislation	  left	  the	  UAE	  vulnerable	  to	  criticism,	  and	  the	  accusation	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  willful	  ignorance	  about	  how	  its	  financial	  sectors	  were	  being	  exploited.675	  According	  to	  one	  former	  auditor	  working	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  much	  of	  the	  banking	  industry	  there	  indeed	  engaged	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  conscious	  blindness	  about	  transfers	  and	  operations	  that,	  under	  other	  circumstances,	  would	  have	  triggered	  suspicions	  and	  alarms.676	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
674	  Al	  Mulla,	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Money	  Laundering],	  307-­‐311,	  translated for the author by Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim.	  675	  Lilley,	  Dirty	  Dealing,	  34.	  676	  Hakim,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11.	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Yet	  whatever	  may	  be	  said	  of	  the	  real	  or	  alleged	  failings	  of	  financial	  watchdogs,	  particularly	  central	  banks,	  those	  in	  all	  countries	  generally	  wish	  to	  avoid	  imposing	  unnecessary	  regulation.	  Historically,	  central	  banks	  have	  preferred	  a	  laissez-­‐faire	  approach	  out	  of	  necessity,	  shifting	  most	  responsibilities	  to	  their	  member	  institutions.	  As	  a	  1967	  publication	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  observed:	  “The	  need	  to	  avoid	  delay	  in	  commercial	  transactions	  has	  made	  it	  desirable	  for	  the	  Bank	  in	  turn	  to	  delegate	  to	  commercial	  banks	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  authority	  to	  handle	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  transactions.”677	  This	  was	  presumably	  still	  true	  in	  2001,	  and	  likely	  remains	  the	  case	  today.	  The	  problem	  occurs	  when	  those	  financial	  institutions	  (and	  other	  relevant	  ones)	  prove	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  adequately	  scrutinize	  or	  police	  their	  load	  of	  daily	  business	  dealings,	  which	  may	  exist	  in	  crushing	  numbers.	  As	  shown	  earlier,	  some	  ML	  techniques	  are	  deliberately	  constructed	  to	  make	  such	  monitoring	  inconvenient,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  While	  modern	  AML/CFT	  thinking	  continues	  to	  identify	  new	  threats	  and	  vulnerabilities,	  addressing	  each	  promises	  to	  be	  a	  work-­‐intensive	  task	  requiring	  the	  involvement	  and	  attention	  of	  many	  specialists.	  	  Unsurprisingly	  perhaps,	  a	  criticism	  in	  some	  FATF	  evaluations	  has	  been	  the	  inability	  or	  unwillingness	  of	  a	  given	  country	  to	  allocate	  enough	  resources	  to	  otherwise	  address	  problem	  areas;	  such	  criticism	  has	  been	  leveled	  at	  the	  UAE.678	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  money	  laundering	  may	  be	  immediately	  seen	  as	  negative.	  One	  list	  of	  25	  consequences	  of	  money	  laundering	  includes	  entries	  such	  as	  “greater	  availability	  of	  credit”	  and	  “profits	  for	  the	  financial	  sector.”679	  However,	  the	  potential	  negative	  effects	  far	  outnumber	  those	  benign	  ones.	  The	  negative	  implications	  are	  spelled	  out	  briefly	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  which	  tries	  to	  introduce	  them	  by	  placing	  them	  in	  a	  UAE	  setting	  in	  order	  highlight	  that	  country’s	  vulnerabilities.	  	  
UAE	  Background,	  Strength,	  and	  Vulnerabilities	  The	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  was	  formed	  in	  1971	  as	  a	  federation	  of	  seven	  emirates:	  Abu	  Dhabi,	  Dubai,	  Sharjah,	  Ajman,	  Umm	  Al-­‐Quwain,	  Ras	  Al-­‐Khaimah,	  and	  Fujairah.	  The	  federal	  capital	  is	  located	  in	  oil-­‐rich	  Abu	  Dhabi,	  the	  ruler	  of	  which	  has	  traditionally	  held	  the	  position	  of	  president	  (technically	  for	  renewable	  five-­‐year	  terms).	  The	  ruler	  of	  Dubai	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677	  “The	  UK	  Exchange	  Control:	  A	  Short	  History,”	  246.	  678	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  9-­‐13.	  679	  Unger	  et	  al,	  “The	  Amounts	  and	  Effects	  of	  Money	  Laundering,”	  100-­‐101.	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–	  with	  less	  oil	  wealth	  but	  a	  strong	  commercially	  driven	  economy	  –	  traditionally	  holds	  the	  position	  of	  vice	  president/prime	  minister.680	  Further	  establishing	  Abu	  Dhabi	  and	  Dubai’s	  preeminence	  among	  the	  seven	  emirates	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rulers	  of	  both	  effectively	  have	  veto	  power	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  of	  Rulers,	  which	  is	  the	  chief	  legislative	  body	  of	  the	  country,	  comprised	  of	  each	  emirate’s	  ruler.681	  Though	  its	  population	  is	  largely	  made	  of	  resident	  expats	  from	  Asia,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  North	  Africa,	  and	  the	  West	  (Emirati	  account	  for	  about	  20%	  of	  the	  total	  population),	  the	  country	  is	  usually	  described	  as	  unified	  and	  stable.	  These	  factors	  have	  made	  its	  location	  –	  “roughly	  half	  way	  between	  Asia	  and	  Europe”	  –	  especially	  attractive	  to	  international	  business.	  Also	  important	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  UAE	  is,	  “by	  international	  standards,	  a	  law-­‐abiding	  country	  whose	  citizens	  residents	  enjoy	  low	  crime	  rates	  and	  civil	  and	  domestic	  harmony.682	  	  In	  such	  settings,	  the	  UAE’s	  GDP	  growth	  has	  been,	  at	  times,	  spectacular.	  It	  grew	  from	  a	  1975	  figure	  of	  US$10	  billion	  to	  US$164	  billion	  by	  2006.	  While	  growth	  slowed	  after	  2007	  (and	  even	  contracted	  -­‐4.8%	  in	  2010),	  it	  subsequently	  continued	  to	  rise	  at	  moderate	  percentages.683	  As	  of	  2013,	  UAE	  GDP	  was	  set	  at	  US$383.80	  billion.684	  Although	  oil	  is	  a	  principal	  source	  of	  wealth,	  a	  significant	  area	  of	  GDP	  growth	  has	  been	  in	  non-­‐oil	  sectors.	  A	  study	  of	  the	  period	  1975-­‐2006	  found	  that	  oil	  GDP	  grew	  at	  an	  annual	  average	  of	  7.1%,	  while	  non-­‐oil	  GDP	  grew	  faster,	  at	  11.45%.	  Significant	  non-­‐oil	  areas	  have	  been	  wholesale/retail	  trade,	  construction,	  manufacturing,	  tourism,	  and	  financial	  services.685	  The	  latter	  area	  is,	  of	  course,	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  money-­‐laundering	  concerns.	  Banks	  operating	  in	  the	  UAE	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  Locally	  Incorporated	  Banks,	  which	  “are	  public	  shareholding	  companies	  licensed	  in	  accordance	  with	  provisions	  of	  Union	  Law	  No.	  (10)	  of	  1980”;	  and	  Branches	  of	  Foreign	  Banks,	  licensed	  by	  the	  Central	  Bank	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  UAE	  under	  the	  same	  law.686	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2006,	  the	  UAE	  had	  21	  national	  commercial	  banks	  operating	  516	  branches;	  25	  foreign	  commercial	  banks,	  operating	  121	  branches;	  two	  investment	  banks;	  11	  finance	  companies	  operating	  18	  branches;	  13	  investment	  companies;	  15	  financial	  intermediaries;	  100	  securities	  brokers;	  and	  102	  moneychangers	  operating	  274	  branches.687	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2014,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  14.	  681	  Provisional	  Constitution	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (1972),	  Part	  IV,	  Article	  49.	  682	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  14.	  683	  Trading	  Economics,	  “United	  Arab	  Emirates	  GDP	  Growth	  Rate	  2000-­‐2014.”	  684	  Trading	  Economics,	  “United	  Arab	  Emirates	  GDP	  1973-­‐2014.”	  	  685	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  14.	  686	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “Commercial	  Banks.”	  687	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  16.	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number	  of	  national	  commercial	  banks	  had	  reached	  23,	  with	  892	  operating	  branches,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  foreign	  commercial	  banks	  grew	  by	  12	  percent	  reaching	  28	  in	  total	  with	  115	  operating	  branches.688	  (The	  latter	  is	  another	  indicator	  of	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  UAE	  financial	  sector.)	  The	  securities	  market	  includes	  a	  pair	  of	  domestic	  operations:	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Securities	  Market	  and	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Market.	  	  	  As	  of	  2008,	  it	  was	  perceived	  that	  “the	  majority	  of	  serious	  criminal	  activity	  in	  the	  UAE	  relates	  to	  either	  transshipment	  of	  prohibited	  goods	  through	  the	  high-­‐volume	  port	  system,	  or	  the	  commission	  of	  financial	  crimes	  and	  fraud-­‐related	  offenses	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  sector.”689	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  US-­‐UAE	  Business	  Council	  report,	  the	  country	  has	  been	  “engaged	  in	  a	  vigorous	  campaign	  to	  develop	  its	  ports	  and	  transportation	  infrastructure	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  bolster	  the	  country’s	  position	  as	  a	  vital	  hub	  in	  the	  global	  logistics	  supply	  chain.”690	  However,	  the	  ports	  operating	  in	  the	  country	  also	  present	  additional	  threats	  for	  trade-­‐based	  money	  laundering.	  The	  country’s	  ports	  operate	  under	  regulations	  from	  the	  National	  Transport	  Authority	  (NTA),	  established	  in	  2006,	  in	  coordination	  with	  other	  federal	  and	  local	  transportation	  regulatory	  agencies	  to	  promote	  consistency.	  The	  NTA	  also	  proposes	  policies,	  laws,	  and	  legislation	  on	  marine	  and	  land	  transport.691	  The	  FATF	  mutual	  evaluation	  report	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  country	  was	  one	  “where	  the	  carrying	  of	  large	  amounts	  of	  cash	  and	  purchasing	  goods	  and	  property	  with	  cash	  is	  quite	  common.”692	  Adding	  to	  the	  concerns	  about	  money-­‐laundering	  threats,	  the	  system	  of	  hawala	  has	  thrived	  in	  the	  UAE,	  especially	  among	  its	  expat	  population.693	  	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  to	  note	  that	  individual	  emirates	  have	  been	  able	  to	  “create	  a	  number	  of	  free	  zones	  in	  which	  foreign	  nationals	  may	  trade	  outside	  the	  constraints	  of	  domestic	  commercial	  law,”	  one	  such	  being	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Center	  (DIFC).	  694	  Another	  such	  entity	  is	  the	  Dubai	  Multi-­‐Commodities	  Center	  (DMCC)	  free	  zone,	  in	  which	  the	  Dubai	  Gold	  and	  Commodities	  Exchange	  (DGCX)	  operates.695	  Dubai’s	  own	  government	  notes	  that	  it	  “was	  the	  first	  emirate	  to	  pioneer	  the	  free	  zone	  model,	  offering	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  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “List	  of	  National	  Banks	  &	  Distribution	  of	  their	  branches	  in	  the	  UAE	  as	  at	  31-­‐10-­‐2014,”	  and	  “List	  of	  Foreign	  Banks	  and	  Distribution	  of	  their	  branches	  in	  the	  UAE	  as	  at	  31-­‐10-­‐2014.”	  	  689	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  14.	  690	  US-­‐UAE	  Business	  Council,	  “Council	  Report:	  U.A.E.	  Ports	  &	  Transportation	  Infrastructure	  Industry	  and	  Opportunities	  for	  Partnership.”	  691	  US-­‐UAE	  Business	  Council,	  “Council	  Report:	  U.A.E.	  Ports	  &	  Transportation	  Infrastructure	  Industry	  and	  Opportunities	  for	  Partnership.”	  692	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  14.	  693	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  15,	  and	  Hakim,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11,	  passim.	  694	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  14.	  695	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  16.	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foreign	  businesses	  attractive	  concessions	  and	  a	  number	  of	  investment	  incentives,	  including	  100	  percent	  ownership	  of	  a	  subsidiary	  and	  zero	  taxation.	  There	  are	  currently	  22	  free	  zones	  in	  operation,	  developed	  for	  specific	  sectors	  and	  industries	  including	  ICT,	  media,	  finance,	  gold	  and	  jewelry	  and	  health	  care.	  Jebel	  Ali	  Free	  Zone	  is	  now	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  free	  zones	  allowing	  for	  100	  percent	  foreign	  ownership	  with	  no	  recruitment	  or	  sponsorship	  restraints.”696	  	  As	  this	  thesis	  will	  detail,	  the	  UAE	  government	  has	  since	  1987,	  and	  especially	  since	  2002,	  taken	  steps	  toward	  addressing	  and	  reducing	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  threat.	  Some	  involve	  administrative	  regulations,	  such	  as	  a	  restriction	  on	  “the	  entry	  of	  new	  foreign-­‐owned	  institutions.”697	  More	  profound	  are	  legislative	  efforts	  (discussed	  in	  depth	  in	  later	  chapters),	  particularly	  the	  2002	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  law	  and	  the	  2004	  counter-­‐terrorism	  law,	  which	  also	  addressed	  financing	  and	  money-­‐laundering	  issues.	  Both	  apply	  to	  the	  financial	  “free	  zones”	  mentioned	  above,	  such	  as	  the	  DIFC.	  The	  DIFC,	  being	  then	  a	  relatively	  recent	  addition	  to	  the	  UAE’s	  financial	  picture,	  was	  spared	  criticism	  in	  the	  2005	  book	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11	  Financing.	  The	  author,	  Iqbal	  Ismail	  Hakim,	  is	  a	  past	  chief	  examination	  officer	  in	  the	  Banking	  Supervision	  and	  Examination	  Department	  of	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank.	  Beyond	  evident	  editing	  and	  production	  limitations,	  the	  book,	  subtitled	  Authorities	  Shut	  Their	  Eyes!,	  needs	  careful	  handling	  as	  a	  source,	  given	  that	  much	  of	  it	  involves	  personal	  vindication	  and	  personal	  attack.	  (It	  is	  noted	  in	  several	  places	  that	  the	  author’s	  life	  had	  been	  threatened.)	  Yet	  it	  paints	  a	  picture,	  with	  documents	  reproduced	  throughout,	  of	  a	  system	  in	  which	  questionable	  financial	  transactions	  regularly	  occurred,	  at	  least	  until	  the	  AML	  law	  of	  2002	  and	  subsequent	  efforts	  to	  raise	  awareness	  about	  the	  subject.	  	  
Some	  Implications	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  The	  wait	  for	  specific	  AML	  legislation	  in	  the	  UAE	  may	  stem	  from	  lack	  of	  awareness	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  problem,	  although	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  future	  chapter,	  significant	  national	  discussions	  of	  the	  concept	  began	  at	  least	  by	  2000.	  It	  was	  noted	  in	  that	  period	  that,	  ironically,	  many	  of	  the	  same	  qualities	  that	  gave	  legitimate	  customers	  confidence	  in	  UAE	  financial	  institutions	  could	  also	  attract	  money	  launderers.	  “Remember,	  if	  you	  are	  a	  money	  launderer,	  you	  want	  to	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  financial	  system	  you	  are	  using,	  just	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as	  a	  genuine	  customer	  does,"	  a	  UK	  consultant	  observed	  in	  2001.	  He	  added:	  “Think	  of	  it	  this	  way	  –	  If	  it's	  attractive	  to	  a	  real	  customer,	  then	  it's	  attractive	  to	  a	  money	  launderer.”698	  There	  may	  also	  have	  been	  a	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  its	  potential	  harmful	  effects	  to	  an	  economy.	  The	  fact	  that	  money	  laundering	  is	  not	  a	  victimless	  crime	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  lists	  of	  predicate	  offenses	  that	  figure	  in	  much	  AML	  legislation,	  but	  such	  practices	  also	  have	  (to	  quote	  one	  book)	  “serious	  macroeconomic	  implications.”	  These	  include	  investing	  in	  legitimate	  businesses	  (to	  mix	  or	  mingle	  “bad”	  funds	  with	  legitimate	  funds);	  choosing	  investments	  not	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  “but	  to	  avoid	  detection”;	  and	  moving	  money	  rapidly	  into	  and	  then	  out	  of	  a	  country.699	  Speaking	  in	  Paris	  on	  10	  February,	  1998,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  Managing	  Director	  Michael	  Camdessus	  described	  the	  scale	  of	  money	  laundering	  as	  offering	  “two	  sorts	  of	  risks:	  one	  prudential,	  the	  other	  macroeconomic.”	  	   Markets	  and	  even	  smaller	  economies	  can	  be	  corrupted	  and	  destabilized.	  We	  have	  seen	  evidence	  of	  this	  in	  countries	  and	  regions,	  which	  have	  harbored	  large-­‐scale	  criminal	  organizations.	  In	  the	  beginning,	  good	  and	  bad	  monies	  intermingle,	  and	  the	  country	  of	  region	  appears	  to	  prosper,	  but	  in	  the	  end,	  Gresham’s	  law700	  operates,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  tremendous	  risk	  that	  only	  the	  corrupt	  financiers	  remain.	  A	  kind	  of	  “lasting	  damage”	  was	  possible,	  he	  added,	  “when	  the	  infrastructure	  that	  has	  been	  built	  up	  to	  guarantee	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  markets	  is	  lost.	  Even	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  not	  reached	  this	  point,	  the	  available	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  money	  laundering	  is	  large	  enough	  that	  it	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  macroeconomic	  policy	  makers.”	  Relevant	  to	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  phenomenon,	  he	  added,	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  “Money	  subject	  to	  laundering	  behaves	  in	  accordance	  with	  particular	  management	  principles.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  it	  is	  less	  productive,	  and	  therefore	  that	  it	  contributes	  minimally,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  to	  optimization	  of	  economic	  growth.”	  Camdessus	  went	  on	  to	  list	  several	  “potential	  macroeconomic	  consequences	  of	  money	  laundering.”	  They	  included:	  	  
• “Inexplicable	  changes	  in	  money	  demand”	  
• “Greater	  prudential	  risks	  to	  bank	  soundness”	  
• “Contamination	  effects	  on	  legal	  financial	  transactions,”	  and	  
• “Greater	  volatility	  of	  international	  capital	  flows	  and	  exchange	  rates	  due	  to	  unanticipated	  cross-­‐border	  asset	  transfers.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698	  Quoted	  in	  Jose,	  “Region	  ‘faces	  risk	  of	  dirty	  money	  flow.’”	  699	  World	  Bank,	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Finance	  of	  Terrorism,	  I:19.	  700	  Gresham’s	  Law	  may	  be	  presented	  as:	  “Bad	  money	  drives	  out	  good.”	  See	  Rolnick	  and	  Weber,	  “Gresham’s	  Law	  or	  Gresham’s	  Fallacy?”	  185.	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In	  addition,	  Camdessus	  argued	  that	  besides	  “the	  economic	  costs,	  we	  must	  also	  remember	  the	  social	  and	  political	  dimensions	  of	  crime	  and	  related	  money	  laundering	  –	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  the	  overall	  weakening	  of	  the	  social	  fabric,	  and	  collective	  ethical	  standards.	  All	  of	  this	  lends	  urgency	  to	  anti-­‐laundering	  efforts,	  which	  attack	  criminal	  activity	  at	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  point	  –	  where	  its	  proceeds	  enter	  the	  financial	  system.”701	  UAE	  authorities	  have	  affirmed	  this	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  viewpoints.	  The	  chief	  executive	  of	  DIFC,	  Nasser	  Al	  Shaali,	  put	  it	  in	  business	  terms	  when	  speaking	  to	  a	  reporter	  in	  2008.	  He	  said	  that	  “a	  sound	  compliance	  framework	  is	  essential	  for	  regional	  companies	  to	  ensure	  long-­‐term	  business	  sustainability,”	  adding	  (in	  the	  reporter’s	  paraphrasing)	  that	  statistics	  showed	  that	  “companies	  that	  apply	  good	  corporate	  governance	  typically	  see	  a	  30	  per	  cent	  premium	  on	  their	  stock	  price	  as	  opposed	  to	  those	  who	  don’t.”702	  From	  a	  law	  enforcement	  perspective,	  in	  his	  book	  on	  money	  laundering	  UAE	  author	  and	  academic	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla	  deemed	  the	  crime	  so	  serious	  that	  he	  called	  for	  tougher	  penalties	  –	  a	  rare	  sign	  of	  a	  public	  disagreement	  with	  national	  policy.703	  	  Outside	  observers	  have	  praised	  the	  country’s	  serious	  approach	  to	  AML/CFT	  issues.	  But	  some	  reports	  have	  indicated	  the	  UAE	  (which,	  again,	  had	  no	  specific	  AML	  law	  before	  2002,	  or	  comprehensive	  CFT	  law	  until	  2004)	  spent	  a	  long	  time	  playing	  catch-­‐up.	  A	  2008	  MENA-­‐FATF	  report	  on	  the	  UAE	  noted	  that	  officials	  were	  unable	  to	  provide	  assessors	  with	  some	  basic	  data	  –	  exact	  figures	  on	  free	  zones,	  for	  example.	  Nor	  could	  they	  provide	  “any	  documents	  that	  articulated	  the	  UAE’s	  overall	  policies	  and	  objectives	  for	  combating	  ML	  and	  FT.	  It	  appeared,	  therefore	  that	  there	  is	  no	  overall	  published	  government	  policy	  on	  AML/CFT	  matters.	  While	  the	  national	  committees	  tasked	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  overseeing	  the	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  formulated	  certain	  objectives	  to	  underpin	  a	  formal	  strategy,	  the	  mission	  was	  not	  made	  privy	  to	  any	  of	  the	  committees’	  discussions	  or	  output.”704	  And	  while	  many	  problems	  spotted	  in	  an	  earlier	  2004	  assessment	  had	  been	  mended,	  “the	  progress	  made	  by	  the	  authorities	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  been	  over-­‐shadowed	  in	  many	  areas	  by	  new	  international	  [FATF]	  standards.”705	  In	  this	  light,	  some	  remarks	  on	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  weak	  AML	  approach	  bear	  repeating.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701	  Camdessus,	  “Money	  Laundering:	  The	  Importance	  of	  International	  Countermeasures.”	  702	  Saleem,	  “Sound	  Compliance	  Framework	  Needed.”	  	  703	  Al	  Mulla,	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Money	  Laundering],	  334-­‐335,	  translated for the author by Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim.	  704	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  18.	  705	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  21	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Effect	  on	  Development	  While	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  UAE	  financial	  and	  development	  areas	  separate	  it	  from	  many	  other	  regional	  economies,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  strong	  as	  to	  be	  invulnerable.	  This	  was	  noticed	  in	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis	  that	  began	  in	  2007.	  Two	  years	  into	  this,	  Dubai	  experienced	  significant	  debt	  problems	  that	  became	  internationally	  visible.706	  Despite	  this,	  officials	  were	  upbeat	  in	  local	  media	  interviews.707	  In	  fact,	  little	  negative	  local	  economic	  news	  appeared	  in	  2009	  in	  the	  UAE,	  where	  journalists	  work	  in	  a	  tightly	  regulated	  industry	  where	  self-­‐censorship	  prevails.	  The	  existing	  media	  law’s	  Article	  81	  prohibits	  publication	  of	  “matters	  that	  impair	  the	  national	  currency	  or	  confuse	  opinions	  on	  the	  economical	  status	  of	  the	  state.”708	  (It	  may	  be	  notable	  that	  in	  2009,	  as	  the	  economy	  sputtered,	  a	  draft	  revised	  media	  law	  –	  ultimately	  never	  signed	  into	  action	  –	  included	  in	  Article	  32,	  No.	  3,	  vague	  restrictions	  against	  the	  broadcasting	  or	  publishing	  of	  “misleading	  news	  to	  the	  public	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  can	  hurt	  the	  national	  economy.”)709	  Irrespective	  of	  local	  coverage,	  in	  the	  following	  year,	  2010	  (as	  noted	  above),	  the	  economy	  endured	  a	  short	  period	  of	  negative	  growth.	  	  	  The	  UAE’s	  long-­‐term	  recovery	  would	  seem	  to	  require	  attention	  to	  details	  that	  dovetail	  into	  a	  strong	  AML/CFT	  framework.	  A	  World	  Bank	  publication	  notes,	  for	  example,	  that	  besides	  macroeconomic	  effects,	  money	  laundering	  undermines	  the	  rule	  of	  law;	  710	  certainly	  the	  UAE	  has	  striven	  to	  progress	  into	  a	  civil	  society	  with	  such	  an	  attitude	  to	  standards	  and	  ethics.	  The	  same	  publication	  also	  links	  economic	  and	  governmental	  quality,	  and	  UAE	  officials	  routinely	  point	  to	  government	  performance	  as	  crucial	  to	  the	  country’s	  success.711	  	  The	  same	  publication	  warns	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  money	  laundering	  on	  the	  “function	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	  …	  Losses	  to	  depositors,	  destabilization	  of	  the	  financial	  system,	  and	  costs	  to	  the	  taxpayers	  are	  but	  the	  obvious	  and	  calculable	  costs	  of	  such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706	  For	  examples	  of	  contemporary	  international	  media	  coverage	  of	  this	  issue,	  see	  Reed,	  “The	  Sheikh's	  New	  Clothes?	  Dubai's	  Desert	  Dream	  Ends”	  and	  Smith	  and	  Kiwan,	  “Dubai	  Seeks	  Debt	  Delay,	  Some	  Units	  Cut	  to	  Junk.”	  	  707	  See,	  for	  example,	  Almezel	  and	  Ahmed,	  “‘Dubai	  a	  Global	  Model	  for	  Success.’”	  708	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (15),	  1980,	  Regarding	  Publications	  and	  Publishing.	  709	  A	  draft	  of	  the	  law,	  with	  editorial	  commentary	  and	  criticism,	  appeared	  in	  the	  local	  newspaper	  Al	  Khaleej,	  18	  Jan.,	  2009,	  17	  (translation	  by	  Dina	  Gharbo).	  710	  World	  Bank,	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Finance	  of	  Terrorism,	  I:20.	  711	  World	  Bank,	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Finance	  of	  Terrorism,	  I:22;	  for	  an	  example	  of	  official	  remarks	  on	  government	  performance,	  see	  Al	  Maktoum,	  “Sheikh	  Mohammed's	  speech	  at	  the	  2004	  World	  Economic	  Forum,	  Sunday,	  May	  16,	  2004,”	  (English	  translation).	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activities.”	  While	  the	  UAE	  does	  not,	  as	  of	  this	  writing,	  have	  an	  income	  or	  sales	  tax	  system	  in	  place,	  officials	  are	  unlikely	  (especially	  given	  the	  slowed	  pace	  of	  growth)	  to	  take	  lightly	  a	  loss	  in	  resources	  that	  could	  be	  spent	  on	  infrastructure	  or	  other	  projects	  among	  their	  own	  citizens,	  especially	  in	  a	  region	  in	  which	  political	  unrest	  is	  a	  sensitive	  concern.	  In	  related	  vein,	  the	  World	  Bank	  publication	  also	  observes	  that	  ML	  practice	  usually	  also	  involves	  the	  corruption	  of	  “bank	  officers	  and	  other	  financial	  market	  professionals,	  such	  as	  insurance	  and	  securities	  brokers,”	  again	  undermining	  “confidence	  in	  the	  financial	  market,”	  and	  spilling	  “over	  into	  other	  forms	  of	  criminality,	  such	  as	  fraud	  and	  extortion.”712	  As	  the	  UAE’s	  creation	  of	  economic	  free	  zones	  testifies	  to	  the	  UAE’s	  commitment	  to	  economic	  liberalization,	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  under	  threat	  should	  the	  country,	  in	  failing	  to	  enact	  “prudent”	  AML/CFT	  restrictions,	  be	  required	  to	  intervene	  more	  forcefully	  in	  interrupting	  the	  flow	  of	  funds	  and/or	  commodities.713	  
Warnings	  for	  Developing	  Countries	  Still	  Relevant	  While	  today	  the	  UAE	  would	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  developed,	  rather	  than	  developing	  country,	  warnings	  issued	  to	  those	  in	  the	  latter	  category	  may	  still	  be	  relevant.	  Recent	  research	  by	  Global	  Financial	  Integrity	  (GFI)	  confirmed	  that	  “organized	  crime,	  corruption	  and	  tax	  evasion	  have	  the	  most	  disproportionately	  corrosive	  impact	  in	  countries	  with	  lowest	  levels	  of	  development,	  along	  with	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  poverty	  and	  economic	  inequality.”714	  In	  this	  context,	  Schott	  noted	  that	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  practices	  had	  “particularly	  significant	  economic	  and	  social	  consequences	  for	  developing	  countries,	  because	  those	  markets	  tend	  to	  be	  small	  and,	  therefore,	  more	  susceptible	  to	  disruption	  from	  criminal	  or	  terrorist	  influences.	  [They]	  also	  have	  significant	  economic	  and	  social	  consequences	  of	  countries	  with	  fragile	  financial	  systems	  because	  they	  too	  are	  susceptible	  to	  disruption	  from	  such	  influences.”715	  Acknowledging	  that	  the	  impact	  was	  hard	  to	  quantify	  (like	  the	  extent	  of	  money	  laundering	  itself),	  Schott	  identified	  five	  broad	  areas	  he	  felt	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  could	  affect:	  Increased	  Crime	  and	  Corruption;	  International	  Consequences	  and	  Foreign	  Investment;	  Weakened	  Financial	  Institutions;	  Compromised	  Economy	  and	  Private	  Sector;	  and	  Damaged	  Privatization	  Efforts.	  Each	  of	  these	  will	  be	  summarized	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs.	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  World	  Bank,	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Finance	  of	  Terrorism,	  I:20-­‐21.	  713	  World	  Bank,	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  Finance	  of	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  714	  Guzman,	  interview	  with	  Global	  Financial	  Integrity	  Managing	  Director	  Tom	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  Schott	  portrays	  the	  view	  promulgated	  by	  the	  international	  community.	  However,	  drawing	  upon	  Osterfeld’s	  methodology,716	  the	  results	  of	  Housten’s	  study	  suggest	  that	  corruption	  can	  have	  “significant	  restrictive	  as	  well	  as	  expansionary	  economic	  effects,”	  depending	  on	  “the	  degree	  to	  which	  laws	  protecting	  property	  are	  enforced	  in	  a	  nation.”	  Hence,	  nations	  with	  weak	  governance	  show	  much	  larger	  positive	  effects	  from	  corruption,	  supporting	  the	  proposition	  that	  many	  corrupt	  activities	  substitute	  for	  missing	  or	  misguided	  law.	  Housten	  points	  that	  direct	  attacks	  on	  corruption	  are	  unproductive	  and	  costly	  battles	  and	  will	  be	  resisted.	  The	  only	  solution	  to	  corruption,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  is	  in	  fundamental	  improvement	  of	  the	  governance	  structures	  of	  these	  countries.717	  	  	  
Increased	  Crime	  and	  Corruption	  The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Corruption	  links	  corruption	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  organizes	  and	  economic	  crime	  including	  money	  laundering.718	  Though	  initially	  being	  tackled	  as	  isolated	  menaces,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  millennium	  the	  international	  community	  and	  lawmakers	  started	  addressing	  them	  as	  interconnected	  elements	  of	  transnational	  crime,	  which,	  according	  to	  Mugarura	  “thrive	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  weaknesses	  in	  national	  regulatory	  environment	  characterised	  by	  lack	  of	  requisite	  laws,	  weak	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  and	  bad	  governance.”719	  	  Schott	  regards	  money	  laundering	  as	  an	  activity	  that	  “helps	  make	  criminal	  activities	  profitable;	  it	  rewards	  criminals.”	  There	  is	  a	  general	  consensus	  with	  this	  statement.	  However,	  Schott’s	  conclusion:	  “Thus,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  country	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  haven	  for	  money	  laundering,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  attract	  criminals	  and	  promote	  corruption,”	  has	  some	  ambiguity.	  According	  to	  him,	  such	  money	  laundering	  “havens”	  have	  weak	  AML/CFT	  frameworks,	  enforcement,	  and	  penalties.	  Such	  states	  also	  see	  a	  culture	  of	  bribery	  emerge	  among	  regulators	  and	  law	  enforcement	  institutions.720	  Proceeds	  of	  corruption	  may	  be	  laundered	  in	  jurisdictions,	  which	  have	  not	  enacted	  strict	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  measures.	  However,	  criminals	  may	  also	  choose	  to	  launder	  funds	  in	  countries,	  which	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  Osterfeld,	  D.	  (1992).	  Prosperity	  versus	  Planning:	  How	  Government	  Stifles	  Economic	  Growth.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	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  Houston,	  “Can	  Corruption	  Ever	  Improve	  an	  Economy,”	  326.	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  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Corruption,	  preamble.	  719	  Mugarura,	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  Corruption	  and	  Money	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  Crimes,”	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uphold	  very	  strict	  bank	  secrecy	  laws	  or	  regulations,	  such	  as	  offshore	  financial	  centers.721	  Sharman’s	  findings	  “contradict	  conventional	  wisdom”	  that	  “financial	  opacity	  is	  not	  caused	  by	  palm-­‐fringed	  tropical	  islands,”	  rather	  by	  “the	  large	  high-­‐income	  economies	  like	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain.”722	  In	  2010,	  the	  state	  of	  Delaware	  in	  the	  US	  toped	  the	  Forbes	  list	  of	  the	  most	  secretive	  tax	  havens	  in	  the	  world,	  outpacing	  Luxembourg,	  Switzerland,	  and	  Cayman	  Islands.	  The	  list	  also	  includes	  the	  U.K.	  (City	  of	  London),	  Ireland,	  Bermuda,	  Singapore,	  Belgium	  and	  Hong	  Kong.	  All	  these	  countries	  have	  established	  the	  AML/CFT	  framework.	  Moreover,	  as	  Dharmapala	  and	  Hines	  conclude:	  “Tax	  havens	  are	  small	  countries,	  they	  are	  affluent	  countries,	  and	  they	  have	  high-­‐quality	  governance	  institutions.723	  One	  author	  audaciously	  explains	  this	  by	  stating	  that	  “if	  you’re	  going	  to	  hide	  illicit	  cash,	  where	  better	  to	  do	  it?	  Where	  it	  stands	  out	  from	  the	  crowd,	  or	  where	  it	  can	  be	  lost	  like	  a	  needle	  in	  the	  proverbial	  haystack?	  Big	  numbers	  help	  the	  owner	  of	  dubious	  cash	  lose	  theirs	  in	  the	  crowd,	  and	  the	  places	  named	  above	  are	  big.”724	  Multiple	  studies	  show	  that	  money-­‐laundering	  vehicles	  are	  used	  to	  hide	  proceeds	  of	  corruption.	  One	  of	  these	  vehicles	  is	  offshore	  jurisdiction.	  The	  study	  of	  the	  round-­‐trip	  investments	  –	  from	  Russia	  to	  offshore	  financial	  centers	  and	  back	  to	  Russia	  –	  found	  that	  these	  investors	  don’t	  leave	  their	  criminal	  funds	  in	  the	  offshore	  jurisdictions,	  but	  rather	  invest	  them	  back	  in	  Russia	  as	  funds	  coming	  from	  a	  new	  source,	  specifically	  foreign	  direct	  investment.	  The	  round-­‐trip	  investors	  are	  often	  closely	  allied	  with	  authorities,	  or	  represent	  authority	  themselves.725	  In	  this	  scenario	  the	  corruption	  has	  been	  expanding	  at	  its	  source,	  in	  this	  case	  Russia.	  One	  article	  suggests	  that	  each	  BRIC	  country	  has	  its	  own	  offshore	  jurisdiction,	  which	  is	  used	  for	  capital	  round	  tripping.726	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  these	  types	  of	  investment	  schemes	  in	  any	  way	  contribute	  to	  promotion	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  offshore	  jurisdictions.	  On	  the	  contrary	  Switzerland,	  Singapore,	  Luxembourg	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  four	  jurisdictions	  that	  were	  in	  the	  top	  ten	  for	  most	  secretive	  tax	  havens	  in	  the	  world,	  are	  also	  ranked	  in	  the	  top	  ten	  least	  corrupt	  countries.727	  The	  availability	  of	  offshore	  jurisdictions	  promotes	  corruption	  in	  the	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  Corruption,	  Money	  Laundering,	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  “Which	  Countries	  Become	  Tax	  Havens?”	  1065.	  724	  Murphy,	  “World’s	  Best	  Tax	  Havens.”	  	  725	  Ledyaeva,	  Karhunen,	  and	  Whalley,	  “Offshore	  Jurisdictions	  (Including	  Cyprus),	  Corruption,	  Money	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  Rovnick,	  N.	  (26	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  Foreign	  Investment	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  Foreign	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  All	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  It’s	  Tycoons	  Using	  Tax	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Quartz,	  Atlantic	  Media,	  available	  at	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  Transparency	  International,	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  2016,	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developing	  countries,	  from	  where	  the	  corrupt	  funds	  are	  flowing	  in,	  because	  only	  the	  wealthiest	  elite	  in	  developing	  countries	  seems	  to	  have	  access	  to	  offshore	  financial	  services.	  A	  study	  by	  Blankenburg	  and	  Khan	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  types	  of	  illicit	  flows	  from	  advanced	  and	  developing	  countries.	  According	  to	  this	  study,	  tax	  evasion	  and	  tax	  avoidance	  constitutes	  the	  important	  part	  of	  illicit	  flow	  from	  advanced	  counties,	  while	  illicit	  flows	  from	  developing	  countries	  are	  at	  large	  politically	  driven.	  728	  The	  study	  builds	  this	  distinction	  on	  Baker’s	  notion	  of	  dirty	  money,	  which	  manifest	  in	  different	  forms	  of	  illicit	  capital	  flows:	  criminal,	  corrupt,	  and	  commercial.	  The	  criminal	  form	  includes	  “a	  boundless	  range	  of	  villainous	  activities	  including	  racketeering,	  trafficking	  in	  counterfeit	  and	  contraband	  goods,	  alien	  smuggling,	  slave	  trading,	  embezzlement,	  forgery,	  securities	  fraud,	  credit	  fraud,	  burglary,	  sexual	  exploitation,	  prostitution,	  and	  more.”	  The	  corrupt	  one	  is	  “from	  bribery	  and	  theft	  by	  (foreign)	  government	  officials.”	  And	  finally,	  the	  commercial	  form	  from	  tax	  evasion.729	  Despite	  of	  its	  form,	  illicit	  flight	  facilitated	  by	  money	  laundering	  will	  have	  economic	  impact	  on	  both	  jurisdictions:	  the	  suppliers	  and	  the	  recipient,	  by	  creation	  of	  an	  asymmetric	  economic	  supply	  and	  hence	  extremes	  of	  wealth	  concentration.	  Corruption	  produces	  enormous	  profits	  to	  be	  laundered;	  hence,	  according	  to	  Chaikin	  and	  Sharman	  it	  is	  “the	  number	  one	  source	  of	  money	  to	  be	  laundered	  in	  the	  developing	  world.”730	  	  However,	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  money	  laundering	  on	  corruption	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  illicit	  flow	  differentiation,	  the	  developing	  countries	  face	  the	  largest	  risk	  of	  growing	  corruption,	  that	  is	  at	  large	  attributed	  to	  prevalence	  of	  political	  corruption,	  where	  corrupt	  politician	  are	  granted	  immunities	  from	  justice	  during	  their	  tenure	  office	  position.	  The	  latter	  explains	  why,	  despite	  the	  efforts	  made	  to	  combat	  money	  laundering,	  in	  Nigeria,	  for	  example,	  corruption	  is	  still	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  country.731	  Yet,	  Christens	  believes	  that	  there	  has	  been	  “an	  obsessive	  focus	  on	  public	  officials	  (politicians	  and	  state	  employees)	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  attention	  to	  other	  elites,	  including	  company	  directors	  or	  financial	  intermediaries.”	  According	  to	  him,	  if	  we	  define	  corruption	  as	  “the	  specific	  activities	  which	  contribute	  to	  undermining	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  rules,	  systems	  and	  institutions	  which	  govern	  societies,”	  the	  focus	  is	  shifted	  to	  the	  enablers	  of	  the	  supply-­‐side	  of	  illicit	  funds,	  exposing	  corrupt	  practices	  such	  as	  “insider-­‐trading,	  tax	  evasion	  and	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  and	  Khan,	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  and	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  Baker,	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  and	  Money	  Laundering:	  Lessons	  from	  Nigeria,”	  169–181.	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avoidance,	  market-­‐rigging,	  non-­‐disclosure	  of	  pecuniary	  involvement,	  embezzlement,	  and	  trade	  mispricing,”	  all	  disguised	  through	  offshore	  structures.	  He	  provides	  some	  evidences,	  such	  as	  operation	  of	  ‘sham’	  trusts,	  to	  illustrate	  how	  tax	  havens	  go	  about	  their	  task	  of	  supporting	  corruption.732	  	  	  The	  UAE,	  while	  ranking	  low	  in	  regards	  to	  many	  basic	  human	  rights,	  scores	  high	  overall	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  corruption,	  taking	  the	  23rd	  position	  out	  of	  97	  countries	  under	  one	  study,	  while	  being	  regionally	  ranked	  as	  the	  least	  corrupt	  county.733	  However,	  as	  illustrated	  earlier,	  the	  country	  traditionally	  served	  as	  a	  recipient	  of	  illicit	  finds	  and	  proceeds	  of	  corruption.	  	  	  Corruption,	  and	  the	  related	  topic	  of	  nepotism,	  is	  potentially	  sensitive	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  In	  the	  Arab	  world,	  tribal	  and	  family	  loyalties	  are	  very	  strong,	  and	  ruling	  families	  tend	  to	  appoint	  or	  arrange	  selection	  of	  trusted	  members	  of	  “their	  own”	  to	  positions	  of	  responsibility.734	  Political	  scientist	  Edward	  Banfield	  found	  strong	  links	  between	  such	  family	  oriented	  cultures	  and	  corruption.	  In	  Lipset	  and	  Lenz’s	  words:	  “The	  underlying	  theory	  stems	  from	  Plato,	  who	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  inherent	  relations	  among	  family	  members,	  especially	  parents	  and	  children,	  press	  them	  to	  give	  particularistic	  preferences	  (nepotism).	  Banfield	  noted	  that	  corruption	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  family	  values	  involving	  intense	  feelings	  of	  obligation.”735	  	  While	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  is	  no	  exception	  to	  family-­‐oriented	  Arab	  culture,	  the	  country	  has	  ranked	  positively	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  low	  amount	  of	  perceived	  public	  sector	  corruption.	  This	  is	  according	  to	  the	  website	  transparency.org,	  which	  compiles	  data	  on	  this	  topic,	  and	  uses	  it	  to	  create	  an	  annual	  “Corruption	  Perception	  Index.”	  According	  to	  the	  site,	  “The	  Corruption	  Perceptions	  Index	  ranks	  countries	  and	  territories	  based	  on	  how	  corrupt	  their	  public	  sector	  is	  perceived	  to	  be.	  A	  country	  or	  territory’s	  score	  indicates	  the	  perceived	  level	  of	  public	  sector	  corruption	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (highly	  corrupt)	  to	  100	  (very	  clean).”	  The	  UAE’s	  rating	  improved	  incrementally	  from	  2012	  (68)	  through	  2013	  (69)	  to	  2014	  (70),	  the	  last	  being	  good	  enough	  to	  place	  the	  UAE	  25th	  worldwide	  on	  the	  list	  of	  lowest	  perceptions	  of	  public	  sector	  corruption.	  This	  ranking	  also	  qualified	  it	  as	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  Christensen,	  ‘The	  Looting	  Continues,”	  186.	  733	  Agrast	  et	  al,	  “The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Index,”	  158,	  181.	  734	  For	  relevant	  discussions,	  see	  El-­‐Ghonemy,	  Affluence	  and	  Poverty	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  112-­‐123;	  and	  Sayan,	  ed.,	  Economic	  
Performance	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa.	  735	  Lipset	  and	  Lenz,	  “Corruption,	  Culture	  and	  Markets,”	  116.	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first	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  placing	  it	  ahead	  of	  states	  such	  as	  Israel	  (37th)	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  (55th).	  In	  an	  international	  setting,	  the	  UAE	  finished	  below	  Austria	  (23rd)	  and	  the	  Bahamas	  (24th),	  and	  just	  above	  Estonia	  and	  France	  (tied	  for	  26th).736	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  an	  aggressive	  AML/CFT	  policy	  and	  its	  enforcement	  would	  help	  keep	  the	  UAE	  on	  track	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  One	  indicator	  that	  this	  is	  necessary	  is	  the	  results	  of	  a	  2014	  PwC	  Global	  Economic	  Crime	  Survey.	  It	  reported	  that	  “27%	  of	  respondents	  in	  the	  UAE	  reported	  economic	  crime	  within	  their	  organization,	  significantly	  above	  the	  average	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	  of	  21%,”737	  although	  still	  considerably	  below	  the	  global	  figure	  of	  37%.738	  On	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  survey	  John	  Wilkinson,	  PwC	  Partner	  and	  leader	  of	  PwC’s	  Middle	  East	  Forensic	  Services	  team,	  said,	  “Economic	  crime	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  threatens	  development	  at	  a	  national	  level.	  It	  impacts	  the	  welfare	  of	  people	  across	  the	  region	  and	  stifles	  economic	  growth.”	  He	  added	  that	  the	  2014	  results	  found	  that	  internal	  audits	  found	  only	  5%	  of	  frauds;	  top-­‐offs	  accounted	  for	  22%,	  and	  16%	  “by	  chance.”	  The	  numbers,	  he	  said,	  indicated	  “a	  widespread	  lack	  of	  effective	  fraud	  detection	  methods	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  We	  believe	  the	  shortfall	  in	  effective	  fraud	  prevention	  and	  detection	  leads	  to	  a	  substantial	  deficit	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	  economic	  crimes	  actually	  being	  committed.”739	  	  	  The	  survey	  also	  showed	  that	  53%	  of	  UAE	  respondents	  (compared	  to	  38%	  globally)	  reported	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  economic	  crime	  to	  their	  organization	  fell	  in	  the	  range	  between	  US$100,000	  and	  $5	  million.	  Also,	  a	  larger	  percentage	  of	  UAE	  respondents	  (compared	  to	  the	  global	  survey)	  identified	  non-­‐financial	  impacts	  of	  economic	  crime	  on	  areas	  such	  as	  Employee	  Morale,	  Business	  Relations,	  Reputation,	  and	  Share	  Price.740	  The	  report	  notably	  pointed	  out	  that	  while	  “the	  low	  level	  of	  reported	  frauds	  is	  encouraging,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  always	  an	  element	  of	  undetected	  fraud	  which	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  when	  interpreting	  these	  results.”741 The latter sentiment can also be found 
in the summary of a 2014 E&Y report on the Middle East, which stated that “Often, the 
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  Transparency	  International,	  “Corruption	  Perceptions	  Index	  2014:	  Results.”	  737	  PwC,	  “Economic	  Crime	  in	  the	  UAE,”	  1.	  	  
738	  PwC,	  “PwC’s	  Global	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  Crime	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  shows	  fraud	  reported	  by	  21%	  of	  organisations	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  compared	  to	  37%	  globally.”	  	  739	  PwC,	  “PwC’s	  Global	  Economic	  Crime	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  shows	  fraud	  reported	  by	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  of	  organisations	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  compared	  to	  37%	  globally.”	  	  740	  PwC,	  “Economic	  Crime	  in	  the	  UAE,”	  3	  	  741	  PwC,	  “Economic	  Crime	  in	  the	  UAE,”	  2.	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survey showed, existing formal anti-fraud policies are designed to be effective after fraud has 
been detected, rather than proactively acting as a deterrent.”742 	  
International	  Consequences	  and	  Foreign	  Investment	  Schott	  argues	  that	  a	  country’s	  reputation	  for	  money	  laundering	  –	  with	  associated	  corruption,	  crime,	  and	  bribery	  –	  would	  logically	  discourage	  foreign	  financial	  institutions	  from	  doing	  business	  there,	  or	  with	  institutions	  located	  there.	  They	  could,	  for	  example,	  “decided	  to	  limit	  their	  transactions	  with	  institutions	  from	  money	  laundering	  havens;	  subject	  these	  transactions	  to	  extra	  scrutiny,	  making	  them	  more	  expensive;	  or	  terminate	  correspondent	  or	  lending	  relationships	  altogether.	  Even	  legitimate	  business	  and	  enterprises	  from	  money	  laundering	  havens	  may	  suffer	  from	  reduced	  access	  to	  world	  markets	  or	  access	  at	  a	  higher	  cost	  due	  to	  extra	  scrutiny	  of	  their	  ownership,	  organization	  and	  control	  systems.”	  Such	  countries	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  high	  risk	  choices	  for	  foreign	  private	  investment	  or	  receive	  foreign	  governmental	  assistance.	  Schott	  noted	  that	  such	  countries	  are	  named	  on	  the	  FATF	  “non-­‐cooperating	  countries	  and	  territories”	  (NCCT)	  list,	  which	  “gives	  public	  notice	  that	  the	  listed	  country	  does	  not	  have	  in	  place	  even	  minimum	  standards.”	  Inclusion	  on	  the	  NCCT	  list	  not	  only	  discourages	  business	  and	  foreign	  assistance,	  Schott	  added,	  but	  also	  subjects	  that	  state	  or	  territory	  to	  “specific	  counter-­‐measures”	  from	  FATF	  member	  countries.	  743	  This	  view	  is	  shared	  by	  Wei	  (2000),	  whose	  analysis	  of	  data	  on	  FDI	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  from	  14	  source	  countries	  to	  45	  host	  countries	  revealed	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  corruption	  on	  FDI.744	  Habib	  and	  Zurawicki,	  by	  analyzing	  data	  from	  international	  statistics	  on	  FDI,	  found	  corruption	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  obstacle	  for	  investments.	  745	  However,	  not	  all	  empirical	  investigations	  on	  impact	  of	  corruption	  on	  FDI	  reach	  this	  conclusion.	  Using	  data	  set	  of	  73	  developed	  and	  less	  developed	  countries,	  Egger	  and	  Winner	  found	  that	  corruption	  can	  server	  as	  a	  stimulus	  for	  FDI,	  providing	  an	  empirical	  support	  to	  existence	  of	  the	  ‘helping	  hand’	  type	  of	  corruption	  with	  regard	  to	  foreign	  investment.746	  The	  results	  of	  Al-­‐Sadig’s	  research	  on	  correlation	  between	  corruption	  and	  direct	  foreign	  investments	  show	  that	  “the	  country’s	  quality	  of	  institutions	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  in	  encouraging	  FDI	  inflows	  into	  the	  country.”747	  Pinto	  and	  Zhu	  in	  their	  study	  of	  empirical	  estimation	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
742	  Goldstraw-­‐White	  and	  Gill,	  “Bribery,	  Corruption	  and	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  in	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  Middle	  East,”	  19.	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  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  II:3-­‐4.	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  Wei,	  “How	  Taxing	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  Corruption	  on	  International	  Investors?,”	  1-­‐11.	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  and	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  “Corruption	  and	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  Investment,”	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relationship	  between	  foreign	  investment	  and	  corruption	  discovered	  that	  FDI	  is	  associated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  corruption	  in	  less	  developed	  countries	  and	  autocratic	  countries.748	  The	  results	  of	  the	  study	  of	  306	  FDIs	  by	  UK	  firms	  in	  75	  emerging	  markets	  (EM)	  show	  that	  political	  risk	  and	  corruption	  do	  not	  deter	  managers	  from	  investing	  in	  EM.	  Moreover,	  the	  research	  found	  investments	  in	  countries	  with	  a	  high	  corruption	  rating	  yield	  the	  highest	  gains,	  since,	  as	  the	  authors	  explain,	  firms	  there	  are	  facilitated	  access	  to	  valuable	  resources	  on	  favorable	  terms.749	  For	  countries	  like	  the	  UAE,	  with	  a	  low	  level	  of	  corruption,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  prevailing	  issue	  in	  this	  context	  is	  a	  damaged	  international	  image.	  International	  pressure	  to	  comply	  with	  AML/CFT	  standards	  can	  manifest	  in	  directly	  expressed	  disapproval	  of	  powerful	  jurisdictions	  and	  international	  organizations.	  Alexander	  observes	  that	  this	  pressure	  is	  especially	  profound	  in	  developing	  countries.750	  FATF	  criticism	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  framework	  created	  sufficient	  pressure	  for	  the	  country	  to	  initiate	  new	  legislation	  and	  regulation	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  international	  standards.	  
	  
Weakened	  Financial	  Institutions	  Schott	  listed	  seven	  “adverse	  consequences”	  to	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions	  from	  working	  in	  a	  money-­‐laundering	  haven.	  They	  are:	  Loss	  of	  profitable	  business;	  liquidity	  problems	  through	  withdrawal	  of	  funds;	  termination	  of	  correspondent	  banking	  facilities;	  investigation	  costs	  and	  fines;	  asset	  seizures;	  loan	  losses;	  and	  declines	  in	  the	  stock	  value	  of	  financial	  institutions.751	  Taken	  together,	  these	  conveyed	  four	  interrelated	  risks:	  reputational,	  operational,	  legal	  and	  concentration.	  Schott	  defined	  a	  reputational	  
risk	  as	  “the	  potential	  that	  adverse	  publicity	  regarding	  a	  bank’s	  business	  practices	  and	  associations,	  whether	  accurate	  or	  not,	  will	  cause	  a	  loss	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  institution.”	  This	  would	  scare	  off	  borrowers,	  depositors,	  and	  investors,	  ultimately	  affecting	  the	  bank’s	  finances	  on	  several	  fronts.	  None	  of	  this	  would	  be	  offset	  by	  any	  perceived	  gains	  from	  facilitating	  money	  laundering,	  Schott	  added,	  because	  “funds	  placed	  on	  deposit	  with	  a	  bank	  by	  money	  launderers	  cannot	  be	  relied	  upon	  as	  a	  stable	  source	  of	  funding.	  Large	  amounts	  of	  laundered	  funds	  are	  often	  subject	  to	  unanticipated	  withdrawals	  from	  a	  financial	  institution	  through	  wire	  transfers	  or	  other	  transfers,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
748	  Pinto	  and	  Zhu,	  “Fortune	  or	  Evil?,”	  693-­‐705.	  749	  Barbopoulos,	  Marshall,	  MacInnes,	  and	  McColgan,	  “Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  in	  Emerging	  Markets	  and	  Acquirers’	  Value	  Gains,”	  604-­‐619.	  750	  Alexander,	  Insider	  Dealing	  and	  Money	  Laundering	  in	  the	  EU,	  28-­‐35.	  751	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  II:4,	  citing	  Basel	  Committee	  on	  Bank	  Supervision,	  “Customer	  Due	  Diligence	  for	  Banks,”	  paragraphs	  8-­‐17.	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causing	  potential	  liquidity	  problems.”752	  This	  observation	  led	  to	  Schott’s	  definition	  of	  an	  
operational	  risk,	  which	  “is	  the	  potential	  for	  loss	  resulting	  from	  inadequate	  or	  failed	  internal	  processes,	  people	  and	  systems,	  or	  external	  events,”	  which	  “occur	  when	  institutions	  incur	  reduced,	  terminated,	  or	  increased	  costs	  for	  inter-­‐bank	  or	  correspondent	  banking	  services.	  Increased	  borrowing	  or	  funding	  costs	  can	  also	  be	  included	  in	  such	  losses.”	  The	  third	  risk,	  legal	  risk,	  “is	  the	  potential	  for	  law	  suits,	  adverse	  judgments,	  unenforceable	  contracts,	  fines	  and	  penalties	  generating	  losses,	  increased	  expenses	  for	  an	  institution,	  or	  even	  closure	  of	  such	  an	  institution.”	  753	  The	  final	  category,	  
concentration	  risk,	  “is	  the	  potential	  for	  loss	  resulting	  from	  too	  much	  credit	  or	  loan	  exposure	  to	  one	  borrower,”	  and	  would	  be	  mitigated	  by	  the	  due-­‐diligence,	  KYC	  (know	  your	  customer)	  procedures	  an	  effective	  AML	  regime	  would	  put	  in	  place.	  Schott	  added:	  	   Statutory	  provisions	  or	  regulations	  usually	  restrict	  a	  bank’s	  exposure	  to	  a	  single	  borrower	  or	  group	  of	  related	  borrowers.	  Lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  a	  particular	  customer,	  the	  customer’s	  business,	  or	  what	  the	  customer’s	  relationship	  is	  to	  other	  borrowers,	  can	  place	  a	  bank	  at	  risk	  in	  this	  regard.	  This	  is	  particularly	  a	  concern	  where	  there	  are	  related	  counter-­‐parties,	  connected	  borrowers,	  and	  a	  common	  source	  of	  income	  or	  assets	  for	  repayment.	  Loan	  losses	  also	  result,	  of	  course,	  from	  unenforceable	  contracts	  and	  contracts	  made	  with	  fictitious	  persons.	  754	  McIntosh’s	  results	  support	  Schott’s	  observations.	  McIntosh	  found	  that	  operating	  performance	  of	  noncompliant	  banks	  worsened	  after	  a	  formal	  enforcement,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  operational	  costs	  for	  upgrading	  their	  AML	  compliance	  programs,	  and	  of	  loss	  in	  profitability	  from	  stopping	  the	  launder-­‐facilitating	  activity.	  McIntosh	  also	  found	  that	  enforcement	  actions	  led	  to	  greater	  capital	  risk	  “due	  to	  the	  increased	  demand	  on	  regulatory	  capital	  to	  support	  the	  operational	  risk	  exposed	  by	  noncompliance.”	  But,	  this	  study	  did	  not	  establish	  any	  correlation	  between	  the	  AML	  enforcements	  and	  the	  banks’	  reputational	  risk.755	  The	  results	  of	  Zeidan’s	  investigation	  failed	  to	  show	  any	  significant	  and	  sustained	  effect	  of	  enforcement	  actions	  on	  bank	  performance.756	  	  
 
Compromised	  Economy	  and	  Private	  Sector	  Schott	  noted	  that	  criminals	  using	  “front	  companies”	  –	  “business	  enterprises	  that	  appear	  legitimate	  and	  engage	  in	  legitimate	  business”	  –	  could	  affect	  legitimate	  businesses	  by	  undercutting	  them	  on	  product	  and	  service	  costs.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  front	  companies,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
752	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  II:4-­‐5.	  See	  also	  Ferwerda,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Money	  Laundering,”	  40.	  753	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  II:4-­‐5.	  754	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  II:5-­‐6.	  755	  McIntosh,	  “The	  Costs	  of	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Enforcements	  to	  Noncompliant	  Banks,”	  2.	  756	  Zeidan,	  M.	  (2012),	  ‘The	  Effects	  of	  Violating	  Banking	  Regulations	  on	  the	  Financial	  Performance	  of	  the	  US	  Banking	  Industry,”	  Journal	  of	  Financial	  Regulation	  and	  Compliance	  20:1,	  56–71.	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which	  launder	  criminal	  proceeds	  by	  mixing	  them	  with	  legitimate	  ones,	  could	  use	  such	  funds	  to	  subsidize	  their	  product	  and	  service	  costs	  to	  below-­‐market	  levels.	  After	  all,	  the	  point	  of	  a	  front	  company	  is	  to	  “preserve	  and	  protect	  the	  illicit	  funds,	  not	  to	  produce	  a	  profit.”	  This	  opens	  the	  potential	  for	  criminal	  enterprises	  “to	  control	  whole	  industries	  or	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  certain	  countries.	  This	  increases	  the	  potential	  for	  monetary	  and	  economic	  instability	  due	  to	  the	  misallocation	  of	  resources	  from	  artificial	  distortions	  in	  asset	  and	  commodity	  prices.	  It	  also	  provides	  a	  vehicle	  for	  evading	  taxation,	  thus	  depriving	  the	  country	  of	  revenue.”	  757	  	  
Damaged	  Privatization	  Efforts	  Not	  only	  can	  criminal	  outfits	  subsidize	  product	  and	  service	  costs	  using	  “front	  companies,”	  but	  they	  also	  can	  outbid	  otherwise	  “legitimate	  purchasers	  of	  former	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  When	  illicit	  proceeds	  are	  invested	  in	  this	  manner,	  criminals	  increase	  their	  potential	  for	  more	  criminal	  activities	  and	  corruption,	  as	  well	  as	  deprive	  the	  country	  of	  what	  should	  be	  a	  legitimate,	  market-­‐based,	  tax	  paying	  enterprise.”	  758	  	  
The	  Cost	  of	  Failure	  As	  with	  all	  countries,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  UAE’s	  interests	  to	  develop	  a	  cogent	  AML/CFT	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  apparatus.	  The	  UAE,	  as	  a	  rapidly	  developing	  country,	  also	  has	  much	  to	  lose,	  as	  becomes	  apparent	  when	  examining	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  being	  singled	  out	  for	  failing	  to	  address	  AML/CFT	  concerns.	  The	  FATF	  works	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  an	  international	  oversight	  body,	  and	  since	  June	  2000	  has	  published	  lists	  of	  “non-­‐cooperative	  countries	  or	  territories.”759	  It	  updates	  this	  list	  in	  regular	  press	  releases	  (or	  “public	  announcements”)	  citing	  what	  it	  calls	  “jurisdictions	  that	  have	  strategic	  deficiencies”	  in	  AML/CFT	  protection.	  The	  FATF	  has	  issued	  three	  such	  “public	  announcements”	  annually	  since	  2008.760	  A	  February	  2015	  press	  release,	  for	  instance,	  called	  on	  FATF	  members	  and	  others	  “to	  apply	  countermeasures”	  against	  Iran	  and	  North	  Korea,	  both	  long-­‐term	  targets	  of	  FATF	  concern.761	  (Observers	  have	  referred	  to	  this	  process	  as	  “blacklisting.”)762	  It	  also	  warned	  its	  members	  to	  be	  wary	  of	  risks	  in	  Algeria,	  Ecuador,	  and	  Myanmar,	  where	  new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
757	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  II:6.	  758	  Schott,	  Reference	  Guide,	  II:7.	  759	  FATF,	  Annual	  Report	  2000-­‐2001,	  10.	  	  760	  FATF,	  Annual	  Report	  2011-­‐2012,	  29.	  761	  FATF,	  “FATF	  Public	  Statement	  –	  27	  February	  2015.”	  762	  See,	  for	  example,	  British	  Virgin	  Islands	  Financial	  Services	  Commission,	  “Public	  Statement	  No.	  8	  of	  2013,	  20	  November,	  2013.”	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AML/CFT	  measures	  had	  either	  not	  yet	  been	  graded	  for	  effectiveness	  or	  were	  deemed	  insufficient.	  In	  the	  more	  serious	  cases,	  that	  of	  Iran	  for	  example,	  its	  recipe	  for	  countermeasures	  read	  in	  part	  as	  follows:	  	   The	  FATF	  reaffirms	  its	  call	  on	  members,	  and	  urges	  all	  jurisdictions,	  to	  advise	  their	  financial	  institutions	  to	  give	  special	  attention	  to	  business	  relationships	  and	  transactions	  with	  Iran,	  including	  Iranian	  companies	  and	  financial	  institutions.	  In	  addition	  to	  enhanced	  scrutiny,	  the	  FATF	  reaffirms	  its	  25	  February	  2009	  call	  on	  its	  members	  and	  urges	  all	  jurisdictions	  to	  apply	  effective	  counter-­‐measures	  to	  protect	  their	  financial	  sectors	  from	  money	  laundering	  and	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  (ML/FT)	  risks	  emanating	  from	  Iran.	  The	  FATF	  continues	  to	  urge	  jurisdictions	  to	  protect	  against	  correspondent	  relationships	  being	  used	  to	  bypass	  or	  evade	  counter-­‐measures	  and	  risk	  mitigation	  practices,	  and	  to	  take	  into	  account	  ML/FT	  risks	  when	  considering	  requests	  by	  Iranian	  financial	  institutions	  to	  open	  branches	  and	  subsidiaries	  in	  their	  jurisdiction.	  Due	  to	  the	  continuing	  terrorist	  financing	  threat	  emanating	  from	  Iran,	  jurisdictions	  should	  consider	  the	  steps	  already	  taken	  and	  possible	  additional	  safeguards,	  or	  strengthen	  existing	  ones.763	  	  Such	  materials	  are	  also	  compiled	  into	  the	  FATF’s	  annual	  report,	  which	  includes	  a	  list	  of	  “high	  risk	  and	  non-­‐cooperative	  jurisdictions.”	  The	  2011-­‐12	  report,	  to	  cite	  one	  example,	  while	  “blacklisting”	  Iran	  and	  North	  Korea,	  also	  listed	  18	  countries	  with	  which	  FATF	  members	  were	  advised	  to	  use	  caution	  when	  dealing	  with	  financially.	  The	  report	  further	  listed	  22	  additional	  countries	  where,	  despite	  a	  “high-­‐level	  political	  commitment”	  to	  fixing	  AML/CFT	  problems,	  FATF	  members	  were	  still	  advised	  to	  be	  wary	  of.	  764	  	  Such	  “blacklisting”	  or	  “greylisting”	  has	  been	  seen	  to	  be	  largely	  effective	  when	  used	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  FATF.765	  (Middle	  Eastern	  countries	  such	  as	  Oman	  and	  Lebanon	  introduced	  their	  own	  AML	  legislation	  in	  2001	  in	  part	  to	  avoid,	  or	  be	  removed,	  from	  FATF	  “uncooperative	  countries”	  listings.766	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  the	  UAE’s	  2002	  AML	  law	  was	  introduced	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  FATF	  was	  closely	  reviewing	  the	  country.)	  While	  the	  intention	  is	  to	  force	  a	  state’s	  decision	  makers	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  international	  body’s	  AML/CFT	  requirements,	  in	  some	  cases,	  pressure	  may	  be	  brought	  from	  external	  players	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  when	  Guyana	  faced	  blacklisting	  by	  the	  Caribbean	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (CFATF)	  in	  early	  2014,	  the	  Conference	  of	  Heads	  of	  Government	  of	  the	  15	  members	  of	  CARICOM	  (Caribbean	  Community)	  issued	  a	  communiqué	  criticizing	  Guyana	  for	  failing	  to	  implement	  the	  FATF-­‐required	  AML/CFT	  legislation.	  It	  noted	  that	  the	  blacklisting	  would	  “’have	  far-­‐reaching	  implications	  and,	  indeed,	  repercussions	  on	  the	  economy	  of	  Guyana	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  every	  territory	  of	  the	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  FATF,	  “FATF	  Public	  Statement	  –	  27	  February	  2015.”	  764	  FATF,	  Annual	  Report	  2011-­‐2012,	  29-­‐31.	  765	  Sharman,	  “The	  Bark	  is	  the	  Bite;	  Johnson,	  “Blacklisting.”	  766	  Ali,	  “Oman	  Money-­‐Laundering	  Law	  Nears	  Completion”;	  and	  Reuters,	  “Lebanon	  Bows	  to	  World	  Pressure	  on	  Banking	  Secrecy.”	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Region.’”	  A	  news	  media	  article	  noted	  that	  these	  repercussions	  would	  “affect	  the	  cost	  of	  processing	  international	  transactions	  and	  will	  adversely	  affect	  trade	  and	  financial	  flows	  in	  the	  Region.”	  The	  statement	  by	  the	  CARICOM	  heads	  added	  that:	  “’The	  non-­‐passage	  of	  the	  Bill	  will	  also	  retard	  the	  regional	  integration	  enterprise,	  limit	  the	  opportunity	  for	  growth	  in	  Guyana	  and	  the	  Region	  and	  result	  in	  hardship	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Guyana,	  and	  indeed,	  of	  the	  Region…We	  call	  on	  all	  relevant	  parties	  to	  enact	  the	  necessary	  legislation	  in	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  interest.’”767	  Another	  way	  blacklisting	  can	  affect	  a	  country	  beyond	  its	  borders	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  remittance.	  When	  the	  Philippines	  faced	  possible	  FATF	  blacklisting	  in	  2013,	  a	  concern	  noted	  at	  the	  time	  was	  that	  the	  process	  meant	  “tighter	  requirements	  imposed	  on	  nationals	  of	  a	  country	  when	  they	  engage	  in	  financial	  transactions.	  Such	  a	  consequence	  is	  seen	  to	  adversely	  affect	  sending	  of	  remittances	  by	  the	  over	  10	  million	  estimated	  overseas	  Filipino	  workers.”768	  	  
The	  Cost	  of	  Terrorism	  While	  many	  of	  the	  above	  issues	  involve	  abstractions	  involving	  reputation,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  pragmatic	  concern	  of	  what	  effect	  terrorism	  would	  have	  on	  the	  UAE.	  Besides	  the	  human	  cost	  of	  victims	  and	  casualties,	  there	  are	  also	  political	  and	  economic	  costs	  involved.	  With	  that	  said,	  assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  an	  AML/CFT	  program	  in	  dealing	  with	  terrorism	  is	  challenging.	  “[I]t	  is	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  establish	  connections	  between	  terrorism	  averted	  and	  any	  specific	  element	  of	  the	  AML	  regime;	  only	  where	  a	  specific	  terrorist	  plot	  is	  foiled,	  fairly	  late	  in	  its	  development,	  can	  a	  connection	  be	  made.	  In	  turn,	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  regime	  is	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  preventing	  international	  terrorism	  incidents,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  examined	  on	  a	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  basis	  as	  much	  as	  on	  its	  efficacy	  in	  measurably	  contributing	  to	  preventing	  an	  incident.”769	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  to	  itemize	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  terrorism	  incidents	  would	  affect	  the	  UAE	  itself.	  The	  country’s	  business	  and	  financial	  sectors	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  at	  risk;	  a	  2005	  IMF	  “working	  paper”	  noted	  that	  since	  1998	  business	  facilities	  have	  become	  a	  preferred	  terrorist	  target.	  The	  authors	  then	  broke	  down	  the	  “economic	  consequences	  of	  terrorism”	  into	  several	  categories.	  	  
• Direct	  Economic	  Costs:	  This	  includes	  “the	  destruction	  of	  life	  and	  property,	  responses	  to	  the	  emergency,	  restoration	  of	  the	  systems	  and	  the	  infrastructure	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  Kaieteur	  News	  report,	  “‘Blacklisted’	  Guyana	  Will	  Have	  Repercussions	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  768	  Remo,	  “Int’l	  Body	  Wants	  More	  Teeth	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  Chasing	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  more	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  effectiveness,	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affected,	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  temporary	  living	  assistance.”	  These	  are	  highest	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  following	  an	  incident,	  and	  are	  “likely	  to	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  attacks	  and	  the	  size	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  economy	  affected.”	  The	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  estimated	  direct	  economic	  costs	  to	  the	  United	  States	  of	  9/11	  at	  $27.2	  billion,	  or	  about	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  US	  GDP.	  
• Indirect	  Costs	  of	  Terrorism:	  These	  “can	  be	  significant	  and	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  medium	  term	  by	  undermining	  consumer	  and	  investor	  confidence.”	  This	  can,	  for	  example,	  “reduce	  the	  incentive	  to	  spend	  as	  opposed	  to	  save,”	  start	  “a	  generalized	  drop	  in	  asset	  prices	  and	  a	  flight	  to	  quality	  that	  increases	  the	  borrowing	  costs	  for	  riskier	  borrowers.”	  The	  9/11	  attacks	  “primarily	  affected	  the	  major	  industrial	  countries	  through	  a	  fall	  in	  demand	  generated	  by	  the	  loss	  in	  confidence	  about	  the	  economy	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  output.”	  
• Negative	  Impact	  on	  Productivity:	  A	  terror	  attack	  can	  do	  this	  “by	  raising	  the	  costs	  of	  transactions	  through	  increased	  security	  measures,	  higher	  insurance	  premiums,	  and	  the	  increased	  costs	  of	  financial	  and	  other	  counterterrorism	  regulations.”770	  
Conclusion	  The	  UAE	  is	  a	  rapidly	  developing	  economy,	  which	  has	  pursued	  policies	  of	  economic	  diversification.	  Some	  argue	  that	  economic	  success	  of	  the	  UAE	  is	  partially	  built	  on	  criminal	  funds.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  9/11	  the	  underground,	  criminal	  economy	  of	  the	  country	  attracted	  attention	  from	  the	  international	  community	  due	  to	  its	  role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  financing	  of	  these	  attacks.	  After	  mounting	  international	  pressure,	  the	  country	  passed	  AML/CFT	  laws,	  though	  publically	  denying	  its	  venerability	  to	  and	  risk	  of	  money	  laundering.	  After	  less-­‐than-­‐expected	  results	  on	  the	  FATF	  mutual	  evaluation	  of	  2008,	  the	  UAE	  embarked	  on	  the	  path	  of	  more	  comprehensive	  legislative	  reforms	  addressing	  money	  laundering,	  terrorist	  financing	  and	  corruption.	  What	  we	  can	  see	  is	  the	  country’s	  reactive	  approach	  to	  the	  international	  criticism	  and	  pressure;	  it	  is	  in	  the	  UAE’s	  interests	  to	  have	  an	  aggressive	  AML/CFT	  framework	  in	  place	  because	  there	  are	  significant	  consequences	  for	  not	  doing	  so.	  Setting	  aside	  the	  potential	  punishment	  of	  “blacklisting”	  or	  “greylisting,”	  Gresham’s	  Law	  that	  “bad	  money	  drives	  out	  good”	  seems	  applicable	  given	  the	  ramifications	  of	  a	  poor	  fiscal	  reputation.	  The	  UAE	  economic	  diversification	  program	  largely	  dependents	  on	  foreign	  investments.	  For	  that	  reason	  the	  country	  has	  established	  a	  channel	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  free	  zones.	  If	  in	  the	  past	  the	  country	  could	  afford	  to	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  on	  capital	  investments	  coming	  to	  it,	  now	  the	  risks	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  are	  too	  high.	  The	  UAE	  has	  worked	  hard	  to	  present	  itself	  to	  the	  world	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as	  a	  low-­‐crime,	  low-­‐corruption	  and	  stable	  state.	  However,	  that	  image	  is	  easily	  wrecked	  in	  an	  era	  of	  fast-­‐moving	  media.	  What	  is	  at	  stake,	  should	  the	  UAE’s	  image	  suffer,	  is	  foreign	  investment,	  which	  the	  UAE	  lobbied	  to	  regain	  after	  the	  fiscal	  problems	  of	  2009.	  Nor	  can	  the	  country	  afford	  to	  see	  its	  financial	  institutions	  weakened	  by	  reports	  or	  the	  perception	  of	  instability	  caused	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  integrity.	  Finally,	  the	  UAE	  must	  consider	  its	  own	  interests	  in	  preventing	  the	  possibility	  of	  terror	  attacks	  on	  its	  own	  soil,	  which	  in	  addition	  to	  direct	  human	  costs	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  own	  long-­‐term	  economic	  consequences.	  The	  UAE	  government’s	  priority	  is	  sustainable	  stability,	  despite	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  turmoil	  in	  the	  region.	  In	  2010,	  the	  government	  of	  the	  UAE	  launched	  its	  plan	  for	  the	  upcoming	  decade	  –	  UAE	  Vision	  2021	  –	  in	  which,	  among	  other	  things,	  it	  seeks	  to	  reinforce	  its	  citizens’	  sense	  of	  safety	  and	  achieve	  leading	  positions	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  security.771	  Though	  some	  aspects	  of	  their	  implementation	  has	  been	  faulted,	  the	  UAE’s	  efforts	  to	  address	  AML	  and	  ultimately	  CFT	  issues	  between	  1987-­‐2014	  were	  undertaken	  with	  all	  of	  the	  above	  concerns	  above.	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  work	  will	  try	  to	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  efforts.	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6.	  Development	  of	  a	  Methodology	  to	  Assess	  
the	  Relevance	  and	  Effectiveness	  of	  UAE	  
AML/CFT	  Efforts	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter,	  evaluating	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  AML/CFT	  laws	  and	  their	  implementation	  is	  challenging	  even	  in	  open	  societies	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  transparency.	  While	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  is	  a	  fast-­‐developing	  country	  with	  oft-­‐stated	  goals	  of	  greater	  information	  flow,	  access	  to	  government	  data	  is	  controlled	  and	  it	  is	  rare	  to	  find	  the	  publication	  of	  official	  statistics	  on	  money	  laundering.	  In	  part,	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  legal	  tradition	  –	  courts	  are	  under	  no	  obligations	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  news	  media,	  for	  instance.	  And	  given	  its	  geographic	  position	  in	  the	  volatile	  Middle	  East,	  there	  are	  presumably	  also	  general	  security	  concerns	  about	  issuing	  data	  that	  would	  reveal	  areas	  of	  law	  enforcement/security	  service	  interest.	  While	  the	  literature	  review	  (given	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter)	  contains	  some	  works	  that	  have	  tried	  to	  assess	  AML/CFT	  effectiveness,	  among	  the	  most	  significant	  are	  the	  “11	  Immediate	  Outcomes”	  put	  forth	  by	  the	  FATF	  in	  2013.	  These	  outcomes,	  which	  are	  now	  part	  of	  FATF	  mutual	  evaluation	  assessments,	  are	  as	  follows:	  	   1) Money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  risks	  are	  understood	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	  actions	  coordinated	  domestically	  to	  combat	  money	  laundering	  and	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  and	  proliferation.	  	  2) International	  cooperation	  delivers	  appropriate	  information,	  financial	  intelligence,	  and	  evidence,	  and	  facilitates	  action	  against	  criminals	  and	  their	  assets.	  	  3) Supervisors	  appropriately	  supervise,	  monitor	  and	  regulate	  financial	  institutions	  and	  DNFBPs	  for	  compliance	  with	  AML/CFT	  requirements	  commensurate	  with	  their	  risks.	  	  4) Financial	  institutions	  and	  DNFBPs	  adequately	  apply	  AML/CFT	  preventive	  measures	  commensurate	  with	  their	  risks,	  and	  report	  suspicious	  transactions.	  	  5) Legal	  persons	  and	  arrangements	  are	  prevented	  from	  misuse	  for	  money	  laundering	  or	  terrorist	  financing,	  and	  information	  on	  their	  beneficial	  ownership	  is	  available	  to	  competent	  authorities	  without	  impediments.	  	  6) Financial	  intelligence	  and	  all	  other	  relevant	  information	  are	  appropriately	  used	  by	  competent	  authorities	  for	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  investigations.	  	  7) Money	  laundering	  offences	  and	  activities	  are	  investigated	  and	  offenders	  are	  prosecuted	  and	  subject	  to	  effective,	  proportionate	  and	  dissuasive	  sanctions.	  	  8) Proceeds	  and	  instrumentalities	  of	  crime	  are	  confiscated.	  	  9) Terrorist	  financing	  offences	  and	  activities	  are	  investigated	  and	  persons	  who	  finance	  terrorism	  are	  prosecuted	  and	  subject	  to	  effective,	  proportionate	  and	  dissuasive	  sanctions.	  	  10) Terrorists,	  terrorist	  organisations	  and	  terrorist	  financiers	  are	  prevented	  from	  raising,	  moving	  and	  using	  funds,	  and	  from	  abusing	  the	  NPO	  sector.	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11) Persons	  and	  entities	  involved	  in	  the	  proliferation	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  are	  prevented	  from	  raising,	  moving	  and	  using	  funds,	  consistent	  with	  the	  relevant	  UNSCRs.772	  	  While	  these	  standards	  are	  significant,	  and	  were	  known	  to	  the	  researcher	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  planning	  of	  this	  thesis,	  several	  factors	  made	  the	  independent	  development	  of	  an	  assessment	  methodology	  attractive.	  One	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  doing	  so	  provided	  a	  solid	  scholarly	  exercise.	  Another	  was	  the	  possibility	  that	  while	  the	  FATF	  outcomes	  reflect	  an	  international	  regulatory	  perspective,	  a	  survey	  of	  those	  standards	  valued	  by	  professional	  AML/CFT	  practitioners	  may	  elicit	  other	  viewpoints.	  A	  third	  was	  the	  realization	  that	  hard	  data	  on	  an	  ongoing	  security	  concern	  (i.e.,	  terrorism)	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  made	  it	  hard	  or	  impractical	  in	  that	  country	  to	  try	  gathering	  data	  on	  terror	  cases.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  this	  study	  is	  built	  upon	  primary	  and	  secondary	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  as	  described	  in	  the	  following	  pages.	  The	  primary	  data	  collection	  was	  conducted	  in	  three	  stages	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  establishing	  and	  applying	  criteria	  for	  evaluation	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  AML/CFT	  legislation	  in	  the	  UAE.	  
Stage	  One	  (Survey	  and	  Interviews)	  The	  first	  stage,	  involving	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  short	  questionnaire	  coupled	  with	  structured	  interview	  questions	  with	  AML	  experts,	  disclosed	  12	  themes	  perceived	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  success	  of	  AML	  legislation	  in	  any	  jurisdiction	  or	  at	  large.	  These	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  at	  the	  ACAMS	  5th	  Annual	  AML	  and	  Financial	  Crime	  Conference	  MENA	  in	  Dubai	  on	  18-­‐19	  January	  2015.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  stage	  was	  to	  identify	  potential	  measures	  of	  effectiveness,	  to	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  general	  criteria.	  	  	  The	  researcher	  chose	  the	  ACAMS	  conference	  as	  a	  venue	  for	  carrying	  the	  interviews,	  since	  its	  presenters,	  attendees	  and	  audience	  comprised	  AML/CFT	  professionals	  representing	  various	  economic	  and	  geo-­‐political	  sectors.	  While	  these	  were	  mainly	  experts	  working	  in	  the	  UAE	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MENA)	  region,	  the	  conference’s	  international	  nature	  allowed	  the	  sampling	  of	  views	  to	  transcend	  Gulf	  Co-­‐Operation	  Council	  (GCC)	  jurisdictional	  boundaries.	  Those	  interviewed	  at	  the	  ACAMS	  MENA	  event	  included	  AML/CFT	  specialists	  from	  the	  UAE	  (12)	  the	  greater	  Middle	  East	  (9),	  North	  America	  (1)	  and	  Europe	  (3).	  Over	  the	  two-­‐day	  period,	  26	  one-­‐on-­‐one,	  in-­‐person	  interviews	  were	  conducted.	  All	  were	  audio	  recorded,	  transcribed,	  and	  then	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analyzed	  using	  NVivo,	  a	  qualitative	  data	  analysis	  software	  package.	  The	  interviewees	  were	  asked	  10	  questions.	  The	  first	  four	  questions,	  delivered	  on	  a	  questionnaire	  form,	  were	  demographical	  in	  nature	  focusing	  on	  where	  and	  how	  long	  the	  interviewee	  worked	  in	  the	  AML	  field.	  	  
• Q1.	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  your	  professional	  position?	  (The	  respondents	  were	  given	  18	  choices	  to	  identify	  their	  professional	  affiliation	  or	  list	  it	  under	  “Other,”	  if	  it	  was	  not	  already	  represented.)	  
• Q2.	  How	  long	  have	  you	  worked	  in	  the	  AML	  area?	  (The	  work	  experience	  was	  broken	  down	  as	  less	  than	  1	  year,	  1	  and	  2,	  3	  and	  5,	  5	  and	  10,	  and	  more	  than	  10	  years.)	  
• Q3.	  How	  long	  have	  you	  worked	  in	  the	  AML	  area	  in	  the	  UAE?	  (The	  questions	  had	  the	  same	  breakdown	  of	  time	  periods	  as	  the	  previous	  one.)	  
• Q4.	  In	  which	  jurisdiction	  do	  you	  work?	  (In	  addition	  to	  a	  list	  of	  all	  seven	  Emirates	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  UK	  were	  given	  as	  options,	  along	  with	  “Other,”	  where	  a	  respondent	  could	  identify	  the	  country	  he/she	  came	  from.)	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  questions	  were	  delivered	  as	  part	  of	  interviews.	  Questions	  5-­‐7	  were	  directed	  toward	  identification	  of	  markers	  of	  success.	  	  
• Q5.	  Can	  you	  identify	  some	  “markers”	  by	  which	  one	  could	  measure	  the	  success	  of	  AML	  legislation?	  	  
• Q6.	  Can	  you	  share	  any	  observations,	  anecdotal	  or	  otherwise,	  involving	  measuring	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  AML	  legislation?	  
• Q7.	  Do	  you	  have	  any	  observations	  about	  AML	  legislation	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  UAE?	  	  The	  remaining	  three	  questions,	  also	  delivered	  during	  the	  interviewing	  phase,	  were	  meant	  to	  assist	  the	  researcher	  with	  obtaining	  additional	  data	  and	  introduce	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  follow-­‐up	  interview.	  	  
• Q8.	  Can	  you	  suggest	  a	  contact	  or	  office	  where	  measurement	  data	  for	  AML	  legislation	  can	  be	  obtained?	  	  
• Q9.	  Is	  there	  anything	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add?	  	  
• Q10.	  Can	  I	  contact	  you	  with	  follow-­‐up	  questions?	  	  	  
Breakdown	  of	  Stage	  One	  Survey/Interview	  Results	  Eleven	  interviewees	  identified	  their	  professional	  position	  as	  “compliance	  officer”	  from	  the	  banking	  sector.	  The	  sample	  also	  included	  regulators	  (3),	  accountants/auditors	  (2),	  lawyer	  (1),	  law	  enforcement	  officer	  (1),	  government	  official	  (1),	  financial	  trading,	  financial	  service	  provider	  and	  consultant	  (4),	  money	  transfer	  and	  mortgage	  providers	  (2),	  and	  NGO	  representative	  (1).	  Eight	  of	  those	  interviewed	  were	  not	  novices	  to	  the	  AML	  field	  and	  had	  worked	  there	  for	  more	  than	  10	  years.	  Seven	  indicated	  that	  they	  had	  worked	  in	  the	  AML	  field	  between	  five	  and	  10	  years;	  five	  had	  worked	  in	  the	  field	  between	  three	  and	  five	  years,	  four	  between	  one	  and	  two	  years;	  and	  one	  less	  than	  a	  year.	  In	  total,	  20	  out	  of	  26	  interviewees	  worked	  in	  the	  AML	  field	  for	  more	  than	  three	  years.	  The	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following	  themes,	  or	  success	  markers,	  emerged	  through	  the	  answers	  given	  in	  interviews	  to	  Questions	  5,	  6	  and	  7	  (they	  are	  presented	  here	  in	  alphabetical	  order):	  	  
• AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	  	  
• AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  	  
• AML	  Legislation	  Enhancement	  	  
• AML	  Legislation	  Harmonization	  in	  Alignment	  to	  International	  Standards	  
• Government	  Commitment	  	  
• High	  Ratio	  of	  Asset	  Recovery	  to	  Cost	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Prosecution	  
• High	  Ratio	  of	  Prosecutions	  to	  STRs	  	  
• Number	  of	  Sanctions	  	  
• Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  	  
• Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  	  
• Transparency	  	  
• Well-­‐Developed	  IT	  Infrastructure	  	  
Stage	  Two:	  Survey	  to	  Determine	  Top	  Five	  Chosen	  Markers	  of	  Success	  	  The	  information	  collected	  during	  the	  first,	  qualitative	  stage	  of	  the	  study	  was	  converted	  into	  a	  survey,	  which	  represents	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  methodology.	  In	  this	  phase,	  the	  earlier	  collected	  “markers	  of	  success”	  were	  narrowed	  down	  to	  five	  through	  tabulation	  of	  data	  from	  a	  qualitative	  survey	  conducted	  at	  the	  20th	  Annual	  International	  AML	  and	  Financial	  Crime	  Conference	  on	  16-­‐18	  March	  in	  Hollywood,	  Florida,	  USA.	  The	  top	  five	  markers	  of	  success	  that	  had	  been	  chosen	  by	  those	  surveyed	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  
Table	  1:	  Top	  5	  Chosen	  Markers	  of	  Success	  
Marker	  of	  Success	   Number	  of	  
Responses	  
Percent	  of	  Total	  
AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	   145	   63	  AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	   141	   61.3	  Transparency	   135	   58.7	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	   126	   54.8	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   120	   52.2	  	  A	  total	  of	  230	  surveys	  were	  administered.	  As	  with	  the	  Dubai	  event,	  while	  many	  of	  those	  attending	  were	  “local”	  (North	  Americans),	  the	  conference’s	  international	  nature	  allowed	  the	  gathering	  of	  views	  from	  a	  diverse	  audience.	  The	  majority	  of	  respondents	  (frequency	  of	  190),	  82.61	  percent	  were	  from	  North	  America,	  but	  the	  surveyed	  pool	  also	  included	  40	  “international”	  respondents	  from	  Latin	  American	  and	  the	  Caribbean,	  South	  America,	  Africa,	  Central	  America,	  Asia,	  and	  Europe.	  Five	  respondents	  (2.2	  percent)	  did	  not	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provide	  a	  response	  to	  the	  regional	  question.	  The	  geographic	  distribution	  of	  the	  surveyed	  is	  presented	  in	  Table	  2.	  	  
Table	  2:	  Place	  of	  Work	  
Geographic	  Region	   Frequency	   Percentage	  North	  America	   190	   82.6	  Latin	  American	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  	   15	   6.5	  South	  American	  	   8	   3.5	  Africa	   3	   1.3	  Central	  America	  	   3	   1.3	  Asia	   3	   1.3	  Europe	  	   3	   1.3	  Not	  Answered	  	   5	   2.2	  Total	  	   230	   100	  	  Almost	  40	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed	  (frequency	  of	  89)	  had	  worked	  in	  the	  AML	  area	  for	  more	  than	  10	  years.	  This	  strengthens	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  collected	  data	  since	  the	  surveyed	  were	  not	  new	  to	  the	  AML	  field.	  Only	  12	  (5.4	  percent)	  of	  those	  surveyed	  respondents	  had	  been	  in	  the	  AML	  field	  for	  less	  than	  one	  year.	  	  	  
Table	  3:	  Work	  Duration	  
Work	  duration	  in	  the	  AML	   Frequency	   Percent	  More	  than	  10	  years	   89	   39.9	  6-­‐10	  years	   64	   28.7	  3-­‐5	  years	   40	   17.9	  1-­‐2	  years	   18	   8.1	  Less	  than	  1	  year	  	   12	   5.4	  	  There	  was	  a	  diverse	  occupational	  affiliation	  of	  the	  surveyed	  pool.	  Though	  33.8	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed	  identified	  their	  professional	  position	  as	  compliance	  officers	  (frequency	  of	  90),	  the	  sample	  also	  included	  consultants,	  accountants,	  software	  developers,	  entrepreneurs,	  government	  officials,	  cyber	  security	  specialists,	  lawyers,	  regulators,	  law	  enforcement	  agents,	  and	  other.	  The	  occupational	  breakdown	  is	  presented	  in	  Table	  4.	  	  	  
Table	  4:	  Professional	  Position	  
Professional	  Position	  	   Frequency	   Percent	  Accountant/Auditor	   33	   12.4	  Consultant	   29	   10.9	  Software	  Developer	   8	   3	  Entrepreneur	   2	   0.8	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Compliance	  Office	   90	   33.8	  Government	  Official	   14	   5.3	  Cyber	  Security	  Specialist	  	   1	   0.4	  Lawyer	   12	   4.5	  Regulator	  	   19	   7.1	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agent	  	   15	   5.6	  Other773	   43	   16.2	  	  Surveyed	  individuals	  worked	  in	  broad	  types	  of	  organizations.	  Almost	  50	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed	  (frequency	  of	  121)	  worked	  in	  the	  banking	  sector	  including	  Private,	  Retail,	  Commercial,	  Investment	  banks.	  The	  sample	  also	  had	  representatives	  from	  Government,	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agencies,	  Consulting	  companies,	  and	  others.	  Table	  5	  shows	  a	  break	  down	  of	  work	  places	  for	  the	  pool	  of	  respondents.	  	  	  
Table	  5:	  Area	  of	  Work	  
Area	  of	  work	   Frequency	   Percent	  Consulting	  Company	   29	   11	  Banking	  (Private)	   27	   10.3	  Banking	  (Retail)	   45	   17.1	  Banking	  (Commercial)	   35	   13.3	  Banking	  (Investment)	  	   14	   5.3	  Other774	   32	   12.2	  Insurance	  	   5	   1.9	  Legal	  firm	   2	   0.8	  Casino	   3	   1.1	  Money	  Service	  Business	   7	   2.7	  NGO	   2	   0.8	  Government	   25	   9.5	  Brokerage	   14	   5.3	  Precious	  Metals/Stones	   1	   0.4	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agency	   18	   6.8	  Security	  Services	   4	   1.5	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
773	  The	  list	  of	  professional	  positions	  identified	  under	  “Other”	  were:	  Compliance	  Auditor,	  Compliance	  Professional,	  Compliance	  Manager,	  Compliance	  Testing,	  Analysts,	  AML	  Analyst,	  AML	  BSA	  Analyst,	  Senior	  BSA	  Analyst,	  Paralegal/Social	  Media	  Analyst,	  Counter	  Threat	  Finance	  Analyst,	  Compliance	  Analysts,	  Investigator,	  Financial	  Crime	  Investigator,	  Investigator/	  AML	  Compliance,	  AML	  Investigations	  Manager,	  BSA	  AML	  Investigations	  Manager,	  Operations	  &	  Security	  Officer,	  Risk	  Officer,	  BSA	  Officers,	  Risk	  Managers,	  AML	  Manager,	  Investment	  Management	  Senior	  Executive,	  AML-­‐Watch	  list	  Screening,	  Banker,	  Sales,	  Software	  Marketing,	  Financial	  Service	  Providers,	  Department	  Of	  Defense	  Civilians,	  and	  Researcher.	  774	  Under	  “Other”	  those	  surveyed	  listed	  the	  following	  workplaces:	  Software	  provider,	  Regulation,	  Military,	  Banking	  Compliance,	  Holding	  Company,	  Payment	  Processing,	  Credit	  Card,	  Sole	  Proprietor,	  Credit	  Union,	  GSE-­‐Mortgage	  Investor,	  Non-­‐bank	  Financial	  Institution,	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Data,	  Asset	  Management	  Company,	  Investment	  Management,	  Vendor-­‐Information	  Provider,	  Financial	  Service	  Providers.	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In	  addition	  to	  testing	  and	  narrowing	  down	  the	  evaluation	  criteria	  for	  AML	  legislation	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  UAE,	  the	  quantitative	  data	  analysis	  of	  the	  surveys	  examined	  correlations	  between	  variables	  in	  the	  survey.	  By	  using	  three	  statistical	  outputs	  –	  the	  Chi-­‐square,775	  Asymptotic	  significance	  (2-­‐sided),776	  and	  Cramer’s	  V777	  –	  the	  study	  tested	  whether	  there	  significant	  relationships	  exist	  between	  chosen	  markers	  of	  success	  and	  particular	  professions,	  areas	  of	  work,	  or	  length	  of	  work	  in	  the	  AML	  field.	  For	  example,	  when	  examining	  whether	  identified	  professions	  tended	  to	  list	  a	  specific	  marker,	  high	  significance	  was	  found	  between	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agents	  and	  the	  marker	  “High	  Ratio	  of	  Asset	  Recovery	  to	  Cost	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Prosecution.	  This	  relation	  has	  a	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐square	  of	  27.213,	  which	  is	  considerably	  higher	  than	  the	  minimum	  expected	  number	  of	  2.15;	  an	  Asymptotic	  Significance	  of	  less	  than	  0.01	  percent;	  and	  a	  rating	  on	  the	  Cramer	  V	  test	  of	  0.344.	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agents	  also	  gave	  preference	  to	  “Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework”	  and	  “AML	  Legislation	  Awareness”	  as	  their	  perceived	  markers	  of	  success.	  The	  survey	  also	  showed	  that	  Compliance	  Officers	  tended	  to	  give	  preference	  to	  “AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement”	  and	  “AML	  Legislation	  Harmonization	  in	  Alignment	  to	  International	  Standards.”	  Consultants	  tended	  to	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  “Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation.”	  The	  relationships	  between	  the	  markers	  of	  success	  and	  profession	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  6.	  Alternately,	  Tables	  7	  and	  8	  highlight	  areas	  of	  moderate	  and	  low	  significance	  in	  correlation	  between	  profession	  and	  selected	  markers	  of	  success.	  	  	  
Table	  6:	  High	  Significance	  Between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Profession	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775	  Chi-­‐square	  test,	  showed	  the	  existence	  or	  nonexistence	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  investigated	  variables.	  	  776	  Asymptotic	  significance	  demonstrated	  the	  statistical	  reliability	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  data.	  To	  establish	  significance	  the	  output	  has	  to	  be	  less	  than	  5	  percent.	  The	  significance	  increase	  as	  its	  value	  approaches	  0.	  	  777	  Cramer's	  V	  measures	  association	  between	  two	  variables	  under	  investigation.	  Its	  reported	  value	  is	  from	  0	  (no	  association)	  to	  1	  (complete	  association).	  778	  Khashayar	  Nikravesh	  helped	  the	  author	  process	  statistical	  data	  presented	  in	  tables	  6-­‐14.	  






High	  Ratio	  of	  Asset	  Recovery	  to	  Cost	  	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Prosecution	   Law	  Enforcement	  Agent	   27.213	   >	  0.001	   0.344	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  	  Cooperation	   Consultant	   10.485	   0.001	   0.214	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   Law	  Enforcement	  Agent	   9.701	   0.002	   0.205	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	   Compliance	  Officer	   9.036	   0.003	   0.198	  AML	  legislation	  Awareness	   Law	  Enforcement	  Agent	  	   8.116	   0.004	   0.188	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Table	  7:	  Moderate	  Significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Profession	  






Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   Consultant	   5.943	   0.015	   0.161	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   Compliance	  Ofcr.	   5.983	   0.014	   0.161	  Government	  Commitment	   Compliance	  Ofcr.	   5.914	   0.015	   0.160	  High	  Ratio	  of	  Prosecution	  to	  STRs	   Law	  Enforcement	  	  Agent	   5.861	   0.015	   0.160	  Government	  Commitment	   Lawyer	   5.627	   0.018	   0.156	  AML	  legislation	  Awareness	   Consultant	   5.554	   0.018	   0.155	  	  
Table	  8:	  Low	  Significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Profession	  






Transparency	  	   Consultant	   4.034	   0.045	   0.132	  AML	  Legislation	  Harmonization	  in	  Alignment	  to	  International	  Standards	   Accountant/Auditor	   3.976	   0.046	   0.131	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	   Law	  Enforcement	  	  Agent	   3.843	   0.050	   0.129	  	  High	  significance	  was	  reported	  in	  relations	  between	  the	  markers	  of	  success	  and	  areas	  of	  work	  including	  Law	  Enforcement	  Agency,	  Government,	  Consulting	  Company,	  Retail	  and	  Commercial	  Banks,	  Brokerage	  and	  Money	  Service	  Business.	  AML	  Professionals	  working	  in	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  identified	  the	  “High	  Ratio	  of	  Asset	  Recovery	  to	  Cost	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Prosecution”	  as	  the	  marker	  of	  success	  for	  the	  AML	  legislation,	  with	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	  output	  of	  20.198	  over	  required	  2.58,	  Asymptotic	  Significance	  of	  less	  than	  0.001	  and	  Cramer’s	  V	  of	  0.2960.	  Representatives	  of	  Commercial	  Banks	  and	  Government	  selected	  “Well-­‐Developed	  IT	  Infrastructure.”	  The	  high	  significance	  of	  relationships	  between	  the	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  the	  area	  of	  work	  is	  presented	  in	  Table	  9.	  	  
	  
Table	  9:	  High	  Significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Area	  of	  Work	  






High	  Ratio	  of	  Asset	  Recovery	  to	  Cost	  	  of	  Investigation	  and	  Prosecution	   Law	  Enforcement	  	  Agency	   20.198	   >	  0.001	   0.296	  Well-­‐Developed	  IT	  infrastructure	   Banking	  	  (Commercial)	   10.544	   0.001	   0.214	  Well-­‐Developed	  IT	  infrastructure	   Government	   9.673	   0.002	   0.205	  AML	  legislation	  Awareness	   Law	  Enforcement	  	  Agency	   9.253	   0.002	   0.201	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	   Banking	  (Retail)	   8.307	   0.004	   0.190	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   Consulting	  Co.	   8.04	   0.005	   0.187	  Government	  Commitment	   Government	   7.584	   0.006	   0.182	  Government	  Commitment	   Brokerage	   7.606	   0.006	   0.182	  Number	  of	  Sanctions	   Money	  Service	  	  Business	   7.625	   0.006	   0.182	  
AML	  Legislation	  Harmonization	  in	  	  Alignment	  to	  International	  Standards	   Compliance	  Officer	  	   7.175	   0.007	   0.177	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  Tables	  10	  and	  11	  present	  moderate	  and	  low	  significance	  in	  relationships	  between	  the	  markers	  of	  success	  and	  areas	  of	  work.	  	  
Table	  10:	  Moderate	  Significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Area	  of	  Work	  






Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  	  Cooperation	   Consulting	  Company	   5.953	   0.015	   0.161	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	   Consulting	  Company	   5.536	   0.019	   0.155	  AML	  Legislation	  Harmonization	  in	  	  Alignment	  to	  International	  Standards	   Brokerage	   5.14	   0.023	   0.149	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  	  Cooperation	   Security	  Services	   4.932	   0.026	   0.146	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   Law	  Enforcement	  	  Agency	   4.658	   0.031	   0.142	  	  
Table	  11:	  Low	  Significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Area	  of	  Work	  






High	  Ratio	  of	  Prosecution	  to	  STRs	   Insurance	   4.363	   0.037	   0.138	  Number	  of	  Sanctions	   Banking	  (Retail)	   4.318	   0.038	   0.137	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	   Money	  Service	  	  Business	   4.232	   0.040	   0.136	  AML	  Legislation	  Enhancement	   Banking	  (Private)	   4.207	   0.040	   0.135	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  	  Cooperation	   Banking	  (Investment)	   4.135	   0.042	   0.134	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  	  Cooperation	   Brokerage	   4.135	   0.042	   0.134	  Government	  Commitment	   Banking	  (Commercial)	   4.078	   0.043	   0.133	  High	  Ratio	  of	  Prosecution	  to	  STRs	   Brokerage	   3.908	   0.048	   0.130	  	  When	  examining	  relationships	  between	  the	  markers	  of	  success	  and	  the	  length	  of	  work	  in	  the	  AML	  field,	  high	  significance	  was	  established	  between	  “Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework”	  and	  working	  in	  the	  AML	  between	  six	  and	  ten	  years	  and	  less	  than	  one	  year.	  The	  new	  comers	  to	  the	  AML	  profession	  found	  strong	  regulatory	  framework	  as	  important	  as	  the	  individuals	  who	  have	  worked	  in	  the	  field	  for	  over	  six	  years.	  The	  results	  of	  identified	  high	  significance	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  12.	  The	  moderate	  and	  low	  significance	  reported	  in	  Tables	  13	  and	  14	  respectively.	  	  	  
Table	  12:	  High	  Significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Length	  of	  Work	  in	  AML	  








Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   6-­‐10	  years	   8.010	   0.005	   0.187	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   Less	  than	  1	  year	   6.397	   0.011	   0.167	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Table	  13:	  Moderate	  Significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Length	  of	  Work	  in	  AML	  








AML	  Legislation	  Enhancement	   Less	  than	  1	  year	   5.867	   0.015	   0.160	  AML	  Legislation	  Enhancement	   6-­‐10	  years	   4.997	   0.025	   0.147	  Transparency	   1-­‐2	  years	   4.889	   0.027	   0.146	  	  
Table	  14:	  Low	  significance	  between	  Markers	  of	  Success	  and	  Length	  of	  Work	  in	  AML	  








Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	   3-­‐5	  years	   4.178	   0.041	   0.1350	  Well-­‐Developed	  IT	  infrastructure	   More	  than	  10	  years	   4.124	   0.042	   0.0134	  Well-­‐Developed	  IT	  infrastructure	   3-­‐5	  years	   4.001	   0.045	   0.1320	  Transparency	   More	  than	  10	  years	   3.962	   0.047	   0.1310	  
Stage	  Three	  The	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  research	  design	  will	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  This	  involves	  applying	  the	  top	  five	  “markers	  of	  success”	  to	  available	  data	  on	  applications	  and	  aspects	  of	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  As	  noted	  before,	  those	  markers	  are	  (in	  alphabetical	  order):	  	  
• AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	  
• AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  
• Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  
• Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  	  
• Transparency	  	  As	  there	  is	  some	  overlap	  between	  these	  concepts,	  as	  operationalized	  in	  the	  UAE	  case,	  they	  will	  not	  be	  addressed	  strictly	  in	  that	  order.	  At	  the	  onset	  of	  each	  chapter,	  perceived	  difficulties	  in	  applying	  these	  markers	  to	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  will	  also	  be	  discussed.	  The	  subsequent	  analysis	  in	  each	  chapter	  may	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  criteria	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  limited,	  fragmentary,	  or	  mainly	  qualitative	  data.	  	  
AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  and	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  Given	  their	  connection,	  the	  two	  markers	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  and	  Robust	  
Regulatory	  Framework	  will	  be	  examined	  together	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  marker	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  how	  effectively	  reported	  cases	  are	  investigated	  and	  prosecuted,	  and	  whether	  appropriate	  penalties	  and	  sentencing	  were	  applied.	  The	  term	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  the	  tools	  and	  vehicles	  put	  in	  place	  for	  companies	  to	  report	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suspicious	  transactions	  and	  whether	  appropriate	  mechanisms	  are	  in	  place	  to	  screen	  them	  for	  further	  referral	  to	  the	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.	  	  	  The	  two	  elements	  will	  be	  conflated	  in	  Chapter	  7	  on	  the	  assumption	  that,	  as	  an	  external	  driver,779	  legislation	  must	  be	  enforced	  to	  be	  compliant.	  Legislation	  can	  be	  passed,	  but	  unless	  regulators	  and	  governmental	  bodies	  put	  in	  place	  mechanisms	  for	  their	  enforcement,	  the	  laws	  will	  not	  be	  followed.	  Regulations	  support	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  serve	  as	  these	  mechanisms.	  AML	  legislation,	  no	  matter	  how	  strong	  it	  is,	  will	  not	  be	  effective	  unless	  there	  is	  a	  robust	  regulatory	  framework	  to	  guarantee	  its	  
enforcement and compliance.  	  To	  do	  this,	  Chapter	  7	  will	  present	  the	  history	  and	  evolution	  of	  AML/CFT	  Legislation	  and	  its	  enforcement	  in	  the	  UAE	  from	  1987-­‐2014,	  noting	  actions	  taken	  in	  response	  to	  standards	  set	  forth	  by	  international	  treaties,	  conventions	  and	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations.	  It	  will	  also	  present	  a	  broad	  examination	  of	  industry	  compliance	  during	  that	  time.	  It	  will	  do	  this	  in	  part	  by	  presenting	  figures	  on	  STRs	  and	  when	  available	  (as	  from	  2010-­‐2013)	  a	  breakdown	  of	  numbers	  showing	  subsequent	  prosecutions	  and,	  when	  successful,	  asset	  recoveries.	  	  
AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	  and	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  markers	  for	  AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	  and	  Private	  
Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation.	  The	  term	  AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  that	  all	  of	  a	  given	  company	  employees	  are	  informed	  and	  educated	  about	  the	  country’s	  AML	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  such	  as	  industry	  specific	  ones	  or	  those	  that	  are	  broader	  in	  scope.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  company	  employees	  must	  understand	  what	  AML	  laws	  require	  them	  to	  do	  in	  terms	  of	  mechanisms	  and	  procedures	  placed	  for	  detection	  and	  reporting	  of	  suspicious	  transactions.	  They	  presumably	  also	  have	  to	  know	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  not	  complying	  with	  the	  legislated	  regulations.	  	  	  Doing	  this	  may	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  impossible	  without	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  
Cooperation.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  that	  term	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
779	  “An	  external	  or	  internal	  condition	  that	  motivates	  the	  organization	  to	  define	  its	  goals.	  An	  example	  of	  an	  external	  driver	  is	  a	  change	  in	  regulation	  or	  compliance	  rules	  which,	  for	  example,	  require	  changes	  to	  the	  way	  an	  organization	  operates;	  i.e.,	  Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  in	  the	  US”	  (From	  “Glossary	  of	  Supplementary	  Definitions,”	  online	  at	  http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/togaf9-­‐doc/arch/apdxa.html.	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that	  private	  sector	  companies	  have	  to	  go	  beyond	  merely	  establishing	  appropriate	  reporting	  mechanisms	  and	  procedures	  for	  suspicious	  transaction	  reporting;	  they	  also	  have	  to	  adopt	  a	  corporate	  culture	  at	  the	  core	  of	  which	  is	  zero-­‐tolerance	  to	  illegal	  activities.	  Doing	  this	  is	  not	  possible	  without	  upper-­‐management	  commitment.	  It	  may	  be	  manifested	  in	  well-­‐designed	  training	  programs,	  which	  are	  ongoing	  and	  mandatory	  for	  all	  employers,	  not	  only	  for	  those	  newly	  on	  board.	  In	  such	  an	  atmosphere,	  private	  sector	  cooperation	  is	  carried	  beyond	  mere	  reporting,	  but	  extends	  to	  active	  cooperation	  with	  regulatory	  and	  law	  enforcement	  authorities.	  	  	  Due	  to	  the	  overlap	  of	  these	  themes,	  there	  will	  be	  some	  interchangeability	  of	  quantitative	  data	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  Chapter	  8	  will	  return	  to	  reported	  STR	  filings	  with	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  between	  2004-­‐2013,	  on	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  numbers	  indicate	  the	  level	  of	  awareness	  of	  legislative/regulatory	  requirements	  among	  private	  sector	  companies,	  and	  consequences	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  them.	  It	  will	  also	  cite	  media	  reports	  on	  awareness-­‐raising	  efforts	  during	  this	  period;	  examine	  the	  number	  of	  AML	  certified	  professionals	  working	  in	  the	  country,	  noting	  the	  recent	  founding	  of	  an	  ACAMS	  UAE	  Chapter;	  and	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  compliance	  services	  to	  ancillary	  companies	  registered	  within	  the	  DIFC.	  	  	  
Transparency	  Chapter	  9	  will	  examine	  the	  evolution	  of	  Transparency	  in	  the	  UAE	  about	  AML/CFT	  issues	  over	  the	  period	  1987-­‐2013.	  Used	  here,	  Transparency	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  access	  to	  and	  sharing	  of	  information	  between	  parties	  concerned	  and	  involved	  in	  business	  processes	  and	  AML	  reporting	  and	  investigation	  processes.	  But	  it	  also	  refers	  to	  transparency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  UAE	  authorities	  and	  UAE-­‐based	  financial	  institutions	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  money	  laundering	  in	  the	  country	  itself.	  To	  this	  end,	  Chapter	  9	  will	  trace	  the	  evolution	  in	  publicly	  expressed	  attitudes	  about	  AML/CFT	  issues	  as	  they	  concerned	  the	  UAE;	  about	  the	  public	  availability	  (or	  non-­‐availability)	  of	  AML/CFT-­‐relevant	  data;	  and	  general	  UAE-­‐based	  media	  reportage	  of	  AML/CFT	  concerns.	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7.	  The	  Evolution	  of	  a	  Regulatory/Legislative	  
Framework	  and	  Subsequent	  AML/CFT	  
Regulation/Legislation	  Enforcement	  in	  the	  
UAE,	  1987-­‐2014	  	  As	  noted	  previously,	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  two	  identified	  “markers	  of	  success”	  –	  “Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework”	  and	  “AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement.”	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  marker	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  how	  effectively	  reported	  cases	  are	  investigated	  and	  prosecuted,	  and	  whether	  appropriate	  penalties	  and	  sentencing	  were	  applied.	  The	  term	  Robust	  Regulatory	  
Framework	  may	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  the	  tools	  and	  vehicles	  put	  in	  place	  for	  companies	  to	  report	  suspicious	  transactions	  and	  whether	  appropriate	  mechanisms	  are	  in	  place	  to	  screen	  them	  for	  further	  referral	  to	  the	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.	  The	  two	  elements	  will	  be	  conflated	  herein	  on	  the	  assumption	  that,	  as	  an	  external	  driver,	  legislation	  must	  be	  enforced	  to	  be	  compliant.	  Legislation	  can	  be	  passed,	  but	  unless	  regulators	  and	  governmental	  bodies	  put	  in	  place	  mechanisms	  for	  their	  enforcement,	  the	  laws	  will	  not	  be	  followed.	  Regulations	  support	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  serve	  as	  these	  mechanisms.	  In	  identifying	  obstacles	  in	  controlling	  money	  laundering,	  Bernasconi	  states:	  “In	  order	  to	  establish	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  country	  may	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  criminal	  haven,	  we	  must	  not	  only	  consider	  the	  existence	  of	  legal	  standards	  but	  also	  the	  existence	  of	  authorities	  which	  may	  exercise	  effective	  control	  in	  applying	  the	  law.”780	  AML	  legislation,	  no	  matter	  how	  strong	  it	  is,	  will	  not	  be	  effective	  unless	  there	  is	  a	  robust	  regulatory	  framework	  to	  guarantee	  its	  enforcement	  and	  compliance.	  	  	  To	  do	  this,	  this	  chapter	  will	  present	  the	  history	  and	  evolution	  of	  AML	  (and	  eventually	  CFT)	  Legislation	  and	  its	  enforcement	  in	  the	  UAE	  from	  1987-­‐2014,	  noting	  actions	  taken	  in	  response	  to	  standards	  set	  forth	  by	  international	  treaties,	  conventions	  and	  FATF	  Recommendations.	  It	  will	  also	  present	  a	  broad	  examination	  of	  industry	  compliance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780	  Bernasconi,	  “Obstacles	  in	  Controlling	  Money	  Laundering	  Crimes,”	  249.	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during	  that	  time,	  presenting	  figures	  on	  STRs	  from	  2004-­‐2013	  and	  when	  available	  (as	  from	  2010-­‐2013)	  a	  breakdown	  of	  numbers	  showing	  subsequent	  prosecutions	  and,	  when	  successful,	  asset	  recoveries.	  
AML	  Regulatory	  Framework,	  1987-­‐2001	  Although	  the	  concept	  of	  money	  laundering,	  as	  understood	  in	  the	  West,	  received	  little	  attention	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  until	  perhaps	  2000,	  it	  was	  technically	  criminalized	  as	  early	  as	  1987.	  This	  came	  as	  part	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  bring	  the	  UAE	  into	  line	  with	  what	  would	  become	  the	  UN’s	  Vienna	  Convention	  of	  1988.	  The	  relevant	  legal	  item	  was	  Chapter	  Four,	  Article	  407	  of	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  1987	  (On	  Issuance	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code).	  Article	  407	  read	  as	  follows:	  	   Whoever	  knowingly	  possesses	  or	  conceals	  things	  resulting	  from	  a	  crime	  without	  taking	  part	  in	  commitment	  of	  the	  act	  shall	  be	  punished	  by	  the	  penalty	  prescribed	  for	  the	  crime	  from	  which	  he	  knows	  such	  things	  have	  resulted.	  A	  culprit	  who	  does	  not	  know	  that	  such	  things	  have	  resulted	  from	  a	  crime,	  but	  has	  obtained	  them	  in	  circumstances	  which	  lead	  him	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  sources	  are	  illegal,	  shall	  be	  punished	  by	  detention	  for	  a	  period	  not	  exceeding	  six	  months,	  by	  a	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  five	  thousand	  Dirhams,	  or	  by	  either	  of	  these	  two	  penalties.	  However,	  this	  included	  no	  specific	  definition	  or	  mention	  of	  the	  money	  laundering	  process.	  The	  FATF	  would	  ultimately	  find	  it	  deficient	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  AML	  legislation.781	  The	  article’s	  general	  language	  may	  also	  help	  explain	  why,	  as	  will	  be	  noted	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  a	  dozen	  years	  after	  its	  passage	  some	  bankers	  in	  the	  UAE	  thought	  no	  AML	  law	  was	  in	  place.782	  	  Little	  additional	  AML	  regulation	  seems	  to	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  UAE	  during	  the	  next	  few	  years.	  UAE	  owned	  banks,	  however,	  did	  run	  afoul	  of	  regulators	  in	  other	  countries.	  In	  1991	  US	  regulators	  fined	  Bank	  of	  Credit	  and	  Commerce	  International	  (BCCI)	  $200	  million	  for	  money	  laundering;	  the	  largely	  Abu	  Dhabi-­‐owned	  bank	  was	  registered	  in	  Luxemburg.	  (The	  then-­‐ruler	  of	  that	  emirate,	  also	  the	  then-­‐UAE	  president,	  himself	  figured	  in	  some	  resulting	  litigation.)783	  Perhaps	  the	  next	  regulatory	  effort	  that	  might	  fit	  into	  an	  AML	  framework	  came	  in	  1992,	  when	  the	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  Board	  of	  Directors’	  Resolution	  No.	  123/7/92.	  This	  required	  moneychangers	  in	  the	  UAE	  to	  obtain	  prior	  approval	  before,	  among	  other	  things,	  opening	  Nostro	  accounts	  (i.e.,	  in	  which	  a	  bank	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781	  FATF,	  “Annual	  Report	  2001-­‐2002,”	  Annex	  G,	  1.	  782	  David	  Bagley	  to	  “Susan”	  sent	  to	  wright.s@mhub2.com	  (likely	  Susan	  Wright,	  then	  HSBC’s	  chief	  AML	  officer),	  21	  Dec.	  1999,	  reproduced	  in	  Hakim,	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11,	  22,	  and	  other	  documents	  reproduced	  on	  23-­‐29.	  783	  Hakim,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11,	  141;	  Walker,	  “Corruption	  in	  International	  Banking	  and	  Financial	  Systems,”	  2,	  5;	  Snider,	  “Corporate	  Economic	  Crimes,”	  42-­‐43.	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opens	  an	  account	  with	  another	  bank).784	  A	  year	  later,	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  Circular	  No.	  14/93,	  which	  contained	  what	  were	  described	  as	  “comprehensive	  customer	  identification	  requirements	  and	  introduced	  a	  new	  requirement	  for	  opening	  of	  accounts	  for	  Charitable	  Institutions.”	  According	  to	  a	  2012	  AMLSCU	  publication,	  “[T]he	  regulation	  consists	  of	  (11)	  articles	  regarding	  account	  opening	  requirements,	  where	  banks	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  open	  secret	  or	  shadowy	  accounts.	  Also,	  banks	  are	  requested	  to	  obtain	  all	  necessary	  documents	  while	  opening	  an	  account	  or	  renting	  safe	  deposit	  boxes.	  Banks	  should	  also	  verify	  the	  name	  of	  the	  accountholder	  as	  per	  his/her	  passport	  or	  trade	  license	  in	  case	  of	  juridical	  persons	  (companies	  and	  establishments).	  All	  documents	  should	  be	  verified	  and	  information	  regarding	  each	  customer	  should	  be	  registered	  and	  duly	  updated	  accordingly.”	  Five	  years	  later,	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  Notice	  No.	  163/98	  “imposed	  an	  obligation	  to	  report	  certain	  types	  of	  suspicious	  transactions	  concerning	  the	  deposit	  of	  cash	  or	  third	  party	  cheques,	  when	  there	  are	  no	  known	  commercial	  activities.”	  The	  Central	  Bank	  subsequently	  directed	  all	  banks	  in	  the	  country	  to	  “monitor	  all	  Letters	  of	  Credit	  opened	  detailing	  the	  steps	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  banks	  in	  this	  regard.”	  And	  in	  July	  1998,	  the	  UAE	  established	  a	  six-­‐member	  Financial	  Intelligence	  Unit	  (FIU).	  It	  was	  given	  “access	  to	  all	  relevant	  authorities	  in	  the	  UAE	  as	  well	  as	  those	  abroad.”785	  	  	  By	  2000,	  although	  UAE	  officials	  downplayed	  concerns	  of	  money	  laundering	  inside	  the	  country,	  it	  had	  clearly	  emerged	  as	  (in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  the	  country’s	  “major	  focus	  …	  from	  the	  regulatory	  side.”786	  Certainly	  there	  were	  significant	  signs	  of	  official	  interest	  in	  the	  topic.	  In	  May	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi-­‐based	  Emirates	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  Studies	  and	  Research	  hosted	  an	  AML	  presentation	  by	  a	  US	  expert.787	  The	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  asked	  the	  Central	  Bank	  to	  form	  a	  body	  devoted	  to	  AML	  issues	  and	  in	  July,	  the	  bank	  created	  a	  National	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Committee	  (NAMLC)	  788	  On	  12	  September,	  the	  undersecretary	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Interior	  issued	  a	  directive	  creating	  an	  “Economic	  Crime	  Suppression	  Division”	  within	  the	  national	  Department	  of	  Security,	  intended	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  police.789	  In	  November	  the	  Dubai	  police	  held	  a	  five-­‐day	  AML	  training	  session,	  with	  help	  in	  part	  from	  their	  German	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
784	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  21.	  785	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  and	  AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report	  “	  (2012),	  13,	  22-­‐23.	  These	  sources	  differ	  on	  the	  year	  in	  which	  the	  FIU	  was	  founded;	  the	  author	  has	  relied	  on	  the	  AMLSCU	  document.	  786	  Chand,	  “In	  2000,	  Banks	  Jumped	  on	  IT	  Bandwagon,	  Kept	  Eye	  on	  Money-­‐Laundering.”	  787	  McDonald,	  Money	  Laundering,	  is	  the	  text	  of	  a	  presentation	  made	  in	  the	  UAE	  at	  that	  time.	  788	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  	  789	  Al	  Mulla,	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Money	  Laundering],	  312,	  translated for the author by Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim.	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counterparts.790	  And	  at	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  Governor	  Nasser	  Al	  Suwaidi	  announced	  that	  a	  new	  AML	  law	  would	  be	  announced	  within	  three	  months.791	  Local	  newspapers	  greeted	  the	  news	  of	  the	  future	  legislation,	  which	  at	  that	  time	  was	  seen	  primarily	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  fight	  organized	  crime.792	  	  	  In	  advance	  of	  the	  law,	  on	  14	  November	  the	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  Circular	  No.	  24/2000,	  which	  required	  immediate	  reportage	  of	  transactions	  over	  AED200,000,	  as	  well	  as	  “all	  deals	  suspected	  of	  being	  money	  laundering	  attempts.”793	  During	  the	  same	  month	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  FIU	  was	  renamed	  the	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit	  (AMLSCU),	  the	  name	  under	  which	  it	  has	  operated	  up	  to	  the	  present	  date.794	  On	  December	  1,	  2000,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  also	  issued	  additional	  new	  regulations	  “to	  all	  banks,	  money	  changers	  and	  finance	  companies	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  check	  money	  laundering.”795	  According	  to	  Central	  Bank	  governor	  Al	  Suwaidi,	  banks	  were	  being	  asked	  “to	  notify	  us	  of	  any	  unusual	  account	  movements;	  then	  we	  start	  an	  investigation	  and	  order	  the	  suspicious	  account	  frozen	  with	  interest.”	  Of	  the	  anticipated	  new	  law,	  it	  would	  “target	  three	  categories	  –	  individuals	  and	  institutions	  indulging	  in	  money	  laundering;	  those	  who	  withhold	  information	  or	  refuse	  to	  cooperate	  in	  fighting	  the	  menace;	  and	  those	  who	  know	  or	  suspect	  they	  are	  helping	  launder	  dirty	  money.”796	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  –	  Oman	  and	  Lebanon	  –	  were	  promoting	  their	  own	  AML	  legislation,	  the	  latter	  hoping	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  an	  FATF	  “uncooperative	  countries”	  listing.”797	  This	  was	  a	  delicate	  time	  for	  the	  UAE	  as	  well.	  In	  February	  2001,	  FATF	  representatives	  conducted	  an	  on-­‐site	  visit	  to	  the	  country	  as	  part	  of	  a	  joint	  FATF/GCC	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report	  (MER)	  project.	  Their	  findings,	  published	  in	  the	  FATF	  Annual	  Report	  2001-­‐2002,	  included	  the	  following:	  	   UAE	  authorities	  do	  not	  see	  a	  significant	  money-­‐laundering	  problem	  affecting	  their	  country.	  The	  domestic	  crime	  level	  is	  low,	  although	  some	  significant	  fraud	  cases	  have	  occurred.	  Only	  a	  few	  cases	  of	  money	  laundering	  have	  been	  detected	  so	  far	  most	  of	  which	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  either	  narcotics	  trafficking	  or	  financial	  fraud	  schemes.	  The	  UAE	  government	  nevertheless	  recognises	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
790	  Abdullah,	  “Faster	  Flow	  of	  Information	  Needed	  to	  Fight	  Money	  Laundering.”	  791	  Carvalho,	  “Abu	  Dhabi	  Trading	  Floor	  Set	  to	  Open.”	  792	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Gulf	  News	  Says:	  Being	  One	  Step	  Ahead.”	  793	  Rao,	  “Finance	  Houses	  Lack	  Effective	  Money-­‐Laundering	  Detection	  Systems,”	  and	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  794	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  13.	  795	  Nazzal,	  “Tougher	  Laws	  Needed	  Against	  Money	  Laundering.”	  796	  Chand,	  “In	  2000,	  Banks	  Jumped	  on	  IT	  Bandwagon,	  Kept	  Eye	  on	  Money-­‐Laundering.”	  797	  Ali,	  “Oman	  Money-­‐Laundering	  Law	  Nears	  Completion,”	  and	  Reuters,	  “Lebanon	  Bows	  to	  World	  Pressure	  on	  Banking	  Secrecy.”	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need	  to	  implement	  an	  effective	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  system	  to	  protect	  its	  financial	  sector	  from	  potential	  money	  laundering,	  and	  it	  is	  taking	  firm	  steps	  to	  put	  relevant	  measures	  in	  place.	  Moves	  recognized	  as	  furthering	  this	  included	  the	  aforementioned	  creation	  of	  the	  National	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Committee	  and	  the	  Central	  Bank	  directives.	  But	  while	  the	  UAE	  had,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  the	  FATF	  report,	  “developed	  and	  significantly	  implemented	  the	  framework	  for	  its	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  system,	  …	  certain	  of	  its	  aspects	  needed	  be	  clarified	  and	  strengthened.”	  For	  example,	  while	  Article	  407	  of	  the	  1987	  Penal	  Code	  broadly	  addressed	  crimes	  such	  as	  money	  laundering	  because	  it	  “covered	  possession	  and	  concealment	  of	  property	  obtained	  as	  the	  result	  of	  any	  crime,	  …	  it	  did	  not	  include	  the	  conversion	  or	  transfer	  of	  such	  property.”	  And	  while	  the	  Penal	  Code’s	  Article	  82	  set	  forth	  confiscation	  laws	  that	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  AML	  cases,	  “UAE	  law	  did	  not	  permit	  the	  confiscation	  of	  property	  of	  equal	  value,	  nor	  did	  it	  permit	  the	  confiscation	  of	  substitute	  assets.”	  Moreover,	  “The	  UAE	  could	  not	  apply	  confiscation	  in	  the	  full	  range	  of	  circumstances	  as	  envisaged	  by	  FATF	  Recommendation	  7.”798	  While	  the	  result	  was	  that	  the	  “UAE	  authorities	  were	  advised	  by	  the	  evaluators	  that	  the	  country	  needed	  to	  modify	  the	  legislation	  then	  in	  effect	  to	  bring	  its	  money	  laundering	  offence	  up	  to	  adequate	  standards,”	  such	  deficiencies	  were	  also	  expected	  to	  be	  corrected	  in	  the	  new	  AML	  law.	  799	  	  For	  his	  part,	  while	  Suwaidi	  was	  outwardly	  cooperative	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  resented	  having	  to	  adjust	  UAE	  regulations	  to	  fix	  a	  problem	  he	  saw	  as	  mainly	  a	  Western	  one.800	  Banks	  in	  the	  UAE	  also	  seemed	  to	  find	  few	  transactions	  worth	  being	  suspicious	  about.	  The	  FATF	  report	  noted	  that	  between	  issuance	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  Nov.	  14,	  2000	  Circular	  No.	  24/2000,	  requiring	  STRs	  to	  be	  filed,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  2001,	  only	  206	  such	  reports	  had	  been	  generated.	  Evaluators	  found	  this	  number	  “very	  low	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  of	  the	  UAE.”	  There	  was	  also	  no	  sign	  that	  the	  Central	  Bank	  had	  yet	  penalized	  any	  financial	  institution	  for	  failing	  to	  comply	  with	  STR	  rules;	  presumably	  the	  FATF	  evaluators	  felt	  the	  low	  number	  of	  STRs	  betrayed	  a	  significant	  compliance	  problem.	  In	  addition,	  no	  AML	  regulations	  had	  yet	  been	  applied	  to	  insurance	  and	  gold-­‐trading	  sectors,	  which	  the	  evaluators	  considered	  vulnerable,	  or	  to	  stopping	  trade-­‐based	  and	  hawala-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  efforts.801	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
798	  FATF,	  Annual	  Report	  2001-­‐2002,	  annex	  G,	  1.	  799	  FATF,	  Annual	  Report	  2001-­‐2002,	  annex	  G,	  3.	  800	  Nawaz,	  McKinnon	  and	  Webb,	  “Informal	  and	  Formal	  Money	  Transfer	  Networks,”	  334,	  citing	  Allen	  in	  Financial	  Times,	  “The	  Veil	  over	  Dirty	  Money	  in	  Dubai.”	  801	  FATF,	  Annual	  Report	  2001-­‐2002,	  annex	  G,	  2.	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Perhaps	  more	  impetus	  to	  the	  expected	  AML	  law	  came	  from	  critical	  US	  media	  articles	  about	  money	  laundering	  in	  the	  region.	  One	  US	  report	  “estimated	  that	  $75-­‐$155	  billion	  is	  laundered	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  each	  year.”802	  The	  Central	  Bank	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  issue	  a	  statement	  on	  May	  20	  that	  “Money	  laundering	  in	  the	  UAE	  is	  minimal	  by	  international	  standards	  because	  the	  UAE	  implements	  tough	  punishment	  for	  crimes	  that	  would	  yield	  dirty	  money.”803	  Just	  two	  days	  later,	  however,	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  board	  of	  directors	  reviewed	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  Circular	  No.	  24/2000.	  On	  June	  3	  the	  bank	  issued	  amendments	  to	  it	  via	  Notice	  No.	  1045/2001.804	  	  Little	  data	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  collected	  regarding	  these	  early	  efforts	  at	  AML	  enforcement.	  One	  rough	  benchmark	  comes	  from	  a	  Dubai	  Police	  economic	  crime	  expert,	  quoted	  in	  a	  news	  article.	  According	  to	  it,	  his	  department	  received	  77	  reports	  of	  suspected	  AML	  cases	  in	  2000	  and	  95	  in	  2001.	  (The	  figure	  for	  2000	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  officer’s	  remark	  that	  the	  2001	  number	  represented	  a	  23%	  increase	  over	  that	  of	  the	  previous	  year.)	  He	  was	  also	  paraphrased	  as	  saying	  that	  “70	  per	  cent	  of	  financial	  crimes	  investigated	  by	  the	  police	  last	  year	  [2001]	  had	  international	  links.”805	  	  Federal	  officials	  felt	  a	  need	  to	  tighten	  the	  AML	  screws.	  Just	  a	  few	  days	  before	  the	  September	  11,	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Al	  Suwaidi	  announced	  that	  the	  text	  of	  a	  new,	  comprehensive	  AML	  law	  would	  be	  finished	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  His	  tone	  on	  the	  money-­‐laundering	  problem	  was	  in	  contrast	  to	  his	  earlier	  statement	  that	  there	  was	  little	  of	  it	  in	  the	  country.	  “It	  is	  not	  very	  easy	  to	  combat	  money	  laundering,”	  he	  acknowledged.	  “You	  need	  to	  know	  the	  transferring	  party	  and	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  money.	  Often	  you	  can	  see	  only	  one	  link.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  very	  easy	  to	  wipe	  it	  out	  completely.	  Every	  active	  banking	  centre	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  such	  things.”806	  
Post-­‐9/11	  AML	  Regulatory	  Framework	  	  International	  AML	  regulation	  took	  on	  a	  new	  urgency	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  9/11,	  with	  counter-­‐financing	  of	  terrorism	  at	  the	  center	  of	  efforts	  such	  as	  the	  USA	  PATRIOT	  act.	  The	  United	  States	  Government’s	  Office	  for	  Foreign	  Assets	  Control	  sent	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  a	  list	  of	  what	  was	  described	  as	  “26	  terrorist	  organisations	  and	  leaders,”	  and	  in	  early	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “GCC	  Law	  Against	  Money	  Laundering	  Takes	  Shape.”	  803	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Central	  Bank	  Denies	  Money	  Laundering	  Charge.”	  804	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  805	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Bane	  of	  Economies.”	  806	  Carvalho,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Law	  by	  Year-­‐End.”	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October	  Al	  Suwaidi	  said	  UAE	  banks	  in	  the	  country	  had	  been	  ordered	  to	  search	  for	  and	  freeze	  any	  accounts	  on	  the	  list.	  He	  emphasized	  that	  he	  did	  not	  expect	  any	  to	  be	  located.807	  Not	  long	  afterwards	  US	  experts	  arrived	  in	  the	  UAE	  to	  train	  local	  bank	  regulators	  in	  techniques	  of	  spotting	  money	  laundering	  and	  suspicious	  transactions.808	  A	  few	  weeks	  later,	  Al	  Suwaidi	  convened	  a	  press	  conference	  to	  deny	  US	  media	  claims	  that	  some	  9/11	  hijackers	  used	  UAE	  bank	  accounts.	  According	  to	  Suwaidi,	  the	  accounts	  were	  in	  names	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  hijackers,	  but	  “They	  are	  different	  people,	  different	  nationalities.”	  Stressing	  that	  “Financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  UAE	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  if	  the	  names	  were	  similar,”	  he	  also	  stated	  that	  “if	  the	  U.S.	  granted	  visas	  to	  the	  suspected	  individuals	  and	  who	  trained	  there,	  the	  UAE	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  dealing	  with	  them.”809	  By	  then	  the	  six-­‐member	  staff	  of	  the	  existing	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit	  had	  been	  doubled,	  presumably	  to	  handle	  the	  increased	  workload.810	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  new	  AML	  law	  was	  nearing	  completion.	  On	  Oct.	  9	  it	  was	  officially	  announced	  that	  the	  UAE	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  had	  approved	  the	  wording	  of	  what	  would	  become	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002,	  “Regarding	  Criminalization	  of	  Money	  Laundering.”811	  An	  editorial	  in	  the	  English-­‐language	  newspaper	  Gulf	  News	  put	  forth	  what	  was	  presumably	  a	  pre-­‐approved,	  official	  position:	  	  	   The	  new	  law	  should	  be	  implemented	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  Approving	  a	  law	  is	  one	  thing,	  enforcing	  it	  is	  another.	  Once	  this	  law	  becomes	  effective,	  it	  is	  very	  important	  that	  the	  Central	  Bank	  makes	  it	  incumbent	  on	  the	  banks	  and	  financial	  institutions	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  it	  works.	  The	  banks	  will	  have	  to	  institute	  new	  procedures	  to	  monitor	  for	  possible	  infringements,	  they	  will	  have	  to	  share	  more	  information	  with	  the	  authorities,	  and	  the	  authorities	  will	  have	  to	  monitor	  the	  banks	  better.	  Only	  once	  this	  happens	  will	  the	  UAE	  be	  sure	  that	  it	  is	  operating	  to	  the	  high	  standards	  that	  it	  has	  set	  for	  itself.812	  Bankers	  and	  analysts	  interviewed	  for	  the	  next	  day’s	  edition	  praised	  the	  law,	  contending	  that	  the	  UAE	  had	  now	  “taken	  the	  lead	  in	  the	  region”	  on	  AML.	  Perhaps	  naively	  or	  disingenuously,	  they	  said	  (in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  that	  “there	  are	  no	  reported	  cases	  of	  money	  laundering	  in	  financial	  institutions	  here.”	  But	  they	  allowed	  that	  “the	  system	  of	  
'hawala'	  or	  funneling	  money	  informally	  is	  an	  area	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  looked	  into.”813	  That	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
807	  Carvalho,	  “Suwaidi	  Sees	  No	  Terrorist	  Assets	  in	  UAE.”	  808	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “U.S.	  to	  Train	  Bank	  Regulators	  in	  Gulf.”	  	  809	  Carvalho,	  “Official	  Says	  UAE	  Not	  Used	  for	  Money	  Laundering.”	  810	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  811	  WAM	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Law	  on	  Money	  Laundering	  Gets	  Cabinet’s	  Nod.”	  812	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Gulf	  News	  Says:	  Building	  Global	  Trust.”	  813	  Carvalho,	  “New	  Law	  to	  Boost	  UAE's	  Financial	  Hub	  Status.”	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said,	  Al	  Suwaidi	  told	  the	  press	  “there	  will	  be	  no	  more	  additions	  to	  the	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  law	  issued	  on	  Tuesday	  [Oct.	  9].”814	  	  	  At	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  closed	  one	  of	  the	  country’s	  money	  exchange	  houses	  and	  announced	  that	  nine	  others	  were	  being	  scrutinized	  for	  unspecified	  “lapses.”815	  The	  institution	  that	  was	  closed	  was	  not	  named;	  Emirati	  author	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla	  asserted	  in	  his	  book	  that	  its	  owners	  were	  found	  guilty	  of	  involvement	  in	  an	  $800	  million	  money-­‐laundering	  operation.816	  Probably	  with	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  subsequently	  announced	  new	  controls	  on	  exchange	  houses,	  including	  basic	  KYC	  “instructions	  to	  check	  the	  identity	  of	  persons	  who	  remit	  at	  least	  Dh2,000	  ($545).”817	  A	  news	  report	  described	  the	  new	  regulations	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “move	  to	  tighten	  the	  transfer	  of	  money	  from	  the	  UAE	  by	  way	  of	  improving	  the	  senders'	  record	  maintenance	  requirement	  by	  the	  exchange	  houses.”	  The	  measure	  earned	  polite	  approval	  in	  the	  UAE	  press,	  although	  (in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  “According	  to	  majority	  of	  the	  exchanges,	  there	  is	  [sic]	  literally	  no	  money	  laundering	  cases	  here.”	  The	  article	  also	  noted	  that,	  among	  exchange	  house	  personnel,	  there	  were	  “no	  serious	  fears	  expressed	  about	  any	  possibility	  of	  the	  money	  transferors	  switching	  to	  the	  unofficial	  'hawala'	  route	  since	  the	  rate	  offered	  by	  them	  are	  said	  to	  be	  no	  match	  to	  that	  of	  the	  exchange	  houses.”818	  More	  tightening	  came	  after	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  Board	  of	  Directors	  met	  on	  Oct.	  29	  and	  “resolved	  to	  reduce	  the	  thresholds,	  for	  official	  identification.”	  The	  bank’s	  subsequent	  Notice	  No.	  1815/2001	  reduced	  the	  thresholds	  for	  moneychangers	  from	  AED200,000	  to	  AED2,000;	  and	  for	  banks	  from	  AED200,000	  to	  AED40,000.	  819	  	  Early	  in	  December,	  UAE	  authorities	  “requested”	  that	  the	  country’s	  free	  trade	  zones	  adopt	  more	  thorough	  KYC	  procedures.	  Specifically,	  they	  were	  asked	  “to	  adopt	  certain	  procedures	  regarding	  natural	  or	  juridical	  persons	  who	  wish	  to	  establish	  their	  business	  at	  the	  Free	  Trade	  Zones,	  i.e.,	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  the	  owners	  of	  foreign	  companies	  that	  wish	  to	  establish	  joint	  venture	  companies	  or	  branch	  offices	  in	  the	  free	  zones.”	  The	  UAE	  government	  would	  also	  issue	  notices	  in	  the	  Arabic	  and	  English	  press	  “advising	  both	  Nationals	  and	  Residents	  to	  exercise	  prudence	  while	  transferring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814	  Carvalho,	  “Suwaidi	  Sees	  No	  Terrorist	  Assets	  in	  UAE.”	  815	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Shuts	  Money	  Exchange	  House.”	  816	  Al	  Mulla,	  [Criminal	  Confrontation	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Money	  Laundering],	  334-­‐335.	  817	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  to	  Enforce	  Money	  Laundering	  Law	  in	  January.”	  818	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Exchange	  Houses	  Hail	  New	  Ruling	  on	  Money	  Transfer.”	  819	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  See	  also	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  25.	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cash	  funds	  abroad	  or	  while	  receiving	  funds	  from	  abroad.“	  And	  a	  Ministry	  of	  Economy	  and	  Commerce	  circular	  directed	  insurance	  companies	  to	  implement	  KYC	  measures	  and	  report	  any	  suspicious	  transactions.820	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  local	  media	  reported	  that	  the	  UAE	  had	  “frozen	  14	  suspect	  bank	  accounts	  and	  placed	  other	  accounts	  on	  the	  blacklist	  in	  support	  of	  an	  international	  drive	  to	  deprive	  terrorists	  from	  funds.”	  The	  customs	  department	  would	  in	  January	  2002	  begin	  implementing	  a	  new	  rule	  requiring	  visitors	  to	  “declare	  their	  funds	  if	  they	  have	  a	  minimum	  Dh40,000	  ($10,900).”	  Bigger	  news	  was	  that	  January	  would	  also	  see	  the	  new	  AML	  law	  come	  into	  effect.	  821	  Its	  timing	  would	  come	  12	  days	  after	  the	  National	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Committee’s	  Jan.	  10,	  2002	  response	  to	  the	  FATF	  report	  of	  its	  earlier	  evaluation	  of	  the	  UAE.	  The	  committee	  “declared	  that	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Systems	  in	  the	  UAE	  have	  been	  eliminated.”822	  
Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002:	  Regarding	  Criminalization	  of	  Money	  
Laundering	  Signed	  by	  UAE	  President	  Zayed	  Bin	  Sultan	  Al	  Nahyan	  on	  22	  January	  2002,	  the	  new	  law’s	  first	  three	  articles	  comprised	  its	  Chapter	  One.	  Articles	  1	  and	  2	  (in	  the	  official	  English	  translation)	  defined	  money	  laundering	  as	  “Any	  act	  involving	  transfer,	  conversion	  or	  deposit	  of	  Property,	  or	  concealment	  or	  disguise	  of	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  those	  Property,	  which	  were	  derived	  from	  any”	  of	  the	  following	  acts:	  a) Narcotics	  and	  psychotropic	  substances.	  b) Kidnapping,	  piracy	  and	  terrorism.	  c) Offenses	  committed	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  environmental	  laws.	  d) Illicit	  dealing	  in	  fire-­‐arms	  and	  ammunition.	  e) Bribery,	  embezzlement,	  and	  damage	  to	  public	  property.	  f) Fraud,	  breach	  of	  trust	  and	  related	  offences.	  g) Any	  other	  related	  offences	  referred	  to	  in	  international	  conventions	  to	  which	  the	  State	  is	  a	  party.	  	  Article	  3	  rendered	  financial,	  commercial,	  and	  economic	  establishments	  in	  the	  UAE	  “criminally	  liable	  for	  the	  offence	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  if	  intentionally	  committed	  in	  their	  respective	  names	  or	  for	  their	  account.”	  Chapter	  Two,	  consisting	  of	  articles	  4-­‐12,	  set	  forth	  the	  “commitments	  of	  government	  agencies.”	  Article	  4	  gave	  the	  Central	  Bank	  power	  to	  freeze	  suspect	  property	  for	  a	  week;	  gave	  the	  Public	  Prosecution	  Office	  power	  to	  seize	  such	  proceeds;	  and	  allowed	  courts	  to	  “order	  Provisional	  Attachment,	  for	  undetermined	  periods,”	  on	  suspect	  property,	  proceeds,	  or	  instrumentalities.	  The	  next	  article	  gave	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  821	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  to	  Enforce	  Money	  Laundering	  Law	  in	  January”;	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  set	  to	  Enforce	  Fund	  Declaration	  for	  Visitors.”	  822	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  
	  	  	  
174	  
Attorney	  General	  “exclusive	  authority	  to	  initiate	  criminal	  action	  against	  a	  perpetrator	  of	  any	  of	  the	  offences	  herein”;	  it	  also	  authorized	  the	  Central	  Bank	  exclusively	  to	  handle	  seizures	  of	  property.	  Article	  6	  authorized	  the	  Central	  Bank	  to	  set	  a	  ceiling	  on	  how	  much	  cash	  could	  be	  brought	  into	  the	  UAE	  without	  declaration,	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  corresponding	  declaration	  system.	  The	  seventh	  article	  established	  a	  Financial	  Information	  Unit	  (FIU),	  to	  which	  all	  UAE	  financial	  institutions	  were	  to	  report	  suspicious	  transactions.	  The	  FIU	  was	  already	  in	  existence	  as	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit	  (AMLSCU),	  and	  was	  charged	  under	  the	  law	  to	  work	  with	  UAE	  law	  enforcement	  bodies	  and	  also,	  when	  appropriate,	  to	  convey	  data	  to	  foreign	  agencies	  when	  called	  for	  by	  treaty	  obligations	  or	  on	  a	  reciprocal	  basis.	  Article	  8	  directed	  the	  FIU	  to	  notify	  the	  Attorney	  General	  of	  any	  possible	  money	  laundering	  cases,	  and	  also	  directed	  the	  office	  of	  Public	  Prosecution	  to	  liaise	  with	  the	  FIU	  should	  such	  a	  case	  have	  been	  directly	  reported	  to	  the	  former.	  Articles	  9	  and	  10	  established	  a	  “National	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Committee,”	  to	  be	  chaired	  by	  the	  Central	  Bank	  governor.	  Its	  membership	  would	  also	  include	  representatives	  of	  the	  UAE	  Customs	  Board	  and	  relevant	  trade	  and	  licensing	  agencies,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ministries	  of	  Interior;	  Justice,	  Islamic	  Affairs	  and	  Awqaf823;	  Finance	  and	  Industry;	  and	  Economy	  and	  Commerce.	  Its	  tasks	  including	  proposing	  further	  AML	  measures	  and	  regulations;	  coordinating	  national	  AML	  efforts;	  and	  representing	  the	  UAE	  at	  international	  AML	  forums.	  Articles	  11	  and	  12	  required	  all	  licensing	  agencies	  dealing	  with	  financial	  and	  commercial	  institutions	  in	  the	  UAE	  to	  ensure	  their	  compliance	  with	  the	  new	  AML	  law,	  and	  imposed	  confidentiality	  requirements	  on	  AML-­‐related	  data	  “except	  to	  the	  extent	  required”	  in	  legal	  actions.	  Chapter	  Three	  of	  the	  law	  comprised	  articles	  13-­‐20,	  which	  addressed	  penalties.	  In	  Article	  13,	  individuals	  who	  violated	  Article	  2	  above	  (which	  gave	  a	  basic	  definition	  of	  money	  laundering)	  faced	  penalties	  of	  up	  to	  seven	  years	  imprisonment	  and	  fines	  between	  AED	  30,000-­‐300,000.	  In	  Article	  14,	  financial	  institutions	  convicted	  of	  money	  laundering	  violations	  faced	  fines	  between	  AED	  300,000	  and	  AED	  1,000,000.	  Both	  articles	  also	  authorized	  confiscation	  of	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  corresponding	  AML	  cases.	  Article	  15	  stipulated	  that	  officials	  and	  employees	  of	  various	  financial	  institutions	  failing	  to	  report	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823	  “Awqaf	  (singular,	  waqf)	  is	  an	  Arabic	  word	  meaning	  assets	  that	  are	  donated,	  bequeathed,	  or	  purchased	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  being	  held	  in	  perpetual	  trust	  as	  ongoing	  charity	  (sadaka	  jariya)	  or	  for	  a	  general	  or	  specific	  cause	  that	  Islam	  regards	  as	  socially	  beneficial.	  This	  condition	  of	  perpetuity	  has	  led	  over	  the	  years	  to	  a	  considerable	  accumulation	  of	  societal	  wealth	  such	  that	  awqaf	  has	  become	  an	  important	  sector	  dedicated	  to	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  improvement	  of	  the	  Muslim	  society.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  awqaf	  sector	  is	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  huge	  assets	  it	  controls,	  in	  its	  social	  expenditure,	  in	  the	  number	  of	  people	  it	  employs,	  and	  in	  its	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  economy	  which	  accounts	  for	  as	  much	  as	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  GDP	  of	  some	  countries”	  (Dafterdar,	  “Towards	  Effective	  Legal	  Regulations	  and	  Enabling	  Environment	  for	  Awqaf,”	  1).	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suspicious	  transactions	  to	  the	  FIU	  faced	  imprisonment	  –	  the	  duration	  was	  unspecified	  –	  and/or	  fines	  between	  AED	  10,000-­‐100,000.	  The	  next	  article	  set	  forth	  imprisonment	  for	  up	  to	  one	  year	  and/or	  fines	  of	  AED5,000-­‐50,000	  for	  informing	  anyone	  that	  they	  were	  under	  AML	  investigation.	  Article	  17	  warned	  anyone	  filing	  a	  false	  AML	  complaint	  that	  they	  faced	  the	  maximum	  penalty	  prescribed	  for	  false	  notification.”	  Article	  18	  set	  the	  penalties	  for	  exceeding	  the	  ceiling	  (set	  in	  article	  6)	  for	  the	  physical	  transfer	  of	  cash	  at	  between	  AED2,000-­‐20,000,	  with	  the	  money	  involved	  liable	  to	  confiscation.	  Article	  19	  established	  a	  “catch	  all”	  penalty	  for	  breaking	  any	  other	  provision	  of	  the	  law	  with	  fines	  of	  AED10,000-­‐100,000,	  while	  the	  final	  article	  in	  the	  section,	  number	  20,	  absolved	  officials	  and	  employees	  of	  financial	  and	  other	  institutions	  from	  liability	  if	  their	  reporting	  of	  transactions	  violated	  other	  confidentiality	  agreements.	  Chapter	  Four’s	  two	  articles	  authorized	  UAE	  bodies	  to	  cooperate	  with	  their	  foreign	  counterparts	  to	  meet	  treaty	  obligations	  and	  reciprocity.	  The	  three	  articles	  in	  Chapter	  Five	  were	  pro	  forma	  statements	  authorizing	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  to	  “issue	  the	  executive	  regulations	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  law”;	  repealing	  any	  earlier	  contradictory	  legal	  provisions;	  and	  arranging	  for	  the	  new	  law’s	  publication.	  	  
Response	  to	  the	  New	  AML	  Law	  Efforts	  at	  implementing	  the	  new	  law	  included	  stepped	  up	  internal	  training.	  At	  about	  the	  same	  time	  the	  new	  law	  went	  into	  effect,	  the	  Dubai	  Police,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  agents	  from	  the	  US	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation,	  hosted	  a	  weeklong	  AML	  course.	  It	  involved	  28	  members	  of	  law	  enforcement	  bodies;	  besides	  local	  UAE	  officers,	  these	  included	  representatives	  from	  other	  GCC	  countries.824	  Of	  the	  new	  legislation	  itself,	  a	  report	  by	  the	  official	  news	  agency	  (WAM)	  in	  English	  said:	  “It	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  law	  which	  meets	  the	  25	  criteria	  set	  by	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (FATF).	  The	  law	  also	  includes	  the	  40	  FATF	  recommendations.”	  It	  quoted	  Al	  Suwaidi	  saying:	  "It	  is	  very	  comprehensive	  and	  many	  countries	  can	  learn	  from	  us,	  including	  some	  West	  European	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  have	  such	  laws.”825	  UAE	  bankers	  and	  financiers	  offered	  supportive,	  even	  enthusiastic	  comments	  to	  the	  English-­‐language	  press.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi-­‐based	  Union	  National	  Bank	  was	  quoted	  saying:	  “We	  welcome	  it	  wholeheartedly.	  It's	  not	  that	  the	  banks	  and	  the	  other	  financial	  institutions	  had	  not	  been	  observing	  strict	  directives	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Police	  Officers	  Attend	  Course	  to	  Combat	  Crime.”	  825	  WAM	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Law	  Signed.”	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the	  regulators,	  but	  the	  law	  being	  in	  place	  will	  certainly	  raise	  the	  image	  of	  the	  UAE	  and	  its	  financial	  system	  globally.”826	  A	  series	  of	  similar	  articles	  followed.827	  In	  one,	  published	  in	  April	  in	  Arabic,	  an	  AMLSCU	  official	  suggested	  that	  the	  potential	  money	  laundering	  market	  in	  the	  UAE	  was	  worth	  $500	  billion	  annually.828	  	  
AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement,	  2002-­‐2003	  With	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  new	  2002	  AML	  law,	  the	  UAE	  had	  an	  AML	  Regulatory	  Framework	  that	  put	  it	  into	  compliance	  with	  FATF	  standards.	  The	  AML	  law	  at	  least	  met	  the	  then-­‐contemporary	  basic	  criteria	  of	  the	  FATF,	  as	  that	  organization	  observed	  in	  its	  Annual	  
Report	  2001-­‐2002.829	  Thus	  this	  initial	  “marker	  of	  success”	  found	  realization	  in	  the	  UAE	  by	  2002.	  That	  said,	  the	  second	  “marker	  of	  success”	  being	  studied	  in	  this	  chapter,	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement,	  is	  harder	  to	  assess	  quantitatively	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  new	  law’s	  passage.	  For	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  statistics	  to	  analyze	  the	  country’s	  actual	  AML	  situation	  for	  the	  first	  two	  years	  the	  law	  was	  in	  operation.	  	  	  The	  UAE’s	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit	  (AMLSCU)	  has	  shared	  with	  the	  author	  STR	  data	  (in	  varying	  degrees	  of	  detail	  and	  internal	  analysis)	  from	  2004-­‐2013.	  However,	  STR	  details	  for	  2002-­‐2003	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  comprehensively	  compiled.	  Suwaidi	  himself	  acknowledged,	  in	  early	  2004,	  bureaucratic	  difficulties	  with	  gathering	  accurate	  statistics	  on	  AML	  reports.	  “Yes,	  we	  have	  had	  some	  cases	  but	  they	  were	  not	  major	  ones,”	  he	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying	  in	  the	  UAE	  press.	  “I	  do	  not	  have	  statistics	  about	  such	  cases	  because	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  Central	  Bank	  that	  records	  such	  cases	  as	  there	  are	  cases	  with	  other	  judicial	  parties.”830	  The	  problem	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  invoked	  a	  2008	  FATF/MENA	  evaluation	  report	  of	  the	  UAE,	  which	  cited	  “a	  lack	  of	  statistics”	  as	  among	  factors	  that	  “do	  not	  permit	  an	  analysis	  of	  effectiveness”	  of	  the	  country’s	  AML	  legislation.831	  (The	  criticism	  was	  repeated	  in	  a	  2008	  IMF	  document	  that	  repackaged	  the	  MENA/FATF	  report.832)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826	  Jose	  and	  Rao,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Law	  Draws	  Big	  Applause.”	  827	  See,	  for	  example,	  Rahman,	  “UAE's	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Law	  Hailed”;	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Task	  Force	  Recognises	  UAE's	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Efforts”;	  and	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Efforts	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering	  Win	  Global	  Praise.”	  828	  Uncredited	  in	  Aawsat,	  [“Emirates	  Applies	  Strict	  Measures	  to	  Combat	  Money	  Laundering”]	  829	  FATF,	  “Annual	  Report	  2001-­‐2002,”	  Annex	  G,	  3.	  830	  Carvalho,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Law	  'Highly	  Effective.'”	  831	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  13.	  832	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  "United	  Arab	  Emirates:	  Detailed	  Assessment	  Report	  on	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Combating	  the	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism,"	  47.	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Outside	  of	  stray	  media	  reports	  and	  fragmentary	  glimpses	  from	  official	  documents,	  little	  hard	  data	  has	  surfaced	  about	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  new	  law	  in	  its	  first	  two	  years,	  or	  which	  might	  help	  measure	  its	  effectiveness.833	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  caution	  that	  “anecdote	  is	  not	  the	  plural	  of	  data,”	  some	  qualitative	  elements	  that	  speak	  to	  the	  early	  enforcement	  of	  the	  new	  law	  in	  2002	  include	  the	  following:	  
• On	  Jan.	  26,	  2002,	  not	  long	  after	  the	  new	  law	  was	  signed,	  a	  man	  using	  a	  German	  passport	  opened	  an	  account	  at	  a	  Dubai	  bank;	  on	  Feb.	  19	  over	  $1	  million	  was	  transferred	  into	  the	  account	  from	  a	  bank	  in	  Germany,	  after	  which	  the	  account	  holder	  (in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  “came	  to	  the	  bank	  and	  attempted	  to	  withdraw	  the	  whole	  amount,	  claiming	  he	  was	  going	  to	  use	  it	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  business	  venture	  in	  the	  country.	  When	  bank	  officials	  enquired	  as	  to	  what	  business	  venture	  he	  was	  planning	  to	  invest	  in,	  the	  man	  had	  no	  clear	  and	  straightforward	  answer.”	  After	  determining	  that	  the	  local	  account	  holder’s	  German	  identity	  was	  false,	  the	  Dubai	  bank	  informed	  authorities	  of	  a	  possible	  ML	  attempt.	  The	  account	  holder	  was	  ultimately	  identified	  as	  an	  Indian	  citizen,	  who	  said	  he	  had	  obtained	  the	  fake	  passport	  from	  a	  UAE	  national	  and	  trader,	  who	  himself	  obtained	  it	  from	  a	  Belgian.	  The	  Indian	  and	  UAE	  national	  both	  received	  two-­‐year	  prison	  terms;	  the	  Belgian	  received	  a	  two-­‐month	  sentence.	  The	  Dubai	  Appeals	  Court	  later	  (3	  October	  2004)	  upheld	  the	  sentencing.834	  
• About	  a	  month	  after	  the	  new	  AML	  law	  took	  effect,	  Dubai	  police	  questioned	  “three	  expatriate	  brothers	  who	  own	  a	  leading	  jewelry	  group	  in	  Dubai	  with	  considerable	  interests	  in	  bullion	  dealing”	  about	  suspected	  money	  laundering.835	  
• In	  March	  2002,	  the	  Dubai	  public	  prosecutor	  agreed	  to	  extradite	  a	  Canadian	  citizen	  who	  had	  been	  “accused	  by	  Canadian	  authorities	  of	  involvement	  in	  drugs	  and	  money	  laundering.	  …	  As	  there	  is	  no	  extradition	  treaty	  between	  the	  UAE	  and	  Canada,	  the	  matter	  was	  submitted	  to	  the	  Dubai	  Public	  Prosecutor	  to	  decide.	  The	  public	  prosecutor	  has	  ordered	  that	  the	  accused	  be	  handed	  over	  to	  Canada,	  on	  condition	  that	  the	  Canadian	  authorities	  give	  a	  written	  undertaking	  that	  they	  will	  hand	  over	  any	  criminal	  if	  the	  UAE	  makes	  such	  a	  request.”836	  
• In	  a	  letter	  received	  on	  6	  May,	  2002,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  ordered	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Islamic	  Bank	  to	  freeze	  accounts	  (then	  containing	  Dh6,943,072)	  of	  Nortel	  Distribution,	  which	  was	  suspected	  of	  money	  laundering.	  A	  subsequent	  letter,	  received	  12	  May,	  told	  the	  bank	  (in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  “to	  preserve	  these	  account[s]	  as	  per	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General.”	  After	  an	  11	  August	  meeting	  with	  the	  AMLSCU,	  at	  which	  representatives	  of	  Nortel	  and	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Islamic	  Bank	  attended,	  the	  “company	  was	  unable	  to	  give	  any	  convincing	  explanations	  regarding	  the	  source	  of	  its	  assets.	  The	  Attorney	  General’s	  decision	  to	  preserve	  the	  account	  remained	  effective.”	  Nortel	  subsequently	  filed	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Islamic	  Bank	  in	  the	  Dubai	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  –	  presumably	  the	  accounts	  had	  been	  located	  in	  a	  Dubai	  branch	  of	  the	  bank	  –	  asking	  that	  its	  assets	  be	  released	  along	  with	  Dh4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
833	  The	  author	  searched	  Gulf	  News,	  available	  at	  www.gulfnews.com;	  Gulf	  Today,	  available	  at	  www.gulftoday.ae;	  and	  
Khaleej	  Times,	  available	  at	  www.khaleejtimes.com.	  Her	  Arabic-­‐speaking	  student	  assistants	  undertook	  a	  similar	  scan	  of	  Arabic-­‐language	  sources,	  which	  yielded	  little	  in	  this	  time	  period,	  possibly	  because	  those	  UAE	  news	  outlets	  may	  not	  yet	  have	  archived	  earlier	  stories	  online.	  834	  Bathish,	  “Court	  Upholds	  Prison	  Terms	  of	  Three	  Criminals.”	  835	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Jewelers	  Held	  for	  Questioning.”	  836	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Canadian	  in	  UAE	  to	  be	  Extradited.”	  
	  	  	  
178	  
million	  in	  compensation.	  The	  court	  rejected	  the	  suit,	  as	  did	  the	  higher	  Dubai	  Courts	  of	  Appeals	  and	  Cassation.837	  
• At	  about	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  freezing	  of	  Nortel’s	  accounts	  took	  place,	  a	  UAE	  judge	  said	  (in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  that	  “The	  UAE	  had	  detected	  minor	  money	  laundering	  operations	  but	  it	  is	  free	  of	  organised	  suspect	  cash	  activities	  as	  a	  result	  of	  direct	  surveillance	  by	  monetary	  authorities	  and	  cooperation	  by	  financial	  institutions…”838	  
• In	  early	  June	  2002,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  reported	  that	  37	  suspect	  bank	  accounts	  had	  been	  frozen	  since	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  new	  law,	  mostly	  done	  on	  orders	  from	  the	  Attorney	  General.	  The	  Arabic	  newspaper	  Al	  Ittihad	  reported	  that	  a	  lawyer	  representing	  the	  holder	  of	  three	  affected	  accounts	  had	  filed	  a	  formal	  complaint	  via	  the	  Dubai	  police	  department	  (It	  is	  unclear	  if	  this	  referred	  to	  the	  Nortel	  case	  cited	  above,	  which	  appears	  to	  have	  involved	  a	  court	  action	  rather	  than	  a	  police	  complaint).839	  
• On	  10	  June	  2002,	  a	  tipoff	  from	  a	  British	  Embassy	  official	  led	  UAE	  police	  to	  arrest	  two	  Germans	  at	  Dubai	  International	  Airport.	  The	  pair,	  flying	  from	  Dusseldorf,	  was	  carrying	  two	  bags,	  one	  containing	  9,820	  Euros	  concealed	  in	  a	  newspaper,	  and	  another	  containing	  370,000	  Euros.840	  
• In	  July	  2002,	  the	  Economic	  Crimes	  Section	  of	  the	  Dubai	  Police	  Criminal	  Investigation	  Department	  reported	  that	  two	  money-­‐laundering	  cases	  were	  among	  59	  actions	  it	  had	  referred	  to	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  year.841	  
• Early	  in	  October	  2002,	  the	  UAE	  finalized	  the	  “implementation	  details”	  of	  the	  AML	  law,	  giving	  the	  Central	  Bank	  powers	  to	  freeze	  suspicious	  assets	  for	  a	  week,	  and	  also	  prescribed	  penalties	  of	  up	  to	  seven	  years	  in	  prison.842	  Also	  in	  October,	  the	  two	  Germans	  arrested	  on	  June	  10	  (see	  above)	  were	  found	  guilty	  of	  money	  laundering.843	  According	  to	  an	  Arabic	  language	  article,	  they	  were	  fined	  Dh100,000;	  it	  is	  unclear	  if	  this	  sum	  was	  applied	  to	  them	  individually	  or	  collectively.844	  
• Also	  in	  October	  2002,	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  a	  total	  of	  30	  money-­‐laundering	  cases	  were	  currently	  under	  investigation	  in	  the	  UAE.	  Seven	  of	  those	  involved	  proceeds	  totaling	  about	  $100	  million.845	  	  Even	  fewer	  details	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  printed	  (or	  perhaps	  digitized	  into	  searchable	  databases)	  about	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  in	  2003.	  The	  MENA/FATF	  2008	  report	  on	  the	  UAE	  noted	  that	  in	  2003,	  the	  Dubai	  public	  prosecutor	  initiated	  five	  cases.846	  Media	  references	  to	  two	  2003	  incidents	  –	  one	  in	  April,	  and	  one	  in	  August	  involving	  a	  “person	  who	  opened	  a	  false	  account	  with	  a	  national	  bank”	  –	  in	  fact	  only	  appeared	  the	  following	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
837	  Uncredited	  in	  Khaleej	  Times,	  “Abu	  Dhabi	  Islamic	  Bank	  to	  Keep	  Nortel	  Funds	  Freeze	  Over	  ‘Money	  Laundering.’”	  838	  Kawach,	  “UAE	  Free	  of	  Organised	  Suspect	  Cash	  Activities.”	  839	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Move	  on	  Freeze	  of	  Accounts	  Defended.”	  840	  Za’Za	  ,	  “Two	  Arrested	  For	  Money	  Laundering.”	  841	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “23	  Piracy	  Suits	  Referred	  To	  Prosecution.”	  842	  Kawach,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Law	  in	  Final	  Stage.”	  843	  Za’Za,	  “Two	  Arrested	  For	  Money	  Laundering.”	  844	  Al Sheikh, [“Emirati	  Lawyer:	  Cases	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  are	  Increasing	  and	  Their	  Size	  Reaches	  up	  to	  $100	  Million”].	  845	  Owais,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Cases	  ‘Under	  Scrutiny.’”	  846	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  26.	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year	  in	  a	  story	  about	  cases	  discussed	  at	  an	  AML	  seminar.847	  The	  paucity	  of	  detailed	  coverage	  may	  reflect	  a	  lack	  of	  official	  data	  dissemination	  rather	  than	  media	  fatigue	  with	  the	  subject,	  for	  money	  laundering	  remained	  much	  discussed.	  Often	  this	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	  terrorist	  funding,	  toward	  which	  the	  UAE’s	  AML	  compass	  was	  gradually	  shifting,	  in	  keeping	  with	  worldwide	  trends	  in	  AML	  legislation.	  
Regulating	  Hawala	  
Hawala	  also	  received	  significant	  media	  attention	  in	  the	  UAE	  at	  this	  time.	  As	  early	  as	  January	  of	  the	  previous	  year,	  UAE-­‐based	  legal	  experts	  had	  issued	  public	  cautions	  over	  the	  practice’s	  vulnerability	  to	  criminal	  exploitation.	  Some	  warned	  of	  similar	  risks	  for	  the	  gold	  industry	  as	  well.848	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  regulations	  going	  back	  to	  1992	  (specifically	  article	  2	  of	  Resolution	  No.	  123/7/92)	  required	  moneychangers	  to	  be	  licensed	  and	  regulated.	  This	  law	  in	  theory	  would	  have	  regulated	  hawaladars,	  but	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  was	  ever	  unforced	  is	  unclear.	  The	  attacks	  of	  9/11	  pushed	  hawala	  closer	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  terror-­‐financing	  concerns;	  some	  in	  the	  West,	  who	  saw	  the	  practice	  as	  an	  unregulated	  menace	  through	  which	  terrorist	  funds	  could	  flow,	  wanted	  hawala	  banned	  outright.	  849	  (As	  noted	  in	  an	  earlier	  chapter,	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  FATF	  recommendations	  sought	  regulation	  of	  all	  such	  IVTS.)	  US	  officials	  felt	  sure	  hawala	  had	  played	  a	  role	  in	  financing	  the	  9/11	  attacks;	  while	  observers	  have	  differed	  on	  their	  interpretation	  of	  the	  evidence	  for	  this,	  if	  hawala	  had	  a	  role	  it	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  a	  minor	  one.850	  (However,	  its	  earlier	  use	  by	  al	  Qaeda	  in	  American	  Embassy	  bombings	  in	  1988,	  and	  later	  use	  to	  move	  funds	  out	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  2001,	  is	  documented.851)	  	  Regardless,	  the	  US	  government’s	  response	  to	  9/11	  included	  launching	  a	  case	  against	  the	  Somalia-­‐based	  Al-­‐Barakaat	  financial	  enterprise,	  a	  large-­‐scale	  international	  hawala	  operation,	  which	  also	  offered	  a	  kind	  of	  banking	  service	  in	  which	  individuals	  could	  deposit	  assets.	  It	  was	  also	  its	  host	  country’s	  largest	  employer.	  Its	  connection	  to	  terrorism	  would,	  in	  hindsight,	  be	  seen	  as	  tenuous.	  To	  some	  critics,	  the	  legal	  assault	  on	  it,	  which	  included	  seizure	  of	  $1.9	  million	  in	  assets,	  cut	  off	  many	  people’s	  legitimate	  source	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847	  Rashid,	  “No	  Money	  Laundering	  in	  the	  UAE,	  Says	  Official.”	  848	  Rao,	  “Finance	  Houses	  Lack	  Effective	  Money-­‐Laundering	  Detection	  Systems.”	  849	  Carvalho,	  “UAE	  to	  Introduce	  New	  Law	  Against	  Terror	  Financing.”	  850	  See	  Borders,	  “Regulating	  and	  Combating	  Underground	  Banking,”	  100-­‐101;	  and	  Bowers,	  “Hawala,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Terrorism	  Finance,”	  387.	  851	  Wheatley,	  “Ancient	  Banking,	  Modern	  Crimes,”	  359.	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of	  income	  and	  denied	  them	  access	  to	  their	  savings	  deposits.852	  Hawala	  did,	  however,	  have	  well-­‐placed	  critics	  in	  Middle	  Eastern	  and	  Asian	  countries.	  But	  while	  the	  West	  saw	  
hawala	  as	  a	  means	  of	  terror	  financing,	  many	  of	  these	  critics	  saw	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  tax	  avoidance.853	  When	  the	  head	  of	  Pakistan’s	  Central	  Bank	  visited	  Suwaidi	  in	  November,	  2001,	  he	  told	  Pakistani	  expats	  that:	  "It	  is	  the	  patriotic	  duty	  of	  all	  Pakistanis	  living	  abroad	  to	  shun	  the	  hundi	  (hawala)	  as	  this	  system	  is	  undermining	  the	  national	  economy.”	  Speaking	  with	  workers	  in	  an	  Abu	  Dhabi	  labour	  camp,	  he	  told	  them	  that	  his	  country’s	  banks	  had	  improved	  efficiency	  and	  would	  not	  charge	  fees	  for	  handling	  remittances.854	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  his	  host	  in	  the	  UAE	  seems	  to	  have	  wanted	  to	  give	  hawala	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt,	  and	  preserve	  it	  as	  a	  functioning,	  though	  more	  regulated,	  system.	  From	  Suwaidi’s	  perspective,	  hawala	  was	  a	  long-­‐established	  part	  of	  Arab	  culture,	  which	  he	  was	  resistant	  to	  sacrifice,	  particularly	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  something	  Suwaidi	  had	  (as	  noted	  above)	  been	  quoted	  as	  calling	  a	  Western	  problem.855	  But	  hawala	  was	  seen	  as	  such	  a	  problem	  that,	  for	  a	  time	  at	  least	  in	  2001,	  the	  UAE	  feared	  being	  placed	  on	  a	  list	  of	  non-­‐cooperative	  countries	  and	  territories	  (NCCT).	  Suwaidi	  later	  attributed	  this	  to	  a	  misunderstanding	  by	  FATF	  “that	  hawala	  was	  prevalent	  only	  in	  the	  UAE.”856	  (FATF	  reports	  indicate	  that	  no	  NCCT	  status	  was	  conferred	  on	  the	  UAE.)857	  	  Regardless,	  Suwaidi	  presumably	  bowed	  to	  international	  pressure	  when	  early	  in	  2002	  he	  announced	  that	  the	  UAE	  was	  working	  with	  its	  GCC	  counterparts	  on	  a	  joint	  approach	  to	  regulate	  the	  practice.	  “If	  hawala	  is	  being	  misused	  by	  some	  people,	  it	  cannot	  be	  countered	  by	  the	  UAE	  alone,”	  he	  told	  local	  journalists.	  “It	  has	  to	  be	  tackled	  at	  the	  GCC	  level	  and	  all	  our	  countries	  are	  making	  efforts	  to	  come	  out	  with	  a	  common	  system	  to	  make	  sure	  hawala	  is	  not	  misused.”858	  Indeed,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Western	  countries	  wanted	  the	  practice	  banned,	  Abu	  Dhabi	  played	  host	  to	  the	  first	  International	  Conference	  on	  
Hawala	  in	  May	  2002.	  (It	  would	  host	  others	  in	  2004,	  2005,	  and	  2007).	  Its	  goals,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  later	  ones,	  were	  to	  “facilitate	  proper	  risk	  and	  impact	  assessment	  and	  prioritization,”	  including	  assessing	  is	  vulnerability	  to	  “money	  laundering,	  terrorist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852	  Guiora	  and	  Field,	  “Using	  and	  Abusing	  the	  Financial	  Markets:	  Money	  Laundering	  as	  the	  Achilles’	  Heel	  of	  Terrorism,”	  87;	  and	  Pathank,	  ‘The	  Obstacles	  to	  Regulating	  the	  Hawala,”	  2045-­‐2046.	  853	  See,	  for	  example	  Sher,	  “Counter	  Point:	  Regulation	  of	  hawala	  is	  a	  Step	  in	  the	  Right	  Direction.”	  854	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Pakistanis	  Urged	  to	  Shun	  Hawala	  System.”	  855	  Nawaz,	  McKinnon	  and	  Webb,	  “Informal	  and	  Formal	  Money	  Transfer	  Networks,”	  334,	  citing	  Allen	  in	  Financial	  Times,	  “The	  Veil	  over	  Dirty	  Money	  in	  Dubai.”	  856	  Carvalho,	  “UAE	  to	  Introduce	  New	  Law	  Against	  Terror	  Financing.”	  857	  See	  FATF,	  “Annual	  Review	  of	  Non-­‐Cooperative	  Countries	  and	  Territories	  2006-­‐2007,”	  2,	  n2.	  858	  Carvalho,	  “GCC	  in	  talks	  to	  check	  hawala	  deals.”	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financing	  and	  other	  related	  crimes.”	  Its	  other	  objectives	  were	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  hawala	  operators	  to	  convince	  them	  “on	  the	  value	  of	  an	  integrated	  and	  sound	  money	  transfer	  system,”	  and	  encourage	  “closer	  co-­‐operation	  and	  enhanced	  information	  exchange	  between	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  and	  regulators	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  applicable	  measures	  are	  both	  effective	  and	  balanced.”859	  	  	  Outreach	  was	  perhaps	  the	  hardest	  part,	  as	  the	  practice	  was	  such	  an	  underground	  element	  that	  no	  hawaladars	  attended	  the	  conference.	  (In	  similar	  fashion,	  when	  word	  leaked	  that	  US	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Paul	  O’Neil	  planned	  a	  visit	  to	  a	  Dubai	  hawala,	  he	  arrived	  to	  find	  “that	  not	  only	  were	  the	  hawaladars	  missing,	  but	  that	  the	  entire	  storefront	  had	  been	  removed	  the	  night	  before.”)860	  Despite	  this,	  on	  16	  May	  the	  conference	  issued	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  the	  “Abu	  Dhabi	  Declaration	  on	  Hawala,”	  praising	  the	  system	  for	  its	  general	  usefulness	  but	  also	  stating	  that	  such	  informal	  value	  transfers	  systems	  should	  be	  regulated	  in	  accordance	  with	  FATF	  recommendations.	  It	  also	  warned	  (in	  an	  observer’s	  words)	  about	  the	  risks	  of	  too	  restrictive	  regulation.”	  One	  danger	  with	  the	  latter	  was	  that	  “too	  stringent	  regulation	  could	  result	  in	  underground	  banking	  being	  carried	  on	  even	  more	  covertly.”861	  	  Suwaidi	  used	  the	  2002	  forum	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  refute	  western	  media	  presentations	  of	  hawala	  as	  a	  means	  of	  transferring	  illicit	  funds.	  “That,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  the	  case	  and	  has	  never	  been	  the	  case,”	  he	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying,	  adding	  (in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  that	  the	  “majority	  of	  people	  who	  use	  hawala	  to	  remit	  their	  funds	  are	  low	  income	  blue-­‐collar	  migrant	  workers	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  or	  western	  countries	  who	  are	  for	  a	  large	  part	  illiterate	  and	  have	  moved	  to	  work	  overseas	  from	  countries	  where	  there	  are	  strict	  exchange	  controls.”862	  However,	  no	  joint	  GCC	  regulatory	  body	  for	  hawala	  ever	  coalesced;	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Qatar	  would	  in	  fact	  ban	  the	  practice.863	  Regardless,	  the	  UAE	  stuck	  to	  a	  moderate	  course	  on	  hawala,	  which	  might	  fall	  into	  what	  a	  later	  observer	  called	  the	  assimilation	  model.	  In	  this	  “underground	  bankers	  will	  have	  to	  look	  more	  like	  ordinary	  bankers	  and	  vice	  versa,	  subject	  to	  the	  precondition	  that	  compliance	  with	  the	  relevant	  rules	  and	  regulations	  and	  government	  supervision	  are	  guaranteed.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  is	  not	  to	  eliminate	  underground	  banking	  as	  an	  institution	  based	  on	  trust,	  but	  ‘only’	  to	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  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013)	  13.	  860	  Bowers,	  “Hawala,	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  Terrorism	  Finance,”	  386.	  861	  Borders,	  “Regulating	  and	  Combating	  Underground	  Banking,”	  107.	  See	  also	  Looney,	  “Hawala,”	  166.	  862	  Carvalho,	  “Meet	  Highlights	  the	  Need	  to	  Regulate,	  But	  Not	  Ban,	  hawala.”	  863	  Maayeh,	  “Hawala	  Money	  Transfers	  Defy	  Regulation	  Efforts.”	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modify	  it,	  while	  offering	  the	  customers	  of	  underground	  bankers	  a	  real	  alternative	  on	  the	  money	  transfer	  market.”864	  	  By	  November,	  likely	  with	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  FATF	  recommendations	  in	  mind,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  announced	  that	  new	  regulations	  for	  UAE-­‐based	  hawaladars	  were	  to	  take	  effect	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  dealers	  would	  be	  required	  to	  register	  with	  the	  Central	  Bank;	  record	  details	  of	  each	  transaction,	  including	  “reverse	  transactions”	  or	  inward	  remittances;	  report	  suspicious	  transactions	  that	  might	  involve	  money	  laundering;	  and	  submit	  returns	  to	  the	  Central	  Bank.	  Perhaps	  because	  hawaladars	  had	  little	  prior	  experience	  of	  government	  registration,	  the	  awareness	  effort	  stressed	  the	  simplicity	  of	  the	  forms	  involved.865	  As	  Trautsolt	  and	  Johnson	  noted	  in	  a	  later	  article,	  the	  incentive	  was	  that	  those	  hawaladars	  who	  registered	  would	  “receive	  a	  certificate	  to	  facilitate	  their	  access	  to	  the	  formal	  financial	  sector,	  should	  they	  wish	  to	  deal	  with	  banks	  or	  moneychangers.”	  However,	  as	  “it	  is	  general	  knowledge	  that	  unregistered	  hawaladars	  use	  the	  formal	  banking	  system	  with	  no	  restrictions	  in	  their	  business	  routines	  …	  this	  incentive	  seems	  to	  matter	  little	  in	  reality.”866	  	  It	  appears	  that	  a	  period	  of	  several	  months	  were	  spent	  spreading	  advance	  notice,	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  pre-­‐registration	  in	  place,	  prior	  to	  the	  actual	  issuance	  of	  the	  relevant	  Central	  Bank	  regulation	  on	  1	  April	  2003.867	  (Moving	  ahead	  of	  this	  chapter’s	  basically	  chronological	  approach,	  by	  October	  2005,	  153	  hawaladars	  would	  be	  registered	  in	  the	  UAE.868	  By	  August	  2008,	  that	  number	  would	  rise	  to	  260,	  with	  100	  applications	  pending.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  unregulated	  hawala	  was	  seen	  as	  omnipresent	  in	  the	  UAE	  capital	  of	  Abu	  Dhabi.	  This	  was	  probably	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  incentive	  cited	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  lax	  enforcement	  and	  nonexistent	  penalties.	  "We	  are	  not	  registered,	  nobody	  is	  registered	  here,"	  an	  Abu	  Dhabi	  storeowner	  and	  hawaladar	  told	  a	  reporter	  from	  The	  National	  newspaper.	  "Every	  textile	  shop	  is	  doing	  hawala.	  It	  is	  how	  people	  make	  most	  of	  their	  money."869	  Trautsolt	  and	  Johnson	  would	  conclude	  from	  the	  hawala	  registration	  effort	  that	  the	  FATF	  recommendations	  themselves	  on	  hawala	  were	  ineffective.870	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864	  Borders,	  “Regulating	  and	  Combating	  Underground	  Banking,”	  104.	  865	  Carvalho,	  “Central	  Bank	  Begins	  Registering	  Hawala	  Operators,”	  and	  Zagaris,	  “Problems	  Applying	  Traditional	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Procedures	  to	  Non-­‐Financial	  Transactions,	  ‘Parallel	  Banking	  Systems,’	  and	  Islamic	  Financial	  Systems,”	  162.	  866	  Trautsolt	  and	  Johnsøn,	  “International	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulation	  of	  Alternative	  Remittance	  Systems,”	  414.	  867	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013)	  12.	  868	  WAM	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “UAE	  Keeps	  Tabs	  on	  Inflow	  of	  Foreign	  Funds.”	  869	  Maayeh	  ,	  “Hawala	  Money	  Transfers	  Defy	  Regulation	  Efforts.”	  870	  Trautsolt	  and	  Johnson,	  “International	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  regulations	  of	  alternative	  remittance	  systems,”	  417.	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The	  Shift	  Toward	  CFT	  	  To	  return	  to	  the	  straight	  chronology	  of	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  brings	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  doctoral	  thesis	  back	  to	  2003.	  While	  earlier	  AML	  efforts	  were	  connected	  to	  concern	  with	  organized	  crime	  and	  narcotics	  trafficking,	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  in	  the	  US	  shifted	  the	  focus	  of	  many	  such	  efforts	  toward	  the	  context	  of	  fighting	  terrorism.	  The	  acronym	  CFT	  (“combating	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism”)	  began	  to	  emerge	  alongside	  AML.	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  US	  representatives	  seem	  to	  have	  initially	  seen	  the	  UAE’s	  2002	  AML	  law.871	  But	  it	  also	  became	  gradually	  clearer	  that	  Western	  governments	  and	  international	  organizations	  felt	  more	  was	  needed.	  As	  a	  modern	  study	  has	  noted,	  there	  are	  clear	  legal	  demarcations	  between	  AML	  and	  CFT	  as	  problems	  to	  be	  regulated.	  	   Despite	  many	  similarities,	  terror	  financing	  presents	  a	  wholly	  different	  discussion	  from	  money	  laundering	  and	  as	  such,	  the	  traditional	  money	  laundering	  legislation	  is	  insufficient	  against	  terror	  financing.	  Money	  laundering	  …	  is	  the	  cleaning	  and	  concealment	  of	  “dirty”	  or	  “illicit”	  money.	  A	  governmental	  program	  that	  searches	  for	  illegal	  activities	  will	  likely	  find	  money	  laundering.	  However,	  the	  financial	  acts	  in	  terror	  financing	  do	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  illicit	  funds.	  In	  money	  laundering	  the	  criminality	  begins	  with	  the	  illicit	  earning	  of	  funds,	  followed	  by	  the	  subsequent	  illegal	  act	  of	  money	  laundering.	  In	  terror	  financing,	  however,	  the	  actual	  illegality	  often	  occurs	  only	  after	  the	  actual	  transfer,	  when	  the	  money	  is	  ultimately	  used	  for	  funding	  terrorism.	  Thus,	  the	  mere	  application	  of	  the	  existing	  money	  laundering	  rules	  is	  insufficient.872	  Or	  as	  another	  scholar	  has	  expressed	  it,	  terror	  financing	  “involves	  a	  process	  completely	  different	  from	  money	  laundering:	  ‘money	  dirtying’	  which	  is	  the	  reverse	  of	  money	  laundering.”873	  	  No	  sign	  of	  any	  perceived	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  UAE	  AML	  law	  in	  this	  regard	  seems	  to	  have	  come	  out	  in	  the	  press	  when	  Dubai	  hosted	  the	  IMF-­‐World	  Bank	  annual	  meetings	  in	  September	  2003.	  Then,	  much	  was	  made	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  UAE	  had,	  mainly	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  AML	  law,	  emerged	  as	  a	  regional	  leader	  in	  halting	  the	  financial	  exploitation	  of	  financial	  institutions	  by	  terrorists.874	  However,	  it	  became	  clear	  within	  a	  few	  months	  of	  the	  IMF-­‐World	  Bank	  meeting	  in	  Dubai	  that	  more	  specific	  anti-­‐terrorism	  approaches	  were	  wanted.	  In	  April	  2004,	  an	  IMF	  delegation	  returned	  to	  the	  UAE	  to	  discuss	  concerns	  about	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism.	  The	  trip	  included	  a	  session	  with	  the	  National	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Committee	  and	  its	  chairman,	  Central	  Bank	  Governor	  Sultan	  bin	  Nasser	  Al	  Suwaidi.	  The	  latter	  told	  a	  reporter	  for	  an	  English-­‐language	  newspaper	  that	  the	  IMF	  team	  had	  “expressed	  satisfaction”	  with	  the	  UAE’s	  AML	  efforts.	  “But,”	  he	  added,	  “the	  IMF	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
871	  Carvalho,	  “U.S.	  Lauds	  UAE	  Role	  in	  Fighting	  Terrorist	  Funds.”	  872	  Guiora	  and	  Field,	  “Using	  and	  Abusing	  the	  Financial	  Markets:	  Money	  Laundering	  as	  the	  Achilles’	  Heel	  of	  Terrorism,”	  76.	  873	  Unger,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Regulation:	  From	  Al	  Capone	  to	  Al	  Qaeda,”	  21.	  874	  Raveendran,	  “UAE	  Plays	  Perfect	  Host	  with	  Reforms	  in	  Banking	  Sector.”	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directed	  us	  to	  put	  in	  place	  a	  law	  to	  combat	  financing	  of	  terrorism.”	  According	  to	  Suwaidi,	  UAE	  authorities	  began	  preparing	  a	  CFT	  law	  at	  once.	  “A	  Technical	  Committee	  has	  been	  formed	  with	  representatives	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  and	  some	  other	  organisations,”	  he	  told	  a	  reporter.	  “When	  it	  is	  ready	  it	  will	  go	  through	  the	  usual	  channels	  before	  a	  decree	  is	  passed."	  Hawala	  was	  apparently	  still	  a	  sore	  point	  with	  Western	  governments,	  because	  Suwaidi	  emphasized	  that	  while	  the	  UAE	  would	  cooperate	  with	  international	  bodies,	  it	  would	  reject	  calls	  to	  ban	  hawala.	  “Hawala	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  facilitating	  remittances,	  especially	  those	  of	  migrant	  workers	  and	  it	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  international	  finance	  system,"	  he	  told	  the	  press.	  "In	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  it	  serves	  a	  very	  important	  purpose	  and	  we	  cannot	  ban	  it.	  However,	  we	  will	  do	  our	  best	  to	  regulate	  it."	  This	  would	  be	  done	  in	  part,	  he	  said,	  by	  continuing	  the	  practice	  of	  registering	  hawaladars.	  Doing	  this,	  made	  hawala	  “a	  legitimate	  way	  of	  transferring	  money,”	  he	  added,	  noting	  that	  criminals	  could	  also	  misuse	  other	  financial	  institutions.875	  Under	  any	  circumstances,	  Suwaidi	  at	  this	  time	  felt	  the	  existing	  AML	  law	  had	  made	  a	  significant	  impact,	  and	  he	  told	  the	  press	  in	  June	  it	  had	  resulted	  in	  a	  drop	  in	  suspicious	  transactions	  from	  abroad.876	  At	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  country	  had	  taken	  steps	  to	  ensure	  competent	  regulation	  of	  its	  Financial	  Free	  Zones,	  of	  which	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Center	  (DIFC)	  was	  the	  first	  and	  most	  visible;	  877	  and	  transportation	  of	  valuables	  in	  the	  diamond	  trade,	  the	  operations	  of	  which	  were	  overseen	  by	  the	  Dubai	  Multi	  Commodities	  Center	  (DMCC).	  878	  
Federal	  Law	  No.	  (1)	  of	  2004	  (“On	  Combating	  Terrorism	  Offenses”)	  UAE	  President	  Zayed	  bin	  Sultan	  Al	  Nahyan	  signed	  the	  decree,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  into	  law	  on	  28	  July	  2004.	  (Decrees	  in	  the	  UAE	  have	  the	  force	  of	  law,	  and	  are	  issued	  by	  the	  president,	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  “should	  necessity	  arise	  for	  urgent	  promulgation	  of	  Union	  laws	  between	  session	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Council.”879	  It	  consisted	  of	  45	  separate	  articles.	  Those	  most	  relevant	  to	  terror-­‐financing	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  Article	  3	  provides	  for	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  “property	  derived	  from	  the	  offence	  or	  apparently	  included	  within	  the	  property	  of	  the	  convict	  if	  it	  is	  proved	  that	  this	  property	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
875	  Carvalho,	  “UAE	  to	  introduce	  new	  law	  against	  terror	  financing.	  876	  Uncredited	  in	  Alyaum,	  [“The	  success	  of	  the	  UAE's	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  the	  suspicious	  transfer	  of	  funds.”]	  877	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  15.	  878	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  15.	  879	  UAE	  Constitution,	  Part	  V,	  Chapter	  2,	  Article	  113,	  as	  translated	  in	  Walters	  and	  Quinn,	  Bridging	  the	  Gulf,	  265-­‐266.	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resource	  assigned	  to	  finance	  the	  said	  societies,	  bodies,	  organizations,	  centres,	  groups	  or	  gangs.”	  Article	  4	  provided	  for	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  any	  property	  or	  proceeds	  given	  to	  support	  such	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  which	  “had	  been	  transferred,	  substituted,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part	  or	  mixed	  with	  other	  property	  gained	  from	  legal	  sources.”	  Moving	  closer,	  perhaps,	  to	  the	  traditional	  money	  laundering	  sphere,	  Article	  12	  provided	  for	  imprisonment	  up	  to	  and	  including	  for	  life	  for	  “Whoever	  gains,	  provides	  collects,	  carries	  or	  transfers	  property,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  with	  intention	  to	  be	  used	  or	  knows	  they	  are	  going	  to	  be	  used,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  to	  financing	  any	  of	  [the]	  terrorist	  acts	  provided	  in	  this	  Decree	  by	  Law	  within	  the	  State	  or	  abroad,	  whether	  the	  said	  act	  occurred	  or	  non-­‐occurred…”	  The	  same	  article	  provided	  for	  forfeiture	  of	  the	  aforesaid	  property.	  And	  Article	  13	  provided	  the	  same	  punishment	  for	  “Whoever	  carries,	  transfers,	  deposits	  property	  on	  the	  account	  of	  another	  person,	  or	  conceals	  or	  disguises	  its	  nature,	  essence	  of	  its	  source	  or	  its	  place	  as	  well	  [as]	  whoever	  possesses	  property	  …	  with	  intention	  to	  be	  used	  or	  knows	  they	  are	  going	  to	  be	  used,	  in	  whole	  or	  I	  part,	  to	  financing	  any	  terrorist	  acts	  provided	  in	  this	  Law…”	  Again,	  the	  article	  called	  for	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  such	  property.	  Article	  34	  specified	  that	  in	  such	  cases	  “the	  competent	  court	  shall	  seize	  the	  property,	  possession	  or	  proceeds	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  trial,”	  and	  that	  all	  orders	  related	  to	  seizure	  or	  freezing	  of	  bank	  accounts	  “shall	  not	  be	  executed	  save	  through	  he	  Central	  Bank.”	  Article	  39	  freed	  the	  Central	  Bank	  from	  liability	  in	  such	  cases.	  Article	  36	  established	  a	  National	  Committee	  for	  Combating	  Terrorism,	  which	  would	  include	  representation	  from	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank.	  It	  would	  sometimes	  be	  known	  as	  the	  National	  Counter	  Terrorism	  Committee	  (NCTC),	  and	  would	  work	  closely	  in	  future	  with	  the	  NAMLC	  and	  AMLSCU.880	  
AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement,	  2004-­‐2008	  With	  the	  signing	  of	  this	  decree,	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  framework	  would	  be	  largely	  settled	  for	  the	  next	  decade,	  until	  the	  signing	  of	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (9)	  of	  2014,	  which	  amended	  portions	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  AML	  law	  of	  2002.	  At	  this	  point,	  in	  2004,	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  data	  emerges	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  draw	  inferences	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  legislative/regulatory	  framework.	  (One	  sign	  of	  how	  2004	  marked	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  data	  collection	  is	  that	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  during	  the	  year	  developed	  a	  secure	  online	  portal	  through	  which	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions	  could	  submit	  STRs.)881	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  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  3.	  881	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  15.	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  The	  starting	  point	  for	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  framework	  at	  this	  point	  is	  the	  MENA/FATF	  evaluation	  performed	  in	  2007,	  which	  culminated	  in	  a	  report	  published	  in	  April	  2008.	  Its	  “key	  findings”	  were	  that	  a	  basic	  legal	  framework	  was	  in	  place	  but	  needed	  strengthening.	  “The	  AML	  law	  needs	  to	  be	  amended	  to	  expand	  the	  range	  of	  predicate	  offences	  and	  to	  provide	  greater	  powers	  for	  the	  financial	  intelligence	  unit.”	  The	  latter,	  the	  AMLSCU,	  also	  needed	  greater	  staffing.	  The	  report	  noted	  that	  the	  UAE’s	  framework	  at	  this	  time	  “predates	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations	  in	  2003,	  which	  have	  now	  imposed	  much	  more	  detailed	  requirements.”	  And	  while	  the	  report	  looked	  favorably	  at	  the	  regulation	  of	  hawala,	  it	  was	  especially	  critical	  of	  the	  low	  numbers	  of	  STRs	  generated.882	  STR	  figures	  can	  indeed	  be	  seen	  as	  key	  indicators	  of	  diligence	  and	  a	  source	  for	  comprehensive	  data	  breakdown,	  and	  were	  understandably	  a	  centerpiece	  of	  the	  evaluators’	  attention.	  	  The	  MENA/FATF	  evaluators	  noted	  that	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  “regulations	  contain	  detailed	  examples	  of	  types	  of	  transactions	  that	  might	  reasonably	  be	  regarded	  as	  unusual	  in	  order	  to	  assist	  the	  institution	  to	  identity	  suspicious	  activity.”	  The	  evaluators	  also	  reproduced	  the	  feedback	  form	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  provided	  in	  receipt	  of	  an	  STR.	  It	  contained	  “five	  tick-­‐box	  items	  notifying	  the	  institution	  of	  any	  one	  of	  the	  following:”	  	  
• The	  STR	  has	  been	  added	  to	  our	  STR	  database	  at	  AMLSCU	  and	  no	  action	  is	  required.	  
• The	  STR	  has	  been	  added	  to	  our	  STR	  database	  at	  AMLSCU	  and	  you	  should	  monitor	  the	  account	  regularly	  for	  suspicious	  movements.	  
• You	  should	  interview	  the	  customer,	  and	  inform	  us	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  interview.	  
• The	  case	  will	  be	  passed-­‐on	  to	  the	  police	  for	  investigating	  concerned	  person/customer/entity’s	  activities.	  
• Steps	  will	  be	  taken	  to	  freeze	  the	  accounts	  and	  pass	  on	  to	  the	  Public	  prosecutor	  for	  further	  investigation.883	  	  These	  five	  tick-­‐boxes,	  then,	  represent	  the	  five	  potential	  outcomes	  of	  a	  single	  STR.	  Compiling	  statistics	  on	  the	  breakdown	  of	  outcomes	  –	  something	  FATF	  evaluations	  would	  request	  while	  compiling	  their	  2008	  report884	  –	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  begun	  in	  the	  UAE	  until	  2011,	  which	  is	  the	  first	  year	  for	  which	  such	  breakdowns	  appears	  in	  the	  AMLSCU	  Annual	  Reports.	  However,	  the	  same	  source	  does	  track	  the	  growth	  of	  STRs	  from	  2004-­‐2013.885	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  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  9.	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  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	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  Evaluation	  Report”	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  Adapted	  from	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	  




Table	  1:	  Annual	  Number	  of	  STR	  Reports,	  2004-­‐2013,	  AMLSCU	  
2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  377	   372	   635	   694	   1170	   1750	   2781	   2576	   2700	   2890	  	  For	  the	  period	  under	  assessment	  in	  this	  section,	  2004-­‐2008,	  it	  shows	  an	  average	  of	  649.6	  STRs	  filed	  annually.	  Some	  contemporary	  media	  reports	  offer	  additional	  numbers	  and	  statistics,	  but	  many	  of	  these	  seem	  to	  confuse	  or	  perhaps	  conflate	  STRs	  with	  other	  types	  of	  reports.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  UAE	  officials	  still	  had	  not	  yet	  consolidated	  AML	  complaints	  in	  a	  central	  database.	  For	  example,	  Dubai	  Police	  operated	  the	  “Al	  Ameen”	  service,	  in	  which	  residents	  could	  report	  crimes	  by	  phone,	  fax	  or	  email;	  this	  service	  generated	  a	  dozen	  money	  laundering	  complaints	  in	  2004	  and	  47	  in	  2005;	  most	  complaints	  involved	  scam-­‐type	  emails	  originated	  from	  Africa.886	  This	  seems	  supported	  in	  a	  footnote	  to	  the	  2008	  MENA/FATF	  MER	  which	  states	  that	  what	  were	  classified	  as	  STRs	  included	  not	  only	  those	  “received	  from	  the	  financial	  sector”	  but	  also	  “reports	  filed	  by	  various	  law	  enforcement	  and	  other	  agencies.”	  887	  Certainly,	  by	  2010	  the	  AMLSCU	  had	  begun	  to	  break	  down	  STRs	  into	  those	  filed	  by	  financial	  institutions	  and	  moneychangers	  on	  ML/FT	  suspicion;	  those	  filed	  by	  financial	  institutions	  and	  moneychangers	  on	  fraud/criminal	  suspicion;	  and	  those	  coming	  from	  other	  law	  enforcement	  authorities.888	  The	  fact	  that	  multiple	  STR	  types	  were	  being	  kept	  seems	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  a	  statement,	  contained	  in	  the	  2008	  MER,	  that	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  officials	  told	  the	  investigators	  that	  “there	  were	  just	  over	  4,000	  STRs	  on	  hand	  as	  at	  [sic:	  of]	  December	  31,	  2006.”889	  This	  was	  apparently	  a	  cumulative	  number	  representing	  STRs	  going	  back	  to	  Central	  Bank’s	  Nov.	  14,	  2000	  Circular	  No.	  24/2000,	  which	  made	  STR	  filing	  mandatory.	  	  Such	  aggregate	  figures	  seem	  to	  make	  other	  appearances	  in	  media	  stories.	  For	  example,	  a	  2005	  story	  in	  Gulf	  News	  reported	  UAE	  officials	  announcing	  that	  the	  “[t]he	  total	  number	  of	  suspicious	  transactions	  and	  cases	  received	  by	  the	  Central	  Bank's	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit	  (AMLSCU)	  so	  far	  has	  been	  2,384.”	  Again,	  this	  is	  presumably	  a	  cumulative	  figure	  going	  back	  to	  November	  2000.	  The	  article	  also	  reported	  that	  the	  UAE	  had	  (in	  an	  unspecified	  time	  period)	  “frozen	  17	  suspicious	  bank	  accounts	  totaling	  Dh4.95	  million”	  or	  US$1.348	  million.	  An	  AMLSCU	  official	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying	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  Bithar,	  “Spike	  in	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  Laundering	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  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	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  Report”	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that	  2,273	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  2,384	  cases	  had	  been	  investigated,	  “of	  which	  27	  were	  referred	  to	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  for	  legal	  action.”	  In	  16	  cases,	  four	  of	  which	  related	  to	  UAE	  Customs,	  proceeds	  from	  money	  laundering	  were	  ordered	  confiscated.	  The	  other	  nine	  cases	  were	  then	  awaiting	  final	  decisions	  in	  the	  courts.890	  	  	  There	  are	  other	  signs	  of	  confusion	  from	  this	  period	  over	  how	  UAE	  officials	  (or	  perhaps	  journalists)	  presented	  or	  interpreted	  figures	  on	  STRs.	  In	  some	  cases,	  it	  seems	  that	  aggregate	  figures	  since	  2000	  (or	  2002,	  when	  the	  AML	  law	  took	  effect)	  were	  translated	  as	  annual	  numbers.	  A	  2009	  story	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  for	  example,	  quoted	  a	  senior	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  official	  as	  stating	  that	  during	  the	  year,	  “6,198	  cases	  have	  been	  reported	  to	  the	  Central	  Bank	  until	  May,	  and	  the	  number	  could	  eventually	  cross	  15,000…	  In	  2008,	  13,101	  cases	  were	  reported	  to	  the	  Central	  Bank.”	  Both	  figures,	  again,	  far	  outpace	  those	  later	  published	  by	  the	  AMLSCU	  (1750	  in	  2009,	  1170	  the	  year	  before),	  suggesting	  that	  multi-­‐year	  cumulative	  totals	  were	  in	  fact	  being	  discussed.	  Yet	  the	  official	  being	  quoted,	  Saeed	  Abdullah	  Al	  Hamiz,	  senior	  executive	  director	  of	  banking	  supervision,	  added	  that	  between	  2002	  and	  2008,	  more	  than	  74,000	  “cases	  of	  suspicious	  transactions”	  had	  been	  reported.	  Of	  that	  huge	  figure,	  he	  said,	  “only	  285	  have	  been	  sent	  to	  the	  Public	  Prosecution	  since	  2002,	  with	  20	  of	  those	  reaching	  court.”891	  	  	  Further	  confusing	  the	  picture,	  the	  MENA/FATF	  team	  compiling	  the	  2008	  evaluation	  report	  received	  a	  different	  set	  of	  STR	  numbers	  than	  those	  later	  published	  by	  the	  AMLSCU.	  According	  to	  the	  MENA/FATF	  document,	  between	  2004-­‐2006	  financial	  institutions	  filed	  the	  following	  numbers	  of	  STRs:892	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Annual	  Number	  of	  STRs	  by	  Financial	  Institutions,	  2004-­‐2006,	  MENA/FATF	  	   2004	   2005	   2006	  Banks	   252	   250	   475	  Moneychangers	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions	   38	   49	   73	  DIFC	  institutions893	   	   2	   8	  Total	   290	   301	   556	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
890	  Carvalho, “UAE	  Freezes	  Suspicious	  Accounts.”	  891	  Uppal,	  “UAE	  regulators	  join	  hands	  to	  ensure	  probity. 892	  Adapted	  from	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  82.	  893	  In	  May	  2008,	  it	  would	  be	  reported	  that	  the	  DFSA	  had	  filed	  “around	  25”	  STRs	  with	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  since	  2004.	  Masudi,	  “DFSA:	  The	  Watchdog	  Fighting	  Financial	  Crimes.”	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This	  yields	  the	  total	  STRs	  for	  2004-­‐06	  as	  published	  in	  MENA/FATF	  MER	  2008.	  But	  this	  contradicts	  the	  STR	  numbers	  for	  the	  same	  period	  as	  published	  in	  AMLSCU	  Annual	  Report	  2013.894	  	  
Table	  3:	  Annual	  Number	  of	  STRs,	  2004-­‐2006,	  AMLSCU	  
2004	   2005	   2006	  377	   372	   635	  	  A	  more	  immediate	  problem	  noted	  in	  2008	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  specific	  information	  derived	  from	  the	  STR	  numbers.	  Besides	  noting	  that	  the	  10	  DIFC	  cases	  all	  involved	  “submission	  of	  forged	  documents,”	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  2008	  MENA/FATF	  report	  observed	  that	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  grant	  the	  team’s	  request	  for	  a	  breakdown	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  STR	  data.	  Moreover,	  the	  authors	  also	  noted	  that	  “[t]he	  level	  of	  STR	  reporting	  in	  the	  domestic	  sector	  appears	  to	  be	  very	  low	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  market.	  It	  is	  also	  understood	  (from	  discussions	  with	  the	  private	  sector)	  that	  the	  reporting	  is	  heavily	  concentrated	  among	  a	  few	  institutions.	  These	  figures	  suggest	  that	  the	  system	  is	  not	  providing	  a	  proper	  basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  and	  investigation	  of	  money	  laundering	  threats	  in	  the	  jurisdiction.”	  The	  authors	  suggested	  two	  causes	  for	  the	  low	  figures:	  most	  financial	  institutions	  were	  failing	  in	  their	  duty,	  or	  “they	  are	  applying	  a	  threshold	  of	  suspicion	  that	  is	  unreasonable	  [sic]	  high.”	  Under	  any	  circumstances,	  “the	  central	  bank	  reports	  that,	  through	  its	  examination	  process,	  it	  is	  generally	  satisfied	  with	  the	  levels	  of	  compliance	  by	  the	  banks.”	  895	  	  	  Another	  aspect	  of	  the	  analysis	  the	  MENA/FATF	  team	  remarked	  at	  was	  the	  low	  number	  of	  AML/CFT	  investigations	  and	  prosecutions	  taking	  place	  outside	  of	  Dubai	  itself.	  There,	  the	  prosecutor’s	  office	  began	  five	  cases	  in	  2003,	  seven	  in	  2004,	  eleven	  in	  2005,	  four	  in	  2006,	  and	  two	  in	  2007.	  In	  comparison,	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  based	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi	  and	  responsible	  for	  prosecuting	  ML	  cases	  outside	  of	  Dubai	  and	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah,	  had	  begun	  only	  two	  cases	  prior	  to	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  evaluators.	  Both	  were	  in	  Sharjah,	  and	  the	  first	  “failed	  for	  lack	  of	  evidence	  and	  the	  second	  is	  still	  before	  the	  courts.”	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  the	  report,	  the	  AMLSCU	  had	  sent	  no	  STR-­‐based	  cases	  to	  the	  federal	  prosecutors	  since	  2005.	  While	  Ras	  Al	  Khaimah	  had	  experienced	  no	  ML-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
894	  Adapted	  from	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	  895	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  82.	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prosecutions,	  the	  analysts	  dismissed	  this	  as	  insignificant	  because	  “this	  is	  a	  small	  emirate.”896	  Outside	  of	  the	  report,	  media	  articles	  provide	  some	  evidence	  of	  Dubai	  efforts.	  	  	  
• The	  Dubai	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance,	  for	  example,	  in	  April	  2005	  found	  an	  accountant	  and	  businessmen	  guilty	  of	  laundering	  Dh6.3	  million	  under	  the	  2002	  law.	  They	  received	  no	  criminal	  penalty,	  but	  were	  each	  fined	  Dh40,000.	  The	  verdict	  was	  however,	  reversed	  on	  appeal	  late	  in	  May.897	  	  
• In	  December	  2005,	  Sharjah	  and	  Dubai	  police	  began	  “Operation	  Octopus,”	  which	  ultimately	  (in	  late	  August	  2006)	  brought	  19	  people	  to	  Sharjah	  court	  charged	  with	  money	  laundering	  and	  drug	  running.	  “According	  to	  the	  case	  file	  —	  comprising	  more	  than	  3,000	  pages	  —	  last	  December,	  the	  authorities	  concerned	  received	  information	  that	  some	  members	  of	  a	  gang	  who	  were	  staying	  in	  the	  UAE,	  were	  planning	  to	  smuggle	  a	  huge	  quantity	  of	  drugs	  —	  2,500kg	  of	  hashish	  —	  in	  containers	  of	  90,000	  towels	  from	  Pakistan	  to	  Holland,	  through	  some	  of	  their	  assistants	  in	  Pakistan.	  The	  smugglers	  hid	  the	  narcotics	  in	  towels	  and	  transferred	  them	  from	  Faisalabad	  to	  Multan	  in	  Pakistan	  where	  they	  were	  repackaged	  in	  cartons,	  then	  sent	  to	  Karachi	  where	  a	  member	  of	  the	  gang	  received	  the	  quantities	  and	  put	  the	  consignment	  in	  a	  container.	  The	  suspect	  completed	  the	  shipment	  procedures	  with	  the	  Pakistani	  Customs,	  and	  the	  cargo	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  shipped	  to	  a	  private	  company	  belonging	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  gang	  in	  Holland.”898	  (The	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  reported;	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  it	  was	  the	  case	  the	  MENA/FATF	  evaluators	  reported	  had	  been	  dropped	  for	  lack	  of	  evidence.)	  
• On	  7	  May	  2006,	  UAE	  authorities	  arrested	  a	  53-­‐year-­‐old	  Russian	  national	  wanted	  on	  an	  Interpol	  warrant	  for	  money	  laundering	  and	  subsequent	  extradited	  him	  to	  Spain.	  899	  	  
• In	  early	  March	  2007,	  Suwaidi	  called	  a	  press	  conference	  to	  announce	  the	  breakup	  of	  an	  international	  money	  laundering	  effort,	  the	  efforts	  done	  mainly	  by	  UAE	  security	  and	  regulatory	  officials.	  In	  discussing	  the	  investigation,	  which	  unfolded	  over	  18	  months,	  he	  attacked	  critics	  of	  UAE	  AML/CFT	  efforts,	  basically	  accusing	  them	  of	  jealousy	  over	  the	  UAE’s	  developed	  financial	  sector.	  He	  said	  the	  investigation	  had	  involved	  a	  group	  of	  21	  people	  and	  nine	  companies	  from	  various	  countries.	  The	  sum	  involved	  was	  $50	  million.900	  While	  a	  hawala	  system	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  case,	  it	  was	  not	  that	  of	  the	  UAE.901	  
• Later	  in	  March	  2007,	  UAE	  investigators	  assisted	  in	  the	  international	  breakup	  of	  what	  was	  described	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  launder	  drug	  money	  “in	  a	  UAE	  ‘cash	  pool’	  serving	  a	  string	  of	  dealers	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  Afghanistan.”	  The	  figure	  involved	  was	  Dh715	  million.902	  	  
• In	  May	  2007	  Dubai	  Police	  closed	  out	  a	  major	  investigation	  against	  a	  money	  laundering	  operation.	  According	  to	  the	  Arabic	  newspaper	  Al	  Bayan,	  the	  first	  involved	  Dh74	  billion	  in	  money	  laundering,	  had	  been	  in	  operation	  since	  1999,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
896	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  26.	  897	  Za’za,	  “Businessman	  and	  Accountant	  Cleared	  of	  Money	  Laundering.”	  898	  Rashed,	  “19	  on	  Trial	  Over	  Record	  2,500kg	  Drugs	  Haul.”	  899	  Za’za,	  “UAE	  Extradites	  Wanted	  Russian	  to	  Spain.”	  900	  Uncredited	  in	  Elaph,	  [“UAE	  Disintegration	  Of	  International	  Money	  Laundering	  Network.”]	  901	  Uncredited	  in	  Al	  Ittihad, [“Central	  Denies	  The	  Use	  Of	  The	  Hawala	  System	  In	  Money	  Laundering	  Operations.”]	  902	  Masudi,	  “Money	  Laundering	  Sweeps	  UAE.”	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and	  the	  cash	  concerned	  had	  passed	  through	  banks	  in	  10	  countries.	  Dubai	  police	  captured	  eight	  suspects;	  five	  more	  were	  captured	  outside	  the	  UAE.903	  	  
• In	  October	  2007,	  after	  16	  months	  of	  monitoring,	  Dubai	  Police	  arrested	  40	  more	  people	  of	  various	  nationalities	  involved	  in	  a	  similar	  operation	  that	  allegedly	  involved	  the	  laundering	  of	  Dh2.4	  billion.904	  	  
Compliance	  Assessments	  in	  2008	  Besides	  the	  STR	  materials	  cited	  above,	  and	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  statistics	  needed	  to	  assess	  the	  AML/CFT	  framework’s	  effectiveness,905	  the	  MENA/FATF	  evaluation	  report	  found	  other	  areas	  to	  critique.	  Assessing	  the	  country’s	  framework	  on	  the	  40	  Recommendations	  and	  Nine	  Special	  Recommendations	  then	  in	  force,	  it	  found	  the	  UAE	  in	  Compliance	  on	  only	  five;	  Largely	  Compliant	  with	  15,	  Partly	  Compliant	  with	  18,	  and	  Non-­‐Compliant	  with	  11.	  The	  5	  areas	  of	  Compliance	  were:	  906	  
Table	  4:	  Areas	  in	  which	  UAE	  was	  Deemed	  Compliant	  
Recommendation	  #	   Description	   Compliance	  Status	  19	   Other	  forms	  of	  reporting	   C	  27	   Law	  enforcement	  authorities	   C	  28	   Powers	  of	  competent	  authorities	   C	  34	   Legal	  arrangements	   C	  35	   Conventions	   C	  	  The	  15	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  UAE	  was	  deemed	  Largely	  Compliant	  were:	  907	  
Table	  5:	  Areas	  in	  which	  UAE	  was	  Deemed	  Largely	  Compliant	  
Recommendation	  #	   Description	   Compliance	  Status	  2	   ML	  offense	  –	  mental	  element	  and	  corporate	  liability	   LC	  3	   Confiscation	  and	  provisional	  measures	   LC	  4	   Secrecy	  laws	  consistent	  with	  the	  Recommendations	   LC	  8	   New	  technologies	  and	  non	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  business	   LC	  9	   Third	  parties	  and	  introducers	   LC	  10	   Record-­‐keeping	   LC	  11	   Unusual	  transactions	   LC	  22	   Foreign	  branches	  &	  subsidiaries	   LC	  31	   National	  co-­‐operation	   LC	  36	   Mutual	  legal	  assistance	  (MLA)	   LC	  37	   Dual	  criminality	   LC	  39	   Extradition	   LC	  SR.II	  	   Criminalize	  terrorist	  financing	   LC	  SR.V	   International	  cooperation	   LC	  SR.VIII	  	   Nonprofit	  organizations	   LC	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
903	  Uncredited	  in	  Al	  Bayan,	  [“Dubai	  Police	  Disrupt	  Largest	  Networks	  of	  Laundering	  and	  Customs	  Fraud…”].	  See	  also	  Za’za,	  “Dubai	  Police	  Arrest	  16	  Suspects	  for	  Money	  Laundering.”	  904	  Al	  Theeb,	  “Huge	  Money-­‐Laundering	  Ring	  Smashed.”	  905	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  43.	  906	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  151-­‐158.	  907	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  151-­‐158.	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The	  18	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  UAE	  was	  deemed	  Partly	  Compliant	  were:	  908	  
Table	  6:	  Areas	  in	  which	  UAE	  was	  Deemed	  Partly	  Compliant	  
Recommendation	  #	   Description	   Compliance	  Status	  1.	  	   ML	  offense	   PC	  14	   Protection	  and	  no	  tipping-­‐off	   PC	  15	   Internal	  controls,	  compliance	  and	  audit	   PC	  17	   Sanctions	   PC	  18	   Shell	  banks	   PC	  20	   Other	  NFBP	  &	  secure	  transaction	  techniques	   PC	  21	   Special	  attention	  for	  higher	  risk	  countries	   PC	  23	   Regulation,	  supervision	  and	  monitoring	   PC	  25	   Guidelines	  &	  Feedback	   PC	  26	   The	  FIU	   PC	  29	   Supervisors	   PC	  30	   Resources,	  integrity,	  and	  training	   PC	  32	   Statistics	   PC	  33	   Legal	  persons–beneficial	  owners	   PC	  38	   MLA	  on	  confiscation	  and	  freezing	   PC	  40	   Other	  forms	  of	  co-­‐operation	   PC	  SR.I	   Implement	  UN	  instruments	   PC	  SR.III	  	   Freeze	  and	  confiscate	  Terrorist	  assets	   PC	  	  The	  11	  areas	  of	  Non-­‐Compliance	  were:	  909	  
Table	  7:	  Areas	  in	  which	  UAE	  was	  Deemed	  Non-­‐Compliant	  
Recommendation	  #	   Description	   Compliance	  Status	  5	   Customer	  due	  diligence	   NC	  6	   Politically	  exposed	  persons	   NC	  7	   Correspondent	  banking	   NC	  12	   DNFBP–R.5,	  6,	  8–11	   NC	  13	   Suspicious	  transaction	  reporting	   NC	  16	   DNFBP–R.13–15	  &	  21	   NC	  24	   DNFBP—regulation,	  supervision	  and	  monitoring	   NC	  SR.IV	   Suspicious	  transaction	  Reporting	   NC	  SR.VI	  	   AML/CFT	  requirements	  for	  money/value	  transfer	  services	   NC	  SR.VII	   Wire	  transfer	  rules	   NC	  SR.IX	  	   Cash	  Border	  Declaration	  &	  Disclosure	   NC	  	  In	  terms	  of	  bullet	  points,	  the	  most	  documented	  area	  of	  complaint	  involved	  the	  NC-­‐rated	  category	  pertaining	  to	  Customer	  Due	  Diligence	  (Recommendation	  5).	  A	  list	  of	  15	  criticisms	  pointed	  out	  the	  lack	  of	  “core	  CDD	  obligations”	  throughout	  the	  country’s	  financial	  institutions,	  including	  a	  failure	  to	  require	  such	  institutions	  to	  understand	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  organizations	  they	  were	  dealing	  with;	  to	  verify	  authorization	  of	  those	  claiming	  to	  be	  acting	  on	  another’s	  behalf;	  too-­‐high	  cash	  thresholds	  in	  some	  cases	  that	  would	  otherwise	  require	  verification	  or	  other	  CDD	  procedures;	  and	  failings	  in	  areas	  involving	  high-­‐risk	  customers.	  910	  Its	  critique	  of	  STR	  handling	  (Recommendation	  13)	  was	  also	  pointed,	  set	  forth	  in	  six	  bullet	  points:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
908	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  151-­‐158.	  909	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  151-­‐158.	  910	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  151-­‐152.	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•	  No	  obligation	  in	  law	  or	  regulation	  to	  report	  suspicions	  related	  to	  terrorist	  financing.	  •	  The	  obligation	  embedded	  in	  ‘other	  enforceable	  means’	  to	  report	  suspicions	  of	  terrorist	  financing	  applies	  only	  to	  institutions	  supervised	  by	  the	  central	  bank.	  •	  Absence	  of	  a	  defined	  basis	  upon	  which	  money	  laundering	  suspicions	  should	  be	  reported	  (subjective	  or	  objective	  or	  both).	  •	  Lack	  of	  clarity	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  reporting	  obligation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  money	  laundering.	  •	  No	  obligation	  to	  report	  attempted	  transactions.	  •	  Low	  rate	  of	  reporting	  (and	  concentration	  among	  relatively	  few	  institutions)	  brings	  into	  question	  the	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regime.911	  	  The	  evaluators’	  action	  plan	  for	  the	  UAE	  to	  put	  itself	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  40	  Recommendations/Nine	  Special	  Recommendations	  comprised,	  when	  reduced	  to	  table	  form,	  about	  six	  pages	  of	  the	  report.	  912	  Among	  them	  was	  the	  advice	  that	  the	  country’s	  FIU,	  the	  AMLSCU,	  should	  hire	  more	  staff,	  and	  also	  be	  able	  to	  better	  handle	  its	  STR	  data.913	  The	  overall	  evaluation	  was	  negative	  enough	  to	  require	  the	  UAE	  to	  submit	  to	  what	  MENA/FATF	  would	  describe	  as	  “a	  regular	  follow-­‐up	  process.”	  The	  first	  of	  these	  follow-­‐up	  reports	  would	  be	  produced	  in	  May	  2010,	  with	  subsequent	  ones	  due	  in	  the	  following	  five	  Novembers,	  plus	  an	  additional	  one	  in	  June	  2014.914	  
Meeting	  the	  Action	  Plan:	  Regulatory	  and	  Legislative	  Responses	  to	  the	  
2008	  MER	  (to	  early	  2014)	  The	  reward	  for	  meeting	  the	  MENA/FATF	  requirements	  would	  be	  exemption	  from	  regular	  follow-­‐up	  visits.	  The	  UAE	  would	  attain	  this	  status	  in	  November	  2014	  coinciding	  with	  the	  7th	  follow-­‐up	  visit,	  coming	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  issuance	  of	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (9)	  of	  2014,	  which	  made	  significant	  amendments	  to	  the	  original	  2002	  AML	  law.	  As	  of	  this	  writing,	  only	  that	  7th	  follow-­‐up	  report	  has	  been	  made	  publicly	  available.	  It	  can	  be	  deduced	  however	  that	  the	  UAE’s	  responses	  to	  the	  2008	  MER	  and	  most	  follow-­‐up	  visits	  was	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  FATF	  in	  2012	  introduced	  an	  updated	  and	  in	  some	  several	  cases	  consolidated	  set	  of	  Recommendations.915	  (This	  was	  a	  point	  alluded	  to	  by	  AMLSCU	  Executive	  Director	  Abdulrahim	  Mohamed	  Al	  Awadhi	  in	  that	  FIU’s	  2012	  annual	  report.916)	  	  While	  preparing	  for	  the	  first	  follow-­‐up	  action,	  scheduled	  to	  occur	  two	  years	  later,	  on	  17	  June	  2008	  the	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  Circular	  No.	  2922/2008.	  Officially	  an	  addendum	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  153.	  912	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  159-­‐165.	  913	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  159.	  914	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  3.	  	  915	  FATF,	  “Recommendations”	  (2012),	  11-­‐30.	  A	  table	  showing	  how	  the	  items	  were	  consolidated	  appears	  on	  4-­‐5.	  916	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  7;	  see	  also	  30.	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Circular	  No.	  24/2000,	  its	  11	  points	  addressed	  issues	  raised	  in	  the	  MER.	  These	  included	  Beneficial	  Ownership;	  Due	  Diligence;	  Wire	  Transfers;	  Enhanced	  CDD	  on	  FPEPs,	  Correspondent	  Banks,	  and	  Businesses/Individuals;	  STRs;	  attempted	  and	  unusual	  transactions,	  and	  tip-­‐offs.	  It	  also	  contained	  stipulations	  about	  compliance	  officer	  hiring	  and	  training,	  and	  noted	  penalties	  for	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  circular.917	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  Dubai’s	  attorney	  general	  released	  a	  statement	  to	  the	  press	  emphasizing	  the	  seriousness	  with	  which	  the	  UAE	  took	  AML/CFT	  issues:	  "Combating	  money	  laundering	  crime	  and	  money	  launderers	  tops	  our	  priorities...	  we	  take	  swift	  action	  and	  speed	  up	  litigation	  process	  in	  money	  laundering	  crimes.	  We	  also	  cooperate	  with	  local	  and	  international	  authorities	  when	  we	  investigate	  such	  crimes	  before	  we	  charge	  the	  suspects	  and	  refer	  them	  to	  Dubai	  courts	  to	  be	  prosecuted.”	  His	  remarks	  came	  shortly	  after	  a	  Dutch	  male	  and	  a	  Jordanian	  female	  were	  put	  on	  trial	  in	  Dubai	  in	  a	  case	  involving	  the	  alleged	  laundering	  of	  Dh60	  million.918	  At	  about	  this	  time,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  published	  regulations	  (No.	  1)	  on	  AML/CFT	  procedures	  for	  lawyers	  including	  their	  requirement	  to	  file	  STRs;	  a	  similar	  code	  (No.	  20)	  for	  public	  notaries	  appeared	  later	  in	  the	  year	  919	  	  There	  were	  other	  efforts	  at	  increased	  regulation	  during	  this	  era.	  January	  2008	  saw	  the	  signing	  of	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (2)	  “In	  Respect	  of	  the	  National	  Societies	  and	  Associations	  of	  Public	  Welfare.”	  It	  contained	  several	  articles	  addressing	  funding,	  and	  may	  have	  been	  issued	  in	  response	  to	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  team	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  domestic	  non-­‐profit	  sector.	  The	  new	  law	  gave	  the	  UAE	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  the	  “power	  to	  supervise	  and	  monitor	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  charitable	  societies	  and	  …	  the	  authority	  to	  close	  the	  entity	  if	  found	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  Law.920	  The	  same	  team	  found	  significant	  concern	  with	  the	  insurance	  sector.	  In	  2007,	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (6)	  had	  created	  an	  Insurance	  Authority	  that	  was	  “empowered	  to	  carry	  out	  all	  regulatory	  and	  supervisory	  functions	  of	  the	  insurance	  sector	  including	  its	  adherence	  to	  international	  standards	  on	  AML/CFT.”921	  However,	  the	  2008	  MER	  found	  that	  AML/CFT	  controls	  and	  inspection	  programs	  for	  the	  insurance	  sector	  fell	  “well	  short”	  of	  FATF	  standards	  (as	  did	  those	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
917	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  Notice	  No.	  2922/2008,	  17	  June	  2008.	  918	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Tackling	  Money	  Launderers	  Head	  On.”	  919	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  16;	  these	  documents	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  published	  in	  English.	  The	  Arabic	  version	  of	  Recommendation	  1	  (pertaining	  to	  lawyers)	  available	  at	  http://www.centralbank.ae/en/pdf/amlscu/Ministry%20of%20Justice%20Regulation%20No.%281%29%20of%202008.pdf	  is	  stamped	  as	  having	  been	  received	  by	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  on	  3	  July	  2008.	  920	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  126-­‐129;	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  20.	  921	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  16.	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UAE’s	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority,	  set	  up	  in	  2000).922	  On	  4	  November	  2009,	  the	  Insurance	  Authority’s	  Board	  of	  Directors	  tried	  to	  fix	  this	  when	  they	  issued	  Resolution	  No.	  1	  of	  the	  year,	  “regarding	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  and	  combating	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  procedures	  for	  the	  said	  sector,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations.”923	  The	  document	  went	  into	  effect	  in	  February	  2010.	  It	  has	  not,	  to	  date,	  been	  translated	  into	  English,	  but	  according	  to	  a	  summary	  that	  has	  circulated	  inside	  the	  insurance	  industry:	  “Under	  the	  Resolution	  it	  is	  a	  criminal	  offence	  to	  aid,	  or	  refrain	  from	  reporting,	  money	  laundering	  activities,	  and	  doing	  so	  is	  punishable	  by	  fines	  and/or	  imprisonment.	  The	  Resolution	  requires	  all	  insurance	  related	  professions	  in	  the	  UAE	  to	  establish	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  procedures,	  concentrating	  in	  particular	  on	  Knowing	  Your	  Client,	  and	  be	  subject	  to	  compliance	  inspections	  by	  the	  Authority.	  Among	  other	  requirements,	  the	  Resolution	  stipulates	  that	  certain	  minimum	  information	  is	  to	  be	  kept	  on	  file	  for	  every	  insured	  and	  the	  information	  to	  be	  updated	  regularly.”	  The	  required	  information	  for	  companies	  was	  “A	  verified	  copy	  of	  the	  current	  trade	  license”;	  “Names	  and	  addresses	  of	  directors’;	  and	  “Names	  and	  addresses	  of	  shareholders.”	  In	  the	  case	  of	  individual	  customers,	  their	  full	  name,	  address,	  place	  of	  work,	  and	  verified	  copy	  of	  their	  passport	  or	  UAE	  identification	  card	  needed	  to	  be	  kept	  on	  file.924	  	  	  At	  about	  the	  same	  time	  that	  insurance	  industry	  circular	  took	  effect,	  the	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority	  issued	  the	  first	  of	  several	  documents	  tightening	  its	  own	  AML/CFT	  controls.	  This	  started	  with	  Decision	  No.	  17R	  of	  2010,	  proceeding	  through	  a	  series	  of	  further	  documents	  meant	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  industry-­‐relevant	  portions	  of	  UN	  Security	  Resolutions	  1267	  of	  1999	  and	  1373	  of	  2001,	  both	  dealing	  with	  counter-­‐terrorism.925	  	  The	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  was	  also	  busy.	  On	  19	  August	  2009,	  a	  Central	  Bank	  notice	  (3809/2009)	  ordered	  all	  financial	  institutions	  “to	  obtain	  prior	  approval	  from	  the	  Central	  Bank	  for	  opening	  accounts	  of	  FPEPs,	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  said	  notice.	  Furthermore,	  financial	  institutions	  were	  also	  instructed	  to	  provide	  a	  list	  of	  their	  FPEP	  customers	  to	  the	  Central	  Bank.”	  (The	  AMLSCU	  has	  noted	  without	  elaboration	  that	  “This	  requirement	  to	  obtain	  prior	  approval	  from	  Central	  Bank	  has	  been	  cancelled	  in	  2013.”)	  926	  On	  16	  March	  2010,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
922	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  11;	  UAE	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission,	  “Establishment.”	  923	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  16.	  924	  UAE	  Insurance	  Authority,	  “Board	  Resolution	  No.	  1	  of	  2009.”	  	  925	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  7.	  926	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  16.	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the	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  Notice	  No.	  1401/2010	  “requiring	  the	  reporting	  entities	  to	  provide	  full	  details	  including	  a	  CV	  of	  compliance	  officers	  and	  alternate	  compliance	  officers.”	  927	  On	  5	  April	  2011,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  Notice	  No.	  2203/2011	  requiring	  “all	  national	  banks	  to	  obtain	  Central	  Bank’s	  written	  approval	  of	  the	  nominations	  to	  the	  membership	  of	  their	  board	  of	  directors.	  Candidates	  would	  have	  to	  meet	  the	  AMLSCU’s	  approval	  that	  they	  were	  “individuals	  of	  appropriate	  academic	  qualifications,	  adequate	  business	  and	  banking	  experience	  and	  of	  sound	  character.”	  928	  	  There	  were	  also	  clear	  signals	  that	  FATF	  Regulations	  were	  driving	  changes	  in	  UAE	  regulation.	  Earlier	  in	  that	  same	  year	  –	  on	  28	  February	  2011	  –	  the	  UAE’s	  Official	  Gazette	  Issue	  No.	  518	  included	  the	  text	  of	  a	  new	  law	  entitled	  “Declaration	  by	  Travellers	  Entering	  or	  Leaving	  the	  UAE	  Carrying	  Cash	  and	  Monetary/Financial	  Bearer	  Instruments.”	  It	  came	  into	  effect	  six	  months	  later,	  on	  1	  September	  2011.	  This	  contained	  two	  amendments	  to	  previous	  regulations,	  both	  meant	  to	  conform	  to	  FATF	  Recommendations.	  “Both	  cash	  and	  bearer	  negotiable	  instruments	  (inbound	  and	  outbound)	  are	  now	  subject	  to	  declaration.”	  The	  other	  was	  that	  “The	  threshold	  has	  been	  increased	  from	  AED	  40,000	  to	  AED	  100,000	  or	  equivalent	  in	  other	  currencies,	  to	  reflect	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  and	  economic	  factors	  in	  the	  region.	  929	  In	  October	  2011,	  the	  Emirates	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority,	  having	  in	  the	  previous	  year	  issued	  revised	  regulations	  “specifying	  the	  AML/CFT	  obligations	  of	  the	  securities	  markets	  and	  the	  brokers	  operating	  therein,”	  issued	  a	  further	  one	  which	  had	  been	  “further	  revised	  in	  line	  with	  recommendations	  from	  the	  NAMLC	  Work	  Team	  for	  full	  compliance	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations.”	  930	  	  	  In	  July	  2012	  the	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  what	  was	  described	  as	  “enhanced	  regulation	  for	  
Hawaladars”	  which	  included	  requirements	  for	  registration,	  on-­‐going	  supervision	  and	  sanctions	  (for	  non-­‐compliance),	  customer	  due	  diligence,	  record	  keeping	  and	  suspicious	  transactions	  reporting	  etc.	  in	  line	  with	  FATF	  Recommendations.”	  931	  It	  effectively	  made	  hawaladar	  registration	  mandatory,	  rather	  than	  voluntary.	  932	  At	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  was	  announced	  that	  Abu	  Dhabi	  officials	  were	  prosecuting	  an	  Arab	  resident	  on	  ML	  charges.	  According	  to	  a	  press	  report,	  “The	  man,	  who	  was	  employed	  at	  the	  General	  Authority	  of	  Islamic	  Affairs	  and	  Endowments,	  was	  detained	  after	  a	  UAE-­‐based	  bank	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
927	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  14.	  928	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  16.	  See	  also	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  5,	  21.	  929	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  25.	  930	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  15.	  931	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  22.	  932	  See	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  5	  and	  20-­‐21.	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reported	  suspicious	  transactions	  into	  his	  account.	  This	  included	  total	  deposits	  of	  Dh6.6	  million	  from	  February	  2011	  to	  April	  2012.	  The	  deposits	  were	  made	  from	  across	  the	  country,	  but	  without	  any	  documentation	  to	  verify	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  funds.	  The	  bank	  reported	  the	  case	  to	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank’s	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit,	  which	  then	  referred	  it	  to	  the	  Public	  Prosecution.	  When	  questioned	  by	  Public	  Prosecutors,	  the	  defendant	  admitted	  to	  undertaking	  business	  activities	  without	  a	  commercial	  license.	  He	  added	  that	  he	  received	  funds	  from	  his	  countrymen	  in	  the	  UAE,	  which	  he	  sent	  back	  to	  their	  families	  outside	  the	  country	  after	  charging	  a	  fee.	  According	  to	  the	  defendant,	  money	  exchanges	  in	  the	  UAE	  do	  not	  transfer	  funds	  to	  his	  country.	  The	  defendant	  also	  admitted	  to	  lending	  funds	  based	  on	  profit	  rates	  used	  by	  Islamic	  banks.”933	  	  On	  13	  August	  2012,	  the	  UAE	  issued	  Federal	  Law	  Decree	  No.	  (5)	  on	  cybercrimes.	  Its	  Article	  37	  criminalized	  money	  laundering	  using	  information	  technology,	  stipulating	  seven	  years	  imprisonment	  and	  fines	  between	  AED500,000	  and	  AED2,000,000.	  934	  Also	  in	  August	  2012,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  issued	  a	  notice	  warning	  banks	  and	  financial	  institutions	  “about	  high	  risk	  jurisdiction	  and	  counter	  measures	  required	  to	  deal	  with	  natural	  and/or	  judicial	  persons	  from	  such	  jurisdictions.”	  The	  AMLSCU	  has	  noted	  that	  “All	  other	  Supervisory	  Authorities	  have	  issued	  regulations	  in	  relation	  to	  high	  risk	  countries	  for	  the	  entities	  supervised	  by	  them.”	  935	  	  	  By	  the	  following	  year,	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  driving	  many	  UAE	  regulatory	  efforts.	  In	  February	  2013	  the	  UAE	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  issued	  a	  decree	  creating	  what	  was	  described	  as	  a	  “follow-­‐up	  committee	  for	  implementation	  of	  the	  UN	  Convention	  against	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime.”	  936	  In	  September	  2013,	  the	  AMLSCU	  circulated	  “the	  UN	  1267	  lists	  as	  per	  the	  mechanism	  adopted	  by	  the	  Central	  Bank	  of	  the	  UAE	  for	  freezing,	  delisting	  and	  other	  administrative	  procedures	  in	  relation	  to	  designated	  entities.”	  Though	  the	  AMLSCU	  report	  does	  not	  specifically	  present	  a	  timeline,	  other	  entities	  such	  as	  the	  Insurance	  Authority,	  the	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authorities,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  also	  circulated	  such	  lists	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter,	  the	  UNSCR	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
933	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Man	  Detained	  for	  Suspected	  Money	  Laundering.”	  	  934	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  17.	  935	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  17.	  936	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  8.	  “The	  UAE,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  is	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  sanctions	  issued	  and	  passed	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  (UNSC)”	  (DFSA,	  DFSA	  Rulebook:	  Anti-­‐Money	  
Laundering,	  Counter-­‐Terrorist	  Financing	  and	  Sanctions	  Module,	  6).	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1373	  criteria	  as	  well.)	  937	  The	  FATF	  Recommendations	  still	  loomed	  in	  the	  background	  however.	  At	  some	  point	  in	  2013	  the	  UAE	  Ministry	  of	  Economy	  issued	  revised	  regulations	  for	  accountants	  and	  auditors	  “in	  full	  conformity	  with	  FATF	  Recommendations.”	  This	  updated	  an	  earlier	  set	  of	  regulations	  originally	  issued	  in	  2007	  by	  the	  Insurance	  Authority.938	  And	  also	  during	  the	  same	  year	  a	  NAMLC	  Working	  Team	  helped	  the	  Insurance	  Authority	  release	  a	  new	  set	  of	  AML/CFT	  guidelines	  “to	  comply	  fully	  with	  the	  FATF	  standards.”	  939	  The	  year	  2014,	  which	  would	  see	  the	  UAE	  escape	  the	  biennial	  follow-­‐up	  process,	  began	  with	  a	  new	  set	  of	  controls	  for	  the	  licensing	  and	  monitoring	  of	  money	  exchanges,	  which	  replaced	  a	  1992	  resolution	  of	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank’s	  Board	  of	  Directors.	  “Applications	  for	  money	  changing	  business[es]	  are	  to	  be	  processed	  keeping	  in	  view	  the	  requirements	  under	  the	  said	  regulation.	  The	  regulation	  details	  permissible	  activities	  and	  activities	  which	  require	  prior	  approval	  of	  [the]	  Central	  Bank	  of	  the	  UAE,	  for	  example,	  opening	  of	  Nostro	  accounts	  and	  borrowings	  by	  encumbering	  assets.”940	  
AMLSCU	  Quantitative	  Data	  on	  AML/CFT	  in	  the	  UAE,	  2010-­‐2013	  Further	  signals	  of	  change	  were	  an	  apparent	  revamping	  at	  the	  AMLSCU,	  which	  would	  begin	  publishing	  an	  Annual	  Report	  in	  2009	  (albeit	  not	  for	  general	  circulation).941	  It	  would	  also	  form	  a	  “working	  group”	  to	  implement	  the	  MER’s	  action	  plan.942	  One	  sign	  of	  its	  “increased	  outreach	  programmes”	  (coupled	  perhaps	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  aforementioned	  Circular	  2922/2088)	  was	  a	  rapid	  rise	  in	  STR	  activity	  at	  the	  UAE’s	  various	  financial	  institutions.	  STR	  figures	  for	  2008	  suddenly	  shot	  up,	  from	  694	  in	  2007	  to	  1170.	  They	  would	  rise	  to	  1750	  in	  2009	  and	  2781	  in	  2010,	  where	  they	  would	  roughly	  level	  off	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years.943	  	  While	  the	  November	  2010	  MER	  follow-­‐up	  report	  is	  not	  available	  from	  the	  MENA/FATF,	  it	  presumably	  repeated	  old	  criticisms	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  STR	  data.	  The	  gathering	  and	  processing	  of	  STR	  data	  appears	  to	  have	  become	  a	  priority	  of	  the	  AMLSCU.	  Key	  to	  doing	  this	  was	  to	  get	  more	  financial	  institutions	  submitting	  STRs	  online,	  utilizing	  the	  system	  initiated	  in	  2004.	  However,	  even	  given	  the	  rising	  numbers	  of	  STR	  submissions	  by	  2010,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  17.	  938	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  15.	  939	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  16.	  940	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  12.	  941	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  25.	  942	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  6.	  943	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  36;	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	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the	  AMLSCU	  felt	  “the	  responses	  from	  the	  reporting	  entities	  were	  not	  up	  to	  the	  desired	  level.”	  Hence,	  “the	  financial	  institutions	  were	  again	  directed	  [via	  Central	  Bank	  Notice	  6703/2010,	  of	  27	  December	  2010]	  to	  file	  STRs	  through	  the	  upgraded	  STR	  on-­‐line	  system…”	  As	  the	  notice	  also	  contained	  a	  deadline	  of	  15	  January	  2011,	  it	  appears	  that	  part	  of	  the	  process	  involved	  the	  financial	  institutions	  being	  required	  to	  register	  or	  otherwise	  arrange	  a	  formal	  connection	  with	  the	  AMLSCU’s	  online	  service.	  944	  By	  2013,	  the	  AMLSCU	  would	  report	  that	  213	  financial	  entities	  and	  111	  exchange	  houses	  were	  connected	  to	  the	  online	  STR	  system.	  945	  	  The	  key	  engine	  inside	  the	  AMLSCU	  was	  its	  STR	  Analysis	  and	  STR	  Database	  Management	  Section,	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  which	  included	  receiving,	  reviewing,	  and	  analyzing	  incoming	  STRs,	  after	  which	  it	  would	  “take	  appropriate	  actions.”	  The	  latter	  included	  initiating	  search	  and	  freeze	  instructions	  when	  necessary.946	  The	  AMLSCU	  would	  undertake	  IT	  improvement	  efforts	  on	  its	  behalf,	  with	  stated	  goals	  of	  reducing	  processing	  time,	  prioritizing	  STRs	  on	  risk	  basis,	  and	  enhancing	  analysis	  through	  data	  mining.947	  A	  significant	  breakdown	  in	  statistics	  was	  in	  place	  at	  least	  by	  the	  time	  the	  2010	  data	  had	  ben	  collated.	  Figures	  from	  the	  2012	  and	  2013	  AMLSCU	  annual	  reports	  (the	  only	  ones	  that	  organization	  has	  shared	  with	  the	  author;	  they	  and	  others	  are	  not	  yet	  publicly	  available)	  have	  been	  adapted	  into	  the	  following	  charts:	  
Table	  8:	  ML/TF-­‐Related	  STRs,	  Financial	  Sector,	  2010-­‐2013,	  AMLSCU948	  	  	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  Banks	   2211	   1800	   1848	   1929	  Moneychangers,	  Other	  Financial	  Institutions,	  and	  Other	  Entities	   298	   421	   443	   428	  Total	   2509	   2221	   2291	   2357	  	  
Table	  9:	  Fraud	  and	  Criminal	  Case-­‐Related	  STRs,	  Financial	  Sector,	  2010-­‐2013,	  AMLSCU949	  	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  Banks	   254	   333	   379	   468	  Moneychangers,	  Other	  Financial	  Institutions,	  and	  Other	  Entities	   18	   22	   30	   65	  Total	   272	   355	   409	   533	  	  
Table	  10:	  STRs,	  Other	  Authorities,	  2010-­‐2013,	  AMLSCU950	  	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  (Police/Ministry	  of	  Interior,	  Public	  prosecution,	  State	  Security)	   624	   801	   385	   258	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
944	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  27.	  945	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  15-­‐16.	  946	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  15.	  	  947	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012)	  5.	  948	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  35;	  and	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	  949	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  35;	  and	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	  950	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  35;	  and	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	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Table	  11:	  Total	  STRs	  Submitted	  Annually,	  2010-­‐2013,	  AMLSCU951	  	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  Total	  STRs	   3405	   3377	   3085	   3148	  	  The	  AMLSCU’s	  number	  crunchers	  were	  also	  tracking	  which	  banks	  were	  submitting	  regular	  STRs,	  and	  which	  were	  not.	  In	  2012,	  40	  UAE	  banks	  (73%	  of	  the	  total)	  had	  submitted	  STRS,	  while	  15	  (or	  27%	  of	  the	  total)	  had	  submitted	  none.	  Of	  those	  that	  had	  submitted	  STRs,	  74%	  of	  the	  figure	  (1644	  STRs)	  had	  come	  from	  just	  seven	  banks.952	  Presumably	  of	  just	  as	  much	  interest	  to	  outside	  reviewers	  were	  the	  figures	  now	  being	  kept	  on	  those	  cases	  referred	  to	  law	  enforcement.	  Interestingly,	  the	  numbers	  showed	  a	  steady	  decrease	  from	  2010	  to	  2013.	  The	  AMLSCU,	  in	  its	  2012	  and	  2013	  annual	  reports,	  credited	  this	  to	  better	  selectivity	  by	  its	  analysts.	  Its	  2013	  report	  noted	  at	  one	  point:	  In	  view	  of	  close	  coordination	  with	  the	  law	  enforcement	  authorities	  on	  their	  requirement	  an	  streamlining	  of	  the	  analytical	  process,	  including	  experience	  gained	  over	  the	  years,	  the	  disseminated	  reports	  are	  now	  aligned	  with	  the	  law	  enforcement	  requirements.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  analysis	  process	  of	  STRs	  has	  been	  enhanced	  in	  order	  to	  disseminate	  only	  those	  STRs	  that	  warrant	  further	  investigation	  by	  law	  enforcement	  authorities.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendation	  that	  states	  that	  dissemination	  of	  information	  should	  be	  selective	  and	  allow	  the	  recipient	  authorities	  to	  focus	  on	  relevant	  cases/information.	  Most	  of	  the	  STRs	  referred	  to	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  were	  pertaining	  to	  suspected	  cases	  of	  money	  laundering	  and	  other	  types	  of	  financial	  crimes.	  There	  was	  close	  interaction	  between	  the	  AMLSCU	  &	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  in	  this	  regard.953	  
Table	  12:	  STRs	  Referred	  to	  Law	  Enforcement954	  
2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  1229	   880	   596	   526	  	  Of	  those	  cases	  referred	  to	  law	  enforcement,	  only	  a	  relative	  handful	  seem	  to	  have	  actually	  gone	  to	  prosecution	  stage:	  Of	  the	  years	  for	  which	  figures	  have	  been	  made	  available	  to	  this	  researcher,	  there	  were	  60	  in	  2012	  and	  120	  in	  2013.	  They	  have	  been	  broken	  down	  as	  follows:	  
Table	  13:	  Cases	  Referred	  to	  Law	  Enforcement955	  
Outcomes	   2012	  Under	  investigation	   23	  No	  Concern	   14	  Absconding	   10	  R/E	  permitted	  to	  Exit	   5	  Account	  Banned	   4	  Imprisoned	   2	  Released	   1	  Case	  Adjourned	   1	  Total	   60	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
951	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  35;	  and	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	  952	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  38.	  953	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  26.	  954	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  43;	  and	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  26.	  955	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),45.	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The	  figures	  for	  2013	  are	  presented	  solely	  on	  a	  bar	  graph	  with	  actual	  numbers	  indistinct.	  Most	  of	  the	  120	  cases	  (the	  bar	  graph	  image	  appears	  to	  be	  about	  42)	  are	  described	  as	  “sub-­‐judice,”	  with	  about	  35	  others	  classified	  as	  under	  on-­‐going	  investigation.956	  Of	  equal	  interest	  in	  assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  framework	  are	  the	  figures	  for	  repatriation	  of	  funds.	  The	  following	  has	  been	  compiled	  from	  the	  2012	  and	  2013	  AMLSCU	  annual	  reports.	  	  









2012	  Cases	   2012	  Funds	  
Repatriated	  
2013	  Cases	   2013	  Funds	  
Repatriated	  16	   US	  $2.41	  million	   15	   US	  $6.76	  million	   22	   US	  $5.12	  million	   70	   US	  $3.26	  million	  	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  by	  2013,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  more	  than	  tripled	  over	  the	  previous	  year,	  the	  total	  sum	  repatriated	  significantly	  shrank.	  According	  to	  the	  AMLSCU,	  26%	  of	  it	  went	  back	  to	  the	  USA;	  17%	  to	  China;	  16%	  to	  the	  UK.	  958	  
Examples	  from	  Media	  Reports	  A	  Dubai	  Police	  investigator	  told	  a	  reporter	  in	  mid-­‐2013	  that	  the	  emirate’s	  customs	  department	  had	  reported	  243	  drug	  cases	  the	  previous	  year,	  many	  of	  which	  had	  an	  aspect	  of	  money	  laundering	  involved.	  In	  some	  cases,	  he	  noted	  parcels	  containing	  cash	  were	  being	  sent	  legally	  –	  with	  necessary	  documents	  attached	  –	  through	  Dubai	  to	  which	  additional	  money	  was	  evidently	  added	  during	  shipment.	  One	  such	  parcel	  that	  weighed	  50	  kg	  when	  it	  entered	  customs	  reached	  the	  bank	  weighing	  80	  kg.	  He	  also	  related	  a	  money	  laundering	  case	  involving	  an	  Indian	  national	  who	  had	  transferred	  about	  Dh111	  million	  using	  various	  exchanges.959	  In	  May	  2014,	  a	  three-­‐year	  international	  manhunt	  ended	  when	  Dubai	  Police	  arrested	  a	  UK	  national	  linked	  to	  14	  alleged	  fraud	  and	  ML	  cases	  between	  2005-­‐07.960	  	  Underscoring	  the	  fact	  that	  money	  laundering	  remained	  a	  serious	  threat	  in	  the	  region,	  news	  broke	  in	  February	  2014	  of	  what	  was	  said	  to	  be	  the	  largest	  ML	  case	  yet	  in	  the	  Gulf.	  Authorities	  in	  Manama,	  Bahrain,	  would	  ultimately	  convict	  15	  people	  (one	  in	  absentia)	  of	  running	  a	  ML	  operation	  from	  the	  UAE	  Exchange	  office.	  On	  1	  October	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  26.	  957	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  47;	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  27.	  958	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  27.	  959	  Fouda,	  [“Arab	  World	  Disorders	  Increase	  the	  Risk	  of	  Drug	  Smuggling	  Crimes”]	  translated	  for	  the	  author	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah	  and	  Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim.	  960	  Uncredited	  in	  Birmingham	  Mail,	  “Suspected	  Fraudster	  Arrested	  in	  Dubai	  After	  Worldwide	  Three-­‐Year	  Hunt.”	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those	  convicted	  included	  11	  managers	  and	  staff	  of	  UAE	  Exchange.	  They	  had	  reportedly	  funneled	  up	  to	  US$922.8	  million	  through	  Saudi	  Banks	  and	  ultimately	  to	  the	  UAE;	  details	  emerged	  of	  bags	  of	  cash	  being	  taken	  illegally	  through	  the	  King	  Fahd	  Causeway	  connecting	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Bahrain;	  over	  a	  million	  Saudi	  riyal	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  UAE	  daily.	  Eleven	  defendants	  were	  sentenced	  to	  eight-­‐year	  jail	  terms	  with	  fines	  of	  Bahrain	  Dh130,000	  each.”961	  	  
Federal	  Law	  No.	  (9)	  of	  2014	  and	  the	  20th	  MENA/FATF	  Plenum	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  while	  the	  UAE	  worked	  steadily	  toward	  full	  compliance	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations	  following	  publication	  of	  the	  2008	  Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report,	  the	  February	  2012	  revision	  of	  the	  recommendations	  complicated	  its	  efforts.	  As	  of	  the	  AMLSCU’s	  annual	  report	  for	  2012,	  that	  body	  reported	  it	  was	  “coordinating	  with	  the	  concerned	  authorities	  in	  the	  UAE	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  requirements	  in	  this	  regard.”962	  It	  seems	  that	  a	  final	  strategy	  for	  removing	  the	  UAE	  from	  regular	  follow-­‐up	  requirements	  was	  worked	  out	  at	  the	  12th	  Plenary	  Meeting	  of	  the	  FATF/MENA	  in	  November	  2010	  and	  an	  e-­‐Plenary	  Meeting	  in	  August-­‐September	  2013.	  By	  then,	  what	  was	  at-­‐issue	  was	  the	  UAE’s	  compliance	  with	  what	  had	  been	  classified	  as	  “core”	  and	  “key”	  elements	  of	  the	  revised	  recommendations.	  Recommendations	  listed	  as	  “core”	  were	  R1,	  R5,	  R10,	  R13,	  SR2,	  and	  SR4;	  of	  them,	  the	  UAE	  was	  found	  to	  have	  problem	  status	  (PC	  or	  NC	  ratings)	  with	  R1,	  R5,	  R13	  and	  SR4.	  The	  “key”	  FATF	  Recommendations	  comprised	  R3,	  R4,	  R23,	  FR26,	  R35,	  R36,	  R40,	  SR1,	  SR3,	  and	  SR5.	  Of	  these,	  the	  UAE	  was	  rated	  as	  PC/NC	  on	  five:	  R23,	  R26,	  R40,	  SR1,	  and	  SR3.963	  	  These,	  again,	  were	  only	  the	  “core”	  and	  “key”	  Recommendations.	  Indeed,	  for	  all	  the	  UAE’s	  efforts	  since	  the	  MER	  was	  published	  in	  April	  2008,	  by	  August-­‐September	  2013	  the	  country	  found	  itself	  rated	  PC	  and	  NC	  on	  37	  of	  the	  new	  list	  of	  40	  recommendations.	  Yet	  UAE	  officials	  were,	  in	  June	  2014	  when	  MENA/FATF	  produced	  the	  6th	  follow-­‐up	  report,	  optimistic.	  A	  7th	  follow-­‐up	  report	  was	  being	  readied	  for	  November,	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  20th	  MENA/FATF	  Plenary	  meeting	  (to	  be	  held	  in	  Manama,	  Bahrain,	  that	  month).	  And	  UAE	  officials	  expressed	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  plenary	  meeting	  would	  grant	  the	  country’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
961	  Uncredited	  in	  Trade	  Arabia,	  “5	  Convicted	  in	  $922m	  Money-­‐Laundering	  Racket	  in	  Bahrain”;	  Qader	  in	  Akhbar	  Al-­‐Khaleej	  (2014,	  5	  Feb.),	  [“Biggest	  Issue	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  in	  the	  Gulf”]	  translated	  for	  the	  author	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah	  and	  Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim;	  and	  Uncredited	  in	  Manama	  Voice	  News,	  [“Officials	  are	  accused	  of	  laundering	  large	  funds	  worth	  4	  billion	  riyals	  and	  exploitation	  of	  records	  …	  “],	  translated	  for	  the	  author	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah	  and	  Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim.	  962	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  30.	  963	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  3-­‐4	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“request	  to	  move	  from	  regular	  follow-­‐up	  to	  biennial	  updating.”964	  	  The	  UAE	  would	  go	  into	  that	  session	  without	  Central	  Bank	  governor	  Al	  Suwaidi,	  who	  had	  reportedly	  long	  expressed	  an	  interest	  in	  retiring.965	  On	  21	  Sept.	  2014,	  the	  UAE	  government	  announced	  “it	  had	  replaced	  its	  Central	  Bank	  governor,	  Sultan	  bin	  Nasser	  Al	  Suwaidi,	  who	  has	  held	  the	  post	  since	  1991,	  with	  Mubarak	  Al	  Mansouri,	  the	  chief	  executive	  of	  the	  Emirates	  Investment	  Authority,	  the	  federal	  sovereign	  wealth	  fund	  that	  helps	  invest	  the	  country’s	  oil	  revenues.”966	  953).	  However,	  he	  was	  reported	  to	  have	  long	  expressed	  interest	  in	  retirement.	  	  Tables	  15	  and	  16	  give	  some	  idea	  of	  the	  problem	  areas	  the	  UAE	  faced	  going	  into	  that	  session	  late	  in	  2014.	  	  	  
Table	  15:	  Problem	  Areas:	  Core	  Recommendations	  
Core	  Recommendation	  #	   Compliance	  Level	  at	  start	  of	  7th	  Follow-­‐
Up	  Review	  
Notes	  R1	  (Money	  Laundering	  Crime)	   PC	   Four	  listed	  areas	  of	  deficiency,	  three	  of	  which	  addressed	  lack	  of	  predicate	  offenses.	  The	  fourth	  involved	  the	  lack	  of	  prosecutions	  registered	  outside	  Dubai,	  and	  lack	  of	  data	  regarding	  prosecutions	  inside	  Dubai.967	  R5	  (Due	  Diligence)	   NC	   Fifteen	  listed	  areas	  of	  deficiency,	  involving	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  CDD	  issues,	  including	  their	  incorporation	  into	  law	  and	  regulations.	  968	  R13	  and	  SR4	  (Suspicious	  Transaction	  reporting)	   NC	   Six	  listed	  deficiencies,	  including	  lack	  of	  clarity	  regarding	  scope	  of	  reporting	  obligations;	  and	  low	  reporting	  rates	  (and	  few	  reporting	  institutions),	  which	  raised	  doubts	  as	  to	  the	  system’s	  efficiency.	  969	  	  
Table	  16:	  Problem	  Areas:	  Key	  Recommendations	  
Key	  Recommendation	  #	   Compliance	  Level	  at	  start	  of	  7th	  Follow-­‐
Up	  Review	  
Notes	  R23	  (Regulation,	  Monitoring,	  and	  Follow-­‐Up)	   PC	   Four	  deficiency	  areas,	  including	  the	  fact	  that	  hawaladar	  registration	  was	  voluntary;	  no	  requirements	  to	  efficiency	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  board	  members	  and	  managing	  directors	  of	  insurance	  firms;	  lack	  of	  AML/CFT	  inspections	  in	  the	  securities	  and	  gold	  sectors;	  lack	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  3.	  965	  Fitch,	  “UAE	  Central	  Bank	  Hits	  Refresh	  with	  New	  Governor.”	  966	  Kassem,	  “UAE	  Central	  Bank	  Says	  Goodbye	  to	  Long-­‐Serving	  Governor.”	  967	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  7-­‐10.	  	  968	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  18-­‐20.	  969	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  11-­‐18.	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control	  over	  AML/CFT	  compliance	  in	  insurance	  sector.	  970	  R26	  (FIU)	   PC	   Four	  deficiency	  areas:	  lack	  of	  concentration	  of	  STR	  submission	  to	  AMLSCU;	  lack	  of	  AMLSCU	  independence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Central	  Bank	  leadership;	  insufficient	  distribution	  of	  STRs	  to	  law	  enforcement	  agencies;	  lack	  of	  publication	  of	  annual	  reports	  and	  other	  data;	  and	  inability	  of	  AMLSCU	  efficiency	  to	  be	  assessed	  from	  available	  statistics.	  971	  R40	  (Other	  forms	  of	  int’l	  cooperation)	   PC	   One	  deficiency:	  “Lack	  of	  legal	  provisions	  defining	  the	  ways	  by	  which	  the	  Central	  Bank,	  the	  Securities	  &	  Commodities	  Authority	  or	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economy	  could	  exchange	  confidential	  information	  with	  foreign	  counterparts.”	  972	  SR1	  (Implementation	  of	  UN	  Instruments)	  and	  SR	  3	  (Freezing/Confiscating	  of	  Terrorist	  Assets)	  
PC	   Two	  identical	  deficiencies	  for	  both:	  Non-­‐observance	  of	  the	  freezing	  list	  relevant	  to	  UNSCR	  1373;	  and	  non-­‐circulation	  of	  freezing	  list	  relevant	  to	  UNSCR	  1267.	  973	  	  The	  key	  to	  resolving	  many	  compliance	  issues	  was	  the	  perceived	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  2002	  AML	  Law.	  By	  2012	  at	  least,	  a	  NAMLC	  Working	  Group	  had	  devised	  a	  strategy	  “for	  fulfilling	  compliance	  requirements”	  based	  on	  “their	  proposal	  on	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  AML	  Law.”	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  reviewed	  the	  proposal,	  forwarded	  it	  to	  the	  AMLSCU,	  which	  returned	  it	  to	  the	  ministry	  (presumably	  with	  its	  own	  additions	  or	  suggestions).	  It	  was	  then	  sent	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  which	  approved	  it	  and	  directed	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  “to	  prepare	  the	  draft	  for	  amending	  the	  AML	  Law.”	  Accordingly,	  in	  July	  2012	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  submitted	  the	  draft	  law	  and	  a	  Bill	  of	  the	  Executive	  Regulation	  to	  the	  UAE’s	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  to	  be	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Technical	  Legislative	  Committee.974	  While	  this	  and	  other	  work	  was	  being	  done	  on	  the	  law,	  the	  AMLSCU	  held	  four	  meetings	  in	  2013	  “to	  discuss	  and	  review	  the	  existing	  AML/CFT	  regime	  and	  recommend	  appropriate	  measures	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations…”975	  	  	  The	  result	  of	  these	  efforts	  was	  that	  on	  26	  October	  2014,	  UAE	  President	  Khalifa	  Bin	  Zayed	  Al	  Nahyan	  signed	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (9)	  into	  existence.	  Its	  formal	  title	  was	  “Regarding	  the	  Amendment	  of	  Some	  Provisions	  of	  the	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002	  Regarding	  Combating	  Money	  Laundering.”	  Several	  of	  its	  points	  directly	  addressed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
970	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  20-­‐23.	  971	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  23-­‐25.	  972	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  25.	  973	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  26-­‐27.	  974	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  34.	  
975	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  34.	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compliance	  with	  “core”	  and	  “key”	  FATF	  Recommendation	  issues;	  some	  of	  the	  latter	  had	  also,	  by	  now,	  been	  resolved	  by	  separate	  codes	  issued	  by	  the	  Central	  Bank	  and	  other	  regulatory	  bodies.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  less	  than	  a	  month	  after	  the	  law	  was	  signed	  into	  effect,	  the	  MENA/FATF	  team	  that	  had	  produced	  the	  first	  MER	  in	  2008	  essentially	  closed	  a	  circuit	  of	  AML/CFT	  compliance	  in	  the	  UAE.	  The	  team’s	  7th	  Follow-­‐Up	  Report	  found	  that	  the	  problem	  “key”	  and	  “core”	  recommendations	  had	  been	  resolved	  as	  follows:	  	  
• R1:	  (Money	  laundering	  crime):	  The	  amended	  AML	  law	  would	  expand	  “the	  scope	  of	  ML	  predicate	  offenses,	  and	  provided	  that	  conviction	  of	  perpetrators	  of	  predicate	  crimes	  is	  not	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  proving	  that	  the	  properties	  are	  the	  proceeds	  of	  a	  crime.”976	  [This	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  addressed	  in	  Article	  2.3	  and	  2.3	  of	  the	  amended	  law.]	  
• R5	  (Due	  Diligence):	  These	  were	  addressed	  in	  “executive	  regulations	  of	  AML	  law	  which	  provided	  for	  many	  basic	  obligations	  related	  to	  customer	  due	  diligence.”977	  
• R13	  and	  SR4	  (STRs):	  Amendments	  to	  the	  AML	  law	  (apparently	  articles	  7,	  8,	  and	  “duplicate	  article”	  12)	  “provided	  for	  obliging	  the	  covered	  entities	  to	  report	  suspicious	  transactions	  …”;	  “expanded	  the	  scope	  of	  obligations	  of	  reporting	  suspicious	  transactions…[;]	  and	  clarified	  the	  legal	  rule	  based	  on	  which	  the	  reporting	  entities	  can	  reach	  a	  objective	  discretion	  to	  decide	  whether	  reporting	  is	  required	  or	  not.”	  978	  
• R23	  (Regulation,	  Monitoring	  and	  Follow-­‐up):	  The	  UAE,	  in	  regulations	  discussed	  above,	  had	  “addressed	  the	  deficiencies	  related	  to	  this	  recommendation	  by	  subjecting	  transfer	  brokers	  (Hawaladars)	  to	  the	  regulation	  and	  supervision	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Insurance	  Authority	  asked	  the	  institutions	  under	  its	  jurisdiction	  to	  develop	  special	  regulations	  related	  to	  the	  efficiency	  and	  adequacy	  of	  the	  Board	  members	  and	  managing	  directors.”	  979	  
• R26	  (FIU):	  The	  UAE	  had	  take	  steps	  to	  centralize	  the	  AMLSCU	  as	  the	  “sole	  national	  center	  concerned	  with	  receiving,	  analyzing,	  and	  forwarding	  suspicious	  transaction	  reports.”	  (Article	  7	  of	  the	  amended	  AML	  law	  stipulated	  that	  the	  AMLSCU	  would	  be	  “the	  entity	  to	  which	  suspicious	  transactions	  reports	  …	  shall	  be	  sent	  from	  all	  relevant	  financial,	  other	  financial,	  commercial	  and	  economic	  institutions.”)	  980	  
• R40	  (Other	  forms	  of	  international	  co-­‐operation):	  The	  UAE	  had	  signed	  “a	  number	  of	  memoranda	  of	  understanding	  with	  equivalent	  regulatory	  authorities,	  which	  would	  contribute	  to	  increasing	  information	  exchange	  with	  equivalent	  foreign	  entities.”	  981	  
• SR1	  (Implementation	  of	  UN	  Instruments)	  and	  SR3	  (Freezing	  and	  Confiscating	  Terrorist	  Assets):	  These	  had	  been	  resolved,	  as	  noted	  above,	  by	  2013	  actions	  of	  the	  AMLSCU	  and	  other	  UAE	  authorities	  and	  ministries.982	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
976	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  4.	  977	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  4.	  978	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  4-­‐5.	  979	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  5.	  980	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  5.	  981	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  5.	  982	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  5;	  and	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  17.	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With	  these	  “core”	  and	  “key”	  areas	  resolved,	  the	  MENA’FATF	  team	  concluded	  that	  the	  organization’s	  20th	  plenary	  meeting	  (to	  be	  held	  in	  Manama,	  in	  Bahrain	  from	  18-­‐20	  November)	  was	  empowered	  to	  approve	  the	  UAE’s	  request	  to	  shift	  from	  follow-­‐up	  to	  biennial	  update	  status.	  983	  Accordingly,	  such	  an	  announcement	  was	  made	  during	  the	  session	  that	  the	  UAE	  had,	  along	  with	  Egypt,	  earned	  a	  change	  in	  reporting	  status.	  As	  the	  MENA/FATF	  website	  reported:	  The	  plenary	  congratulated	  the	  Arab	  Republic	  of	  Egypt	  and	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  for	  the	  significant	  progress	  made	  in	  addressing	  the	  AML/CFT	  deficiencies	  as	  identified	  earlier	  and	  based	  on	  the	  recommended	  action	  plan	  established	  in	  their	  mutual	  evaluation	  reports.	  The	  plenary	  meeting	  adopted	  the	  follow	  up	  reports	  and	  approved	  to	  be	  moved	  from	  regular	  follow	  up	  to	  biennial	  update….984	  
Conclusion	  With	  the	  change	  in	  MENA/FATF	  review	  status	  in	  late	  2014,	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  had	  reached	  a	  new	  level	  of	  international	  acknowledgment	  for	  its	  AML/CFT	  framework.	  The	  history	  of	  UAE	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  from	  1987-­‐2014	  does	  show	  linear,	  if	  uneven,	  progress	  toward	  a	  goal	  of	  international	  acceptance	  and	  recognition	  for	  its	  efforts.	  By	  obtaining	  MENA/FATF	  approval,	  the	  UAE	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  have	  hit	  the	  pre-­‐defined	  “markers	  of	  success”	  of	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  and	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement.	  However,	  measuring	  the	  latter	  especially	  remains	  problematic	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  harder	  statistical	  data	  for	  this	  period,	  something	  even	  the	  MENA/FATF	  team	  commented	  on	  in	  2014.	  	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  examine	  two	  different	  “markers	  of	  success”:	  AML	  Legislation	  
Awareness	  and	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation.	  Both	  of	  these	  touch	  upon	  elements	  addressed	  above	  in	  this	  chapter,	  such	  as	  interaction	  with	  the	  AMLSCU	  (as	  FIU)	  and	  other	  regulatory	  bodies.	  The	  final	  chapter	  before	  the	  conclusion,	  on	  the	  “marker	  of	  success”	  entitled	  Transparency,	  will	  also	  return	  in	  places	  to	  elements	  addressed	  in	  this	  chapter	  related	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  in	  official	  publications	  and	  in	  transmission	  via	  news	  and	  other	  information	  media.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
983	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2014),	  6.	  	  984	  MENA/FATF,	  “20th	  MENAFATF	  Plenary	  Meeting	  and	  10th	  Anniversary	  Celebration.”	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8.	  AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	  and	  Private	  
Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  the	  
UAE,	  2002-­‐2008,	  and	  2009-­‐2014	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  assess	  two	  more	  “markers	  of	  success”	  –	  AML	  Legislation	  Awareness	  and	  
Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation.	  It	  will	  be	  broken	  into	  several	  segments,	  each	  with	  some	  overlapping	  elements.	  As	  these	  two	  markers	  represent	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  private	  sector	  that	  may	  be	  ostensibly	  symbiotic	  but	  officially	  hierarchical,	  the	  chapter	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  compliance	  and	  commitment.	  Following	  this,	  the	  chapter	  will	  examine	  official	  awareness	  and	  outreach	  efforts	  made	  by	  UAE	  authorities	  over	  the	  period	  2002-­‐2014	  to	  alert	  the	  financial	  sector	  (and	  other	  institutions)	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  AML	  (and	  later	  CFT)	  laws.	  These	  efforts	  continued	  over	  the	  years	  as	  part	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  drive	  to	  meet	  compliance	  with	  the	  changing	  FATF	  Recommendations	  on	  AML/CFT	  legislation.	  Because	  this	  section	  will	  also	  detail	  shifting	  patterns	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  STR	  filings	  after	  2004,	  it	  will	  in	  passing	  broadly	  address	  private	  sector	  commitment	  and	  cooperation.	  The	  third	  and	  fourth	  parts	  will	  address	  two	  specialized	  topics	  regarding	  private	  sector	  commitment/cooperation.	  They	  will	  examine,	  in	  turn,	  the	  activities	  of	  several	  organizational	  entities	  in	  the	  UAE.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Center	  (DIFC),	  which	  has	  unique	  legal	  status	  in	  the	  UAE,	  with	  AML/CFT	  regulation	  operated	  in	  line	  with	  UAE	  law	  but	  overseen	  by	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  (DFSA),	  and	  also	  outsources	  compliance	  services	  to	  ancillary	  companies	  registered	  within	  the	  DIFC.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  Certified	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Specialists	  (ACAMS),	  an	  international	  group	  increasingly	  active	  in	  the	  UAE	  and	  GCC.	  Following	  this,	  the	  chapter	  will	  examine	  some	  other	  organizations	  that	  have	  also	  obtained	  a	  significant	  presence	  in	  the	  UAE.	  Please	  note	  that	  some	  materials	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  such	  as	  figures	  on	  STR	  filings	  in	  the	  UAE	  between	  2004-­‐2013,	  will	  reappear	  in	  places	  herein.	  	  
Compliance	  vs.	  Commitment	  	  Before	  addressing	  the	  marker-­‐specific	  areas,	  derived	  in	  the	  process	  of	  qualitative	  study	  of	  AML/CFT	  professionals,	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  research	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dedicated	  to	  distinguishing	  and	  assessing	  impacts	  of	  compliance	  versus	  commitment	  on	  organizational	  effectiveness.985	  In	  the	  organizational	  ethics	  context	  the	  above	  dualism	  is	  denoted	  as	  “compliance	  orientation”	  versus	  “value	  orientation.”986	  References	  to	  “compliance-­‐based”	  versus	  “integrity-­‐based”	  approach	  to	  management	  can	  also	  be	  found.987	  In	  all	  cases,	  compliance	  requires	  a	  set	  of	  control	  systems	  aimed	  at	  standardizing	  employee	  behavior	  in	  the	  space	  of	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  requirements.988	  Hence,	  it	  is	  predominantly	  externally	  driven	  and	  often	  oriented	  toward	  protecting	  top	  management	  from	  blame	  in	  the	  event	  of	  any	  legal	  misdemeanors.989	  While	  commitment	  -­‐based	  approach	  is	  internally	  driven	  and	  deeply	  grounded	  in	  the	  personal	  and	  organizational	  values,	  compliance-­‐based	  approach	  is	  a	  reactive	  measure	  to	  external	  events	  and	  pressures.990	  Compliance-­‐based	  approach,	  when	  it	  takes	  the	  “bureaucratic	  form,”	  becomes	  “synonymous	  with	  rigidity,	  goal	  displacement,	  and	  authoritarian	  command	  and	  control.”991	  It	  is	  often	  labeled	  as	  “coercive”	  approach.	  Theorists	  distinguish	  between	  “coercive	  systems”	  to	  achieve	  behavioral	  compliance	  and	  “enabling	  systems”	  that	  promote	  commitment	  to	  organizational	  goals.	  Alder	  and	  Borys	  argue	  that	  in	  a	  coercive	  environment	  employees	  lose	  their	  ability	  to	  grasp	  changes	  taking	  place	  in	  their	  organization,	  therefore	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  modify	  their	  response	  to	  new	  situations.992	  According	  to	  Stansbury	  and	  Barry,	  this	  affects	  “employees'	  ability	  and	  motivation	  to	  exercise	  their	  own	  moral	  judgment,	  especially	  in	  novel	  situations.”993	  Alternatively,	  “enabling	  systems”	  produce	  “organizational	  adaptability,”	  which	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  performance.994	  We	  can	  assume	  that	  these	  academic	  distinctions	  of	  compliance	  versus	  commitment	  are	  echoed	  among	  practitioners.	  The	  same	  dualism	  is	  present	  in	  the	  corporate	  compliance	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  term	  is	  used	  as	  an	  organizational	  function).	  Some	  researchers	  purport	  that	  “corporate	  compliance	  practices	  are	  often	  “coercively”	  structured,	  coined	  by	  a	  legal	  discourse.”995	  “Compliance	  by	  financial	  institutions	  with	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  rules	  has	  sometimes	  been	  looked	  on	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  whereas	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  no	  more	  than	  a	  means	  of	  providing	  law	  enforcement	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authorities	  with	  useful	  information	  and	  protecting	  the	  financial	  industry	  from	  criminal	  influence.”996	  	  When	  the	  above	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  financial	  institutions,	  which	  operate	  in	  a	  highly	  competitive	  environment,	  some	  believe	  that	  value	  calculation	  will	  be	  a	  deciding	  factor	  in	  selecting	  the	  right	  corporate	  strategies.997	  This	  observation	  is	  rooted	  in	  Friedman's	  statement:	  “Only	  people	  can	  have	  responsibilities.	  A	  corporation	  is	  an	  artificial	  person	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  may	  have	  artificial	  responsibilities,	  but	  ‘business’	  as	  a	  whole	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  have	  responsibilities...”998	  	  Financial	  institutions	  are	  faced	  with	  the	  dilemma	  “whether	  to	  forgo	  immediate	  revenues	  because	  of	  a	  relatively	  low	  probability	  of	  unspecified	  regulatory	  or	  reputational	  sanctions	  at	  some	  unknown	  future	  point.”999	  It	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  managers	  will	  favor	  correction	  over	  detection.1000	  As	  one	  manager	  stated:	  “…nobody	  ever	  gets	  credit	  for	  fixing	  problems	  that	  never	  happened.”1001	  The	  latter	  can	  possibly	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  that	  are	  built	  into	  the	  structure	  of	  financial	  institution	  and	  self-­‐interests	  of	  financial	  service	  providers.1002	  	  	  In	  the	  environment	  of	  elevated	  regulatory	  pressure	  where	  “external	  regulators	  and	  internal	  controllers	  tighten	  enforcement	  of	  existing	  rules,	  generate	  new	  types	  of	  rules,	  and	  try	  to	  close	  loop-­‐holes	  in	  rules	  to	  prevent	  new	  violations,”1003	  rule-­‐compliance	  is	  becoming	  a	  main	  focus.	  However,	  it	  comes	  at	  increasing	  cost,	  deterring	  from	  building	  a	  commitment-­‐based	  culture.	  According	  to	  a	  KPMG	  survey	  of	  industry	  views:	  “As	  management	  attention	  continues	  to	  be	  pulled	  in	  multiple	  directions	  there	  are	  many	  who	  feel	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  possible	  to	  meet	  all	  regulatory	  expectations.	  The	  AML	  burden	  placed	  on	  senior	  management	  time	  will	  continue	  to	  increase,	  making	  it	  more	  challenging	  than	  ever	  to	  meet	  the	  regulatory	  requirements.”1004	  As	  Alexander	  notes,	  in	  addition	  to	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rising	  compliance	  costs,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  risk	  of	  civil	  litigation	  in	  cases	  when	  an	  institution	  suspects	  money	  laundering,	  but	  these	  suspicions	  prove	  unfounded.1005	  	  	  	  There	  is	  even	  a	  growing	  fear	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  that	  is	  spilling	  over	  into	  non-­‐regulated	  business	  areas.	  An	  example	  is	  Monjasa,	  a	  bunker-­‐fuel	  supplier	  present	  in	  the	  UAE	  since	  2006.	  According	  to	  its	  UAE-­‐based	  compliance	  manager,	  though	  the	  company	  is	  not	  formally	  regulated,	  to	  maintain	  relationships	  with	  banks	  and	  its	  clientele	  it	  still	  had	  to	  establish	  a	  compliance	  function.	  Banks,	  he	  noted,	  vary	  in	  their	  expectations	  of	  compliance	  programs,	  so	  his	  firm	  ultimately	  has	  to	  satisfy	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  compliance	  criteria.	  Monjasa,	  according	  to	  him,	  sees	  regulatory	  obligations	  flowing	  from	  US	  regulators	  to	  US	  banks,	  then	  to	  local	  banks	  (through	  correspondent	  relations),	  and	  from	  these	  to	  companies	  across	  the	  globe.	  Compliance	  expectations,	  he	  noted,	  are	  not	  just	  “Know	  Your	  Customer”	  but	  increasingly	  “Know	  Your	  Customer’s	  Customer.”1006	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  according	  to	  a	  2015	  Dow	  Jones	  survey	  “Increased	  regulatory	  expectations	  continue	  to	  represent	  the	  greatest	  AML	  compliance	  challenge.”1007	  Some	  even	  argue	  that	  the	  duty	  of	  fighting	  money	  laundering	  has	  been	  shifted	  mainly	  to	  the	  private	  sector,	  responsibilities	  of	  which	  now	  include	  client	  surveillance.1008	  Compliance	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  having	  been	  extended	  beyond	  a	  company's	  commercial	  goals,	  where	  Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  (CSR)	  rests	  upon	  a	  “sophisticated,	  multi-­‐layered	  regime	  of	  compliance.”1009	  	  In	  another	  2015	  survey,	  compliance	  officers	  identified	  “Failure	  to	  meet	  regulatory	  requirements”	  as	  the	  most	  substantial	  risk	  posed	  to	  their	  organization.	  Though	  the	  majority	  of	  surveyed	  compliance	  officers	  in	  the	  MENA	  acknowledge	  that	  their	  organizations	  have	  AML	  policies	  in	  place,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  same	  survey	  also	  show	  that	  57	  percent	  of	  respondents	  questioned	  the	  ability	  of	  their	  compliance	  policies	  to	  prevent	  illicit	  activity.1010	  In	  this	  setting,	  legal	  scholar	  Lynn	  Stout's	  argument	  comes	  to	  mind,	  that	  “we	  do	  not	  always	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  crude	  material	  rewards	  and	  punishment	  to	  encourage	  prosocial	  behavior.”	  She	  describes	  prosocial	  acts	  as	  those	  for	  the	  benefits	  of	  others,	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including	  broad	  society.	  In	  her	  opinion	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  law	  lies	  in	  its	  power	  to	  activate	  conscience.	  1011	  	  	  We	  also	  cannot	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  institution	  is	  a	  composition	  of	  individuals,	  whose	  “commitment”	  to	  the	  organization	  and	  its	  goals	  can	  also	  be	  questioned	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  conflict	  of	  interest.	  After	  all,	  the	  organization	  itself	  does	  not	  make	  decisions,	  but	  rather	  its	  employees	  do,	  which	  impact	  the	  institution	  as	  a	  whole.	  According	  to	  Davis	  and	  Stark,	  in	  situations	  when	  professionals	  are	  required	  to	  exercise	  judgment	  for	  decision-­‐making	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  organizations	  and	  institutions,	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  are	  inevitable.	  These	  do	  not	  merely	  involve	  “apparent	  conflict	  of	  interests,”	  which	  can	  be	  guarded	  against	  by	  laws,	  professional	  codes	  and	  other	  regulations.	  As	  Davis	  and	  Stark	  point	  out:	  “Conflict	  of	  interest	  can	  remain	  a	  technical	  problem	  after	  it	  has	  ceased	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  problem.”1012	  Some	  may	  predict	  the	  conflict	  of	  interest	  will	  be	  more	  pronounced	  in	  the	  UAE,	  due	  to	  its	  high	  proportion	  of	  expatriates,	  especially	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  Despite	  the	  government	  policy	  of	  Emiratisation,	  which	  is	  described	  by	  one	  as	  “a	  carrot-­‐and-­‐stick	  approach”	  to	  encourage	  private	  sector	  companies	  to	  employ	  UAE	  Nationals	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  the	  latter	  is	  still	  largely	  comprised	  of	  expatriates	  from	  multiple	  nationalities	  and	  religious	  groups.1013	  Based	  on	  2009	  figures	  expatriate	  workers	  held	  99	  percent	  of	  private	  sector	  jobs.1014	  The	  country's	  reliance	  on	  an	  expatriate	  workforce	  results	  in	  high	  turnover	  due	  to	  the	  temporary	  nature	  of	  foreign	  worker	  employment.	  An	  expatriate's	  weighted	  average	  duration	  of	  residency	  in	  the	  UAE	  is	  8.7	  years.	  1015	  Other	  issues	  that	  should	  be	  mentioned	  in	  this	  context	  are	  possible	  inconsistency	  and	  general	  lack	  of	  training	  for	  new	  employees	  due	  to	  high	  job	  turnover	  rate	  and	  reduced	  organizational	  and	  job	  commitment.	  Based	  on	  social	  exchange	  and	  social	  comparison	  theories,	  research	  shows	  that	  foreign	  workers	  tend	  to	  show	  lower	  organizational	  citizenship	  behavior.1016	  Organizational	  citizenship	  behavior	  (OCB)	  has	  drawn	  interest	  from	  many	  researchers	  as	  contributing	  to	  organizational	  effectiveness.	  It	  is	  defined	  as	  employees'	  willingness	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  organization	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  formal	  definition	  of	  their	  job	  requirements.	  1017	  According	  to	  Reoux	  and	  Penner	  “OCB	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1011	  Stout,	  Cultivating	  Conscience,	  16	  and	  passim.	  1012	  Davis	  and	  Stark,	  eds.,	  “Introduction,”	  Conflict	  of	  Interest	  in	  the	  Professions,	  12	  and	  passim.	  1013	  Ahmad,	  “New	  UAE	  Emiratisation	  Regulations.”	  1014	  Ahmed,	  “Expats	  Make	  up	  99%	  of	  Private	  Sector	  Staff	  in	  UAE.”	  1015	  De	  Bel-­‐Air,	  “Demography,	  Migration,	  and	  the	  Labour	  Market	  in	  the	  UAE.”	  1016	  Ang,	  Linn,	  and	  Begley,	  “The	  Employment	  Relationships	  of	  Foreign	  Workers	  Versus	  Local	  Employees.”	  1017	  Organ,	  Podsakoff,	  and	  MacKenzie,	  Organizational	  Citizenship	  Behavior.	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is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  a	  proactive	  behavior	  driven	  by	  motives,”	  one	  of	  which	  is	  Organizational	  Commitment	  (OC),	  “which	  is	  influenced	  by	  an	  employee's	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  about	  the	  organization.”	  1018	  Another	  study	  determined	  that	  Leader-­‐Member	  Exchange	  (the	  latter	  implies	  supervisor-­‐subordinate	  relationship)	  and	  organizational	  justice	  serve	  as	  motivational	  bases	  for	  OCB.1019	  These	  findings	  are	  especially	  relevant	  to	  this	  study	  due	  to	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  composition	  of	  the	  workforce	  in	  the	  UAE,	  where	  “tiering	  of	  citizenship	  and	  residency	  and	  hierarchisation	  of	  migrant	  communities”	  performed	  by	  Emirati	  authorities	  penetrated	  societal	  and	  organizational	  environment.1020	  Based	  on	  the	  above,	  inequality	  in	  work	  status	  and	  pay	  determined	  by	  nationality	  can	  impede	  front-­‐line,	  blue-­‐collar	  employees	  and	  low-­‐management	  (largely	  occupied	  by	  Non-­‐Emiratis,	  from	  “Non-­‐Western”	  nationalities)1021	  from	  exercising	  a	  high	  level	  of	  commitment	  to	  their	  organization.	  We	  can	  purport	  that	  even	  rule-­‐compliance	  might	  be	  at	  question.	  In	  the	  AML/CFT	  field	  private	  sector	  institutions	  rest	  their	  compliance	  function	  more	  and	  more	  on	  critical	  and	  analytical	  skills	  of	  their	  employees,	  which	  surpasses	  the	  basic	  requirement	  of	  the	  “check-­‐list”	  compliance.	  Regulators	  expect	  from	  compliance	  departments	  to	  identify	  and	  respond	  proactively	  to	  potential	  wrongdoing.1022	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UAE's	  socio-­‐economic	  divisions	  determined	  largely	  by	  nationalities,	  with	  the	  country's	  public	  sector,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  legislators,	  senior	  officials,	  regulators,	  law	  enforcement	  represented	  predominantly	  by	  Emirati	  citizens,	  the	  conflict	  of	  interest	  is	  inevitable.1023	  As	  one	  researcher	  observes:	  “While	  they	  are	  well	  protected	  and	  privileged	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  Emiratis	  find	  themselves	  vulnerable	  in	  private	  sector	  jobs,”	  due	  to	  “a	  stricter	  legal	  framework	  that	  is	  mainly	  designed	  for	  the	  transient	  expatriate	  workforce	  in	  the	  private	  sector.”	  1024	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  Rioux	  and	  Penner,	  “The	  Causes	  of	  Organizational	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  1019	  Oren,	  Tziner,	  Sharoni,	  Amor,	  and	  Alon,	  “Relations	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  and	  Job	  Attitudes.”	  1020	  Jamal,	  “The	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  of	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  and	  Residency	  and	  the	  ‘Hierarchization’	  of	  Migrant	  Communities:	  The	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  in	  Historical	  Context.”	  1021	  De	  Bel-­‐Air,	  “Demography,	  Migration,	  and	  the	  Labour	  Market	  in	  the	  UAE.”	  1022	  Securities	  Industry	  Association,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Compliance.”	  1023	  De	  Bel-­‐Air,	  “Demography,	  Migration,	  and	  the	  Labour	  Market	  in	  the	  UAE.”	  1024	  Al-­‐Waqfi	  and	  Forstenlechner,	  “Of	  Private	  Sector	  Fear	  and	  Prejudice,”	  612.	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Official	  AML	  Legislative	  Awareness/Outreach,	  and	  the	  Growth	  of	  
Private	  Sector	  Commitment/Cooperation	  One	  researcher	  notes	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  effective	  measures	  to	  combat	  economic	  crime	  requires	  “an	  alliance	  between	  law	  enforcement	  and	  the	  private	  sector.”1025As	  the	  case	  below	  demonstrates,	  this	  alliance	  is	  impossible	  without	  the	  private	  sector’s	  awareness	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  requirements.	  	  	  In	  1999,	  HSBC	  officials	  conducted	  an	  internal	  investigation	  into	  suspicious,	  apparently	  money-­‐laundering	  related	  activities	  in	  their	  branch	  in	  Sharjah	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  At	  issue	  were	  several	  “Russian”	  accounts	  opened	  by	  an	  individual	  employee,	  into	  which	  (according	  to	  an	  internal	  memo)	  flowed	  “transactions	  of	  a	  distinctly	  suspicious	  nature.”	  As	  efforts	  were	  made	  to	  close	  the	  accounts	  and	  discipline	  the	  employee,	  HSBC	  officials	  struggled	  to	  decide	  how,	  and	  to	  whom,	  to	  report	  the	  problem	  outside	  the	  company.	  The	  same	  internal	  memo	  quoted	  above	  read	  at	  one	  point:	  “As	  there	  is	  no	  money	  laundering	  law	  in	  the	  UAE	  no	  local	  regulation	  has	  been	  broken	  and	  it	  may	  be	  that	  these	  particular	  accounts	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  being	  part	  of	  misfeasance	  by	  a	  single	  employee.	  As	  such	  there	  is	  probably	  only	  slight	  risk	  of	  any	  external	  reputational	  damage.	  …	  I	  do	  not	  propose	  making	  any	  report	  of	  an	  ML	  related	  nature	  to	  the	  local	  Central	  Bank,	  although	  a	  report	  will	  have	  to	  be	  made	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  staff	  fraud,	  and	  I	  will	  leave	  [others]	  to	  determine	  whether	  you	  need	  to	  formally	  advise	  the	  FSA	  [Financial	  Services	  Authority].”1026	  	  The	  problem	  was	  that,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  money	  laundering	  had	  in	  fact	  been	  criminalized	  in	  the	  UAE	  in	  1987.	  The	  fact	  that	  employees	  at	  a	  major	  international	  banking	  firm	  were	  unaware	  of	  that	  fact	  may	  speak	  to	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  –	  or	  concern	  –	  within	  the	  financial	  sector	  about	  the	  law,	  and	  to	  some	  perhaps	  the	  criminal	  practice	  itself.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  a	  former	  UAE-­‐based	  bank	  examiner,	  Iqbal	  Ismail	  Hakim,	  prior	  to	  9/11	  financial	  crime	  activities	  were	  routine.	  Also	  routine	  was	  a	  sense	  that	  national	  authorities	  had	  little	  interest	  in	  pursuing	  money-­‐laundering	  cases.	  According	  to	  Hakim,	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  in	  the	  pre-­‐9/11	  era	  made	  the	  UAE	  an	  attractive	  destination	  for	  financial	  crime	  purposes.	  These	  included:	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  Ali,	  “Economic	  Crime	  and	  Terror:	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  and	  Fear,”	  99.	  1026	  David	  Bagley	  to	  “Susan”	  via	  wright.s@mhub2.com	  (likely	  Susan	  Wright,	  then	  HSBC’s	  chief	  AML	  officer),	  21	  Dec.	  1999,	  reproduced	  in	  Hakim,	  UAE	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  Bank	  &	  9/11,	  22,	  and	  other	  documents	  reproduced	  on	  23-­‐29.	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1) Tax	  status.	  The	  UAE	  had	  no	  tax	  system,	  hence	  no	  tax	  regulation.	  “During	  the	  course	  of	  my	  duties	  as	  an	  examiner,”	  Hakim	  wrote	  in	  2005	  of	  his	  earlier	  experiences,	  “I	  have	  seen	  billions	  and	  billions	  parked	  in	  UAE	  banks	  as	  non-­‐resident	  deposits	  for	  tax	  evasion	  motives.”	  2) Ineffective	  regulators.	  In	  the	  UAE,	  Hakim	  alleged	  that	  many	  “financial	  institutions	  that	  received	  dirty	  money	  pay	  only	  lip-­‐service	  to	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  laws.”	  There	  were	  also	  regulators,	  he	  charged,	  who	  “turn	  a	  blind	  eye”	  to	  memos	  and	  reports	  of	  suspicious	  financial	  activity.	  3) Corrupt	  professionals.	  Hakim	  alleged	  that	  “lawyers,	  accountants	  and	  bankers	  are	  willing	  to	  help	  in	  hiding	  and	  laundering	  money	  or	  simply	  shut	  their	  eyes.	  Such	  professionals	  are	  a	  dime	  a	  dozen	  in	  the	  UAE.”1027	  	  A	  contemporary	  FATF	  report	  from	  2001-­‐2002	  lent	  substance	  to	  Hakim’s	  complaints	  about	  the	  low	  priority	  given	  to	  AML	  efforts	  in	  the	  country.	  It	  noted,	  for	  example,	  that	  between	  issuance	  of	  the	  Central	  Bank’s	  Nov.	  14,	  2000	  Circular	  No.	  24/2000,	  requiring	  STRs	  to	  be	  filed,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  2001,	  only	  206	  such	  reports	  had	  been	  generated.	  Evaluators	  found	  this	  number	  “very	  low	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  of	  the	  UAE.”	  There	  was	  also	  no	  sign	  that	  the	  Central	  Bank	  had	  yet	  penalized	  any	  financial	  institution	  for	  failing	  to	  comply	  with	  STR	  rules;	  presumably	  the	  FATF	  evaluators	  felt	  the	  low	  number	  of	  STRs	  betrayed	  a	  significant	  compliance	  problem.	  In	  addition,	  no	  AML	  regulations	  had	  yet	  been	  applied	  to	  insurance	  and	  gold-­‐trading	  sectors,	  which	  the	  evaluators	  considered	  vulnerable,	  or	  to	  stopping	  trade-­‐based	  and	  
hawala-­‐based	  money	  laundering	  efforts.1028	  	  When	  in	  2001,	  UAE	  officials	  announced	  that	  an	  AML	  law	  (to	  be	  passed	  in	  2002)	  was	  in	  the	  works,	  local	  bankers	  and	  analysts	  were	  quoted	  politely	  praising	  the	  initiative,	  contending	  that	  the	  UAE	  had	  now	  “taken	  the	  lead	  in	  the	  region”	  on	  AML.	  However,	  they	  also	  called	  it	  unnecessary.	  Money	  laundering,	  they	  explained,	  didn’t	  happen	  in	  UAE	  financial	  institutions	  and	  (as	  paraphrased	  in	  a	  reporter’s	  words)	  “there	  are	  no	  reported	  cases	  of	  money	  laundering	  in	  financial	  institutions	  here.”	  Even	  the	  head	  of	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  seemed	  to	  suggest	  the	  legislation	  was	  preventative,	  rather	  than	  responding	  to	  an	  actual	  problem.	  Local	  bankers	  and	  experts,	  however,	  allowed	  that	  “the	  system	  of	  'hawala'	  or	  funneling	  money	  informally	  is	  an	  area	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  looked	  into.”1029	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1027	  Hakim,	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  &	  9/11,	  40.	  1028	  FATF,	  “Annual	  Report	  2001-­‐2002,”	  annex	  G,	  2.	  1029	  Carvalho,	  “Official	  Says	  UAE	  Not	  Used	  for	  Money	  Laundering.”	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Whatever	  the	  case,	  the	  UAE	  government	  would	  make	  concerted	  efforts	  over	  the	  following	  years	  to	  spread	  awareness	  of	  the	  law,	  particularly	  as	  external	  reviewing	  bodies	  (principally	  from	  MENA/FATF)	  began	  to	  seek	  out	  statistical	  data	  from	  which	  the	  UAE’s	  degree	  of	  compliance	  with	  AML/CFT	  standards	  could	  be	  deduced.	  The	  principal	  figure,	  as	  discussed	  in	  a	  previous	  chapter,	  was	  the	  number	  of	  Suspicious	  Transaction	  Reports	  (STRs)	  filed.	  	  After	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  new	  AML	  law,	  UAE	  officials	  began	  to	  regularly	  hold	  workshops	  for	  financial	  sector	  representatives	  which,	  to	  judge	  from	  media	  reports,	  addressed	  AML/CFT	  topics	  either	  directly	  or	  as	  part	  of	  wider	  discussions	  of	  reporting	  obligations.	  	  Some	  early	  efforts	  included	  the	  following:	  	  
• In	  April	  2002,	  responding	  to	  the	  new	  AML	  law	  and	  to	  Central	  Bank	  directives,	  the	  Emirates	  Insurance	  Association,	  with	  over	  50	  affiliated	  businesses,	  began	  “raising	  awareness	  within	  the	  sector”	  about	  compliance	  with	  the	  law.	  In	  a	  reporter’s	  words:	  “This	  includes	  setting	  up	  dedicated	  units	  within	  the	  companies	  to	  oversee	  the	  processes,	  and	  nominating	  compliance	  officers	  with	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  which	  is	  required	  under	  the	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  laws	  recently	  issued	  by	  the	  UAE.”	  The	  story	  noted	  that	  “The	  directives	  from	  the	  Central	  Bank	  make	  it	  mandatory	  for	  all	  licensed	  financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  country	  to	  report	  transactions	  of	  Dh20,000	  or	  over.”1030	  
• Also	  in	  June	  2002,	  the	  AMLSCU	  joined	  the	  Egmont	  Group	  of	  FIUs	  –	  an	  international	  AML/CFT	  coordinating	  council	  –	  becoming	  the	  first	  such	  unit	  in	  the	  Gulf	  region	  to	  do	  so.1031	  
• In	  July	  2002,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economy	  and	  Commerce	  announced	  it	  was	  “working	  on	  a	  set	  of	  directives	  for	  the	  audit	  firms	  in	  the	  country	  in	  a	  view	  to	  making	  these	  firms	  responsible	  for	  weeding	  away	  any	  possible	  money	  laundering	  activities	  their	  clients	  might	  [be]	  involve[d]	  in.”1032	  	  The	  AMLSCU	  became	  the	  principal	  engine	  of	  promoting	  AML	  –	  and	  later	  CFT	  –	  awareness	  and	  outreach	  in	  the	  UAE.	  However,	  the	  body	  was	  initially	  understaffed	  (as	  previously	  noted)	  and	  these	  efforts	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  always	  been	  successful.	  When,	  in	  2008,	  a	  MENA/FATF	  team	  of	  evaluators	  assessed	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  situation,	  they	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  AMLSCU	  had	  “conducted	  numerous	  courses	  and	  seminars	  for	  the	  financial	  industry.”	  But	  the	  report	  went	  on	  to	  note	  that	  evaluators	  “received	  mixed	  reports	  on	  the	  value	  of	  these	  training	  courses.	  Some	  institutions	  felt	  that	  they	  were	  consistently	  at	  a	  level	  that	  was	  too	  basic	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  compliance	  officers,	  since	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1030	  Nair,	  “Insurers	  to	  Monitor	  Money	  Laundering.”	  1031	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  8;	  see	  also	  Egmont	  Group,	  “About	  the	  Egmont	  Group,”	  and	  Gilmore,	  Dirty	  
Money,	  71-­‐73.	  1032	  Jose,	  “High-­‐Level	  Panel	  on	  Auditing	  Set	  Up.”	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they	  largely	  focused	  on	  the	  core	  legal	  requirements.”1033	  The	  same	  evaluators	  complained	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  available	  STR	  data	  that	  would	  indicate	  how	  well	  the	  country	  was	  tackling	  the	  problem.1034	  	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  there	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  some	  confusion	  over	  how	  STRs	  were	  tabulated	  in	  this	  era.	  Under	  any	  circumstances,	  a	  preponderance	  of	  STR	  filings	  did	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  into	  court	  cases.	  A	  2009	  media	  story,	  citing	  a	  Central	  Bank	  official	  speaking	  to	  a	  press	  briefing,	  included	  STR	  numbers	  which	  seem	  wildly	  at	  odds	  with	  later,	  official	  AMLSCU	  figures	  for	  the	  period;	  presumably	  some	  qualifiers	  regarding	  the	  data	  numbers	  were	  lost.	  According	  to	  the	  story,	  the	  official	  said	  that	  “out	  of	  more	  than	  74,000	  [sic]	  cases	  of	  suspicious	  transactions	  reported	  between	  2002	  and	  2008,	  only	  285	  have	  been	  sent	  to	  the	  Public	  Prosecution	  since	  2002,	  with	  20	  of	  those	  reaching	  court.”1035	  In	  this	  setting,	  it	  may	  be	  worth	  repeating	  the	  official	  figures	  of	  STRs	  from	  2004-­‐2013.1036	  
	  
2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  377	   372	   635	   694	   1170	   1750	   2781	   2576	   2700	   2890	  	  The	  MENA/FATF	  complaints	  over	  the	  lack	  of	  STRs	  prompted	  UAE	  officials	  to	  new	  outreach	  efforts	  meant	  to	  encourage	  filing	  of	  the	  reports,	  an	  activity	  that	  required	  some	  training	  in	  recognizing	  suspicious	  fiscal	  activities	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  worked	  jointly	  with	  representatives	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  (principally	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority,	  or	  DFSA,	  discussed	  further	  below),	  and	  the	  Emirates	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority	  (ESCA).	  The	  three	  bodies	  came	  together,	  for	  example,	  in	  2009	  to	  host	  an	  event	  “to	  provide	  guidance	  and	  training	  in	  the	  reporting	  and	  investigation	  of	  suspicious	  money	  transactions.”1037	  The	  Central	  Bank	  also	  sponsored	  a	  2011	  workshop,	  along	  with	  DFSA	  representatives,	  and	  probably	  counterparts	  from	  other	  regulatory	  bodies	  as	  well,	  that	  included	  a	  discussion	  of	  STR	  numbers	  from	  the	  previous	  two	  years.1038	  The	  AMLSCU	  also	  factored	  the	  news	  media	  into	  what	  it	  described	  as	  its	  “policy	  to	  create	  awareness	  on	  matters	  of	  pubic	  concern.”	  In	  2012	  it	  issued	  a	  pair	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1033	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  81.	  1034	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  13.	  1035	  Uppal,	  “UAE	  Regulators	  Join	  Hands	  to	  Ensure	  Probity.” 1036	  Adapted	  from	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	  1037	  See,	  for	  example,	  Uppal,	  “UAE	  Regulators	  Join	  Hands	  to	  Ensure	  Probity.” 1038	  Kumar,	  “Banks	  Detect	  an	  Increase	  in	  the	  Number	  of	  Suspicious	  Transactions.”	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of	  “Cautionary	  Notices	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  alerting	  them	  about	  fraudulent	  documents	  and	  schemes,	  through	  major	  Arabic	  and	  English	  newspapers	  in	  UAE.”1039	  	  The	  result	  was	  a	  steady	  rise	  in	  STR	  filings	  over	  time.	  As	  the	  AMLSCU	  2013	  annual	  report	  observed,	  “the	  increase	  in	  STR	  submission	  started	  from	  2006,	  gained	  momentum	  in	  2008,	  showed	  a	  slight	  decline	  in	  2011	  and	  then	  increased	  steadily	  during	  2012	  and	  2013.	  The	  increase	  in	  STR	  submission	  over	  the	  years	  is	  due	  to	  more	  awareness	  among	  the	  reporting	  entities	  on	  their	  obligations	  to	  file	  STRs	  due	  to	  sector-­‐specific	  outreach	  programmes	  by	  AMLSCU	  and	  electronic	  linkage	  of	  banks	  and	  moneychangers	  to	  the	  on-­‐line	  reporting	  system.”1040	  By	  2012	  the	  AMLSCU	  was	  also	  circulating	  –	  internally	  at	  least	  –	  reports	  based	  on	  a	  steadily	  rising	  amount	  of	  collated	  and	  processed	  data	  from	  STR	  filings.	  Among	  other	  things,	  they	  showed	  that,	  increasingly	  after	  2004,	  the	  ability	  to	  spot	  and	  report	  suspicious	  financial	  operations	  had	  taken	  hold	  in	  the	  UAE.	  	  While	  the	  author	  does	  not	  have	  earlier	  official	  figures	  available,	  according	  to	  AMLSCU	  data	  the	  year	  2011	  saw	  training	  and	  outreach	  efforts	  that	  reached	  2,644	  professionals	  from	  both	  the	  financial	  and	  legal	  industries	  (1,496)	  and	  law	  enforcement	  (1,148).	  The	  AMLSCU	  separately	  listed	  43	  “interactions”	  in	  which	  its	  staff	  “provided	  guidance	  and	  technical	  assistance	  on	  AML/CFT	  through	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meetings	  with	  the	  representatives	  from	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  entities.”	  The	  numbers	  compiled	  during	  the	  following	  year,	  2012,	  showed	  a	  shrinking	  figure	  for	  those	  participating	  in	  AMLSCU	  outreach	  efforts	  (678	  total:	  583	  from	  finance	  industry,	  etc.;	  95	  from	  law	  enforcement),	  but	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  those	  receiving	  “technical	  assistance”	  from	  its	  staff	  (113	  interactions	  involving	  483	  people).	  1041	  A	  detailed	  snapshot	  is	  available	  of	  the	  organization’s	  awareness	  and	  outreach	  efforts	  during	  that	  year,	  some	  of	  which	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  highly	  specialized	  projects	  involving	  small	  groups,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  individuals.	  (The	  AMLSCU	  did	  not,	  in	  its	  methodology,	  classify	  these	  as	  “technical	  assistance”	  encounters.)	  One	  was	  a	  training	  program	  for	  six	  university	  students;	  another	  was	  a	  presentation	  on	  AML/CFT	  given	  to	  three	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority	  officials.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  Sharjah	  Police	  Department’s	  Organized	  Crime	  section	  benefited	  from	  a	  two-­‐day	  AMLSCU	  program;	  four	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  received	  two	  months	  of	  specialized	  AML/CFT	  training.	  The	  AMLSCU	  also	  conducted	  ongoing	  training	  for	  new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  6.	  1040	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  21.	  1041	  From	  a	  comparative	  chart,	  “Training	  and	  Outreach	  Efforts	  (2011-­‐2013)	  in	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  34.	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Central	  Bank	  staff,	  which	  in	  2012	  amounted	  to	  two-­‐dozen	  employees.	  Larger-­‐scale	  efforts	  included	  six	  seminars	  and	  presentations,	  all	  held	  in	  Dubai,	  variously	  aimed	  at	  private	  sector,	  DIFC,	  and	  law	  enforcement	  personnel.1042	  There	  were	  also	  14	  other	  occasions	  during	  the	  year	  in	  which	  AMLSCU	  staff	  took	  part	  in	  AML/CFT-­‐relevant	  workshops,	  seminars,	  and	  training	  events.	  Eleven	  of	  these	  took	  place	  in	  the	  UAE:	  seven	  were	  held	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi,	  two	  in	  Dubai,	  and	  one	  each	  in	  Sharjah	  and	  Fujairah.	  Two	  of	  the	  three	  external	  events	  occurred	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  one	  in	  Beirut,	  Lebanon.	  Some	  such	  events	  were	  sponsored	  by	  MENA/FATF,	  FATF,	  and/or	  the	  GCC.	  Some	  were	  awareness-­‐oriented,	  such	  as	  the	  event	  in	  Sharjah,	  listed	  as	  an	  “AML	  Awareness	  Course	  conducted	  by	  Emirates	  Institute	  for	  Banking	  &	  Financial	  Services.”1043	  A	  similar	  set	  of	  outreach	  efforts	  is	  listed	  for	  the	  following	  year,	  2013,	  which	  saw	  an	  increase	  in	  participant	  numbers	  in	  AMLSCU	  outreach	  programs	  (753	  finance	  and	  legal	  professionals,	  174	  law	  enforcement	  agents,	  927	  total	  –	  up	  from	  678),	  and	  a	  dip	  in	  the	  number	  of	  “technical	  assistance”	  participants	  (270,	  down	  from	  483),	  though	  only	  a	  mild	  reduction	  in	  the	  total	  number	  of	  “encounters”	  from	  the	  previous	  year	  (110,	  down	  from	  113).1044	  	  By	  2014,	  at	  least,	  officials	  in	  UAE-­‐based	  financial	  institutions	  were	  seemingly	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  country’s	  AML/CFT	  legislation,	  and	  of	  the	  need	  for	  compliance	  with	  it.	  As	  the	  head	  of	  compliance	  of	  one	  Dubai-­‐based	  bank	  remarked	  in	  an	  opinion	  piece	  published	  in	  Gulf	  
News:	  	   Depending	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  a	  financial	  institution,	  it	  may	  be	  subjected	  to	  numerous	  regulators	  and	  regulations.	  I	  wouldn’t	  be	  surprised	  if	  a	  financial	  institution	  is	  subjected	  to	  examination	  from	  an	  authority,	  which	  possibly	  was	  not	  in	  the	  list	  of	  “regulators”.	  This	  may	  seem	  a	  bit	  overbearing	  but	  the	  reality	  is	  —	  banks	  in	  the	  UAE	  have	  three	  financial	  regulators,	  depending	  on	  the	  banking	  activities	  being	  conducted	  (UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  Emirates	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority	  and	  DFSA),	  in	  addition	  to	  Labour/Immigration	  laws,	  Commercial	  Law,	  the	  Telecommunications	  Regulatory	  Authority	  Additionally	  we	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  laws	  originating	  out	  of	  the	  UN,	  US	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  directives	  which	  need	  to	  be	  adhered	  to	  in	  cross	  border	  banking	  relationships.	  Keeping	  abreast	  of	  the	  new	  regulations,	  which	  run	  into	  hundreds	  of	  pages,	  is	  the	  biggest	  challenge	  for	  any	  compliance	  professional.1045	  The	  concurrent	  rise	  of	  political	  and	  religious	  extremism	  in	  the	  Gulf	  area	  was	  also	  giving	  a	  special	  impetus	  to	  AML/CFT	  efforts.	  Media	  coverage	  of	  trials,	  in	  2014-­‐15,	  of	  those	  alleged	  to	  have	  joined	  such	  groups	  –	  some	  involving	  dozens	  of	  suspects	  –	  contained	  little	  detail	  about	  terror	  finances.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  UAE	  has	  stringent,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1042	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  62-­‐64.	  1043	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2012),	  58-­‐59.	  1044	  UAE/AMLSCU,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2013),	  34.	  1045	  Anand,	  “When	  Compliance	  Becomes	  the	  Watchword	  for	  Banks.”	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comprehensive	  sedition	  laws,	  and	  it	  may	  have	  had	  no	  need	  to	  invoke	  AML/CFT	  legislation	  in	  such	  cases.	  However,	  in	  January	  2016	  the	  local	  press	  reported	  that	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  had	  revoked	  the	  license	  of	  Al	  Zarooni	  Exchange	  “due	  to	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  compliance	  violations.	  The	  move	  came	  after	  a	  special	  examination	  of	  the	  firm	  and	  its	  activities.”	  This	  may	  have	  been	  prompted	  from	  outside,	  the	  article	  adding:	  “The	  US	  Treasury	  has	  linked	  the	  firm	  to	  Altaf	  Khanani	  Money	  Laundering	  Organisation	  and	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	  laundered	  money	  for	  criminals	  and	  political	  extremists.”	  The	  move	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  the	  UAE’s	  larger	  financial	  industry.	  The	  chief	  compliance	  officer	  of	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Commercial	  Bank	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying	  “The	  recent	  regulatory	  action	  has	  reiterated	  the	  need	  for	  Financial	  Institutions	  to	  fully	  comply	  with	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  regulations.	  Institutions	  are	  expected	  to	  act	  swiftly	  and	  effectively	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  evolving	  risks	  in	  the	  business	  environment.	  Credibility	  of	  UAE	  financial	  sector	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance,	  the	  message	  is	  clear.”1046	  
Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  
DIFC/DFSA	  While	  the	  rise	  of	  STR	  numbers	  from	  2004-­‐2013,	  as	  described	  above,	  may	  give	  a	  general	  picture	  of	  private	  sector	  commitment	  and	  cooperation	  with	  the	  country’s	  AML/CFT	  regimen,	  separate	  mention	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  of	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Finance	  Center	  (DIFC).	  Because	  of	  its	  members	  firms’	  high-­‐profile	  presence	  in	  the	  UAE’s	  financial	  system,	  the	  DIFC,	  and	  its	  regulatory	  body,	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  (DFSA),	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  separate	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country’s	  financial	  institutions.	  The	  DIFC,	  as	  briefly	  described	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter,	  was	  created	  under	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  2004,	  which	  established	  “Financial	  Free	  Zones,”	  some	  of	  which	  were	  to	  be	  allowed	  to	  operate	  their	  own	  civil/commercial	  court	  systems.	  The	  DIFC,	  in	  fact,	  “operates	  under	  a	  separate	  legal	  regime	  from	  the	  UAE	  as	  a	  whole,	  although	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  are	  applicable	  within	  the	  DIFC.”1047	  The	  DIFC’s	  supervisory	  regime	  for	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  applies	  to	  all	  financial	  service	  businesses	  (or	  Authorized	  Firms),	  Ancillary	  Services	  Providers	  (ASPs)	  and	  Designated	  Non-­‐Financial	  Businesses	  and	  Professions	  (DNFBPs)	  and	  is	  consistent	  with	  international	  standards	  set	  by	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force.	  1048	  Article	  3.1	  of	  the	  Financial	  Free	  Zones	  law	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  “The	  Financial	  Free	  Zones	  and	  all	  the	  operations	  conducted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1046	  Rahman,	  “Experts	  Stress	  on	  Complying	  with	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulations.”	  	  1047	  Reus,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering:	  A	  Guide	  For	  UAE	  Companies.”	  	  1048	  DIFC,	  “Non	  Financial	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering/Anti	  Terrorism	  Financing	  (AML/CFT)	  Regulations,”	  passim.	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therein	  shall	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2002	  Regarding	  Criminalization	  Of	  Money	  Laundering.”	  Authorized	  Firms	  and	  ASPs	  are	  required	  to	  report	  suspicious	  transactions	  to	  the	  AMLSCU	  and	  to	  simultaneously	  file	  a	  report	  with	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Service	  Authority	  (DFSA).	  DNFBPs	  are	  required	  to	  report	  such	  transactions	  to	  the	  AMLSCU	  and	  simultaneously	  file	  a	  report	  with	  the	  Compliance	  Department	  of	  the	  DIFC	  Authority.1049	  Accordingly,	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  (DFSA),	  which	  oversees	  the	  DIFC,	  has	  special	  courts	  to	  handle	  civil	  and	  commercial	  cases	  there,	  and	  has	  investigated	  and	  prosecuted	  component	  banks	  for	  “alleged	  shortcomings	  in	  its	  customer	  due	  diligence	  and	  anti-­‐money-­‐laundering	  procedures.”1050	  Note	  that,	  as	  the	  DFSA	  website	  acknowledges,	  in	  the	  DIFC	  “Any	  criminal	  investigation	  and	  resulting	  penalties	  would	  be	  performed	  by	  UAE	  authorities.”1051	  	  The	  DIFC’s	  legal	  sovereignty,	  outside	  of	  criminal	  cases,	  is	  considerable.	  The	  DIFC	  has,	  for	  example,	  the	  power	  to	  create	  its	  own	  internal	  laws.1052	  Its	  judicial	  authority	  was	  established	  in	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (12)	  of	  2004,	  Article	  3	  of	  which	  established	  DIFC	  Courts	  of	  First	  Instance	  and	  Appeal.	  The	  former	  was	  to	  be	  composed	  of	  a	  single	  judge;	  the	  latter	  of	  a	  presiding	  judge	  (known	  as	  the	  Chief	  Justice)	  and	  two	  others.	  The	  Appellate	  court	  judges	  were	  to	  be	  appointed	  by	  a	  decree	  of	  the	  ruler	  of	  Dubai,	  in	  whose	  name	  its	  judgments	  were	  to	  be	  issued.	  The	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  had	  “exclusive	  jurisdiction	  to	  hear	  and	  determine”	  civil	  or	  commercial	  claims	  and	  actions	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  DIFC.	  However,	  it	  could	  not	  hear	  such	  cases	  “of	  which	  a	  final	  judgment	  is	  rendered	  by	  another	  court.”1053	  Other	  UAE	  legislation	  also	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  Financial	  Free	  Zones,	  including	  the	  DIFC,	  were	  “subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  federal	  laws	  applicable	  in	  the	  State	  concerning	  criminalization	  of	  money	  laundering	  and	  anti-­‐terrorism	  finance.”1054	  	  	  The	  DFSA	  has	  close	  working	  relationships	  with	  regulatory	  bodies	  in	  the	  UAE	  and	  several	  other	  countries.	  In	  late	  September	  2005,	  for	  example,	  the	  DFSA	  signed	  a	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  with	  the	  Emirates	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority,	  pledging	  to	  “cooperate	  and	  share	  information.”1055	  It	  later	  signed	  a	  similar	  document	  with	  the	  UAE	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1049	  DIFC,	  “Non	  Financial	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering/Anti	  Terrorism	  Financing	  (AML/CFT)	  Regulations,”	  5.	  1050	  Everington	  in	  The	  National,	  “Dubai	  Investigates	  Deutsche	  Bank	  Over	  Anti-­‐Money-­‐Laundering	  Practices.”	  1051	  Interview	  with	  attorney	  Dr.	  Al-­‐Mulla,	  27	  April	  2015,	  transcribed	  and	  translated	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah;	  and	  DFSA,	  “AML,	  CFT	  &	  Sanctions	  Compliance.”	  1052	  See	  for	  example,	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News	  “DIFC	  Releases	  Draft	  Law	  For	  Fund	  Management	  Firms.”	  1053	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (12)	  of	  2004.	  1054	  See	  Article	  3	  of	  UAE	  Cabinet,	  Resolution	  No.	  28	  (2007).	  1055	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Esca	  and	  DFSA	  in	  Accord	  on	  Information	  Sharing,”	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Central	  Bank.1056	  It	  also	  has	  MOUs	  in	  place	  with	  regulators	  in,	  for	  example,	  the	  USA,1057	  the	  UK,1058	  Australia,1059	  Egypt,1060	  Greece,1061	  South	  Africa,1062	  and	  France.1063	  	  While	  DIFC	  courts	  lack	  criminal	  AML/CFT	  jurisdiction,	  the	  DFSA	  has	  still	  been	  given	  the	  responsibility	  of	  regulating	  AML	  in	  the	  DIFC.1064	  This	  means	  that	  it	  oversees	  compliance	  with	  general	  AML/CFT	  regulations,	  and	  can	  penalize	  firms	  that	  fail	  to	  meet	  standards	  of,	  for	  example,	  CDD	  and	  KYC.	  Such	  efforts	  included	  the	  2006	  addition	  of	  Compliance	  Consultants	  (CCL)	  to	  the	  DIFC.	  According	  to	  a	  news	  article,	  “CCL	  will	  focus	  on	  supporting	  firms	  applying	  for	  authorised	  status	  with	  the	  DFSA	  and	  help	  regional	  firms	  operate	  in	  a	  market	  with	  world	  standard	  laws	  and	  regulations.”	  The	  same	  piece	  noted	  that	  “firms	  regulated	  by	  the	  DFSA	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  rigorous	  on-­‐going	  supervision.”1065	  As	  the	  DIFC	  grew,	  the	  DFSA	  regulating	  body	  had	  occasion	  to	  emphasize	  the	  seriousness	  with	  which	  it	  viewed	  AML/CFT	  issues.	  In	  a	  2008	  interview,	  its	  director	  of	  supervision,	  Bryan	  Stirewalt,	  acknowledged	  to	  a	  reporter	  that	  the	  DFSA	  (in	  the	  reporter’s	  words)	  “is	  a	  young	  entity	  –	  so	  criminals	  may	  regard	  it	  as	  exploitable,	  at	  least	  initially.	  ‘But	  people	  with	  less	  than	  good	  intentions	  will	  find	  out	  it’s	  not	  the	  case,’	  he	  [Stirewalt]	  said.”1066	  A	  law	  enacted	  in	  January	  2012,	  gave	  the	  DFSA	  additional	  AML/CFT	  responsibilities	  by	  transferring	  supervision	  of	  DNFBPs	  to	  it	  from	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Center	  Authority	  (DIFCA).1067	  Later	  in	  2012,	  DFSA	  received	  positive	  media	  comment	  when	  it	  issued	  a	  consultation	  paper	  on	  Politically	  Exposed	  People	  (PEP)	  in	  an	  AML	  context.1068 Examples	  of	  the	  DFSA	  penalizing	  DIFC-­‐based	  firms	  include	  the	  following:	  	  
• Investment	  bank	  Arqaam	  Capital	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  fined	  twice	  by	  the	  DFSA.	  The	  first	  time,	  in	  2012,	  it	  was	  fined	  $50,000	  along	  with	  Ernst	  &	  Young	  “over	  breaches	  of	  its	  rules	  in	  the	  way	  Arqaam	  valued	  eight	  artworks	  in	  its	  2009	  financial	  statements.”1069	  Three	  years	  later,	  in	  July	  2015,	  the	  DFSA	  again	  fined	  it	  $50,000	  due	  to	  problems	  with	  AML	  compliance.	  A	  DFSA	  statement	  said	  that:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1056	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “DFSA,	  Central	  Bank	  in	  Pact.”	  	  1057	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “DFSA	  Signs	  Agreement	  with	  US	  Banking	  Regulators”;	  and	  “DFSA	  in	  Deal	  with	  US	  Audit	  Regulator.”	  	  1058	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News	  “DFSA	  Signs	  Data	  Sharing	  Pact	  with	  UK	  Counterpart,”	  and	  “DFSA	  in	  MoU	  with	  Jersey	  Financial.”	  1059	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  Signs	  Accord	  with	  Australia's	  ASIC.”	  1060	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “DFSA	  Signs	  Agreement	  with	  Egyptian	  Regulator.”	  1061	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “DFSA	  Signs	  Deal	  with	  Greek	  Regulator.”	  1062	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “DFSA	  Signs	  Pact	  with	  South	  African	  Banking	  Regulator.”	  1063	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Dubai	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  inks	  accord	  with	  French	  regulator	  AMF.”	  1064	  DFSA,	  “DFSA	  Rulebook,”	  6.	  1065	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Compliance	  Specialist	  Sets	  Up	  Shop	  at	  DIFC.”	  1066	  Masudi,	  “DFSA:	  The	  Watchdog	  Fighting	  Financial	  Crimes.”	  1067	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Role	  Moved	  to	  DFSA.”	  	  1068	  Raveendran,	  “A	  Salute	  to	  DIFC	  Regulators.”	  	  1069	  Zawya	  Dow	  Jones,	  “Arqaam	  and	  Ernst	  &	  Young	  Agree	  to	  Pay	  Fines.”	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“The	  risk	  assessment	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  deficiencies	  in	  Arqaam’s	  AML	  systems	  and	  controls,	  assessment	  of	  customer	  AML	  risks	  and	  customer	  due	  diligence	  (CDD)	  practices.”	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  news	  report,	  “The	  DFSA	  is	  concerned	  that	  Arqaam	  may	  not	  have	  acted	  with	  due	  skill,	  care	  and	  diligence;	  ensured	  that	  its	  affairs	  were	  managed	  effectively	  and	  responsibly;	  and	  complied	  with	  certain	  DFSA	  AML	  Rules	  requirements.”1070	  
• In	  April	  2015	  the	  DFSA	  fined	  the	  DIFC	  branch	  of	  Deutsche	  Bank	  $8,400,000	  for	  what	  were	  described	  as	  “serious	  contraventions.”	  According	  to	  media	  reports,	  the	  bank	  “breached	  the	  DFSA	  rules	  regarding	  its	  private	  wealth	  management	  business.”	  According	  to	  a	  DFSA	  statement,	  “Those	  contraventions	  include	  misleading	  the	  DFSA,	  failures	  in	  [the	  bank’s]	  internal	  governance	  and	  systems	  and	  controls	  and	  in	  its	  client	  take-­‐on	  and	  anti-­‐money	  laundering	  processes.”	  The	  fine	  was	  the	  result	  of	  three-­‐year	  investigation	  that	  began	  in	  January	  2011	  “based	  on	  information	  that	  Deutsche	  Bank	  failed	  to	  properly	  classify	  some	  of	  its	  customers	  as	  clients	  under	  DFSA	  rules,	  depriving	  them	  of	  certain	  protections.	  Investigators	  later	  found	  that	  there	  were	  ‘wider	  failings’	  at	  the	  bank,	  prompting	  the	  authority	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  inquiry.”1071	  	  
ACAMS	  One	  may	  also	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  conclusions,	  or	  at	  least	  hypothesize,	  about	  levels	  of	  private	  sector	  commitment	  and	  cooperation	  by	  examining	  the	  numbers,	  over	  time,	  of	  UAE-­‐based	  financial	  professionals	  who	  have	  joined	  the	  Association	  of	  Certified	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Specialists	  (ACAMS).	  With	  antecedents	  going	  back	  to	  1989,	  ACAMS	  was	  founded	  in	  2001	  and	  describes	  itself	  on	  its	  website	  as	  “the	  largest	  international	  membership	  organization	  dedicated	  to	  enhancing	  the	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  of	  AML/CTF	  and	  financial	  crime	  detection	  and	  prevention	  professionals,	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  industries,	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.”	  Its	  resources	  include	  the	  subscription-­‐required	  website	  www.moneylaundering.com,	  featuring	  databases	  on	  legislation,	  regulation,	  and	  sanctions,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  current	  and	  past	  news	  articles.	  The	  organization	  itself	  has	  an	  extensive	  policy	  on	  integrity	  and	  conduct.1072	  As	  of	  2016,	  the	  cost	  of	  joining	  ACAMS	  is	  expensive	  enough	  to	  discourage	  casual	  applicants:	  annual	  memberships	  cost	  US$295	  for	  a	  private-­‐sector	  individual,	  US$195	  for	  a	  government	  employee.1073	  	  	  Since	  2007	  ACAMS	  has	  held	  all	  of	  its	  annual	  MENA	  conferences	  (save	  for	  the	  2014	  edition)	  in	  Dubai.	  The	  growing	  interest	  in	  the	  topic	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  increasing	  number	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1070	  Uncredited	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “DFSA	  Fines	  Arqaam	  Capital	  Over	  Money	  Laundering	  Rules.”	  	  1071	  Maceda,	  “Bank	  in	  DIFC	  Fined	  Dh30	  Million.”	  	  1072	  This	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  following	  web	  sources:	  http://www.acams.org/about-­‐acams/;	  http://www.moneylaundering.com/Pages/AboutUs.aspx;	  http://www.advisoryhq.com/articles/cams-­‐certification-­‐guide/;	  http://www.acams.org/standards-­‐of-­‐conduct/.	  1073	  http://www.acams.org/become-­‐an-­‐acams-­‐member/.	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of	  attendees.	  According	  to	  a	  regional	  ACAMS	  official:	  “We	  [ACAMS]	  have	  seen	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  participation	  for	  this	  conference	  year	  after	  year	  and	  that	  the	  audience	  has	  diversified	  dramatically	  over	  the	  years.	  At	  first	  the	  event	  drew	  mostly	  AML,	  CTF	  and	  financial	  crimes	  prevention	  professionals	  from	  the	  banking	  sector	  but	  today	  non-­‐banking	  financial	  institutions	  such	  as	  MSBs	  and	  insurance	  firms	  also	  attend.	  In	  addition,	  government	  regulators	  and	  law	  enforcement	  personnel	  are	  present	  as	  well	  thereby	  creating	  a	  nice	  public-­‐private	  sector	  mix	  of	  attendees.”1074	  	  	  Among	  ACAMS’	  offerings	  is	  a	  form	  of	  professional	  accreditation	  known	  as	  CAMS	  (Certified	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Specialist).	  Again	  according	  to	  its	  website,	  such	  certification	  is	  “the	  gold	  standard	  in	  AML	  certifications	  and	  recognized	  internationally	  by	  financial	  institutions,	  governments	  and	  regulators	  as	  a	  serious	  commitment	  to	  protecting	  the	  financial	  system	  against	  money	  laundering.”1075	  CAMS	  accreditation	  is	  knowledge-­‐intensive;	  the	  fifth	  edition	  of	  the	  ACAMS-­‐produced	  study	  guide	  for	  the	  exam	  is	  a	  hefty	  435	  pages.1076	  As	  with	  ACAMS	  membership,	  applying	  for	  CAMS	  certification	  is	  expensive;	  the	  cost	  of	  taking	  the	  exam,	  plus	  different	  sets	  of	  preparation	  materials,	  ranges	  from	  US$1145-­‐US$1880	  depending	  on	  private-­‐	  or	  public	  sector	  employment.1077	  	  ACAMS’	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MENA)	  chapter	  began	  operating	  in	  the	  UAE	  in	  2006,	  that	  year	  enrolling	  330	  members	  and	  146	  CAMS-­‐certified	  AML	  specialists.	  Both	  of	  these	  categories	  showed	  steady,	  sometimes	  sharp,	  growth	  over	  the	  following	  years,	  until	  by	  2014	  ACAMS	  MENA	  registered	  in	  1,524	  members	  with	  739	  certified	  specialists.	  Though	  a	  breakdown	  by	  country	  was	  not	  available,	  the	  following	  chart,	  prepared	  for	  the	  author	  by	  an	  ACAMS	  officer,	  shows	  the	  course	  of	  that	  regional	  growth.1078	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1074	  Email	  correspondence	  with	  Jose	  Lewis,	  Head	  of	  Middle	  East	  and	  Africa,	  ACAMS,	  9	  Nov.	  2016.	  1075	  http://www.acams.org/anti-­‐money-­‐laundering-­‐specialist-­‐certification/.	  1076	  Pasley	  ed.,	  Study	  Guide	  for	  the	  CAMS	  Certification	  Examination.	  1077	  http://www.advisoryhq.com/articles/cams-­‐certification-­‐guide/.	  1078	  Courtesy	  of	  Mr.	  Mike	  Rodriguez,	  CAMS-­‐FCI,	  Chapter	  Development	  Manager,	  ACAMS®,	  80	  Southwest	  8th	  Street,	  Suite	  2350,	  Miami,	  FL	  33130.	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  UAE-­‐specific	  figures	  are,	  however,	  available	  for	  those	  attaining	  CAMS	  certification,	  as	  a	  searchable	  list	  of	  graduates	  (including	  country	  data)	  is	  available	  via	  the	  ACAMS	  website.	  As	  of	  its	  26	  July	  2016	  update,	  the	  UAE	  was	  home	  to	  281	  CAMS	  graduates.1079	  	  	  
Other	  Professional	  Programs	  There	  are	  other	  AML	  certificate	  programs	  offered	  in	  the	  UAE.	  Besides	  the	  CAMS,	  the	  CCL	  Academy	  started	  to	  offer	  training	  courses	  in	  the	  UAE	  in	  2006.	  Among	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  finance	  related	  courses	  there	  are	  also	  training	  in	  financial	  crime	  prevention,	  risk	  management	  and	  compliance.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  annual	  compliance	  executive	  program	  and	  two	  compliance	  certificates,	  it	  also	  offers	  Advanced	  Diplomas	  in	  Compliance	  and	  Financial	  Crime.1080	  Ethan	  Hethaway,	  a	  Hong	  Kong-­‐based	  banking	  and	  finance	  training	  provider	  officers	  training	  and	  certificate	  programs	  in	  corporate	  compliance	  in	  the	  UAE.1081	  Multiple	  online	  certificate	  programs	  are	  also	  available	  to	  the	  UAE-­‐based	  compliance	  professionals,	  among	  which	  are	  the	  International	  Compliance	  Association	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1079	  http://www.acams.org/aml-­‐certifications/cams-­‐graduates-­‐index,	  accessed	  10	  August	  2016.	  1080	  https://www.cclacademy.com/certification/course-­‐labels/level-­‐1-­‐introduction-­‐to-­‐the-­‐compliance-­‐-­‐aml-­‐functions-­‐2077.	  1081	  http://www.ethanhathaway.com.	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(ICA)	  International	  Diploma	  in	  Anti	  Money	  Laundering	  and	  the	  ICA	  International	  Diploma	  in	  Governance,	  Risk	  and	  Compliance.	  Though	  these	  programs	  are	  offered	  online,	  these	  are	  four	  workshops,	  which	  the	  program	  participants	  have	  to	  attendees	  in	  person.	  The	  ICA	  has	  established	  its	  presence	  in	  Dubai	  in	  2008.	  It	  also	  offers	  in-­‐house	  trainings	  for	  companies	  that	  sign	  more	  than	  ten	  its	  employees	  for	  the	  program.1082	  Starting	  from	  2009,	  NASDAQ	  Dubai	  Academy	  offers	  training	  courses	  in	  anti-­‐money	  laundering.1083	  	  
Thomson	  Reuters	  Thomson	  Reuters	  is	  another	  firm	  with	  a	  well-­‐established	  presence	  in	  the	  UAE	  that	  offers	  professional	  training,	  consulting,	  research,	  and	  IT	  solution	  services	  in	  the	  AML/CFT	  field.	  The	  company’s	  presence	  in	  the	  region	  dates	  to	  1866,	  when	  it	  established	  a	  news	  bureau	  in	  Egypt.	  In	  2007	  it	  launched	  its	  annual	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	  (GCC)	  Regulators'	  Summits	  to	  facilitate	  dialogue	  between	  financial	  services	  regulators	  and	  their	  regulated	  entities,	  as	  it	  recognized	  their	  mutual	  need	  to	  share	  information	  and	  learn	  from	  each	  other.	  Five	  of	  10	  summits	  were	  hosted	  in	  the	  UAE,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  has	  progressively	  grown	  from	  150	  in	  2007	  to	  500	  in	  2016.1084	  	   	  
The	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance	  From	  2013	  on	  professional	  associations	  and	  conference	  organizers	  started	  to	  introduce	  AML/CFT	  related	  topics	  to	  their	  events	  held	  in	  the	  UAE.	  The	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance	  (IIF),	  1085	  association	  of	  financial	  institutions,	  one	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  enterers	  into	  the	  UAE,	  started	  to	  conduct	  its	  annual	  IIF	  MENA	  Chief	  Risk	  Officer	  Forum	  in	  2013,	  three	  of	  which	  were	  hosted	  in	  the	  UAE.	  The	  forum’s	  goal	  is	  to	  facilitate	  a	  dialog	  between	  regional	  regulators	  and	  the	  banks	  to	  aide	  with	  implementation	  of	  new	  regulatory	  developments	  in	  the	  MENA	  region.	  This	  initiative	  followed	  by	  the	  IIF’s	  opening	  of	  its	  office	  in	  the	  DIFC	  in	  2014	  “to	  better	  serve	  its	  members.”1086	  The	  same	  year,	  the	  IIF	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Centre	  (DIFC)	  launched	  an	  annual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1082	  http://www.int-­‐comp.com/qualifications/diploma-­‐in-­‐grc.	  1083	  http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/press/nasdaq-­‐dubai-­‐academy-­‐to-­‐provide-­‐anti-­‐money-­‐laundering-­‐and-­‐compliance-­‐courses-­‐for-­‐brokers;	  http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/academy-­‐courses/anti-­‐money-­‐laundering;	  http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/press/nasdaq-­‐dubai-­‐academy-­‐training-­‐sessions-­‐to-­‐cover-­‐anti-­‐money-­‐laundering-­‐and-­‐sanctions.	  1084	  Uncredited	  in	  Saudi	  Gazette,	  “Abu	  Dhabi	  to	  host	  10th	  GCC	  Regulators’	  Summit”;	  and	  email	  correspondence	  with	  Samah	  Noureldine	  of	  Thomson	  Reuters,	  10	  Nov.,	  2016.	  1085	  “The	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance	  is	  the	  global	  association	  of	  the	  financial	  industry,”	  members	  of	  which	  are	  the	  world’s	  largest	  commercial	  and	  investment	  banks,	  asset	  managers,	  insurance	  companies,	  sovereign	  wealth	  funds,	  hedge	  funds,	  central	  banks	  and	  development	  banks.	  Information	  about	  the	  IIF	  can	  be	  found	  on	  https://www.iif.com/about.	  1086	  https://www.iif.com/press/iif-­‐open-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐and-­‐africa-­‐regional-­‐office-­‐dubai-­‐names-­‐wolfgang-­‐engel-­‐chief-­‐0.	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executive	  program	  on	  Understanding	  Country	  Risk,	  which	  among	  other	  topics	  also	  included	  the	  country’s	  regulatory	  environment.1087	  	  	  
Academy	  and	  Finance	  The	  Switzerland-­‐based	  Academy	  and	  Finance1088	  quickly	  identify	  AML/CFT	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  training	  as	  a	  niche	  for	  its	  conference	  theme	  in	  Dubai,	  when	  it	  first	  hosted	  “Dubai	  Forward”	  Conference	  in	  2014,	  the	  main	  theme	  of	  which	  was	  on	  how	  Dubai	  will	  maintain	  its	  competitive	  regulatory	  framework	  and	  how	  the	  UAE	  adapt	  to	  the	  new	  standards	  of	  fiscal	  transparency.	  In	  2015	  it	  organized	  in	  Dubai	  a	  conference	  titled	  ‘Anti	  money	  laundering	  obligations	  in	  the	  UAE:	  the	  recent	  changes.	  Based	  on	  the	  growing	  interest	  and	  demand,	  in	  2016	  alone	  it	  hosted	  nine	  conference	  and	  trainings	  related	  to	  AML/CFT	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  compliance.1089	  	  
Legal	  Week	  Legal	  Week,	  the	  UK-­‐based	  law	  journal,	  helps	  fill	  the	  educational	  platform	  for	  legal	  professionals	  in	  the	  AML/CFT	  field.	  In	  addition	  to	  publishing	  news,	  analysis	  and	  research	  on	  business	  law	  developments	  worldwide,	  its	  staff	  manages	  professional	  events.	  After	  its	  launch	  of	  Corporate	  Counsel	  Forum	  Middle	  East	  in	  Dubai	  in	  2013,	  a	  year	  later	  it	  introduced	  a	  new	  annual	  event:	  Regulatory	  and	  Compliance	  Forum	  Middle	  East,	  which	  in	  2016	  was	  titled:	  "Completing	  the	  Compliance	  Compass	  -­‐	  Filling	  in	  the	  Gaps."1090	  
An	  Abundance	  of	  Outreach	  By	  late	  2015	  outreach	  and	  awareness	  on	  economic	  crime	  in	  general,	  often	  citing	  AML/CFT	  in	  particular,	  seemed	  to	  have	  hit	  a	  peak	  in	  the	  UAE.	  The	  Pearl	  Initiative,	  a	  Gulf-­‐area	  business	  organization	  promoting	  accountability,	  hosted	  The	  Pearl	  Initiative	  and	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  on	  28	  October	  in	  the	  Dubai	  Exhibition	  Center.	  Just	  a	  few	  days	  later,	  on	  1-­‐2	  November,	  ACAMS	  hosted	  its	  6th	  Annual	  AML	  and	  Financial	  Crime	  Conference	  at	  Jumeirah	  Emirates	  Towers.	  This	  was	  followed,	  on	  4-­‐5	  November,	  by	  a	  conference	  sponsored	  by	  a	  “Policing	  and	  Security	  Conference:	  Global	  Challenges,	  Local	  Solutions,”	  held	  at	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  National	  Exhibition	  Centre.	  Less	  than	  two	  weeks	  later,	  The	  Palace	  Downtown	  Dubai	  was	  the	  setting	  for	  a	  conference	  entitled	  “Anti	  Money	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1087	  https://www.iif.com/news/events/executive-­‐program-­‐understanding-­‐country-­‐risk-­‐2014.	  1088	  Academy	  and	  Finance	  was	  created	  in	  2000,	  in	  Switzerland	  with	  a	  purpose	  to	  organize	  conferences	  and	  seminars	  in	  the	  field	  of	  finance.	  More	  information	  on	  it	  is	  available	  at	  http://www.academyfinance.ch/v2/company_profile.html.	  1089	  See	  http://www.academyfinance.ch/v2/wmd.html.	  	  1090	  http://www.legalweek.com.	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Laundering	  Obligations	  in	  the	  UAE:	  The	  Recent	  Change.”	  And	  on	  9	  December,	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Police	  Department’s	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Department	  hosted	  an	  event	  on	  that	  city’s	  corniche	  to	  mark	  “International	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Day.”1091	  	  
Conclusion	  Regarding	  knowledge	  of	  money	  laundering	  and	  related	  economic	  crime	  issues,	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  has	  come	  a	  long	  way	  since	  1999,	  when	  some	  bankers	  did	  not	  know	  the	  country	  even	  had	  criminalized	  AML.	  The	  UAE	  government,	  through	  official	  bodies,	  embarked	  on	  significant	  outreach	  efforts	  to	  educate	  its	  finance	  sector	  about	  AML	  (and	  later	  CFT)	  laws;	  these	  efforts	  ran	  parallel	  with	  the	  UAE’s	  effort’s	  to	  comply	  with	  fluid	  FATF	  Recommendations.	  In	  this	  regard	  the	  UAE	  government	  was	  assisted	  by	  organizational	  entities	  such	  as	  the	  Dubai	  International	  Financial	  Center	  (DIFC)	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Certified	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Specialists	  (ACAMS).	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1091	  The	  author	  attended	  each	  of	  these	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9.	  Toward	  Transparency	  in	  the	  UAE	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  survey	  the	  concept	  of	  Transparency,	  the	  last	  of	  the	  “markers	  of	  success”	  regarding	  AML/CFT	  regimes	  to	  be	  examined,	  as	  it	  has	  evolved	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  transparency,	  and	  the	  related	  term	  accountability,	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  business	  and	  governmental	  setting.	  In	  addition,	  this	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  the	  relevant	  concept	  of	  public	  disclosure	  in	  the	  UAE	  presented	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  financial	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  reporting	  and	  whistleblower	  provisions	  in	  the	  country’s	  legislation.	  	  
Transparency	  “In	  general,”	  according	  to	  one	  authority,	  “transparency	  is	  the	  quality	  of	  being	  easily	  seen	  through.”	  It	  adds	  elsewhere	  that:	  “Transparency,	  in	  a	  business	  or	  governance	  context,	  is	  honesty	  and	  openness.	  Transparency	  and	  accountability	  are	  generally	  considered	  the	  two	  main	  pillars	  of	  good	  corporate	  governance.	  The	  implication	  of	  transparency	  is	  that	  all	  of	  an	  organization’s	  actions	  should	  be	  scrupulous	  enough	  to	  bear	  public	  scrutiny.”1092	  The	  website	  BusinessDictionary.com	  provides	  a	  definition	  which	  includes	  the	  following	  relevant	  meanings.	  	  
• “Lack	  of	  hidden	  agendas	  and	  conditions,	  accompanied	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  full	  information	  required	  for	  collaboration,	  cooperation,	  and	  collective	  decision	  making.”	  
• “Minimum	  degree	  of	  disclosure	  to	  which	  agreements,	  dealings,	  practices,	  and	  transactions	  are	  open	  to	  all	  for	  verification.”	  
• “Essential	  condition	  for	  a	  free	  and	  open	  exchange	  whereby	  the	  rules	  and	  reasons	  behind	  regulatory	  measures	  are	  fair	  and	  clear	  to	  all	  participants.”1093	  	  At	  the	  outset,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  such	  Western	  styles	  and	  concepts	  of	  transparency	  have	  historically	  been	  foreign	  to	  the	  UAE.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  the	  similar	  term	  accountability.	  BusinessDictionary.com	  defines	  it	  as:	  “The	  obligation	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  organization	  to	  account	  for	  its	  activities,	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  them,	  and	  to	  disclose	  the	  results	  in	  a	  transparent	  manner.	  It	  also	  includes	  the	  responsibility	  for	  money	  or	  other	  entrusted	  property.”1094	  While	  UAE	  officials	  and	  managers	  may	  well	  have	  to	  accept	  responsibility	  and	  take	  ownership	  of	  problems,	  they	  do	  not	  need	  to	  “disclose	  the	  results	  in	  a	  transparent	  manner”	  as	  far	  as	  concern	  public	  data,	  public	  discourse	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1092	  TechTarget,	  http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/transparency.	  1093	  WebFinance Inc.,	  http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/transparency.html#ixzz4Go88TcaI.	  1094	  WebFinance Inc., http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/accountability.html#ixzz4HBxu9uym.	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communication	  are	  concerned.	  While	  officials	  in,	  for	  example,	  American	  government	  and	  publicly	  traded	  companies	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  answerable	  to	  the	  public	  via	  the	  press,	  there	  is	  no	  comparable	  requirement	  for	  a	  UAE	  government	  operative	  or	  company	  manager	  or	  director.	  The	  international	  investigation	  into	  the	  BCCI	  scandal,	  mentioned	  in	  the	  earlier	  chapter,	  demonstrates	  what	  critics	  would	  describe	  as	  the	  UAE’s	  public	  denial	  of	  involvement	  in	  the	  bank’s	  criminal	  activities.	  While	  publically	  declaring	  innocence,	  proclaiming	  victimization,	  and	  citing	  the	  intent	  to	  fully	  cooperate	  with	  investigators,	  the	  country’s	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  in	  providing	  key	  documents	  and	  keeping	  accused	  BCCI	  official	  away	  from	  international	  interrogations	  only	  raised	  more	  suspicion	  from	  the	  international	  community.1095	  	  	  
Words	  and	  Actions	  There	  are,	  then,	  significant	  cultural	  differences	  between	  Western	  and	  Arab	  countries	  that	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  when	  assessing	  transparency	  (and	  related	  terms,	  such	  as	  
public	  disclosure,	  discussed	  below)	  in	  the	  UAE.	  These	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  to	  suggest	  that	  these	  differences	  alter	  how	  reality	  is	  perceived.	  As	  one	  Arabist	  noted,	  "Arabs	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  allow	  subjective	  perceptions	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  real	  and	  to	  direct	  their	  actions.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  source	  of	  frustration	  for	  Westerners	  ...	  A	  Westerner	  can	  point	  out	  flaws	  in	  their	  arguments,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  the	  point.	  If	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  accept	  the	  facts,	  they	  will	  reject	  them	  and	  proceed	  according	  to	  their	  own	  view	  of	  the	  situation.	  Arabs	  will	  rarely	  admit	  to	  errors	  openly	  if	  doing	  so	  will	  cause	  them	  to	  lose	  face.	  To	  
Arabs,	  honor	  is	  more	  important	  than	  facts."1096	  	  Zaharna,	  surveying	  the	  work	  of	  several	  scholars,	  contrasted	  American	  examples	  against	  Arab	  ones,	  the	  list	  including	  (among	  others):	  	  	   1) High	  Context/Low	  Context.	  “Low-­‐context	  cultures,	  such	  as	  the	  American	  culture,	  tend	  to	  place	  more	  meaning	  in	  the	  language	  code	  and	  very	  little	  meaning	  in	  the	  context.	  For	  this	  reason,	  communication	  tends	  to	  be	  specific,	  explicit,	  and	  analytical.”	  In	  contrast,	  Arab	  culture	  is	  seen	  as	  high-­‐context.	  In	  such	  an	  environment,	  “meaning	  is	  embedded	  more	  in	  the	  context	  rather	  than	  the	  code.	  …	  Thus	  the	  listener	  must	  understand	  the	  contextual	  cues	  in	  order	  to	  grasp	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  the	  message.	  Thus,	  a	  high-­‐context	  person	  will	  tend	  to	  talk	  around	  a	  point	  and	  expect	  his	  listener	  to	  know	  what	  he	  means.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  speaker	  to	  be	  specific	  because	  the	  details	  are	  in	  the	  context,	  not	  the	  message.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  high-­‐context	  exchanges,	  much	  of	  the	  ‘burden	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1095	  Kerry	  and	  Brown,	  “The	  BCCI	  Affair:	  A	  Report	  to	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,”	  421-­‐461.	  	  1096	  Nydell,	  Understanding	  Arabs,	  29.	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meaning’	  appears	  to	  fall	  on	  the	  listener.	  In	  low	  context	  cultures,	  the	  burden	  appears	  to	  fall	  on	  the	  speaker	  to	  accurately	  and	  thoroughly	  convey	  the	  meaning	  in	  her	  spoken	  or	  written	  message.”1097	  2) Indirect/Direct:	  Americans	  are	  said	  to	  have	  a	  cultural	  preference	  for	  clarity	  and	  directness.	  This	  Direct	  Style	  “strives	  to	  accurately	  represent	  fact,	  technique,	  or	  expectation	  and	  to	  avoid	  emotional	  overtones	  and	  suggestive	  allusions.”	  In	  contrast,	  the	  writer	  identifies	  the	  Arab	  world	  with	  the	  Indirect	  Style.	  “[A]mbiguous	  communication	  is	  more	  indirect	  and	  emotionally	  rich.	  Whereas	  univocal	  stresses	  openness,	  ambiguous	  styles	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  conceal	  or	  bury	  the	  message.	  Additionally,	  the	  desire	  for	  precision	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  creating	  emotional	  resonance.	  The	  ambiguous	  style	  would	  likely	  omit	  specific	  factual	  and	  even	  technical	  aspects	  of	  a	  message.”1098	  3) Oral/Literate:	  Put	  briefly,	  Western	  culture	  in	  this	  example	  is	  seen	  as	  Literate-­‐dominant,	  a	  term	  emphasizing	  the	  written/printed	  word,	  while	  Arab	  culture	  is	  seen	  as	  linked	  to	  an	  Oral-­‐dominant	  tradition.	  “The	  print	  or	  literate	  dominant	  society	  relies	  more	  on	  the	  factual	  accuracy	  of	  a	  message	  than	  its	  emotional	  resonance.	  This	  may	  relate	  to	  the	  historical	  purpose	  of	  the	  written	  word	  –	  to	  record,	  preserve,	  and	  transmit.	  Literate	  societies	  also	  favor	  evidence,	  reasoning,	  and	  analysis	  over	  the	  less	  rational,	  more	  intuitive	  approach.	  This	  contrasts	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  oral	  cultures,	  where	  a	  single	  anecdote	  can	  constitute	  adequate	  evidence	  for	  a	  conclusion	  and	  a	  specific	  person	  or	  act	  can	  embody	  the	  beliefs	  and	  ideals	  of	  the	  entire	  community.	  Whereas	  literate	  cultures	  may	  place	  a	  higher	  premium	  on	  accuracy	  and	  precision	  than	  on	  symbolism,	  in	  the	  oral	  cultures	  the	  weights	  are	  reversed.	  In	  oral	  cultures	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  greater	  involvement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  audience,	  and	  this	  in	  turn,	  affects	  the	  importance	  of	  style	  and	  devices	  that	  enhance	  audience	  rapport.”	  1099	  4) Linear/Non-­‐Linear:	  Citing	  the	  work	  of	  scholar	  Cary	  Dodd,	  Zaharna	  indicates	  that	  Western	  culture	  is	  linear,	  and	  Arab	  culture	  non-­‐linear.	  “The	  linear	  cultural	  pattern	  stresses	  beginnings	  and	  ends	  of	  events,	  is	  object-­‐oriented	  rather	  than	  people-­‐	  or	  event-­‐oriented,	  and	  is	  empirical	  in	  its	  use	  of	  evidence.	  Linearity	  also	  stresses	  presentation	  of	  singular	  themes;	  i.e.,	  one	  point	  followed	  by	  second	  point,	  followed	  by	  third,	  etc.	  Points	  or	  facts	  are	  presented	  sequentially,	  in	  a	  linear	  progression.	  One	  “builds	  an	  argument”	  in	  a	  “step	  by	  step	  fashion”	  instead	  of	  “throwing	  things	  in	  all	  at	  once.”	  In	  contrast,	  the	  communication	  message	  of	  non-­‐linear	  cultures	  normally	  has	  multiple	  themes,	  is	  expressed	  in	  oral	  terms	  and	  heightened	  by	  nonverbal	  communication.	  The	  non-­‐linear	  thought	  framework,	  according	  to	  Dodd,	  involves	  the	  “simultaneous	  bombardment	  and	  processing	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  stimuli”	  so	  these	  people	  would	  think	  in	  images,	  not	  just	  words.	  Time	  orientation	  is	  less	  important	  than	  people	  and	  events,	  and	  frequently,	  time	  is	  not	  segmented.	  1100	  The	  role	  of	  literacy	  –	  to	  record	  material	  as	  a	  source	  of	  data	  –	  is	  echoed	  in	  the	  same	  article’s	  broad	  observations	  about	  the	  differing	  roles	  of	  language	  between	  West	  and	  East.	  	   From	  a	  Western	  historical	  perspective,	  written	  language	  was	  viewed	  primarily	  as	  a	  means	  for	  record	  keeping	  and	  documentation.	  Thus	  language	  was	  used	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  conveying	  information	  across	  time	  and	  space.	  By	  necessity,	  focus	  was	  on	  accuracy	  of	  content.	  Style	  served	  primarily	  as	  a	  means	  for	  enhancing	  the	  accuracy	  and	  truth	  of	  the	  substance.”	  In	  contrast,	  Arabic	  may	  be	  seen	  not	  as	  a	  means	  for	  conveying	  and	  preserving	  data,	  but	  as	  “an	  art	  form,	  a	  religious	  phenomenon,	  and	  an	  identity	  tool.	  These	  forces	  appear	  to	  have	  shaped	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Arabic	  language	  in	  an	  entirely	  different	  fashion	  than	  English.	  Rather	  than	  viewing	  language	  as	  a	  means	  for	  transferring	  information	  with	  a	  stress	  on	  factual	  accuracy,	  language	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  social	  conduit	  in	  which	  emotional	  resonance	  is	  stressed.	  1101	  Zaharna,	  the	  author	  of	  the	  piece	  being	  cited	  here,	  presents	  this	  material	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  public	  relations.	  Zaharna	  adds	  that:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1097	  Zaharna,	  “Understanding	  Cultural	  Preferences	  of	  Arab	  Communication	  Patterns,”	  242-­‐243.	  1098	  Zaharna,	  “Understanding	  Cultural	  Preferences	  of	  Arab	  Communication	  Patterns,”	  243.	  1099	  Zaharna,	  “Understanding	  Cultural	  Preferences	  of	  Arab	  Communication	  Patterns,”	  244.	  1100	  Zaharna,	  “Understanding	  Cultural	  Preferences	  of	  Arab	  Communication	  Patterns,”	  244-­‐245.	  1101	  Zaharna,	  “Understanding	  Cultural	  Preferences	  of	  Arab	  Communication	  Patterns,”	  245-­‐246.	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Just	  as	  humor	  is	  culturally	  relative,	  standards	  and	  norms	  of	  acceptable	  business	  and	  social	  practices	  are	  culturally	  based	  as	  well.	  A	  skillful	  American	  practitioner	  will	  not	  only	  explicitly	  state	  what	  the	  practices	  are	  but	  also	  explain	  why	  they	  exist.	  A	  particularly	  helpful	  technique	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  historical	  example	  of	  what	  happened	  when	  a	  practice	  was	  violated	  and	  what	  the	  negative	  ramifications	  were.	  Accuracy	  may	  be	  a	  particular	  concern	  for	  American	  practitioners	  to	  watch	  for,	  remembering	  that	  in	  Arabic,	  emotional	  resonance	  through	  vivid	  imagery	  is	  more	  important	  than	  facts.	  Additionally,	  from	  the	  Arab	  perspective,	  preserving	  the	  social	  bonds	  and	  a	  positive	  “public	  face”	  are	  much	  more	  important	  than	  facts.	  Thus,	  a	  “little	  white	  lie”	  can	  readily	  become	  a	  BIG	  white	  lie	  if	  public	  face	  or	  social	  relations	  are	  threatened.	  1102	  
UAE	  Standards	  and	  Perceptions	  Western	  politicians	  and	  business	  figures,	  of	  course,	  can	  also	  lie	  and	  may	  routinely	  downplay	  concerns	  or	  negative	  news.	  But	  in	  an	  Arab	  setting,	  a	  cultural	  rather	  than	  strictly	  professional	  distinction	  may	  need	  to	  be	  made	  between	  words	  and	  action	  in	  the	  UAE	  regarding	  several	  elements	  of	  its	  AML/CFT	  regimen.	  This	  may	  also	  apply	  to	  assessments	  of	  the	  state	  of	  economic	  crime	  within	  the	  country	  itself.	  The	  problem,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  such	  a	  dichotomous	  approach	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  transparency.	  But	  it	  also	  may	  help	  explain	  why	  former	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  governor	  Sultan	  bin	  Nasser	  Al	  Suwaidi	  would	  tell	  the	  country’s	  media	  in	  2000	  that	  "There	  is	  very	  little	  money	  laundering	  in	  the	  UAE,”	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  his	  office	  was	  hard	  at	  work	  on	  AML	  legislation.	  (Indeed,	  AML	  would	  be	  described	  in	  2000	  as	  the	  country’s	  “major	  focus	  …	  from	  the	  regulatory	  side.”1103)	  	  	  There	  may	  be	  other	  cultural	  issues	  at	  play,	  in	  instances	  where	  reporting	  an	  episode	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  counter-­‐productive,	  or	  as	  an	  unacceptable	  admission	  of	  failure.	  To	  cite	  a	  2014	  study	  based	  on	  interviews	  with	  UAE	  officials,	  many	  individuals	  are	  reluctant	  to	  come	  forward	  and	  acknowledge	  a	  problem.	  	   Furthermore,	  even	  when	  knowingly	  victimised,	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  fail	  to	  report	  money	  laundering	  and	  other	  acts.	  An	  individual	  may	  feel	  embarrassed	  and	  fail	  to	  report	  the	  crime;	  an	  organisation	  might	  investigate	  in-­‐house	  and	  decide	  that	  it	  would	  be	  best	  to	  resolve	  the	  matter	  internally,	  even	  though	  a	  crime	  has	  been	  committed,	  to	  protect	  its	  public	  reputation,	  rather	  than	  open	  a	  “Pandora’s	  box”	  and	  expose	  the	  level	  and	  depth	  of	  corruption	  in	  their	  company.1104	  There	  are	  also	  differences	  in	  how	  Emirati	  observers	  assess	  responsibility	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  economic	  crimes.	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  Al	  Suwaidi	  saw	  money	  laundering	  as	  a	  Western	  problem.1105	  Other	  UAE	  experts	  challenge	  notions	  of	  bank	  complicity	  with	  money	  laundering	  that	  are	  generally	  accepted	  in	  the	  West.	  The	  law	  enforcement	  scholar	  Dr.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1102	  Zaharna,	  “Understanding	  Cultural	  Preferences	  of	  Arab	  Communication	  Patterns,”	  252.	  1103	  Chand	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  “In	  2000,	  Banks	  Jumped	  on	  IT	  Bandwagon,	  Kept	  Eye	  on	  Money-­‐Laundering.”	  1104	  Belaisha	  and	  Brooks,	  “Money	  Laundering	  in	  Dubai,”	  348,	  citing	  Levi,	  “Money	  Laundering	  and	  its	  Regulation.”	  1105	  Nawaz,	  McKinnon	  and	  Webb,	  “Informal	  and	  Formal	  Money	  Transfer	  Networks,”	  334,	  citing	  Allen	  in	  Financial	  Times,	  “The	  Veil	  over	  Dirty	  Money	  in	  Dubai.”	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Ibrahim	  Al-­‐Mulla,	  writing	  in	  a	  2010	  book,	  observed	  (in	  an	  English	  translation	  of	  the	  original	  Arabic	  text)	  that	  “In	  general,	  the	  criminal	  contribution	  [to	  money	  laundering]	  takes	  three	  forms:	  it’s	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  incitement,	  form	  of	  criminal	  conspiracy	  or	  in	  the	  form	  of	  assistance.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  the	  bank	  contributing	  to	  crime	  through	  incitement	  or	  conspiracy.	  However,	  the	  question	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  bank	  is	  considered	  a	  criminal	  contributor	  in	  the	  form	  of	  assistance	  as	  it	  helps	  the	  client	  by	  providing	  an	  easy	  channel	  for	  ML.”	  He	  continued	  that:	  	   It	  is	  also	  hard	  to	  consider	  the	  bank	  a	  contributor	  to	  the	  crime	  of	  ML	  even	  in	  the	  form	  of	  assistance	  because	  of	  two	  points.	  First,	  the	  original	  crime	  happens	  before	  the	  bank	  accepts	  the	  dirty	  funds	  and	  thus,	  the	  bank	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  original	  crime.	  Even	  if	  supposedly	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  the	  bank	  is	  involved	  with	  the	  ML	  offenders,	  however	  it	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  the	  reason	  of	  the	  crime	  especially	  if	  found	  later	  that	  it	  is	  just	  to	  secure	  the	  fruits	  of	  the	  money	  obtained	  from	  crime.	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  say	  that	  a	  bank	  is	  a	  criminal	  contributor	  just	  because	  they	  refused	  to	  investigate	  the	  source	  or	  every	  deposit	  that	  is	  suspicious.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Al	  Mulla	  argued	  that	  a	  bank’s	  failure	  to	  investigate	  the	  source	  of	  the	  suspicious	  money	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  make	  it	  a	  contributor	  or	  a	  partner	  in	  crime.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  bank’s	  behavior	  is	  not	  instrumental	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  crime	  but	  rather	  ends	  at	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  crime.1106	  	  
Low	  Numbers	  as	  Proof	  of	  Effectiveness	  In	  a	  2015	  interview	  with	  author	  Al	  Mulla	  (in	  which	  this	  researcher	  was	  assisted	  by	  two	  translators),	  he	  estimated	  that,	  since	  2004,	  while	  thousands	  of	  allegations	  of	  money	  laundering	  had	  been	  passed	  to	  the	  police,	  he	  knew	  of	  only	  a	  handful	  that	  prosecutors	  actually	  brought	  to	  court.	  This	  was	  due,	  he	  said,	  to	  the	  difficulty	  involved	  in	  tracking	  funds	  through	  the	  alleged	  ML	  process	  to	  any	  criminal	  origins.	  Money	  laundering	  cases,	  he	  said,	  are	  among	  the	  hardest	  to	  tackle.	  “It’s	  easy	  to	  get	  suspicious	  cases	  to	  the	  police	  and	  prosecution,”	  he	  said	  at	  one	  point	  (as	  translated	  from	  Arabic	  into	  English),	  “but	  most	  of	  the	  cases	  fail	  to	  reach	  the	  court	  in	  this	  process.	  Some	  of	  them	  don’t	  even	  make	  it	  to	  the	  prosecution.	  The	  reason	  could	  be	  the	  lack	  of	  evidence	  or	  a	  failure	  in	  one	  of	  the	  regulatory	  steps.”(Note	  that	  much	  of	  this	  period	  being	  discussed	  was	  prior	  to	  the	  2014	  amendment	  to	  the	  AML/CFT	  law).	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  observers	  tend	  to	  measure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  AML	  legislation	  by	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  reported.	  The	  fewer	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  Al-­‐Mulla,	  I.,	  [Criminal	  Responsibility	  of	  the	  Banks	  and	  their	  Role	  in	  Money	  Laundering	  Crimes],	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  as	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  translated	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the	  number	  of	  cases,	  he	  said,	  the	  more	  effective	  the	  regimen	  is	  considered.	  1107	  However,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  this	  standard	  of	  “low	  numbers	  =	  good	  enforcement”	  has	  run	  contrary	  to	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  FATF	  evaluators,	  who	  presume	  a	  level	  of	  ML	  activity	  is	  present	  based	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  financial	  industry.	  1108	  	  
Transparency	  and	  Public	  Disclosure	  Al	  Mulla’s	  observations	  help	  introduce	  the	  generally	  cautious	  approach	  some	  in	  the	  UAE	  have	  taken	  toward	  transparency	  and	  the	  related	  concept	  of	  public	  disclosure.	  According	  to	  general	  belief	  in	  the	  West,	  transparency	  serves	  as	  a	  guarantor	  of	  greater	  accountability	  and	  a	  deterrent	  against	  abuses	  and	  misdeeds	  by	  officials,	  because	  it	  enables	  citizens	  to	  assess	  to	  what	  extent	  government	  is	  serving	  their	  interests.1109	  But	  some	  in	  the	  West	  do	  argue	  that	  transparency	  can	  “do	  more	  harm	  than	  good	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  citizens’	  civil	  mindedness”	  and	  “potentially	  erode	  institutional	  confidence	  and	  citizens’	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  individual	  or	  collective	  actions,”	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  institutional	  avenues	  to	  hold	  government	  accountable.1110	  In	  societies	  with	  no	  existing	  institutes	  insuring	  public’s	  participation	  in	  policy-­‐making,	  transparency	  will	  not	  produce	  institutional	  trust.1111	  The	  latter	  ambiguity	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  UAE	  environment	  where	  there	  are	  no	  institutional	  channels	  for	  public	  participation	  in	  the	  legislative	  processes.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  enhancing	  transparency	  is	  crucial	  for	  UAE	  development,	  due	  to	  the	  country’s	  dependency	  on	  direct	  foreign	  investment.	  Some	  findings	  suggest	  that	  lack	  of	  transparency	  can	  greatly	  impede	  the	  amount	  of	  foreign	  investment	  in	  a	  country.	  “The	  (relatively)	  more	  transparent	  are	  the	  country's	  policies	  and	  institutions,	  the	  more	  attractive	  is	  the	  country	  to	  foreign	  investors.”1112	  So,	  establishing	  itself	  as	  a	  highly	  transparent	  society	  in	  perception	  of	  foreign	  observers	  is	  becoming	  the	  UAE’s	  top	  priority.	  What	  are	  the	  indicators	  of	  good	  transparency?	  	  	  	  Transparency	  cannot	  be	  discussed	  without	  examination	  of	  public	  disclosure	  laws	  and	  practices.	  One	  business	  dictionary	  defines	  public	  disclosure	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1107	  Interview	  with	  author	  Dr.	  Ibrahim	  Al	  Mulla	  (Dubai	  Police	  Academy),	  4	  Oct.	  2015,	  translation	  and	  transcription	  by	  Mira	  Saeed	  Lootah	  and	  Hamda	  Faidallah	  Abdulkarim.	  1108	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  9.	  1109	  Carey,	  Legislative	  Voting	  and	  Accountability.	  	  1110	  Bauhr	  and	  Grimes,	  “Indignation	  or	  Resignation,”	  309,	  310-­‐311.	  1111	  Frost,	  “Restoring	  Faith	  in	  Government.”	  1112	  Drabek	  and	  Warren,	  “The	  Impact	  of	  Transparency	  on	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment,”	  24.	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organization	  makes	  information	  available	  by	  publishing	  it.1113	  The	  concept	  generally	  is	  interpreted,	  in	  the	  West	  at	  least,	  as	  embracing	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  data.	  While	  the	  term	  is	  often	  associated	  in	  media	  reports	  with	  negative	  or	  potentially	  negative	  data,	  it	  has	  been	  also	  observed	  that	  “disclosure	  in	  finance	  includes	  much	  more	  than	  disclosure	  of	  adverse	  interests.	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  disclosure	  of	  performance	  data	  of	  all	  kinds,	  including	  levels	  of	  risk,	  facilitates	  competition,	  which	  in	  turn	  reduces	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  In	  addition,	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  can	  be	  avoided	  by	  making	  known	  a	  firm's	  policies	  and	  procedures	  for	  dealing	  with	  conflicts."1114	  	  	  When	  referring	  to	  public	  disclosure	  laws	  we	  presume	  legal	  provisions	  for	  privately	  owned	  entities,	  which	  do	  not	  have	  to	  disclose	  financial	  and	  operating	  details	  in	  most	  cases.	  These	  laws	  ultimately	  determine	  what	  information,	  if	  any,	  should	  become	  public	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  voluntary	  from	  required	  disclosures.	  The	  former	  means	  “disclosures	  in	  excess	  of	  requirements,	  representing	  free	  choices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  company	  managements	  to	  provide	  accounting	  and	  other	  information	  deemed	  relevant	  to	  the	  decision	  needs	  of	  users	  of	  their	  annual	  reports,”	  making	  them	  more	  politically	  sensitive	  than	  the	  other	  types.1115	  Legal	  provisions	  for	  required	  disclosure	  are	  largely	  considered	  as	  guaranteeing	  transparency	  within	  private	  and	  public	  sectors.	  Roberts	  argues	  that	  many	  countries	  have	  been	  pressured	  by	  a	  transnational	  network	  of	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  to	  adopt	  national	  disclosure	  laws	  to	  endorse	  transparency.	  Transparency	  International	  (TI)	  publishes	  a	  Corruption	  Perceptions	  Index	  that	  annually	  ranks	  countries	  based	  on	  the	  international	  business	  community’s	  view	  about	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  corruption	  within	  each.	  (The	  UAE’s	  standing	  on	  this	  index	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.)	  The	  TI	  has	  also	  endorsed	  enactment	  of	  a	  disclosure	  law	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  elements	  of	  a	  national	  anticorruption	  strategy,	  purporting	  the	  link	  between	  access	  to	  information	  and	  low	  levels	  of	  corruption.	  This	  external	  pressure,	  according	  to	  Roberts,	  suggests	  that	  the	  ‘late	  adopters,’	  mainly	  developing	  countries,	  possibly	  enacted	  disclosure	  laws	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  appearances,	  motivated	  only	  by	  improving	  their	  ranking	  in	  TI’s	  Corruption	  Perceptions	  Index	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  inflow	  of	  foreign	  investment.1116	  The	  latter	  case	  is	  evident	  when	  the	  disclosure	  laws	  are	  adopted,	  but	  public	  access	  to	  information	  is	  still	  impeded	  by	  poor	  recordkeeping.	  For	  example,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1113	  McIntosh,	  chief	  ed.,	  Cambridge	  Business	  English	  Dictionary.	  1114	  Boatright,	  "Financial	  Services,"	  232.	  1115	  Meek,	  Roberts,	  and	  Gray,	  “Factors	  Influencing	  Voluntary	  Annual	  Report	  Disclosures	  by	  US,	  UK	  and	  Continental	  European	  Multinational	  Corporations,”	  555.	  1116	  Roberts,	  “Soft	  States.”	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UAE	  law	  guarantees	  de	  facto	  public	  access	  to	  government	  information,	  but	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  enforced	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess.	  One	  attempting	  to	  view	  AML	  court	  cases	  on	  the	  UAE	  Public	  Prosecutor’s	  official	  website	  has	  to	  search	  for	  cases	  by	  their	  numbers.	  But	  access	  to	  the	  ledger	  for	  case	  numbers	  is	  not	  open	  to	  the	  public.	  So	  though	  on	  the	  surface	  everyone	  is	  given	  access	  to	  information,	  technical	  roadblocks	  limit	  accessibility.	  	  	  Legal	  provisions	  requiring	  accurate	  corporate	  books	  and	  record	  keeping	  along	  with	  effective	  internal	  and	  external	  auditing	  are	  stated	  in	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1984,	  the	  Commercial	  Company	  Law.1117	  Detailed	  provisions	  for	  internal	  control,	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  audit	  committee	  and	  the	  appointment	  of	  external	  auditors	  are	  contained	  in	  Ministerial	  Resolution	  No.	  518	  of	  2009	  Concerning	  Governance	  Rules	  and	  Corporate	  Discipline	  Standards,	  which	  apply	  to	  entities	  with	  securities	  listed	  in	  the	  UAE.	  All	  financial	  institutions	  doing	  business	  in	  the	  UAE	  are	  required	  to	  apply	  International	  Accounting	  Standards	  (now	  International	  Financial	  Reporting	  Standards,	  IFRSs),1118	  promoting	  transparency,	  accountability	  and	  efficiency	  in	  annual	  accounts.	  The	  2016	  Global	  Forum	  Peer	  Review	  of	  the	  UAE	  implementation	  of	  international	  standards	  of	  transparency	  and	  exchange	  of	  information	  for	  tax	  purposes	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  absence	  of	  account	  auditing	  requirement	  for	  partnerships	  and	  offshore	  companies	  in	  the	  Jebel	  Ali	  Free	  Zone	  and	  RAK	  Free	  Zones,	  where	  no	  framework	  has	  been	  established	  to	  monitor	  the	  accounting	  records.1119	  Though	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  in	  the	  UAE,	  in	  general,	  are	  not	  under	  this	  requirement,	  a	  majority	  of	  them	  adopted	  IFRS	  voluntarily.	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  laws	  and	  regulations	  with	  its	  international	  counterparts	  and	  by	  companies’	  desire	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investments.1120	  One	  study	  establishes	  a	  strong	  link	  between	  voluntary	  financial	  disclosure	  and	  accessibility	  to	  capital	  markets,	  where	  the	  former	  provides	  an	  apparent	  competitive	  advantage.1121	  By	  this	  logic,	  the	  competition	  for	  foreign	  investment	  will	  ultimately	  make	  all	  countries	  adopt	  universally	  transparent	  disclosure	  practices.	  According	  to	  Zarzeski	  it	  is	  impossible	  because	  accounting	  disclosure	  practices	  are	  culture-­‐driven.	  International	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1117	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1984.	  1118	  The	  International	  Accounting	  Standards	  Committee	  (IASC)	  was	  founded	  in	  June	  1973.	  International	  Accounting	  Standards	  Board	  (IASB)	  is	  the	  independent	  standard-­‐setting	  body	  of	  the	  International	  Financial	  Reporting	  Standards	  (IFRS)	  Foundation.	  More	  information	  on	  the	  IFRS	  is	  available	  at:	  http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Pages/IFRS.aspx	  1119	  OECD,	  “Global	  Forum	  on	  Transparency	  and	  Exchange	  of	  Information	  for	  Tax	  Purposes	  Peer	  Reviews:	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  2016,	  Phase	  2:Implementation	  of	  the	  Standard	  in	  Practice,”	  9.	  1120	  Aljifri	  and	  Khasharmeh,	  “An	  Investigation	  into	  the	  Suitability	  of	  the	  International	  Accounting	  Standards	  to	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  Environment.”	  1121	  Choi,	  “Financial	  Disclosure	  and	  Entry	  to	  the	  European	  Capital	  Market.”	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firms	  disclose	  higher	  level	  of	  public	  information	  because	  they	  are	  driven	  by	  global	  culture	  and	  market	  forces.	  The	  level	  of	  accounting	  disclosure	  in	  locally-­‐operated	  firms	  would	  be	  dictated	  by	  “the	  secretive	  nature	  of	  a	  culture.”	  they	  operate	  it.1122	  	  	  Aljifri	  argues	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  disclosure	  in	  the	  UAE	  is	  primarily	  driven	  by	  regulations	  than	  by	  market.	  According	  to	  him,	  high	  level	  of	  disclosure	  in	  the	  UAE’s	  banking	  sector	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  UAE	  Central	  Bank’s	  close	  control	  and	  monitoring.	  Firms	  from	  business	  sectors	  with	  weak	  legal	  and	  enforcement	  framework	  demonstrate	  lower	  level	  of	  disclosure.1123	  The	  results	  of	  one	  study	  show	  that	  the	  disclosure	  of	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  in	  the	  UAE	  is	  rather	  low,	  especially	  related	  to	  disclosures	  on	  board	  of	  directors’	  qualifications,	  skills	  and	  the	  training	  programs	  available	  for	  them.	  This	  can	  imply	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  directors	  may	  be	  influences	  by	  the	  ownership,	  which	  are	  more	  interested	  “in	  electing	  directors	  who	  represent	  them	  in	  the	  board”	  regardless	  of	  their	  qualification	  and	  experience.1124	  	  The	  terms	  disclosure	  and	  transparency	  appearing	  jointly	  in	  the	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2000,	  which	  established	  the	  Security	  and	  Commodity	  Authority	  and	  granted	  it	  supervisory	  and	  executive	  powers	  over	  the	  securities	  and	  commodities	  market	  licensed	  in	  the	  UAE.	  According	  to	  Articles	  4(2)(e)	  the	  authority	  may	  exercise	  its	  power	  to	  make	  regulations	  concerning	  disclosure	  and	  transparency.	  Articles	  12	  (4)	  and	  (5)	  gives	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors	  power	  to	  require	  companies	  licensed	  by	  the	  Authority	  to	  take	  necessary	  measures	  for	  disclosure	  of	  any	  substantial	  developments	  occurring	  in	  such	  companies	  to	  ensure	  transparency	  and	  disclosure.	  In	  Article	  22(4)	  states	  the	  obligation	  for	  the	  listed	  companies	  “to	  present	  reports	  and	  data	  to	  the	  Authority	  and	  make	  the	  necessary	  press	  releases	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  transparency	  of	  information	  and	  disclosure.”	  In	  Chapter	  Five,	  “Disclosure	  and	  Transparency,	  ”Articles	  (33),	  (34),	  and	  (35)	  outline	  the	  rules	  of	  public	  and	  private	  disclosure	  and	  powers	  given	  to	  the	  Authority	  to	  conduct	  investigation	  if	  necessary.1125	  The	  Authority’s	  most	  recent	  regulation,	  which	  opens	  the	  UAE	  equity	  market	  to	  private	  joint	  stock	  companies,	  requires,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  financial	  and	  managerial	  disclosure	  obligations,	  “any	  other	  disclosures,	  statements	  or	  reports.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1122	  Zarzeski,	  “Spontaneous	  Harmonization	  Effects	  of	  Culture	  and	  Market	  Forces	  on	  Accounting	  Disclosure	  Practices,”	  35.	  1123	  Aljifri,	  “Annual	  Report	  Disclosure	  in	  a	  Developing	  Country:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  UAE.”	  	  1124	  Al-­‐Janadi,	  Rahman,	  and	  Omar,	  “The	  Level	  of	  Voluntary	  Disclosure	  Practices	  Among	  Public	  Listed	  Companies	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  the	  UAE:	  Using	  a	  Modified	  Voluntary	  Disclosure	  Index,”	  194.	  1125	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2000	  Concerning	  the	  Emirates	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority	  and	  Market.	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Furthermore,	  the	  new	  Regulation	  makes	  the	  issuer’s	  Directors	  liable	  personally	  for	  the	  accuracy	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  information	  provided.1126	  One	  observer	  comments	  that	  these	  tighter	  regulations	  “will	  come	  at	  a	  cost,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  additional	  compliance	  requirements,	  particularly	  the	  need	  for	  continuous	  disclosure	  of	  developments	  affecting	  the	  company.”1127	  	  	  Regardless	  of	  these	  stringent	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  requirements,	  there	  is	  a	  prevalent	  perception	  of	  high	  level	  of	  insider	  trading	  on	  regional	  stock	  markets.1128	  Lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  public	  and	  corporate	  spheres	  can	  be	  one	  of	  the	  explanations.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  insufficient	  transparency	  may	  lead	  to	  corruption.	  So,	  the	  country’s	  anti-­‐corruption	  program	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  criminal	  liability	  for	  companies	  and	  individuals	  is	  one	  of	  the	  indicators	  of	  transparency.	  	  	  The	  Ministerial	  Resolution	  No.	  (225)	  of	  2015	  amending	  certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  Ministerial	  Resolution	  No.	  (518)	  of	  2009	  concerning	  Governance	  Rules	  and	  Corporate	  Discipline	  Standards	  promulgates	  that	  cases	  concerning	  company	  transactions	  involving	  fraud	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  a	  criminal	  court,	  where	  the	  penalty	  of	  imprisonment	  or	  fine	  may	  be	  impose.1129	  Penalties	  on	  company	  directors	  are	  imposed	  by	  the	  Federal	  Commercial	  Companies	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1984	  (amended	  by	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (13)	  of	  1988),	  which	  inflicts	  penalties	  on	  directors	  if	  they,	  among	  other	  things,	  intentionally	  state	  false	  information	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  company’s	  profits	  and	  losses.1130	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (18)	  of	  1993,	  known	  as	  the	  “Commercial	  Transactions	  Law”	  imposes	  a	  penalty	  on	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  if	  they	  conceal	  or	  destroy	  the	  company’s	  books	  or	  acknowledge	  debts	  that	  they	  know	  are	  not	  payable	  by	  the	  company.1131	  Article	  65	  of	  the	  Federal	  Criminal	  Penal	  Code	  states	  that	  juridical	  persons,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  governmental	  agencies	  “shall	  be	  criminally	  responsible	  for	  crimes	  committed	  by	  representatives,	  directors	  or	  agents	  acting	  in	  favor	  of	  or	  on	  behalf	  thereof.”	  The	  same	  Article	  explicitly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1126	  UAE/SCA,	  “The	  Authority’s	  Board	  of	  Directors	  Decision	  No.	  (10)	  of	  2014,	  Concerning	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Listing	  and	  Trading	  of	  Private	  Joint	  Stock	  Companies,	  Articles	  (9).“	  1127	  Ibrahim	  and	  Hamad,	  “A	  New	  Pathway	  to	  Market	  for	  UAE	  Companies.”	  1128	  Al	  Sayegh	  in	  The	  National,	  “GCC’s	  Small	  Volumes	  and	  Insider	  Trading	  Keep	  Hedge	  Funds	  at	  Bay.”	  	  
1129	  UAE	  Minister	  of	  Economy,	  Ministerial	  Resolution	  No.	  (225)	  of	  2015	  Concerning	  Governance	  Rules	  and	  Corporate	  Discipline	  Standards.”	  Also,	  UAE/SCA,	  “Amendment	  of	  Governance	  Rules	  and	  Corporate	  Discipline	  Standards	  Stresses	  the	  Requirement	  to	  Nominate	  Ladies	  to	  Boards	  of	  Directors.”	  1130	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1984	  as	  Amended	  by	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (13)	  of	  1988.	  1131	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (18)	  of	  1993	  Commercial	  Transactions	  Law.	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states	  that	  the	  financial	  penalty	  imposed	  on	  the	  corporate	  offender	  does	  not	  prohibit	  punishment	  of	  the	  individual	  offender.1132	  	  	  Despite	  of	  the	  above	  judiciary	  mechanisms	  in	  place	  to	  promote	  transparency	  in	  the	  corporate	  field	  absence	  of	  financial	  disclosure	  laws	  for	  public	  officials	  hampers	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  in	  the	  UAE.	  That	  being	  said,	  bribery	  is	  punishable	  in	  the	  UAE	  under	  a	  number	  of	  Federal	  and	  Dubai	  legislations,	  including	  the	  Federal	  Penal	  Code,	  Dubai	  Penal	  Code,	  Federal	  Human	  Resources	  Law	  and	  Financial	  Fraud	  Law.1133	  It	  is	  worth	  to	  mention	  that	  the	  Federal	  Penal	  Code	  applies	  to	  the	  UAE	  as	  a	  whole,	  including	  the	  free	  zones	  without	  making	  any	  distinction	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  entities.	  But	  UAE	  has	  yet	  to	  criminalize	  bribery	  of	  foreign	  public	  officials	  and	  officials	  of	  international	  public	  organizations.	  In	  addition,	  UAE	  laws	  do	  not	  make	  any	  specific	  requirements	  upon	  auditors	  to	  disclose	  any	  violation	  under	  the	  anti-­‐bribery	  laws.	  The	  earlier	  mentioned	  prevalence	  of	  insider	  trading	  in	  the	  UAE	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  mere	  existence	  of	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  requirements	  for	  disclosure	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  guarantee	  transparency.	  This	  is	  something	  that,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  commercial	  treaties,	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  stresses.	  Guarantees	  that	  these	  laws	  are	  regulations	  and	  administered	  and	  implemented	  are	  crucial.1134	  	  
 Companies’	  willingness	  to	  disclose	  information,	  especially	  concerning	  violations	  associated	  with	  their	  books	  and	  records,	  is	  also	  vital.	  Counter-­‐corruption	  professionals	  suggest	  that,	  while	  the	  regional	  perception	  was	  once	  that	  fraud	  and	  corruption	  was	  acceptable,	  that	  is	  now	  changing.	  However,	  stringent	  regulatory	  oversight	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  sustain	  any	  change	  in	  attitude;	  rather,	  effective	  supervision	  and	  procedures	  at	  company	  level	  are	  also	  needed	  to	  enhance	  transparency	  and	  consequently	  reduce	  abuses.1135	  	  	  Another	  issue	  concerning	  disclosure,	  as	  Rider	  points,	  is	  “even	  if	  the	  laws	  and	  requiring	  continuous	  and	  timely	  reporting	  and	  actually	  and	  properly	  complied	  with,	  which	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1132	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  1987	  On	  Issuance	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code,	  Article	  (65).	  1133	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  1987	  On	  Issuance	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code,	  Articles	  234–239;	  Dubai	  Penal	  Code	  1970,	  Articles	  118–122;	  Human	  Resources	  Management	  Law	  No.	  (27)	  2006,	  Article	  (11);	  Federal	  Human	  Resources	  Law	  (Federal	  Law	  No.	  (11)	  of	  2008),	  Articles	  70-­‐72;	  Dubai	  Law	  No.	  (37)	  of	  2009	  on	  the	  Procedures	  for	  the	  Recovery	  of	  Illegally	  Obtained	  Public	  and	  Private	  Funds	  (Financial	  Fraud	  Law),	  Articles	  2-­‐6.	  1134	  WTO/GATT,	  Article	  X,	  WTO/GATS,	  Article	  III,	  and	  WTO/TRIPS,	  Part	  V:	  Dispute	  Prevention	  and	  Settlement,	  Article	  63.	  	  1135	  Farooq	  and	  Brooks,	  “Arab	  Fraud	  and	  Corruption	  Professionals’	  Views	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Gulf.”	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course	  in	  many	  cases	  and	  countries	  they	  are	  not,	  there	  are	  real	  issues	  as	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  ordinary	  investors	  and	  others	  to	  understand	  and	  interpret	  the	  relevant	  information.”	  Hence,	  disclosure	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  availability	  of	  professional	  interpretation	  and	  analysis	  dispersed	  to	  the	  public	  via	  media	  and	  pressure	  groups.	  Rider	  remarks:	  “few	  societies,	  particularly	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  have	  these	  luxuries.”	  1136	  	  Corruption	  is	  more	  appealing	  where	  the	  risk	  of	  detection	  is	  low	  and	  the	  punishments	  are	  minor.	  In	  this	  case,	  whistleblowing	  often	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  only	  approach	  to	  expose	  wrongdoings	  within	  an	  organization.1137	  Whistleblowing	  is	  generally	  considered	  “the	  disclosure	  by	  organization	  members	  (former	  or	  current)	  of	  illegal,	  immoral	  or	  illegitimate	  practices	  under	  the	  control	  of	  their	  employers,	  to	  persons	  or	  organizations	  that	  may	  be	  able	  to	  effect	  action.”1138	  Miceli	  and	  Near	  draw	  an	  analogy	  between	  a	  whistleblower	  and	  a	  football	  referee,	  “who	  can	  blow	  the	  whistle	  to	  stop	  actions.”1139	  	  One	  of	  the	  dimensions	  to	  measure	  transparency	  is	  availability	  of	  whistleblower	  protection,	  which	  allows	  individuals	  to	  disclose	  information	  despite	  of	  their	  personal	  vulnerability	  to	  retaliation	  from,	  those	  in	  power.	  The	  protections	  offered	  to	  whistleblowers	  vary	  from	  fewer	  whistleblower	  protections	  to	  more	  comprehensive	  ones.	  Only	  a	  few	  countries	  have	  adopted	  comprehensive	  whistleblowing	  laws,	  which	  facilitate	  the	  disclosure	  of	  information	  and	  provide	  not	  only	  a	  series	  of	  protections	  but	  also	  incentives	  for	  people	  to	  come	  forward	  without	  a	  fear	  of	  being	  sanctioned	  for	  their	  disclosures.1140	  But	  as	  Bradley	  observes,	  “even	  in	  the	  US,	  where	  policy-­‐makers	  have	  chosen	  to	  reward	  whistleblowing,	  whistleblowers	  are	  still	  vulnerable	  to	  employer	  retaliation...”1141	  The	  difference	  in	  level	  of	  protection	  exists	  even	  among	  different	  states	  in	  the	  USA.1142	  The	  majority	  of	  countries,	  including	  the	  UAE,	  have	  adopted	  whistleblower	  protections	  in	  “a	  piecemeal	  fashion.”	  These	  protections	  can	  be	  found	  in	  different	  statutes	  and	  are	  limited	  in	  terms	  of	  persons	  or	  types	  of	  information	  they	  cover.1143	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1136	  Rider,	  “Strategic	  Tools	  –	  For	  Now	  and	  Perhaps	  the	  Future?”	  730.	  1137	  Miceli,	  Near	  and	  Dworkin,	  Whistle-­‐Blowing	  in	  Organizations.	  1138	  Near	  and	  Miceli,	  “Organizational	  Dissidence:	  The	  Case	  of	  Whistle-­‐Blowing,”	  4.	  1139	  Miceli	  and	  Near,	  Blowing	  the	  Whistle,	  15.	  1140	  Callahan	  and	  Dworkin,	  “The	  State	  of	  State	  Whistleblower	  Protection.”	  Also	  see	  Armstrong	  and	  Francis	  “Protecting	  the	  Whistleblower,”	  in	  Rider,	  ed.,	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  International	  Financial	  Crime.	  	  1141	  Bradley,	  “Rewards	  for	  Whistleblowing,”	  in	  Rider,	  ed.,	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  International	  Financial	  Crime,	  611.	  1142	  Bowden,	  “A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  Whistleblower	  Protection.”	  1143	  Banisar,	  “Whistleblowing:	  International	  Standards	  and	  Developments.”	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It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  the	  existing	  discrepancies	  between	  legal	  and	  actual	  protection	  available	  for	  whistleblowers.	  “A	  legal	  right	  of	  protection	  is	  difficult	  to	  implement,	  since	  an	  organizations	  retaliation	  against	  ‘traitors’	  can	  be	  sophisticated	  and	  subtle	  and	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  prosecute.”1144	  Whistleblowing	  requires	  courage,	  since	  individuals	  who	  decide	  to	  blow	  a	  whistle	  often	  face	  “demotion,	  termination,	  blackballing,	  isolation,	  and	  humiliation.”1145	  Organizations	  can	  have	  financial	  and	  nonfinancial	  disincentives	  to	  internal	  whistleblowing,	  even	  if	  there	  the	  whistleblowing	  policies	  are	  in	  place.	  1146	  Empirical	  research	  into	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  whistleblowing	  programs	  suggests	  that	  a	  number	  of	  these	  policies	  and	  procedures	  will	  actually	  be	  ineffective	  when	  applied	  to	  practice.1147	  Some	  suggest	  that	  whistleblower	  legislation	  should	  include	  protection	  against	  the	  retaliatory	  actions	  of	  the	  organization.	  “Until	  retaliation	  has	  consequences	  for	  the	  organization	  concerned,	  persecution	  of	  whistleblowers	  will	  continue	  regardless	  of	  the	  public	  benefit	  derived	  from	  their	  actions.”1148	  	  Cultural	  variation	  in	  attitudes	  toward	  whistleblowing	  can	  also	  impact	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  policies.1149	  In	  cultures	  with	  high	  power	  distance,	  individuals	  are	  reluctant	  to	  blow	  a	  whistle	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  fear	  of	  retaliation	  for	  challenging	  the	  established	  authority.1150	  While	  there	  is	  an	  obligation	  to	  report	  criminal	  activity,	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  274	  of	  the	  UAE	  Penal	  Code,1151	  in	  practice	  whistleblowing	  is	  rare	  in	  the	  UAE.	  As	  was	  mentioned	  earlier	  the	  UAE	  has	  a	  complex	  cultural,	  ethnic	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  composition	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  workforce	  coming	  from	  other	  countries,	  especially	  at	  the	  labor,	  lower	  and	  middle	  management	  levels.	  Migrant	  labors	  can	  work	  in	  the	  UAE	  for	  as	  long	  as	  their	  employer	  provides	  a	  sponsorship	  to	  get	  a	  work	  permit.	  An	  individual	  does	  not	  have	  the	  legal	  right	  to	  reside	  in	  the	  UAE	  without	  a	  sponsorship,	  and	  cannot	  work	  in	  the	  country	  without	  a	  work	  permit.	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  UAE	  Labor	  Law	  states	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  may	  cancel	  work	  permits	  in	  case	  of	  unemployment	  for	  more	  than	  three	  months,	  a	  failure	  to	  meet	  permit’s	  conditions,	  and	  if	  the	  employee	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1144	  Bauhr	  and	  Grimes,	  “What	  is	  Government	  Transparency?	  New	  Measures	  and	  Relevance	  of	  Quality	  of	  Government,”	  9.	  1145	  Berry,	  “Organizational	  Culture:	  A	  Framework	  and	  Strategies	  for	  Facilitating	  Employee	  Whistleblowing,”	  8.	  1146	  Lipman,	  Whistleblowers:	  Incentives,	  Disincentives,	  and	  Protection	  Strategies,	  57-­‐68.	  1147	  Pascoe	  and	  Welsh,	  “Whistleblowing,	  Ethics	  and	  Corporate	  Culture:	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  in	  Australia.”	  1148	  Sawyer,	  Johnson,	  and	  Holub,	  “The	  Necessary	  Illegitimacy	  of	  the	  Whistleblower,”	  104.	  	  1149	  Oktem	  and	  Shahbazi,	  “Attitudes	  Toward	  Different	  Forms	  of	  Whistleblowing	  in	  Turkey	  and	  Iran”;	  and	  Park,	  Blenkinsopp,	  Oktem,	  and	  Omurgonulsen,	  “Cultural	  Orientation	  and	  Attitudes	  toward	  Different	  Forms	  of	  Whistleblowing”	  1150	  Tavakoli,	  Keenan,	  and	  Crnjak-­‐Karanovic,	  “Culture	  and	  Whistleblowing.”	  	  1151	  “Whoever	  becomes	  aware	  of	  a	  crime	  and	  abstains	  from	  informing	  the	  concerned	  authorities	  shall	  be	  punished	  by	  a	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  one	  thousand	  Dirhams.”	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  1987	  On	  Issuance	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code,	  Article	  (274).	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can	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  qualified	  Emirati.1152	  If	  employment	  contract	  is	  terminated	  and	  an	  expatriate	  does	  not	  find	  another	  employment	  within	  the	  required	  three	  months,	  he/she	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  leave	  the	  country.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  the	  UAE	  Labor	  Law,	  employers	  can	  terminate	  a	  contract	  when	  its	  term	  has	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  employee	  will	  at	  least	  be	  notified	  whether	  his	  contract	  would	  not	  be	  extended.1153	  But	  Article	  120	  lists	  10	  circumstances	  under	  which	  the	  employer	  can	  terminate	  the	  employee	  without	  a	  notice.	  One	  of	  these	  reasons	  is	  “If	  he	  [employee]	  divulges	  any	  secrets	  of	  the	  establishment	  where	  he	  is	  employed.”1154	  What	  falls	  under	  “any	  secret”	  is	  not	  specified	  in	  the	  law,	  thus	  can	  be	  broadly	  interpreted.	  Additionally,	  if	  the	  employee	  discloses	  confidential	  information	  about	  his	  employer	  to	  any	  regulatory	  authorities	  or	  even	  to	  the	  police,	  not	  only	  may	  he	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  his	  employment	  contract,	  but	  he	  may	  also	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  law.	  It	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  criminal	  offence	  under	  Article	  379	  of	  the	  UAE	  Penal	  Code.1155	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  criminal	  liability,	  a	  disclosure	  can	  be	  viewed	  by	  an	  employer	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code,	  Article	  905	  (5)	  of	  which	  states	  that	  "the	  employee	  must	  keep	  the	  industrial	  or	  trade	  secrets	  of	  the	  employer,	  including	  after	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  contract,	  as	  required	  by	  the	  agreement	  or	  by	  custom."1156	  In	  this	  case	  the	  employer	  can	  file	  a	  civil	  suit	  against	  the	  whistleblower	  for	  damages.	  	  	  That	  being	  said,	  workers	  are	  granted	  protection	  against	  arbitrary	  termination.	  Article	  122	  of	  UAE	  Labor	  Law	  states:	  “Termination	  by	  the	  employer	  of	  an	  employee's	  service	  is	  considered	  arbitrary	  if	  the	  cause	  for	  such	  termination	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  work.	  In	  particular,	  termination	  is	  considered	  arbitrary	  if	  the	  employee's	  service	  has	  been	  terminated	  on	  grounds,	  or	  a	  reasonable	  complaint	  lodged	  by	  him	  to	  the	  competent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1152	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1980,	  UAE	  Labor	  Law,	  Article	  (15).	  1153	  “An	  employment	  contract	  may	  either	  be	  for	  a	  limited	  or	  an	  unlimited	  period.	  If	  it	  is	  for	  a	  limited	  period,	  such	  period	  shall	  not	  exceed	  four	  years	  and	  the	  contract	  may	  with	  mutual	  agreement	  be	  renewed	  one	  or	  more	  times	  for	  similar	  or	  shorter	  period/periods.”	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1980,	  UAE	  Labor	  Law,	  Article	  (38).	  1154	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1980,	  UAE	  Labor	  Law,	  Article	  (120).	  1155	  “Punishment	  by	  detention	  for	  a	  period	  of	  not	  less	  than	  one	  year	  and	  by	  a	  fine	  of	  not	  less	  than	  twenty	  thousand	  Dirhams,	  or	  by	  either	  of	  these	  two	  penalties,	  shall	  apply	  to	  any	  one	  who	  is	  entrusted	  with	  a	  secret	  by	  virtue	  of	  his	  profession,	  trade,	  position	  or	  art	  and	  who	  discloses	  it	  in	  cases	  other	  than	  those	  lawfully	  permitted,	  or	  if	  he	  uses	  such	  a	  secret	  for	  his	  own	  private	  benefit	  or	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  another	  person,	  unless	  the	  person	  concerned	  permits	  the	  disclosure	  or	  use	  of	  such	  a	  secret.	  A	  penalty	  of	  imprisonment	  for	  a	  period	  not	  exceeding	  five	  years	  shall	  apply	  to	  a	  culprit	  who	  is	  a	  public	  official	  or	  in	  charge	  of	  a	  public	  service,	  and	  has	  been	  entrusted	  with	  the	  secret	  during,	  because	  of	  or	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  duty	  or	  service.”	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  1987	  on	  Issuance	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code,	  Article	  (379).	  1156	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (5)	  of	  1985	  On	  the	  Civil	  Transactions	  Law	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  The	  UAE	  Civil	  Code,	  Article	  (905)(5).	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authorities,	  or	  on	  grounds	  of	  a	  justifiable	  action	  brought	  by	  him	  against	  the	  employer.”1157	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  arbitrary	  dismissal,	  the	  court	  has	  the	  jurisdiction	  “to	  give	  judgment	  against	  the	  employer	  for	  payment	  of	  compensation	  to	  the	  employee,”	  amount	  of	  which	  will	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  court	  after	  considering	  “the	  nature	  of	  work	  sustained	  by	  the	  employee,	  period	  of	  service	  and	  after	  investigation	  of	  dismissal	  circumstances.”1158	  Most	  migrant	  workers	  move	  to	  the	  UAE	  in	  search	  of	  employment	  opportunities	  due	  to	  the	  unavailability	  of	  jobs	  in	  their	  home	  country.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  often	  their	  entire	  family	  back	  home	  depends	  on	  their	  remitted	  income.	  The	  scenario	  of	  losing	  a	  job	  (and	  the	  possibility	  of	  not	  finding	  another	  one	  within	  the	  required	  three	  months	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  country)	  would	  outweigh	  the	  compensation	  for	  arbitrary	  termination.	  	  Johnson	  in	  his	  book	  purports	  that	  “whistleblowers	  need	  media	  coverage,”	  since	  it	  assists	  and	  encourages	  whistleblowing.	  1159	  “Media	  can	  provide	  a	  key	  outlet	  for	  important	  information	  which	  has	  been	  ignored	  by	  the	  persons	  or	  organizations	  charged	  to	  respond.	  The	  media	  can	  also	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  when	  a	  whistleblower	  experience	  retaliation.”1160	  	  	  But	  when	  discussing	  the	  media’s	  role	  in	  whistleblowing	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  whether	  it	  is	  provided	  with	  a	  special	  privilege	  to	  protect	  their	  sources	  from	  disclosure.	  In	  the	  UAE,	  journalists	  have	  the	  rights	  to	  obtain	  and	  publish	  news	  and	  commentary	  “within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  law	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  following:”	  	   •	  A	  journalist	  may	  not	  be	  pressured	  and	  must	  not	  be	  forced	  to	  disclose	  his	  sources.	  •	  A	  journalist	  may	  be	  held	  accountable	  only	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  professional	  duties	  as	  defined	  by	  law.	  •	  A	  journalist	  must	  not	  be	  harassed	  for	  expressing	  an	  opinion	  or	  publishing	  correct	  information.	  •	  A	  journalist	  must	  not	  be	  unduly	  deprived	  of	  writing	  or	  publishing	  information	  and	  his	  name	  must	  be	  mentioned	  in	  his	  reports.1161	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1157	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1980,	  UAE	  Labor	  Law,	  Article	  (122).	  1158	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (8)	  of	  1980,	  UAE	  Labor	  Law,	  Article	  (123).	  1159	  Johnson,	  Whistleblowing,	  10.	  	  1160	  Callahan	  and	  Dworkin,	  “Who	  Blows	  the	  Whistle	  to	  the	  Media,	  and	  Why:	  Organizational	  Characteristics	  of	  Media	  Whistleblowers,”	  152.	  1161	  Quinn	  and	  Walters,	  Bridging	  the	  Gulf,	  56.	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However,	  the	  UAE	  Penal	  Code	  states:	  “Whoever	  publishes	  news,	  pictures	  or	  comments	  related	  to	  the	  secrets	  of	  private	  or	  family	  life	  of	  persons	  even	  if	  they	  are	  true,	  shall	  be	  punished	  by	  detention	  for	  a	  period	  not	  exceeding	  one	  year	  and	  by	  a	  fine	  not	  exceeding	  ten	  thousand	  Dirhams,	  or	  by	  one	  of	  these	  two	  penalties.”1162	  Alexander	  points	  out	  that	  often	  whistleblowers’	  reports	  are	  based	  on	  mere	  suspicion	  rather	  than	  facts.	  However,	  the	  whistleblower	  protection	  is	  applied	  only	  when	  suspicion	  is	  proven	  to	  be	  correct,	  a	  limitation	  that	  may	  dissuade	  many	  employees	  from	  reporting.1163	  It	  is	  an	  especially	  major	  concern	  in	  the	  UAE,	  since	  potential	  whistleblowers	  can	  be	  accused	  of	  defamation,	  which	  is	  a	  criminal	  offence	  in	  the	  country.1164	  Internal	  critics	  argue	  that	  the	  UAE’s	  loose	  defamation	  and	  libel	  laws	  have	  been	  used	  to	  stifle	  criticism	  of	  businesses	  (such	  as	  developers),1165	  and	  generally	  prevent	  serious	  reporting.1166	  The	  country	  also	  has	  strict	  laws	  on	  the	  use	  of	  social	  media,	  limiting	  its	  attractiveness	  to	  whistleblowers.1167	  	  Until	  recently,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  statutory	  protection	  for	  whistleblowers	  in	  the	  UAE	  law.	  As	  one	  author	  points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  “a	  very	  rare	  case	  among	  the	  MENA	  countries”	  to	  have	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  provisions	  to	  protect	  whistleblowers.1168	  However,	  the	  UAE	  is	  an	  exception	  from	  this	  case.	  1169	  	  	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  whistleblowers	  were	  protected	  for	  voluntarily	  reporting	  money	  laundering	  to	  the	  authorities	  under	  the	  New	  AML	  Law,	  which	  requires	  the	  relevant	  authorities	  to	  provide	  protection	  for	  witnesses	  or	  the	  accused	  in	  offences	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism	  and/or	  Financing	  of	  Unlawful	  Organizations,	  whenever	  it	  is	  required	  or	  in	  case	  of	  fear	  for	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  witness	  or	  accused.1170	  The	  most	  recent	  development	  in	  this	  field	  was	  the	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2016	  on	  the	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre	  (commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Financial	  Crime	  Law)	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1162	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  1987	  On	  Issuance	  of	  the	  Penal	  Code,	  Article	  (378).	  1163	  Alexander,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Whistleblowers	  in	  the	  Fight	  Against	  Economic	  Crime,"	  134.	  1164	  “Shall	  be	  sentenced	  to	  detention	  for	  a	  term	  not	  exceeding	  two	  years,	  or	  to	  a	  fine	  not	  in	  excess	  of	  twenty	  thousand	  Dirhams,	  whoever	  attributes	  to	  another,	  through	  a	  means	  of	  publicity,	  a	  fact	  that	  makes	  him	  object	  of	  punishment	  or	  contempt.	  The	  penalty	  shall	  be	  detention	  and/or	  a	  fine	  in	  case	  the	  libel	  is	  perpetrated	  against	  a	  public	  servant,	  or	  a	  person	  in	  charge	  of	  a	  public	  service,	  during	  or	  because	  of	  the	  discharge	  of	  his	  duties	  or	  performing	  the	  public	  service,	  or	  if	  it	  affects	  honor	  or	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  families,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  fulfill	  an	  illicit	  purpose.	  In	  case	  the	  libel	  is	  done	  by	  means	  of	  publication	  in	  one	  of	  the	  newspapers	  or	  printed	  material,	  this	  shall	  be	  considered	  an	  aggravating	  circumstance.”	  UAE	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (3)	  of	  1987,	  Concerning	  the	  Penal	  Code,	  Article	  372.	  	  1165	  Brass,	  “Defamation	  Laws	  Keep	  the	  Aggrieved	  Quiet.”	  1166	  Duffy,	  “UAE	  Journalists	  Need	  More	  Legal	  Protections.”	  1167	  For	  summaries	  of	  cases,	  plus	  links	  to	  news	  stories	  on	  them,	  see	  “How	  Social	  Media	  Can	  Turn	  an	  Average	  Person	  into	  a	  
 	  UAE	  Criminal .” 	  1168	  Braendle,	  “Corporate	  Governance	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  –	  Which	  Way	  to	  Go?,“	  59.	  1169	  OECD,	  “Survey	  on	  Corporate	  Governance	  Frameworks	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (draft),”	  24.	  	  1170	  Federal	  Law	  No.	  (9)	  of	  2014,	  Article	  (13)(3)	  and	  Article	  (20)	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included	  protection	  for	  those	  that	  report	  crimes	  to	  the	  newly	  established	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre	  (DESC).	  The	  text	  of	  the	  law	  has	  not	  yet	  (at	  this	  writing)	  been	  published	  in	  English,	  but	  the	  official	  website	  of	  Dubai	  Government	  indicates	  that	  it	  guarantees	  protection	  to	  whistleblowers.	  The	  site	  states:	  	  	   The	  Centre	  will	  also	  provide	  protection	  and	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  individuals	  collaborating	  with	  it	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  maintaining	  the	  economic	  security	  of	  the	  emirate	  by	  not	  disclosing	  information	  about	  the	  identity	  and	  whereabouts	  of	  the	  collaborator.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  Law,	  providing	  information	  on	  matters	  affecting	  the	  economic	  security	  of	  the	  emirate	  shall	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  violation.	  Any	  person	  providing	  the	  information	  shall	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  any	  legal	  or	  disciplinary	  action	  unless	  proven	  to	  be	  providing	  false	  information.1171	  	  According	  to	  Glyde	  &	  Co.	  law	  firm,	  the	  law	  stipulates	  that	  “the	  reporter's	  freedom,	  security	  and	  protection	  shall	  be	  guaranteed,	  and	  that	  no	  legal	  or	  disciplinary	  action	  may	  be	  taken	  against	  the	  reporter	  unless	  the	  report	  is	  false.”1172	  	  	  Since	  the	  DESC	  has	  not	  been	  formally	  established	  yet,	  it	  is	  premature	  to	  assess	  its	  role	  and	  effectiveness.	  But	  its	  applicability	  in	  other	  emirates	  and	  protection	  for	  whistleblowers,	  which	  report	  the	  wrongdoings	  not	  to	  the	  DESC	  but	  to	  the	  police	  and	  the	  public	  prosecutor,	  as	  required	  under	  the	  UAE	  Penal	  Code,	  is	  not	  clear.	  	  
The	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Accountability	  Authority	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  DESC’s	  tasks	  are	  said	  to	  include	  “Preparing	  and	  publishing	  periodical	  reports	  and	  statistics	  on	  the	  financial	  and	  economic	  position	  of	  Dubai.1173	  It	  may	  be	  presumed	  that	  this	  is	  meant	  to	  rectify	  criticisms	  contained	  in	  past	  MENA/FATF	  evaluations	  (particularly	  that	  published	  in	  2008),	  which	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  statistics	  and	  data	  as	  signs	  of	  accountability	  and	  transparency.	  That	  document	  presented	  these	  concepts	  as	  desirable	  ones	  it	  hoped	  the	  country	  would	  embrace.	  Among	  212	  entities	  surveyed	  in	  the	  World	  Bank	  Worldwide	  Governance	  Indicators,	  the	  report	  noted,	  the	  UAE	  ranked	  in	  the	  top	  third	  in	  five	  of	  the	  six	  categories	  surveyed:	  political	  stability	  and	  absence	  of	  violence,	  regulatory	  quality,	  rule	  or	  law,	  and	  control	  of	  corruption.	  However,	  the	  UAE	  “lags	  behind	  in	  voice	  and	  accountability.”1174	  	  	  After	  2008,	  likely	  in	  response	  to	  such	  concerns,	  and	  as	  part	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  efforts	  to	  meet	  FATF	  recommendations,	  the	  terms	  accountability	  and	  transparency	  became	  increasingly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1171	  Government	  of	  Dubai,	  Media	  Office,	  Mohammed	  issues	  Law	  on	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre	  1172	  Ford	  and	  Braganza,	  “New	  Protection	  for	  Whistleblowers	  in	  Dubai.”	  1173	  Lassoued	  and	  Eissa,	  “An	  Insight	  into	  the	  Newly-­‐Formed	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre.”	  1174	  MENA/FATF,	  “Mutual	  Evaluation	  Report”	  (2008),	  15.	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visible.	  One	  example	  concerns	  the	  evolution	  of	  an	  Abu	  Dhabi-­‐specific	  body,	  on	  which	  the	  DESC	  may	  be	  partly	  modeled.	  Now	  known	  as	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Accountability	  Authority,	  it	  originated	  as	  the	  Financial	  Audit	  Authority	  in	  1985.	  A	  passage	  from	  a	  UAE	  government	  website	  explains	  both	  the	  original	  body’s	  origins,	  and	  why	  it	  was	  deemed	  insufficient:	  	   The	  first	  law	  to	  establish	  The	  Financial	  Audit	  Authority	  stated	  that	  it	  be	  established	  as	  an	  independent	  body	  reporting	  to	  the	  Crown	  Prince	  and	  limited	  its	  mandate	  to	  include	  performing	  a	  financial	  audit	  on	  the	  funds	  of	  Public	  Entities	  and	  ensuring	  that	  these	  funds	  are	  managed	  efficiently	  and	  legitimately,	  with	  no	  reference	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  performance	  and	  risk	  reviews	  or	  advisory	  and	  assistance	  and	  it	  did	  not	  include	  training	  and	  development	  of	  UAE	  Nationals	  in	  Accounting	  and	  Audit.	  1175	  Presumably	  because	  of	  these	  limitations,	  the	  body	  was	  replaced	  in	  2008	  with	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Accountability	  Authority,	  or	  ADAA.	  According	  to	  a	  short	  description	  provided	  by	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi-­‐owned,	  English-­‐language	  newspaper	  The	  National,	  it	  “was	  set	  up	  in	  December	  2008	  to	  promote	  accountability	  and	  transparency	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  Among	  those	  under	  their	  purview	  are	  government	  departments,	  local	  councils	  and	  all	  companies	  or	  projects	  in	  which	  the	  Government	  owns	  more	  than	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  share.	  ADAA	  says	  it	  aims	  to	  ensure	  all	  of	  these	  entities	  use	  their	  resources	  and	  funds	  efficiently,	  effectively,	  economically,	  ethically	  and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  overall	  vision	  of	  Abu	  Dhabi.	  It	  also	  has	  a	  training	  centre,	  where	  Emirati	  graduates	  are	  trained	  in	  auditing.	  The	  authority	  audits	  Government	  bodies,	  investigates	  corruption	  and	  sets	  up	  anti-­‐fraud	  programmes.	  In	  2011,	  ADAA	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  advisory	  council	  of	  the	  International	  Forum	  of	  Independent	  Audit	  Regulators,	  making	  the	  UAE	  the	  first	  Arab	  member.	  Last	  year,	  the	  authority	  hosted	  a	  workshop	  for	  the	  forum.”1176	  	  The	  ADAA’s	  annual	  reports	  provide	  some	  background	  on	  the	  organization’s	  efforts	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  economic	  crime	  regulation.	  Some	  examples	  are	  written	  in	  ways	  that	  appear	  to	  exemplify	  the	  indirect	  rhetoric,	  common	  in	  the	  UAE,	  described	  above.	  Consider	  the	  following	  from	  the	  2014	  annual	  report,	  concerning	  a	  2013	  investigation:	  “The	  case	  relates	  to	  what	  was	  attributed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  staff	  and	  officials	  of	  a	  Subject	  Entity	  who	  concluded	  several	  contracts	  with	  several	  consulting	  firms	  with	  an	  amount	  of	  AED	  2,136,000	  in	  violation	  of	  laws.	  ADAA	  formed	  a	  work	  team	  to	  conduct	  an	  examination	  of	  these	  contracts	  …”	  After	  determining	  there	  were	  flaws	  in	  the	  tendering	  process,	  “the	  Subject	  Entity	  was	  notified	  with	  the	  examination	  results	  to	  take	  the	  necessary	  actions	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1175	  ADAA,	  “History.”	  	  1176	  Uncredited	  in	  The	  National,	  “What	  is	  the	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Accountability	  Authority?”	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light	  of	  such	  results.”1177	  Neither	  the	  2014	  or	  2015	  reports	  make	  reference	  to	  money	  laundering,	  although	  the	  latter	  document	  mentions	  two	  2014	  embezzlement	  cases.1178	  No	  bodies	  similar	  to	  the	  ADAA	  appear	  to	  have	  emerged	  in	  the	  other	  emirates	  until	  the	  April	  2016	  creation	  of	  the	  DESC	  was	  announced.	  Nor	  is	  there	  any	  sign	  as	  of	  this	  writing	  that	  a	  nationwide,	  federal	  accountability-­‐focused	  body	  will	  emerge.	  	  
Media	  Themes	  Transparency	  and	  accountability	  have	  also	  been	  popular	  topics	  for	  business	  discussion.	  In	  2010,	  the	  US	  software	  services	  firm	  SunGard	  organized	  an	  event	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi	  that	  (to	  cite	  a	  media	  report)	  “focused	  on	  transparency,	  efficiency	  and	  networks	  as	  drivers	  of	  change	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.”1179	  Other	  contemporary	  press	  articles	  dealt	  with,	  for	  example,	  transparency	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  modernizing	  family	  owned	  businesses.1180	  The	  benefits	  coming	  from	  the	  2013	  introduction	  of	  a	  Direct	  Debit	  System	  (DDS)	  in	  the	  UAE	  included	  “boost[ing]	  transparency.”1181	  Following	  accepted	  indirect	  rhetorical	  practice,	  many	  articles	  tended	  to	  raise	  local	  problems	  with	  transparency	  cautiously.	  These	  showed	  the	  UAE	  in	  comparatively	  good	  light	  against	  regional	  examples,	  such	  as	  a	  2012	  article,	  which	  examined	  flaws	  with	  GCC	  (though	  non-­‐UAE)	  businesses	  in	  transparency	  and	  accountability.1182	  In	  similar	  vein,	  consider	  this	  2013	  opinion	  piece	  in	  Gulf	  News,	  submitted	  by	  an	  outside	  contributor:	  	   Transparency	  is	  a	  sensitive	  topic,	  particularly	  for	  companies	  when	  disclosing	  information	  that	  can	  be	  critical	  to	  the	  image	  and	  life	  of	  the	  firm.	  	  Industry	  participants	  tend	  to	  conceal	  critical	  information	  from	  the	  market	  assuming	  it’s	  in	  their	  best	  interest,	  being	  naive	  about	  the	  way	  information	  flow	  affects	  the	  return	  and	  risk	  pattern	  of	  an	  asset.	  It	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  company	  to	  have	  optimum	  transparency	  to	  attract	  outside	  investment.	  	  However,	  transparency	  remains	  elusive	  to	  property	  investors	  and	  occupiers	  in	  any	  country.	  Although	  the	  UAE	  has	  consistently	  outperformed	  other	  GCC	  markets	  in	  transparency	  rankings,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  lot	  to	  be	  done	  to	  get	  investor	  confidence	  back	  to	  the	  market.1183	  A	  relatively	  rare	  example	  of	  a	  more	  direct	  approach	  came	  in	  a	  2012	  article	  that	  used	  fluctuation	  on	  the	  UAE	  stock	  market	  as	  the	  “hook”	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  transparency,	  or	  lack	  thereof:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1177	  ADAA,	  “Accountability	  Report”	  (2014),	  52.	  1178	  ADAA,	  “Accountability	  Report”	  (2015),	  46.	  1179	  Scott,	  “Transparency	  in	  Focus	  at	  Abu	  Dhabi	  Meeting.”	  1180	  Rahman,	  “Transformation	  in	  Region’s	  Corporate	  Culture.”	  1181	  Rahman,	  “Direct	  Debit	  System	  will	  Change	  the	  Way	  Payments	  are	  made.”	  1182	  Crowcroft,	  “Changing	  Corporate	  Ways	  Across	  the	  GCC.”	  1183	  Teh,	  “Firms	  offering	  transparency	  in	  an	  opaque	  GCC	  marketplace.”	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DUBAI:	  Local	  investors	  have	  been	  left	  bemused	  in	  recent	  months	  as	  UAE-­‐listed	  firms	  make	  sharp	  movements	  up	  and	  down	  the	  stock	  market	  for	  no	  apparent	  reason.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  much-­‐bemoaned	  issue	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  has	  once	  again	  come	  into	  sharp	  focus	  as	  traders	  question	  whether	  both	  the	  market	  regulator	  —	  the	  Securities	  and	  Commodities	  Authority	  (SCA)	  —	  and	  public	  companies	  are	  fulfilling	  their	  financial	  disclosure	  requirements.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  eye-­‐catching	  instances,	  construction	  firm	  Arabtec	  Holding's	  share	  price	  jumped	  more	  than	  128	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  first	  two	  months	  of	  the	  year	  on	  unsubstantiated	  rumours,	  including	  speculation	  the	  company	  is	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  winning	  several	  key	  infrastructure	  contracts.	  The	  firm's	  chief	  financial	  officer,	  Ziad	  Makhzoumi,	  told	  Gulf	  News	  last	  month	  the	  stock	  surge	  was	  purely	  a	  result	  of	  market	  conditions	  and,	  in	  particular,	  an	  increase	  in	  trading	  volumes.	  But	  it	  has	  since	  emerged	  the	  intense	  buying	  interest	  was	  driven	  by	  Aabar	  Investments,	  an	  Abu	  Dhabi-­‐based	  sovereign	  wealth	  fund,	  increasing	  its	  stake	  in	  the	  builder.	  …	  1184	  In	  2014,	  JLL	  Consultants,	  on	  its	  “Global	  Real	  Estate	  Transparency	  Index,”	  ranked	  the	  Dubai	  property	  market	  the	  “most	  transparent”	  in	  the	  region	  (Abu	  Dhabi	  came	  in	  a	  few	  rungs	  lower).	  While	  local	  media	  made	  much	  of	  this,	  both	  emirates	  still	  ranked	  as	  “semi	  transparent”	  on	  the	  larger	  scale.1185	  	  Wealth	  transparency	  and	  information	  sharing	  related	  to	  taxes	  is	  another	  area	  the	  UAE	  has	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  commitment	  to	  capabilities.	  The	  UAE	  is	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  Global	  Forum	  of	  Transparency	  and	  Exchange	  of	  Information	  for	  Tax	  Purposes	  and	  FATCA.	  These	  require	  smooth	  information	  flow	  to	  and	  from	  the	  UAE.	  To	  facilitate	  it,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  system	  in	  place	  for	  information	  sharing	  internally	  between	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  regulatory	  bodies	  or	  between	  different	  government	  offices.	  	  
Work	  in	  Progress	  Based	  on	  such	  reports	  from	  various	  other	  ranking	  organizations,	  the	  UAE	  has	  a	  varied	  track	  record	  on	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  issues.	  The	  Transparency	  International	  (TI)	  2016	  Corruption	  Perceptions	  Index	  gave	  it	  a	  66	  on	  a	  scale	  in	  which	  zero	  means	  “highly	  corrupt”	  and	  100	  “very	  clean.”1186	  More	  directly	  as	  far	  as	  transparency	  goes,	  the	  Tax	  Justice	  Network’s	  Financial	  Secrecy	  Index	  in	  2015	  assessed	  the	  emirate	  of	  Dubai	  on	  its	  own,	  giving	  it	  a	  77	  score	  on	  a	  scale	  in	  which	  31-­‐40	  meant	  “moderately	  secretive”	  and	  91-­‐100	  was	  “Exceptionally	  secretive.”	  It	  summarized	  the	  situation	  like	  this:	  	   Dubai	  is	  unquestionably	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  best	  known	  tax	  havens	  or	  secrecy	  jurisdictions	  built	  on	  an	  increasingly	  complex	  array	  of	  offshore	  facilities:	  free-­‐trade	  zones;	  a	  low-­‐tax	  environment;	  multiple	  secrecy	  facilities	  and	  lax	  enforcement.	  In	  addition,	  Dubai	  has	  a	  strong	  culture	  of	  an	  ask-­‐no-­‐questions,	  see-­‐no-­‐evil	  approach	  to	  commercial	  or	  financial	  regulation	  or	  foreign	  financial	  crimes.	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1184	  Scott,	  “UAE	  Stock	  Market:	  Working	  to	  Ensure	  Full	  Disclosure.”	  1185	  Nair,	  “Dubai	  Property	  Market	  is	  Most	  ‘Transparent’	  in	  Region.”	  1186	  Transparency	  International,	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  Index	  2016.”	  
	  	  	  
248	  
has	  consequently	  attracted	  large	  financial	  flows	  and	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  high	  profile	  criminals.1187	  That	  this	  perception	  remained	  prevalent	  in	  2015,	  just	  a	  year	  after	  the	  country	  implemented	  a	  comprehensive	  AML	  legislative	  overhaul,	  shows	  how	  much	  work	  the	  UAE	  needs	  to	  do.	  
Conclusion	  The	  UAE	  has	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go	  to	  implement	  a	  culture	  of	  transparency	  in	  its	  government	  operations,	  let	  alone	  its	  AML/CFT	  regimen.	  The	  latter	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  country’s	  lack	  of	  publicly	  available	  data,	  reticence	  to	  acknowledge	  or	  discuss	  AML/CFT	  issues,	  and	  an	  inherent	  reluctance	  even	  to	  report	  economic	  crimes	  but	  to	  address	  them	  “in	  house.”	  With	  that	  said,	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  transparency	  (and	  the	  related	  term	  accountability)	  to	  the	  business	  and	  governmental	  worlds,	  and	  to	  promote	  it	  via	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  ADAA	  and	  DESC	  and	  the	  media.	  The	  UAE	  currently	  shows	  signs	  of	  improvement	  on	  some	  relevant	  world	  rankings,	  but	  even	  after	  implementing	  comprehensive	  new	  AML	  legislation	  the	  country	  is	  still	  perceived	  as	  opaque	  and	  lax	  on	  many	  financial	  crime	  issues.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1187	  Tax	  Justice	  Network/Financial	  Secrecy	  Index,	  “Narrative	  Report	  on	  Dubai,”	  1.	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10.	  Conclusion	  	  	  This	  doctoral	  thesis	  has	  involved	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  methodology	  aimed	  at	  assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  AML/CFT	  efforts	  in	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  The	  preceding	  chapters	  have	  applied	  five	  “markers	  of	  success”	  (as	  determined	  by	  AML/CFT	  professionals)	  to	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  framework.	  While	  viewed	  separately,	  each	  shows	  progress	  over	  time;	  however,	  it	  must	  be	  admitted	  that	  the	  final	  result	  is	  inconclusive.	  This	  is	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  country’s	  lack	  of	  transparency	  (itself	  a	  marker	  under	  analysis	  herein).	  This	  factor	  -­‐-­‐	  an	  often-­‐criticized	  characteristic	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  AML/CFT	  regimen	  since	  at	  least	  its	  2008	  MENA/FATF	  evaluation	  -­‐-­‐	  overlaps	  in	  several	  key	  areas	  covered	  by	  other	  markers.	  While	  there	  is	  impressive	  outreach	  and	  private	  sector	  commitment,	  the	  apparent	  paucity	  of	  ML	  cases	  in	  the	  UAE,	  for	  example,	  seems	  to	  signal	  a	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  AML,	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  pursuing	  such	  cases,	  or	  both.	  With	  that	  said,	  the	  country	  as	  of	  this	  writing	  (2016)	  has	  undertaken	  new	  steps	  (detailed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter)	  which	  ostensibly	  address	  this	  element.	  	  When	  assessing	  effectiveness	  of	  AML/CFT	  legislation	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  gets	  actually	  translated	  into	  real	  life,	  how	  it	  manifests	  and	  impacts	  reality.	  Simply	  put,	  its	  applicability,	  rather	  than	  mere	  existence	  on	  paper,	  was	  of	  prime	  interest	  to	  this	  research.	  In	  this	  context,	  to	  distinguish	  between	  “normative	  compliance”	  and	  “functional	  compliance”	  as	  Unger	  labeled	  them,	  becomes	  crucial	  in	  the	  assessment.	  1188	  The	  FATF	  draws	  this	  distinction	  in	  separating	  “technical	  compliance”	  and	  “effectiveness	  assessment”	  as	  two	  components	  of	  its	  new	  methodological	  assessment.1189	  While	  at	  the	  “normative”	  or	  “technical”	  level,	  it	  is	  fairly	  easy	  to	  assess	  the	  country’s	  compliance	  with	  international	  AML/CFT	  standards,	  practice	  suggests	  mere	  existence	  of	  laws	  might	  not	  reflect	  commitment	  and	  produce	  the	  desired	  impact.	  	  	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  employed	  assessment	  criteria	  proposed	  by	  individuals	  working	  in	  the	  AML/CFT	  spheres,	  rather	  than	  borrowed	  from	  earlier	  developed	  methodologies,	  was	  applied	  to	  avoid	  ambiguities	  and	  disconnect	  between	  different	  players’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1188	  Unger,	  The	  Scale	  and	  Impact	  of	  Money	  Laundering,	  191.	  1189	  See	  FATF,	  “Methodology	  for	  Assessing	  Technical	  Compliance	  with	  the	  FATF	  Recommendations	  and	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  AML/CFT	  Systems.”	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understandings	  of	  and	  approach	  to	  the	  issue.	  Views	  of	  representatives	  of	  academia,	  regulatory	  authorities,	  compliance	  departments,	  law	  enforcement	  officials,	  intergovernmental	  institutions,	  software	  developers,	  and	  government	  officials	  –	  coming	  from	  different	  jurisdictions	  and	  with	  a	  range	  of	  working	  experience	  –	  formed	  “markers	  of	  success”	  for	  the	  AML	  regime.	  The	  principal	  ones	  they	  supplied	  have	  been	  described	  in	  earlier	  chapters	  as	  comprising	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework;	  AML	  Legislation	  
Enforcement;	  AML	  Legislation	  Awareness;	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation;	  and	  Transparency.	  The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  tried	  to	  apply	  these	  criteria	  against	  a	  variety	  of	  sources,	  including	  UAE	  laws	  of	  2002	  and	  2004	  and	  their	  amendments/replacements	  of	  2014;	  various	  regulatory	  documents	  and	  policies	  enacted	  by	  the	  UAE	  Central	  Bank	  and	  other	  UAE	  bodies;	  expert	  opinion	  when	  available;	  and	  other	  materials	  from	  both	  official	  bodies	  and	  the	  country’s	  media.	  	  
Observations/Evaluations	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  UAE	  reached,	  in	  2014,	  a	  new	  level	  of	  international	  acknowledgement	  for	  its	  AML/CFT	  framework	  via	  its	  desired	  change	  in	  MENA/FATF	  review	  status.	  The	  path	  toward	  attaining	  that	  goal	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  starting	  in	  1987,	  with	  the	  first	  efforts	  to	  criminalize	  money	  laundering,	  followed	  by	  linear	  though	  uneven	  progress.	  That	  was	  when	  the	  international	  community	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  money	  laundering	  is	  amorphous.	  It	  rapidly	  spills	  over	  national	  borders	  evolving	  into	  transnational	  phenomena.	  Money	  launderers	  were	  capitalizing	  on	  existence	  of	  weak	  links	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  chain,	  lack	  of	  or	  poor	  AML	  controls	  in	  various	  jurisdictions,	  and	  overall	  differences	  in	  perception	  of	  and	  attitude	  toward	  the	  issue.1190	  By	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  “internalization”	  of	  money	  laundering	  gained	  international	  attention,	  which	  encouraged	  the	  harmonization	  of	  AML	  laws.	  Within	  this	  period,	  domestic	  regulations	  gradually	  expanded	  into	  criminal	  statutes	  with	  extraterritorial	  reach	  and	  further	  into	  major	  international	  conventions	  with	  global	  standards.	  	  	  While	  AML	  efforts	  began	  largely	  in	  response	  to	  drug	  trafficking	  concerns,	  post-­‐9/11	  AML	  legislative	  efforts	  encompassed	  combating	  the	  financing	  of	  terrorism	  (CFT)	  and	  weapons	  proliferation.	  International	  cooperation	  in	  all	  areas	  and	  at	  every	  stage	  and	  level	  of	  AML	  domain	  has	  since	  become	  essential	  and	  was	  solidified	  in	  the	  FATF	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  Savona	  and	  De	  Feo,	  “International	  Money	  Laundering	  Trends	  and	  Prevention/Control	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standards.	  That	  framework	  was	  created,	  among	  several	  of	  its	  functions,	  to	  identify	  weak	  links	  in	  the	  chain	  open	  to	  criminal	  abuse.	  FATF	  labels	  these	  as	  “high	  risk	  and	  non-­‐cooperative	  jurisdictions,”	  the	  “blacklisting”	  or	  “greylisting”	  of	  which	  has	  been	  seen	  to	  be	  largely	  effective,	  though	  criticized	  by	  some.1191	  	  	  In	  today’s	  global	  financial	  interdependencies,	  the	  consequences	  of	  being	  identified	  as	  a	  weak	  link	  can	  be	  dire	  for	  a	  country’s	  economy	  and	  development.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  a	  country,	  such	  as	  the	  UAE,	  that	  counts	  on	  continuously	  increasing	  direct	  foreign	  investments	  to	  sustain	  its	  economic	  diversification	  program	  and	  ensure	  political	  security.	  The	  UAE’s	  creation	  of	  economic	  free	  zones	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  country’s	  commitment	  to	  economic	  liberalization	  has	  served	  this	  goal.	  There	  was	  a	  significant	  inflow	  of	  foreign	  capital	  into	  the	  UAE	  from	  2003	  to	  2007.	  While	  2007	  saw	  the	  largest	  sum,	  US	  $14.187	  billion,	  a	  sharp	  plunge	  followed	  in	  the	  following	  two	  consecutive	  years.1192	  This	  was	  crowned	  by	  the	  Nov.	  2009	  announcement	  that	  Dubai	  World	  and	  its	  main	  property	  subsidiary,	  Nakheel,	  were	  seeking	  repayment	  delay	  on	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  debt.	  At	  that	  time,	  one	  journalist	  observed:	  “restoring	  the	  trust	  of	  investors	  is	  now	  a	  critical	  challenge,”	  suggesting	  legal	  clarifications	  accompanied	  by	  transparency	  as	  a	  remedy.	  The	  latter	  was	  then	  identified	  as	  a	  major	  concern	  in	  the	  region.1193	  As	  this	  study	  demonstrates	  it	  remains	  an	  issue	  now.	  Investor	  confidence	  places	  a	  large	  role	  in	  capital	  allocation.	  When	  making	  decisions	  on	  country	  allocation,	  investors’	  perception	  of	  corruption	  becomes	  an	  investment	  obstacle.	  An	  underdeveloped	  legal	  system	  also	  discourages	  foreign	  financial	  institutions	  from	  entering	  the	  market	  due	  to	  higher	  perceived	  risks.1194	  We	  can	  speculate	  that	  the	  return	  of	  the	  UAE’s	  capital	  prosperity	  after	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  circa	  2008	  can	  not	  only	  be	  linked	  to	  high	  oil	  prices,	  but	  also	  by	  its	  initiatives	  to	  tighten	  legislative	  controls	  to	  promote	  economic	  stability	  and	  security.	  The	  UAE’s	  economic	  diversification	  policy	  largely	  depends	  on	  inflow	  of	  foreign	  capital,	  especially	  as	  oil	  prices	  decline.	  The	  new	  AML	  Law	  of	  2014	  came	  into	  force	  on	  30	  October	  of	  that	  year,	  at	  the	  time	  when	  oil	  prices	  had	  begun	  to	  free	  fall,	  plunging	  from	  US$115	  per	  barrel	  in	  June	  2014	  to	  under	  US$35	  at	  the	  end	  of	  February	  2016.1195	  This	  weakened	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1191	  FATF,	  “Annual	  Report”	  (2011-­‐2012),	  29-­‐31.	  1192	  World	  Bank,	  “Foreign	  Direct	  Investment,	  Net	  Inflows	  (BoP,	  Current	  US$),”	  United	  Arab	  Emirates.	  1193	  Philips,	  “Centers	  of	  Attention,”	  42.	  	  1194	  Groh	  and	  Liechtenstein,	  Determinants	  for	  Allocations	  to	  Central	  Eastern	  Europe	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity	  Limited	  Partnerships”;	  Johan	  and	  Najar,	  “The	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  Corruption,	  Culture,	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  Law	  in	  Investment	  Fund	  Manager	  Fees”;	  and	  Hain,	  Johan,	  and	  Wang,	  “Determinants	  of	  Cross-­‐Border	  Venture	  Capital	  Investments	  in	  Emerging	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  Economies:	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  Effects	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  1195	  World	  Economic	  Forum,	  “What’s	  Behind	  the	  Drop	  in	  Oil	  Prices?”	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country’s	  growth	  outlook	  and	  increased	  uncertainties.1196	  As	  a	  countermeasure,	  the	  Central	  Bank	  announced	  “the	  UAE	  regulatory	  framework	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  progressively	  enhanced	  in	  line	  with	  international	  standards	  and	  best	  practice,”	  proposing	  a	  plan	  for	  new	  regulatory	  initiatives	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  liquidity,	  digital	  payments,	  risk	  management,	  non-­‐bank	  financial	  institutions,	  financial	  reporting,	  internal	  controls,	  compliance	  and	  internal	  audit.1197	  That	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  Dubai	  legislative	  initiative,	  Law	  No.	  (4)	  of	  2016	  –	  the	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre	  (DESC)	  Law	  –	  which	  aimed	  “to	  provide	  investors	  with	  an	  attractive	  economic	  environment.”1198	  	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  UAE’s	  best	  interest	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	  a	  stable	  and	  secure	  country	  with	  low-­‐crime,	  low-­‐corruption,	  and	  a	  robust	  AML/CFT	  legal	  framework.	  Potential	  criticism	  of	  being	  a	  weak	  link,	  resulting	  in	  punishments	  of	  “blacklisting”	  or	  “greylisting,”	  would	  have	  significant	  consequences	  for	  the	  UAE”s	  economic	  development	  and	  consequently	  political	  stability.	  The	  UAE	  cannot	  afford	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  weak	  state,	  because	  another	  big	  concern	  for	  the	  country	  is	  preventing	  any	  possibility	  of	  terror	  attacks	  on	  its	  own	  soil,	  which	  with	  no	  doubt	  would	  have	  long-­‐term	  direct	  and	  indirect	  consequences.	  	  
Markers	  1	  and	  2:	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  and	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement	  Driven	  by	  external	  pressure	  coupled	  with	  internal	  self-­‐interest,	  the	  UAE’s	  efforts	  to	  establish	  a	  robust	  AML/CFT	  regime	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  country’s	  (albeit	  uneven)	  progress	  in	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  and	  AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement,	  the	  first	  two	  “markers	  of	  success,”	  from	  1987	  to	  2014.	  The	  country’s	  objective	  to	  be	  internationally	  recognized	  for	  its	  efforts	  was	  achieved	  in	  an	  acknowledgment	  to	  it	  in	  the	  change	  in	  MENA/FATF	  review	  status	  in	  late	  2014.	  By	  obtaining	  MENA/FATF	  approval,	  the	  UAE	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  have	  hit	  the	  pre-­‐defined	  Robust	  Regulatory	  Framework	  and	  
AML	  Legislation	  Enforcement.	  However,	  measuring	  the	  latter	  especially	  remains	  problematic	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  hard	  statistical	  data	  for	  much	  this	  period,	  something	  the	  MENA/FATF	  team	  commented	  on	  in	  2014,	  essentially	  repeating	  a	  concern	  raised	  in	  2008.	  To	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  money	  laundering	  reporting	  in	  respect	  to	  its	  ultimate	  impact	  on	  reduction	  of	  predicate	  and	  ML	  crimes	  is	  inconclusive,	  because	  there	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1196	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “Financial	  Stability	  Report	  2015.”	  1197	  UAE	  Central	  Bank,	  “Financial	  Stability	  Report	  2015,”	  49.	  1198	  Lassoued	  and	  Eissa,	  “An	  Insight	  into	  the	  Newly-­‐Formed	  Dubai	  Economic	  Security	  Centre.”	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is	  little	  data	  available	  on	  how	  many	  ML	  investigations,	  prosecutions	  and	  convictions	  have	  been	  made	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reports	  filed	  by	  financial	  institutions.	  	  	  During	  that	  period	  of	  legislative/regulatory	  development,	  the	  UAE	  gradually	  created	  a	  strong	  outreach	  program	  via	  official	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  and	  Suspicious	  Cases	  Unit	  (AMLSCU),	  making	  significant	  efforts	  to	  educate	  its	  financial	  sector	  about	  AML	  (and	  later	  CFT)	  laws.	  These	  efforts	  ran	  parallel	  with	  the	  UAE’s	  efforts	  to	  comply	  with	  fluid	  FATF	  Recommendations.	  Initially,	  the	  AMLSCU	  was	  the	  principal	  engine	  to	  promote	  legislative	  and	  regulatory	  awareness	  and	  outreach	  in	  the	  UAE	  by	  conducting	  courses	  and	  seminars	  for	  the	  financial	  industry.	  But	  outside	  evaluators	  viewed	  these	  trainings	  as	  insufficient	  in	  depth	  for	  the	  compliance	  officers.	  MENA/FATF	  criticism	  of	  low	  STRs	  prompted	  UAE	  officials	  to	  new	  outreach	  efforts	  focusing	  on	  recognizing	  suspicious	  fiscal	  activities	  and	  filing	  of	  reports.	  The	  Central	  Bank	  often	  conducted	  these	  trainings	  jointly	  with	  the	  Dubai	  Financial	  Service	  Authority,	  and	  the	  Emirates	  Security	  and	  Commodities	  Authority.	  In	  addition	  to	  trainings,	  the	  AMLSCU	  provided	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  technical	  assistance	  to	  representatives	  from	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  entities.	  	  
Markers	  3	  and	  4:	  AML	  Legislative	  Awareness/Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  By	  2015	  at	  least,	  an	  intensive	  outreach	  program,	  seemingly	  fully	  in	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  with	  the	  private	  sector,	  was	  in	  place.	  The	  UAE	  emphasis	  on	  building	  AML	  
Legislative	  Awareness	  across	  various	  economic	  sectors	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  conferences,	  forums,	  and	  training	  courses	  dedicated	  to	  this	  topic	  that	  have	  been	  hosted	  in	  the	  country.	  Professional	  organizations	  such	  as	  ACAMS,	  Thompson	  Reuters,	  the	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance	  (among	  others)	  regularly	  host	  summits	  and	  other	  outreach-­‐type	  events	  in	  the	  UAE;	  some	  (such	  as	  ACAMS)	  also	  offered	  professional	  certification.	  	  These	  educational	  and	  training	  platforms	  continue	  to	  draw	  interest	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  the	  UAE.	  It	  is	  noticeable	  in	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  attendees	  and	  of	  educational	  and	  training	  opportunities	  being	  offered	  in	  the	  country.	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  head	  of	  ACAMS	  MENA	  noticed,	  the	  attendees	  are	  now	  more	  diversified	  across	  different	  industries,	  beyond	  the	  financial	  sector	  only.	  It	  does	  not	  necessarily	  prove	  Private	  Sector	  
Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  regarding	  AML/CFT	  efforts.	  Rather	  it	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  increasing	  attention	  companies	  give	  given	  to	  stay	  compliant	  with	  the	  tighter	  AML/CFT	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legislative	  and	  regulatory	  framework,	  which	  require	  regulated	  businesses	  to	  include	  a	  training	  component	  into	  their	  compliance	  functions	  and	  across	  other	  departments.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  while	  the	  study	  was	  assessing	  Private	  Sector	  
Commitment	  and	  Cooperation	  as	  labeled	  in	  the	  process	  of	  the	  interviews,	  under	  
commitment	  it	  presumed	  obligation	  and	  duty	  rather	  than	  dedication	  to	  the	  AML/CFT	  legislative	  efforts.	  Though	  some	  may	  argue	  that	  the	  dedication	  rather	  than	  compliance	  with	  requirements	  actually	  contributes	  to	  the	  legislative	  effectives.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  its	  nature,	  the	  concept	  of	  dedication	  was	  not	  assessed	  in	  this	  research.	  The	  rise	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  STR	  filings	  from	  2004	  to	  2013	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  broadly	  indicating	  positive	  change	  in	  Private	  Sector	  Commitment	  and	  Cooperation.	  	  	  
Marker	  5:	  Transparency	  While	  similar	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  encourage	  a	  culture	  of	  transparency	  (and	  the	  related	  concept	  of	  accountability),	  this	  has	  been	  harder	  to	  find	  positive	  results	  in.	  The	  reluctance	  of	  government	  bodies	  to	  share	  data	  –	  not	  just	  with	  the	  public,	  but	  also	  with	  FATF	  evaluators	  –	  does	  not	  point	  to	  a	  significant	  cultural	  shift	  over	  this	  time.	  Recent	  academic	  studies	  have	  found,	  akin	  to	  this	  one,	  a	  reluctance	  to	  discuss	  AML/CFT	  issues,	  combined	  with	  the	  perhaps	  erroneous	  paradigm	  that	  the	  low	  numbers	  of	  reported	  AML/CFT	  incidents	  and	  prosecution	  cases	  indicates	  excellent	  law	  enforcement.	  The	  UAE	  remains	  (as	  of	  2015	  at	  least)	  perceived	  as	  a	  largely	  non-­‐transparent	  jurisdiction	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  financial	  crimes,	  including	  AML/CFT.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  the	  country’s	  lack	  of	  transparency	  was	  also	  an	  impediment	  for	  reaching	  a	  definitive	  conclusion	  in	  assessment	  of	  other	  markers	  of	  success.	  It	  especially	  played	  a	  negative	  role	  in	  evaluating	  AML	  Legislative	  Enforcement.	  Despite	  an	  image	  of	  prevailing	  transparency,	  access	  to	  “public”	  information	  is	  blocked	  at	  various	  stages	  and	  levels.	  There	  is	  always	  someone	  who	  has	  to	  grant	  permission	  to	  release	  the	  information.	  The	  reluctance	  of	  public	  officials	  (and	  private	  sector	  representatives)	  to	  share	  data	  and	  provide	  insight	  was	  encountered	  regularly	  during	  this	  research.	  Generally,	  individuals	  in	  the	  UAE	  are	  afraid	  to	  disclose	  information.	  This	  is	  due	  not	  only	  to	  the	  essentially	  secretive	  nature	  of	  the	  society,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  protection	  for	  those	  providing	  sensitive	  information,	  who	  may	  face	  prosecution	  for	  releasing	  such	  data	  to	  the	  public.	  Only	  recently,	  Dubai	  granted	  legal	  protection	  to	  whistleblowers	  under	  its	  DESC	  Law	  of	  2016.	  But	  it	  seems	  to	  have	  limited	  coverage.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  this	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protection	  extends	  to	  UAE	  jurisdictions	  beyond	  Dubai.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  it	  will	  actually	  be	  applied.	  	  Unavailability	  of	  access	  to	  public	  information	  is	  often	  concealed	  and	  obscured.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  example	  with	  court	  cases,	  where	  unattainability	  of	  case	  numbers	  to	  conduct	  the	  search,	  prevents	  the	  public,	  including	  this	  researcher,	  from	  viewing	  ‘publicly’	  available	  information	  on	  the	  prosecutor’s	  website.	  Albeit,	  by	  the	  looks	  of	  it,	  the	  access	  is	  provided	  via	  the	  case	  search	  option	  on	  the	  public	  prosecutors	  website.	  The	  problem	  is	  the	  search	  can	  be	  conducted	  only	  by	  entering	  the	  case	  number,	  date	  and	  location.1199	  	  Lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  UAE,	  according	  to	  Allen,	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  “traditional	  secrecy”	  that	  “provides	  perfect	  cover,”	  noting	  that	  many	  “are	  frustrated	  by	  government	  secrecy	  over	  basic	  economic	  data	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  audited	  figures	  for	  all	  but	  one	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise.”1200	  Silos	  in	  information,	  whether	  within	  different	  Emirates	  or	  among	  various	  departments	  and	  sectors	  of	  each	  emirate,	  without	  doubt	  impede	  the	  country’s	  AML/CFT	  efforts.	  With	  that	  said,	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  transparency	  (and	  the	  related	  term	  accountability)	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  by	  promoting	  it	  via	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  ADAA,	  and	  a	  more	  recent,	  the	  DESC.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  both	  of	  these	  agencies	  have	  jurisdiction	  only	  over	  their	  emirates:	  the	  ADAA	  is	  responsible	  to	  promoting	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  across	  government	  and	  private	  entities	  in	  Abu	  Dhabi,	  while	  the	  DESC	  has	  jurisdiction	  over	  government	  agencies	  and	  businesses	  in	  Dubai.	  	  	  Fifteen	  years	  into	  its	  much-­‐publicized	  AML/CFT	  campaign,	  and	  even	  after	  implementing	  comprehensive	  new	  legislation	  in	  that	  field,	  the	  UAE	  is	  still	  (understandably)	  perceived	  as	  opaque	  and	  lax	  on	  many	  financial	  crime	  issues.	  The	  country’s	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  direct	  investments	  requires	  it	  to	  take	  a	  tougher	  measure	  to	  curtail	  financial	  crime,	  which	  threatens	  not	  only	  its	  economic	  and	  political	  stability,	  but	  also	  national	  security,	  given	  the	  country’s	  geo-­‐political	  state.	  The	  UAE	  has	  acted	  to	  address	  ML	  issues	  largely	  in	  response	  to	  international	  pressure,	  often	  denying	  or	  downsizing	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	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UAE.	  As	  the	  country	  gets	  further	  integrated	  financially	  into	  the	  global	  economy,	  safeguarding	  its	  economy	  from	  criminal	  abuse	  has	  to	  become	  a	  priority	  if	  it	  is	  to	  sustain	  its	  role	  as	  a	  major	  economic	  player.	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